This project models the series of formal and informal negotiations which led to the publication, in December 1993, of a declaration issued jointly by the British and Irish Governments. The Joint Declaration was a critical policy document which paved the way for a ceasefire and the entry of Sinn Féin into formal talks. It also laid out a shared set of principles – including, crucially, self-determination for the people of Ireland subject to the consent of the people of Northern Ireland – which would come to underpin the Belfast Good Friday Agreement and provide a framework for its ratification.
This committee has been created to model internal British Government documents and meetings.
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[Exact time unknown] Quentin Thomas reported back on the Butler/Nally meeting on 10 November 1993 and outlined suggested next steps. He also reported his phone call with Ó hUiginn. Drafts of a letter to Reynolds from Major were written, but the letter was not sent because Major received a letter from Reynolds first, protesting British refusal to engage with the Joint Declaration Initiative. A draft passage on Northern Ireland for the Lord Mayor's Banquet Speech was also submitted.
Membership (at session start):
Michael Ancram, Kenneth Baker, Tony Beeton, David Blatherwick, John Blelloch, Ian Burns, Robin Butler, John Chilcot, Ken Clarke, David Cooke, Jim Daniell, Timothy Daunt, John Deverell, David Fell, William Fittall, David Gillmore, Christopher Glyn-Jones, Richard Gozney, Michael Howard, Douglas Hurd, Roderic Lyne, John Major, Jonathan Margetts, Peter May, Patrick Mayhew, John McConnell, David McIlroy , Danny McNeill, R. O. Miles, Anthony Pawson, Christopher Prentice , Stephen Rickard, Malcolm Rifkind , A W Stephens, Jonathan Stephens, Quentin Thomas, Stephen Wall (37 total)
Representing 1 delegations:
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States that this is a critical time for change given the overwhelming desire for peace.
Draft letter to the Taoiseach referring to developments since the 19 October Brussels Joint Statement. Repeats principal concern that an agreement with republicans does not ignore the likely unionist response. This is especially important for the British given the pressure following Hume/Adams and the need to apppear separate from those discussions. Repeats the British commitment to Ancram's talks process and expresses disappointment that the Irish have delayed on this front.
Jonathan Stephens sets the scene for the upcoming speech by giving a précis of the context in the peace talks. The main blockages to roundtable talks ae elucidated. They include the Irish Government's attitude towards Article 2 & 3 of the constitution and the shadow of John Hume's talks with Gerry Adams. Bilateral talks overseen by Michael Ancram are thought to have been productive. The British are keen to continue along this path and eventually expand to multilateral discussions. A key issue in this is thought to be the position of the Irish Government, particularly their view of the separation between the Talks process and the Joint Declaration Initiative (JDI).
An early draft of a letter from John Major to Albert Reynolds following the introduction of JD13 during a Butler/Nally meeting on 10 November 1993. The letter aimed to signpost continuing British caution about the idea of making a Joint Declaration and push instead the furtherance of the talks process, including the draft framework document that the Irish government had promised. This draft was made obsolete by the arrival of a letter from Reynolds expressing his frustration and disappointment at the British approach, which prompted a redraft of the letter to take a more conciliatory line.
An early draft of a letter from John Major to Albert Reynolds following the introduction of JD13 during a Butler/Nally meeting on 10 November 1993. The letter aimed to signpost continuing British caution about the idea of making a Joint Declaration and push instead the furtherance of the talks process, including the draft framework document that the Irish government had promised. This draft was made obsolete by the arrival of a letter from Reynolds expressing his frustration and disappointment at the British approach, which prompted a redraft of the letter to take a more conciliatory line.
Letter intitially drafted by the British government on their own initiative in order to emphasise the importance of the talks organised by Michael Ancram. It was annotated to reflect the Taoiseach's concerns about perceived British foot-dragging on the Joint Declaration Initiative expressed in a letter of 11 November 1993. The principal British message is that the talks process and the joint declaration initiative must be pursued together, and that peace not be a condition for political progress.
David Cooke sets out points to make about the Irish approach to the parallel peace and talks processes. The main British concern is that talks are not made conditional on peace, so as to avoid handing initiative to violent actors. The British repeated their perception that the Hume/Adams talks made gaining unionist approval for a Joint Declaration (which might appear reminiscent of Hume/Adams) very difficult. The British concern about Irish foot-dragging in Ancram's talks process is also repeated.
The following sentiments are included in Patrick Mayhew's draft speech segment: the reprehensibility of paramilitary violence, the British commitment to defend democracy and not concede political ground to violent tactics, an expression of shared goals with the Irish government, and an encouragement of more progress through political talks.
Quentin Thomas' record of a Butler/Nally meeting on 10 November 1993. The new copy of the Joint Declaration, JD13, with Archbishop Eames' additions, was on the table. The British delegation made it clear that they were under instructions not to proceed with the Joint Declaration initiative. The Irish delegation threatened recriminations. The atmosphere was severely strained.
Albert Reynolds expresses his concern about British non-cooperation and cites the Irish political pressure to pursue a perceived opportunity for peace. He is anxious that failure to explore this option will lead to increased support for the PIRA.
Reynolds is disappointed by the apparent withdrawal of the British from JDI. Irish gov. will pursue alt. initiatives for peace.
David Cooke encloses a draft of a speaking note prior to a discussion between Patrick Mayhew and Jonathan Stephens about the Joint Declaration Initiative
Jonathan Stephens provides a draft letter to the Taoiseach outlining the British desire to speed up Ancram's talks process. Annotations in pen indicate that between drafts of this letter the Taoiseach wrote separately about the peace process more generally.
Jonathan Stephens encloses Patrick Mayhew's draft of a section of a speech due to be given by John Major and a covering letter for Roderic Lyne outlining the future of the Talks process.
Following the Butler Nally meeting at which the Irish stated that failure to continue with the Peace Process would lead them halt the talks process, the enclose letter seeks to remind Taoiseach of commitment made at Brussels.
Quentin Thomas provides commentary on enclosed meeting minutes from the Butler/Nally group a day earlier. The substantial points made are as follows: the Irish government, particularly Albert Reynolds, favours the Joint Declaration initiative (JDI) over the Talks process. The Irish claim that Draft 12 of the JDI (JD13) has been substantially revised, under supervision of Archbishop Eames (key figure in the broad Church of Ireland) to be acceptable to Unionists. This claim will be tested by Patrick Mayhew, before deciding whether to test it on Jim Molyneaux or abandon denial of 'textual barter' altogether by presenting the Irish with a British draft of the Joint Declaration. The Irish claim that Anglo-Irish relations depend on whether JDI progress has been made before the Heads of Government meeting on 3rd December 1993. They believe that the British are dragging their feet because of a need to appease Jim Molyneaux. The British government rejects this as an explanation for their perceived hesitance over JDI. Quentin Thomas also includes comments from Martin Mansergh, advisor to Albert Reynolds. These provide a counter point to the Nally/ O hUiggin school of thought and generally cast doubt on the idea that the JDI can instantly deliver peace, given likely Provisional opposition.
Secretary of state intends to meet with Eames; Thomas gives analysis; Mansergh said that if 2 gov.s mostly agreed on JD then Irish gov. planned to allow Hume to approach PIRA with it; Thomas spoke to OhUiggin to prep for Spring's call with Sec. of State; encloses meeting notes in full.
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