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These documents were scanned, collated and catalogued by Ruth Murray, Annabel Harris, Isha Pareek, Eleanor Williams, Antoine Yenk, Harriet Carter, Oliver Nicholls, Kieran Wetherwick, and Cerys Griffiths.
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DRAFT ELEMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE STATEMENT ABOUT HMG TALKING TO THE PROVISIONALS WITHOUT A PERMANENT RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE
If unsuccessful
- HMG is committed to eradicating terrorism; the most effective way of doing this is to remove it at source by encouraging Sinn Fein to seek persuade PIRA of the error of their strategy of violence. No responsible Government could wantonly miss any opportunity of bringing violence to an end. [Indeed, it is the duty of Government to take an imaginative step where necessary.]
- I have always stressed the importance of dialogue as a part of the democratic tradition; I have also said that HMG's role is to help, enable and encourage the process of reconciliation. It seemed for a time that there was a possibility of bringing the violence to an end, and that was something which we could simply not pass by.
- [No concessions were offered to the Provisionals.] [No concessions were offered to Sinn Fein and there was of course no contact at all with PIRA.] The question of appeasement or of attempting to buy them off therefore does not arise. That much should be apparent from the fact that no substantive discussions took place.
- But I still believe that the overwhelming majority in the island of Ireland realise that there is no future for terrorism. I very much regret that overall [the Provisionals] [Sinn Fein] seem at present unable to [understand] [accept] this. Until they do, [their] [PIRA's] criminal acts (in common with those perpetrated by other sections of the community) will be met with a firm and resolute response.
If successful
- We have gained a major prize. After 20 years the IRA have called off their campaign of violence which was becoming increasingly futile. This is a significant step in returning Northern Ireland to normality.
- I have always stressed the importance of dialogue as part of the democratic tradition; I have also said that HMG's role is to help, enable and encourage the process of reconciliation. There were signs that the republican movement was re-examining its espousal of the armed struggle and it was HMG's duty to grasp the opportunity to bring violence to an end.
- HMG has made no concessions of substance [and there has been no direct contact with PIRA]. In particular the guarantee remains that Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom for so long as a majority of its population wish it.
- PIRA have finally realised that their campaign of violence was getting nowhere, it is now time for all of us to set about healing the divisions in our society which that campaign has exacerbated.
RN/6328
DRAFT ELEMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE STATEMENT ABOUT HMG TALKING TO THE PROVISIONALS WITHOUT A PERMANENT RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE
If unsuccessful
HMG is committed to eradicating terrorism; the most effective way of doing this is to remove it at source by encouraging Sinn Fein to seek persuade PIRA of the error of their strategy of violence. No responsible Government could wantonly miss any opportunity of bringing violence to an end. [Indeed, it is the duty of Government to take an imaginative step where necessary.]
I have always stressed the importance of dialogue as a part of the democratic tradition; I have also said that HMG's role is to help, enable and encourage the process of reconciliation. It seemed for a time that there was a possibility of bringing the violence to an end, and that was something which we could simply not pass by.
[No concessions were offered to the Provisionals.] [No concessions were offered to Sinn Fein and there was of course no contact at all with PIRA.] The question of appeasement or of attempting to buy them off therefore does not arise. That much should be apparent from the fact that no substantive discussions took place.
But I still believe that the overwhelming majority in the island of Ireland realise that there is no future for terrorism. I very much regret that overall [the Provisionals] [Sinn Fein] seem at present unable to [understand] [accept] this. Until they do, [their] [PIRA's] criminal acts (in common with those perpetrated by other sections of the community) will be met with a firm and resolute response.
If successful
We have gained a major prize. After 20 years the IRA have called off their campaign of violence which was becoming increasingly futile. This is a significant step in returning Northern Ireland to normality.
I have always stressed the importance of dialogue as part of the democratic tradition; I have also said that HMG's role is to help, enable and encourage the process of reconciliation. There were signs that the republican movement was re-examining its espousal of the armed struggle and it was HMG's duty to grasp the opportunity to bring violence to an end.
HMG has made no concessions of substance [and there has been no direct contact with PIRA]. In particular the guarantee remains that Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom for so long as a majority of its population wish it.
PIRA have finally realised that their campaign of violence was getting nowhere, it is now time for all of us to set about healing the divisions in our society which that campaign has exacerbated.
RN/6328
27 1987 - 1990
38 1993
55 1990 - 1991
64 1993 - 1997
26 1993
57 1993
59 1993
51 1993
18 1993
24 1993 - 1994
41 1993 - 1994
32 1993 - 1994
72 1993 - 1994
8 1989 - 1990
76 1993 - 1994
1 1994
60 1993
65 1993
37 1993
54 1993
32 1993
77 1993
59 1993
49 1993
61 1991 - 1992
38 1991
48 1992 - 1993
134 1993 - ?-??
59 1993 - 1993
84 1993
64 1991
42
9
31 1996 - 1996
61 196 - 1996
49 1996 - 1996
20 1996 - 1997
32 1996 - 1996
14 1996 - 1996
74 1996 - None
4 1996 - 1996
8 1996 - 1996
30 1996 - 1996
7 1996 - 1996
24 1996 - 1996
9 1996 - 1996
59 1996 - 1996
60 1996 - 1996
14 1996 - 1997
41 1996 - 1996
45 1996 - 1996
67 1996 - 1996
16 1996 - 1996
1991-01-15
This document provides two sets of defensive line pointers for the British Government to use in the situation where its contact with PIRA in the absence of PIRA's renunciation of violence becomes public knowledge. The two sets of defensive lines are based on two scenarios: one where talks proved to be unsuccessful, and another where they were successful.
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Unless otherwise specified, this material falls under Crown Copyright and contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The National Archives of the UK (TNA), digitzed by the Quill Project at https://quillproject.net/resource_collections/351/.