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FROM: C G MACCABE POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION 30 November 1993
COPY NO [] OF 12 COPIES
cc PS/Secretary of State (B&L) – M [2&3] PS/Michael Ancram (B&L) – M [4&5] PS/PUS (L) – M [6] PS/Mr Fell [7] Mr Deverell [8] Mr Cooke – M [9] Mr Rickard [10] Mr Beeton – M [11] Mr May/Files [12]
Mr Thomas – M [1]
CONVERSATION WITH ARCHBISHOP EAMES
On your instructions, I called with Archbishop Eames in Armagh at noon today. I showed him a copy of the British version of the Dublin Joint Statement (25 November Draft). In doing so, I explained that in this form, and although it contained a lot of their language, it was unacceptable to the Irish Government. I added, however, that in the light of further current dialogue in London and Dublin, some modification may still be possible.
I said I had been instructed to impress on him how seriously HMG were treating the drafting exercise, and that our profound wish was to reach a satisfactory outcome. It was, however, necessary to temper my remarks with the reality that there were limits beyond which we could not go if there was to be any hope of keeping the majority of Unionists on side. He said he was glad to hear this as community contacts during and since the weekend had shown him once again just how fragile and nervous Unionist opinion was.
The Archbishop's first remark after reading the Joint Statement was that it was satisfactory from a Unionist point of view. But, he could see little in it to bring comfort to the Irish Government and, as he put it, "I expect Reynolds will drive this home when we meet in Dublin tomorrow by hitting me over the head with a copy." While he (Eames) was generally satisfied with the document, and in the present circumstances could not argue that it should be any greener, he said he was afraid that no-one but the most careful reader would see anything new in it. From a Nationalist point of view it must fall far short of the once-and-for-all settlement of the Irish Question Messrs Reynolds, Spring and Hume were looking for (and which, in the Archbishop's opinion, each wanted to claim credit for).
I reminded the Archbishop what I had said at the beginning of our conversation about HMG's commitment and that the Irish had seen a copy of the document and were, to put it mildly, unimpressed. I did not say to whom it had been shown: he suggested Martin Mansergh. As regards tomorrow's meeting with the Taoiseach, he was free to say he had seen the document today, and I suggested it might then be best to wait for Mr Reynolds' response – which might not be as antagonistic as the Archbishop expected if today's dialogue were fruitful. He said he would do this. He said he would also reflect on the document's contents overnight (I had taken it back but he said he could rely on his memory and some notes he had taken) and would probably conclude it was more novel than he had thought. In any case he intended to impress on Mr Reynolds that he thought it was a sincere attempt by HMG to be as constructive as possible.
Finally, the Archbishop suggested that the reference to "the Talks process" in the third tiret of paragraph 4, and elsewhere, could be simplified to make it clear to what we were referring. As drafted, and notwithstanding that it came from the joint statement of 29 October, he thought it could be mistaken for talks between the two Governments, or worse, Hume/Adams (a strained construction I must say). He also said the "constructive ambiguity" about self-determination at the end of paragraph 2(c) of the constitutional annex was probably the most contentious passage.
Christopher Maccabe.
C G MACCABE SH EXT 27085
27 1988 - 2023
38 1993 - 1993
55 101 - 1991
64 1993 - 2020
26 1993 - 1993
57 1993 - 1993
59 1993 - 1993
51 1993 - 1993
18 1993 - 1993
24 1993 - 1994
41 1993 - 1994
32 1993 - 1994
72 101 - 1994
8 101 - 1990
76 101 - 1994
1 1994
60 101 - 1994
65 1993 - 2023
37 101 - 1993
54 101 - 1993
32 101 - 1993
77 1993 - 1993
58 101 - 2018
49 1993 - 1997
61 101 - 1992
38 101 - 1991
48 1992 - 1993
134 101 - ?-??
59 101 - 2023
84 101 - 1993
64 101 - 1991
44
11
31 1996 - 1996
61 1996 - 1996
49 1996 - 1996
20 1996 - 1997
32 1996 - 1996
48 1996 - 1996
74 1996 - None
4 1996 - 1996
33 1996 - 1996
30 1996 - 1996
7 1996 - 1996
24 1996 - 1996
9 1996 - 1996
59 1996 - 1996
60 1996 - 1996
14 1996 - 1997
41 1996 - 1996
45 1996 - 1996
67 1996 - 1996
16 1996 - 1996
87 1996 - None
23 1996 - 1996
79 1996 - None
22 1996 - 1996
1993-11-30
A meeting to discuss the 25 November 1993 alternative British draft of the Joint Declaration. Eames was satisfied with the draft bar a couple of minor amendments but unsurprised to hear that the Irish were not.
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Unless otherwise specified, this material falls under Crown Copyright and contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
The National Archives of the UK (TNA), digitzed by the Quill Project at https://quillproject.net/resource_collections/351/.