Do you want to go straight to a particular resource? Use the Jump Tool and follow 2 steps:
This can usually be found in the top hero section of overview, delegations visualize, session visualize, event visualize, commentary collection, commentary item, resource collection, and resource item pages.
Enter the shortcut code for the page that you wish to search for.
These documents were scanned, collated and catalogued by Ruth Murray, Annabel Harris, Isha Pareek, Eleanor Williams, Antoine Yenk, Harriet Carter, Oliver Nicholls, Kieran Wetherwick, and Cerys Griffiths.
Collection associations (1)
Already have an account? Login here
Don't have an account? Register here
Forgot your password? Click here to reset it
None
Copyright
None
Physical Copy Information
None
Digital Copy Information
None
From: D E S Blatherwick Date: 10 November 1993
Mr Archer, RID
cc. Sir T Daunt Mr Q Thomas, NIO
I had lunch today with Martin Mansergh. He launched into the question of a "peace framework".
Mansergh said that the Taoiseach was determined to smoke out PIRA on their attitude to a peace formula. He could not allow the possibility that PIRA might turn round at some point in the future and say that the Irish Government, or the Irish and the British governments together, had thrown away the prospect of real peace. And of course, peace, if it could be secured, would be a great gain. The Taoiseach did not dismiss the 3-stranded talks, but in his view they were on a longer time scale. The question of peace was immediate, and the Taoiseach wanted to get it out of the way if possible by the time of the Summit on 3 December.
Nally and OhUiginn had gone to London today with a text which sought to include material welcome to the unionists (this had been drafted by Mansergh following the Taoiseach's meetings with Archbishop Eames and the Rev John Dunlop: he had shown a text to the former but not to the latter). The Taoiseach hoped that HMG would give their general blessing to the text as a basis for discussion, but without commitment. The Irish would then seek to recruit Hume, pass the text through their usual contacts to PIRA and ask PIRA to give their general approbation too. If they agreed, then the Taoiseach hoped the text could be "polished up" before the Summit. If they prevaricated or failed to meet a pretty tight deadline, then the Irish would press Hume to go public with them in condemning PIRA for turning down the prospect of peace.
Mansergh said that the Irish had decided only yesterday on the importance of bringing in Hume; both to help them persuade PIRA and to get him on side for a possible denunciation of PIRA. It was important to split Hume from Adams if a peace formula could not be worked out, and to bring Hume in from the cold.
Mansergh said that the Irish were not sure whether PIRA genuinely wanted peace, or whether their manoeuvrings with Hume were politically motivated, to win propaganda points. There was evidence both ways. He also remarked that PIRA (who had the pre-Brussels text) had not yet made comments on any points in the texts the Irish had passed them. They had merely commented that the texts were not acceptable, and referred the Irish to their public statements.
Mansergh said that in his view there were 3 problems for PIRA in the current text. They were still keen on the concept of a time limit. The formula on consent should be more acceptable now to unionists, but less so to PIRA. And they still wanted some wording about HMG joining the ranks of the persuaders.
I said that we remain extremely cautious about the whole concept, and that I could not guess the reception Nally and OhUiginn might get in London. The Taoiseach's public statements about the two government [sic] working on a peace formula, and about a Summit deadline had made things even more difficult for us. So had the implication that anything produced by the two governments would build on Hume-Adams. Mansergh acknowledged these points.
Finally, I said that we were very frustrated that the Irish had yet again failed to provide a paper for the Liaison Group discussions. At the end of the day we would need to press forward with the 3-stranded talks, and we genuinely wished to explore the extent of common ground with the Irish, and share views on a possible outcome. Mansergh acknowledged that the Irish Cabinet had not agreed the Irish draft yesterday, and promised to try to speed things up.
[Signature]
D E S Blatherwick
PS: We* subsequently spoke about all this. I suggested that if we could give hedged and general approval to the kind of statement the Irish have in mind in the context of a clear cessation of PIRA violence, we might go along with the Taoiseach's aim of smoking out PIRA, with the expectation of a negative answer from them.
27 1988 - 2023
38 1993 - 1993
55 101 - 1991
64 1993 - 2020
26 1993 - 1993
57 1993 - 1993
59 1993 - 1993
51 1993 - 1993
18 1993 - 1993
24 1993 - 1994
41 1993 - 1994
32 1993 - 1994
72 101 - 1994
8 101 - 1990
76 101 - 1994
1 1994
60 101 - 1994
65 1993 - 2023
37 101 - 1993
54 101 - 1993
32 101 - 1993
77 1993 - 1993
58 101 - 2018
49 1993 - 1997
61 101 - 1992
38 101 - 1991
48 1992 - 1993
134 101 - ?-??
59 101 - 2023
84 101 - 1993
64 101 - 1991
44
11
31 1996 - 1996
61 1996 - 1996
49 1996 - 1996
20 1996 - 1997
32 1996 - 1996
48 1996 - 1996
74 1996 - None
4 1996 - 1996
33 1996 - 1996
30 1996 - 1996
7 1996 - 1996
24 1996 - 1996
9 1996 - 1996
59 1996 - 1996
60 1996 - 1996
14 1996 - 1997
41 1996 - 1996
45 1996 - 1996
67 1996 - 1996
16 1996 - 1996
87 1996 - None
23 1996 - 1996
79 1996 - None
22 1996 - 1996
1993-11-10
Record of meeting with Martin Mansergh about a peace framework. Indicates urgency with which Irish government wants a commitment to peace (by summit on 3rd December 1993). Indicates that Mansergh had drafted JD13 after comments from Archbishop Eames to Albert Reynolds. Illustrates pathway for covertly showing JD13 to the PIRA, and notes that they had previously rejected JD12 as they were still pushing for a time limit and for HMG to joint the persuaders. Differences between British and Irish remain over the Talks process, with British frustrated by Irish refusal to produce a Framework paper. Annotations by David Blatherwick, for clarification, and by Quentin Thomas upon receipt of the document on 15 November.
N/A
N/A
Unless otherwise specified, this material falls under Crown Copyright and contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The National Archives of the UK (TNA), digitzed by the Quill Project at https://quillproject.net/resource_collections/351/.