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These documents were scanned, collated and catalogued by Ruth Murray, Annabel Harris, Isha Pareek, Eleanor Williams, Antoine Yenk, Harriet Carter, Oliver Nicholls, Kieran Wetherwick, and Cerys Griffiths.
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FROM: PUS
23 JANUARY 1991
Copy no 5 of [5]
cc. Mr Pilling [2]
Mr Deverell - B [3]
Mr McNeill [4]
PS/SECRETARY OF STATE [1]
POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND THE PROVISIONALS
Mr John Hume telephoned me yesterday evening from Strasbourg, and spoke with a sense of urgency and perhaps too much anxiety. His purpose was to tell us of a further conversation he had had, and to convey a request to which he seeks an answer tomorrow afternoon (Thursday 24 January), before he begins his travels (to California on Sunday, from which he may not return for 10 days or so).
2. He has had a further conversation with, I assume, Gerry Adams (he was speaking in guarded language on an open line). It was hoped HMG had noticed how quiet PIRA had been since the ceasefire ended (only relative, as the DCI observed), and he was told great embarrassment was felt about the recent firebombings (possibly supporting the speculation, for which there is other evidence that they were mounted from Dublin and not by Northern Command).
3. It appears Mr Hume had given his interlocutor some expectation (without, as he acknowledged, any promise of it from us) that there might be some signal eg in the course of a speech, from HMG. He had also hoped that the Dublin Government would by now have produced a first sketch of a way forward embracing the political development initiative and the pursuit of a peace process; but this was taking time, and anyway Dublin would not move before first consulting and concerting a line with HMG. He was in consequence coming under some pressure from his interlocutor - who had, he implied, nothing else to think about. (This was where I sensed some anxiety in his tone, though it might be no more than a wish to clear his yard arm of this particular set of signals before going away.)
5. He also reported that, in a separate conversation with a journalist he believed had good connections with the Provisionals, he was told that the journalist had had confirmation from both the 'politicians' and the 'hard men' in PIRA that they were all considering actively a ceasefire option - the risk at this stage of a split at the PAC level was not showing itself.
6. Mr Hume's request was this. Could the Secretary of State find some means, eg in a speech, to say words (not necessarily new words) which could be read by the Provisionals as a signal that a possibility of process leading to peace was not opposed by HMG - he said there were paranoid fears in the minds of some of them that the political development process had in fact failed, but had been artificially resuscitated by HMG (? and Dublin) as a means of blocking progress to a ceasefire (useful confirmation of the pressure which progress on political development has applied to the Provisionals). He greatly hopes something can be arranged, and that he can be told of it on Thursday afternoon so that he has something to say to his interlocutors.
7. We are considering the arguments, and possible options, urgently and I will advise further as soon as possible. If a few minutes discussion were possible tomorrow before or after Cabinet, that might be helpful.
J A CHILCOT
23 JANUARY 1991
JEN/L/1/40/21363
FROM: PUS 23 JANUARY 1991
Copy no 5 of [5] cc. Mr Pilling [2] Mr Deverell - B [3] Mr McNeill [4]
PS/SECRETARY OF STATE [1]
POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND THE PROVISIONALS
Mr John Hume telephoned me yesterday evening from Strasbourg, and spoke with a sense of urgency and perhaps too much anxiety. His purpose was to tell us of a further conversation he had had, and to convey a request to which he seeks an answer tomorrow afternoon (Thursday 24 January), before he begins his travels (to California on Sunday, from which he may not return for 10 days or so).
He has had a further conversation with, I assume, Gerry Adams (he was speaking in guarded language on an open line). It was hoped HMG had noticed how quiet PIRA had been since the ceasefire ended (only relative, as the DCI observed), and he was told great embarrassment was felt about the recent firebombings (possibly supporting the speculation, for which there is other evidence that they were mounted from Dublin and not by Northern Command).
It appears Mr Hume had given his interlocutor some expectation (without, as he acknowledged, any promise of it from us) that there might be some signal eg in the course of a speech, from HMG. He had also hoped that the Dublin Government would by now have produced a first sketch of a way forward embracing the political development initiative and the pursuit of a peace process; but this was taking time, and anyway Dublin would not move before first consulting and concerting a line with HMG. He was in consequence coming under some pressure from his interlocutor - who had, he implied, nothing else to think about. (This was where I sensed some anxiety in his tone, though it might be no more than a wish to clear his yard arm of this particular set of signals before going away.)
He also reported that, in a separate conversation with a journalist he believed had good connections with the Provisionals, he was told that the journalist had had confirmation from both the 'politicians' and the 'hard men' in PIRA that they were all considering actively a ceasefire option - the risk at this stage of a split at the PAC level was not showing itself.
Mr Hume's request was this. Could the Secretary of State find some means, eg in a speech, to say words (not necessarily new words) which could be read by the Provisionals as a signal that a possibility of process leading to peace was not opposed by HMG - he said there were paranoid fears in the minds of some of them that the political development process had in fact failed, but had been artificially resuscitated by HMG (? and Dublin) as a means of blocking progress to a ceasefire (useful confirmation of the pressure which progress on political development has applied to the Provisionals). He greatly hopes something can be arranged, and that he can be told of it on Thursday afternoon so that he has something to say to his interlocutors.
We are considering the arguments, and possible options, urgently and I will advise further as soon as possible. If a few minutes discussion were possible tomorrow before or after Cabinet, that might be helpful.
J A CHILCOT
23 JANUARY 1991
JEN/L/1/40/21363
27 1987 - 1990
38 1993
55 1990 - 1991
64 1993 - 1997
26 1993
57 1993
59 1993
51 1993
18 1993
24 1993 - 1994
41 1993 - 1994
32 1993 - 1994
72 1993 - 1994
8 1989 - 1990
76 1993 - 1994
1 1994
60 1993
65 1993
37 1993
54 1993
32 1993
77 1993
59 1993
49 1993
61 1991 - 1992
38 1991
48 1992 - 1993
134 1993 - ?-??
59 1993 - 1993
84 1993
64 1991
42
9
31 1996 - 1996
61 196 - 1996
49 1996 - 1996
20 1996 - 1997
32 1996 - 1996
14 1996 - 1996
74 1996 - None
4 1996 - 1996
8 1996 - 1996
30 1996 - 1996
7 1996 - 1996
24 1996 - 1996
9 1996 - 1996
59 1996 - 1996
60 1996 - 1996
14 1996 - 1997
41 1996 - 1996
45 1996 - 1996
67 1996 - 1996
16 1996 - 1996
1991-01-23
This document provides an account of the telephone conversation that took place on 22 January 1991 between John Hume and John Chilcot. It records that Hume had a conversation with an unidentified PIRA representative, whom Chilcot assumed was Gerry Adams. It also documents Hume's request that the British Government issue a statement that PIRA could interpret as a signal indicating non-opposition to the peace process.
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Unless otherwise specified, this material falls under Crown Copyright and contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The National Archives of the UK (TNA), digitzed by the Quill Project at https://quillproject.net/resource_collections/351/.