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Writing Peace: The National Archives of the UK (TNA)

Record of Meeting between British Officials Regarding Responses to the Christmas Ceasefire on 24 December 1990

Thursday, 27 December 1990

i22803

This document provides an account of the meeting between Peter Brooke, GOC John Wilsey, Deputy Chief Constable Michael McAtamney, John Ledlie, John Deverell, Andrew Wood, Danny McNeill and Mr Millar on 24 December 1990. The purpose of the meeting was to consider further actions that the British Government could take in addition to their statement on the Christmas ceasefire and the potential publicity implications of such actions. The record also notes that Brooke agreed that there was a case for relaxing control at the Permanent Vehicle Checkpoints. The document includes light marking and underlining.

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From: PS/Secretary of State (B)
27 December 1990

cc PS/SofS (B&L) - B
PS Paymaster Genereal (B&L) - B
PS/PUS (B&L) - B
PA/Sir K Bloomfield - B
Mr Ledlie - B
Mr Piling - B
Mr A Wilson
Mr Alston
Mr Deverell - B
Mr Thomas - B
Mr Wood - B
Mr McNeill - B

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PIRA CEASEFIRE

The Secretary of State chaired a meeting in the Conference Room, Hillsborough Castle on Monday morning, 24 December. The meeting was attended by the GOC, Deputy Chief Constable McAtamney, Mr Ledlie, Mr Deverell, Mr Wood, Mr McNeill and Mr Millar.

2. The Secretary of State had asked for the meeting to consider:
(a) what further action, if anything, might be taken in addition to his statement on the ceasefire the previous evening;
(b) the publicity implications of any further action.

3. There was a general consensus that the PIRA declaration was not operationally significant, since historically there had been a low level of activity in any event over the Christmas period, and that in many respects PIRA were making a virtue out of necessity. It was also acknowledged that the ceasefire was not binding on other groups, such as the UFF or INLA.

4. In further discussion, the Secretary of State agreed that while vigilance generally by the security forces continued to be necessary, there was nevertheless a case for relaxing control at PVCPs. This had already begun the previous evening, with local operational commanders being given discretion to allow passage on demand after dark rather than only in an emergency; and it was now proposed to extend this arrangement by leaving the barriers open throughout the three-day period. The decision to do so should [_not_] be presented formally as a measured response to the ceasefire declaration, though it would of course be interpreted as such. Mr Wood also suggested that the Army might also consider making it clear in response to any press enquiries that the return of 2 LI to the mainland would have happened anyway.

5. The [_Secretary of State_] said that he was content to leave it to the GOC to make appropriate arrangements for announcing the decision. Mr Wood would liaise as necessary with the Army Press Office.

Signed

DAVID FERGUSON
Private Secretary