SPEAKING NOTE
- Intelligence reports consistently confirm that the Provisionals are serious about wanting to end violence, but will not risk doing so without a pretext. A wholly unambiguous, balanced Declaration would not be a sufficient, justifying pretext. But the present draft is much improved.
- The issues we must address today are set out fully in my minute and paper of 12 October. The present Irish text won’t quite do. Imperative that we have an explicit reference to Northern Ireland’ statutory constitutional guarantee in the text. But, provided we can secure Irish agreement to our amendments I recommend that we process with the Initiative.
- I recommend early briefing of Jim Molyneaux on Privy Council terms, preferably by the Prime Minister. Martin Smyth’s comments earlier this week were helpful and we should give the UUP encouragement to continue a constructive approach to the JDI. Early briefing of Jim Molyneaux should help, without breaching confidentially.
- Irish officials have been given notice through the Butler/Nally Group that we would want to brief Jim Molyneaux on Privy Council terms. They thought this could be helpful, provided the initiative were not “put in commission” to him. We would not be doing so: we would be seeking to secure his support, but only on the basis that an explicit reference to the constitutional guarantee were included.
- The script for the briefing will need careful preparation. The briefing needs to carry conviction about the seriousness of the prospect that PIRA violence would end. This needs to be based on more than just John Hume's judgement. But we also need to keep in mind the position of the Irish Government. I envisage that Jim Molyneaux would be shown the text and the proposed amendment, and perhaps also the intelligence assessment. It would be wrong to disclose without permission the detail of the Irish Government's indirect negotiations with PIRA. It might suffice on this to say that we understand that the Irish Government would, at the appropriate stage, be ready to give their assurance that a Declaration in these terms would bring about an end to PIRA violence.
- When we go back to the Irish Government we should continue to try to get from them, as early as possible, a clear understanding of when the violence would stop. Our objective should be to have that happen before the Declaration is made if at all possible (the Irish undertook in the Butler/Nally Group to consider this), but it should not be delayed beyond it.
- Assuming all the lights are green we should also need to secure final understanding with the Irish on a range of detailed questions such as the terms of reference of the proposed Convention, the modalities of making the Declaration, and the drawing up of joint lines to take on the questions which will arise once this matter is public. My officials have begun work contingently on these matters.
- I would like to be able to brief the Chief Constable and the GOC as soon as possible in strict confidence - ideally as soon as today's meeting has taken place.
- For consideration whether next step is to brief Jim Molyneaux, or whether the issues should be considered first by a slightly wider circle of Ministers. We need to move very quickly.
Defensive
Deploy HMG's alternative paragraph 4?
I fear that both the Provisionals and the Irish would see this as a wrecking amendment – too extensive a change at this stage.
Must insist that PIRA stacks arms?
The Provisional leadership will want to enforce the ceasefire on their own members and to have weapons in store against Loyalists and splinter groups. They have deep hides: so any surrender of weapons could not be fully monitored and enforced. Our insistence would draw us into indirect negotiations and be seen as a wrecking tactic.
Who will participate in the proposed Convention?
HMG not invited. Unionists invited but not likely to attend. Realistically, likely to be a rerun of the 1984 Forum. But could lead into wider political Talks if the cessation holds.
