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**{10 (a-c)}**
**SECRET**
**PRIME MINISTER**
cc: PS/Foreign Secretary
PS/Chancellor of the Exchequer
**JOINT DECLARATION INITIATIVE: TEXT**
You have seen the NIO letter commenting on the outstanding points after the 10 December round of negotiations with the Irish.
The NIO have reversed the position which they and the Cabinet Secretary took fiercely over the telephone concerning the "Forum for Peace and Reconciliation". They now grudgingly accept that there should be reference in the text, hedged with qualifications. It is largely our own fault that the Irish were able to counter attack over the Convention, as we let them know that Molyneaux was not strongly opposed to it.
If there is to be a "Forum" or Convention, I believe that we would be right to mention it in the text, with its lack of powers and status indicated as clearly as possible. To have the body surface from the Irish side within hours of the Joint eclaration would create enormous suspicion among Unionists that we had been party to a hidden Irish agenda – another act of "betrayal". I have consulted Archbishop Eames privately on the telephone, and he shares this view. We also know that James Molyneaux accepts the point.
The NIO's other main quibble is over the phrase "as of right". Here again, we have not helped ourselves. The phrase has been in the text for weeks, without objection from us. We have only picked it up at the eleventh hour.
With your agreement, I propose to negotiate in three parts:
1\. \_Clear the ground of minor points\_\. I shall deal first\, as instructed\, with points a\. b\. d\. e\. g\. h\. j\. k\.
2\. \_New Final Paragraph\.\_ I shall then take paragraph 11\, which is a new Irish proposal this week\, plus one contested British sentence\. I shall accept most of the Irish language \(this involves few concessions – none of real substance\) and negotiate hard for the best obtainable reference to the talks process\. NIO's instructions do not help: we had "intensify" in the relevant paragraph of the 29 October Brussels statement\, but they do not want to repeat it\.
**If the Irish do not concede an acceptable reference to the talks process, I shall reserve the point for you and the Taoiseach.**
3\. \_Trade off of major points\_\.
I shall negotiate on the basis that the old paragraphs 10 and 11 (the Irish Convention paragraphs in JD14) are already off the table and cannot be reintroduced. **This remains a potential break point for us.**
That leaves \_four outstanding points\_ which can reasonably be defined as the major obstacles.
I shall offer to trade:
– "within three months" (paragraph 10)
– inclusion of the "Forum for Peace and Reconciliation" (end of paragraph 10), with acceptable qualifications;
– the Irish re-draft of the first sentence of paragraph 4 (which includes an aextra reference to a "united Ireland)
**against:**
– extensive revision of the "as of right" sentence (point (f) – fifth sentence of paragraph 4);
I may well not be able to complete this trade off. The Irish will fight hard to retain "as of right". In that case, I shall reserve the outstanding **points to you and the Taoiseach.**
\_Conclusion\_
This should leave us with no more than a handful of differences, if any, for you and the Taoiseach to discuss either here or by telephone. I doubt if they will include any genuine break points on either side, pretence apart.
{Roderic Lyne}
**ROD LYNE**
\_10 December 1993\_
\_text.jdi\_
{10 (a-c)} SECRET
PRIME MINISTER
cc: PS/Foreign Secretary PS/Chancellor of the Exchequer
JOINT DECLARATION INITIATIVE: TEXT
You have seen the NIO letter commenting on the outstanding points after the 10 December round of negotiations with the Irish.
The NIO have reversed the position which they and the Cabinet Secretary took fiercely over the telephone concerning the "Forum for Peace and Reconciliation". They now grudgingly accept that there should be reference in the text, hedged with qualifications. It is largely our own fault that the Irish were able to counter attack over the Convention, as we let them know that Molyneaux was not strongly opposed to it.
If there is to be a "Forum" or Convention, I believe that we would be right to mention it in the text, with its lack of powers and status indicated as clearly as possible. To have the body surface from the Irish side within hours of the Joint eclaration would create enormous suspicion among Unionists that we had been party to a hidden Irish agenda – another act of "betrayal". I have consulted Archbishop Eames privately on the telephone, and he shares this view. We also know that James Molyneaux accepts the point.
The NIO's other main quibble is over the phrase "as of right". Here again, we have not helped ourselves. The phrase has been in the text for weeks, without objection from us. We have only picked it up at the eleventh hour.
With your agreement, I propose to negotiate in three parts:
1. _Clear the ground of minor points_. I shall deal first\, as instructed\, with points a. b. d. e. g. h. j. k.
2. _New Final Paragraph._ I shall then take paragraph 11\, which is a new Irish proposal this week\, plus one contested British sentence. I shall accept most of the Irish language (this involves few concessions – none of real substance) and negotiate hard for the best obtainable reference to the talks process. NIO's instructions do not help: we had "intensify" in the relevant paragraph of the 29 October Brussels statement\, but they do not want to repeat it. If the Irish do not concede an acceptable reference to the talks process, I shall reserve the point for you and the Taoiseach.
3. _Trade off of major points_. I shall negotiate on the basis that the old paragraphs 10 and 11 (the Irish Convention paragraphs in JD14) are already off the table and cannot be reintroduced. This remains a potential break point for us.
That leaves _four outstanding points_ which can reasonably be defined as the major obstacles.
I shall offer to trade: – "within three months" (paragraph 10)
– inclusion of the "Forum for Peace and Reconciliation" (end of paragraph 10), with acceptable qualifications;
– the Irish re-draft of the first sentence of paragraph 4 (which includes an aextra reference to a "united Ireland)
against:
– extensive revision of the "as of right" sentence (point (f) – fifth sentence of paragraph 4);
I may well not be able to complete this trade off. The Irish will fight hard to retain "as of right". In that case, I shall reserve the outstanding points to you and the Taoiseach.
_Conclusion_
This should leave us with no more than a handful of differences, if any, for you and the Taoiseach to discuss either here or by telephone. I doubt if they will include any genuine break points on either side, pretence apart.
{Roderic Lyne}
ROD LYNE _10 December 1993_
_text.jdi_
27 1987 - 1990
38 1993
55 1990 - 1991
64 1993 - 1997
26 1993
57 1993
59 1993
51 1993
18 1993
24 1993 - 1994
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8 1989 - 1990
76 1993 - 1994
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60 1993
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32 1993
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38 1991
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64 1991
42
9
31 1996 - 1996
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24 1996 - 1996
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14 1996 - 1997
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67 1996 - 1996
16 1996 - 1996
1993-12-10
NIO conceding that the text should mention the Irish Convention in some way, though begrudgingly. Lyne then sets out the negotiating strategy at the upcoming Brussels summit, most of which involves trade-offs. He remains confident, however, that there remains only a handful of issues.
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Unless otherwise specified, this material falls under Crown Copyright and contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
NoneThe National Archives of the UK (TNA), digitzed by the Quill Project at https://quillproject.net/resource_collections/351/.