Northern Ireland International Body on Arms Decommissioning 1995-1996

The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.

Mitchell Committee

This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.

The Committee Secretary's View The Committee Secretary's View

To see the full record of a committee, click on the corresponding committee on the map below.

Document introduced in:

Session 14766: 1996-01-11 00:00:00

Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown

Document View:

Mitchell Principles

Shown with amendment 'Mitchell Principles Version 1' (e908303)

(Showing state at moment e908606)
There are 0 proposed amendments related to this document on which decisions have not been taken.
Jump to change 1 Jump to change 2 Jump to change 3 Jump to change 4 Jump to change 5 Jump to change 6 Jump to change 7 Jump to change 8 Jump to change 9 Jump to change 10 Jump to change 11 Jump to change 12 Jump to change 13 Jump to change 14 Jump to change 15 Jump to change 16 Jump to change 17 Jump to change 18 Jump to change 19 Jump to change 20 Jump to change 21 Jump to change 22 Jump to change 23 Jump to change 24 Jump to change 25 Jump to change 26 Jump to change 27 Jump to change 28 Jump to change 29 Jump to change 30 Jump to change 31 Jump to change 32 Jump to change 33 Jump to change 34 Jump to change 35 Jump to change 36 Jump to change 37 Jump to change 38 Jump to change 39 Jump to change 40 Jump to change 41 Jump to change 42 Jump to change 43 Jump to change 44 Jump to change 45 Jump to change 46 Jump to change 47 Jump to change 48 Jump to change 49 Jump to change 50 Jump to change 51 Jump to change 52 Jump to change 53 Jump to change 54 Jump to change 55 Jump to change 56 Jump to change 57 Jump to change 58 Jump to change 59 Jump to change 60 Jump to change 61 Jump to change 62 Jump to change 63 Jump to change 64 Jump to change 65 Jump to change 66 Jump to change 67 Jump to change 68 Jump to change 69 Jump to change 70 Jump to change 71 Jump to change 72 Jump to change 73 Jump to change 74 Jump to change 75 Jump to change 76 Jump to change 77 Jump to change 78 Jump to change 79 Jump to change 80 Jump to change 81 Jump to change 82 Jump to change 83 Jump to change 84 Jump to change 85 Jump to change 86 Jump to change 87 Jump to change 88 Jump to change 89 Jump to change 90 Jump to change 91 Jump to change 92 Jump to change 93 Jump to change 94 Jump to change 95 Jump to change 96 Jump to change 97 Jump to change 98 Jump to change 99 Jump to change 100 Jump to change 101 Jump to change 102 Jump to change 103 Jump to change 104 Jump to change 105 Jump to change 106 Jump to change 107 Jump to change 108 Jump to change 109 Jump to change 110 Jump to change 111 Jump to change 112 Jump to change 113 Jump to change 114 Jump to change 115 Jump to change 116 Jump to change 117 Jump to change 118 Jump to change 119 Jump to change 120 Jump to change 121 Jump to change 122 Jump to change 123 Jump to change 124 Jump to change 125 Jump to change 126 Jump to change 127 Jump to change 128 Jump to change 129 Jump to change 130 Jump to change 131 Jump to change 132 Jump to change 133 Jump to change 134 Jump to change 135 Jump to change 136 Jump to change 137 Jump to change 138 Jump to change 139 Jump to change 140 Jump to change 141 Jump to change 142 Jump to change 143 Jump to change 144 Jump to change 145 Jump to change 146 Jump to change 147 Jump to change 148 Jump to change 149 Jump to change 150 Jump to change 151 Jump to change 152 Jump to change 153 Jump to change 154 Jump to change 155 Jump to change 156 Jump to change 157 Jump to change 158 Jump to change 159 Jump to change 160 Jump to change 161 Jump to change 162 Jump to change 163 Jump to change 164 Jump to change 165 Jump to change 166 Jump to change 167 Jump to change 168 Jump to change 169 Jump to change 170 Jump to change 171 Jump to change 172 Jump to change 173 Jump to change 174 Jump to change 175 Jump to change 176 Jump to change 177 Jump to change 178 Jump to change 179 Jump to change 180 Jump to change 181 Jump to change 182 Jump to change 183 Jump to change 184 Jump to change 185 Jump to change 186 Jump to change 187 Jump to change 188 Jump to change 189 Jump to change 190 Jump to change 191 Jump to change 192 Jump to change 193 Jump to change 194 Jump to change 195 Jump to change 196 Jump to change 197 Jump to change 198 Jump to change 199 Jump to change 200 Jump to change 201 Jump to change 202 Jump to change 203 Jump to change 204 Jump to change 205 Jump to change 206 Jump to change 207 Jump to change 208 Jump to change 209 Jump to change 210 Jump to change 211 Jump to change 212 Jump to change 213 Jump to change 214 Jump to change 215 Jump to change 216 Jump to change 217 Jump to change 218 Jump to change 219 Jump to change 220 Jump to change 221 Jump to change 222 Jump to change 223 Jump to change 224 Jump to change 225 Jump to change 226 Jump to change 227 Jump to change 228 Jump to change 229 Jump to change 230 Jump to change 231 Jump to change 232 Jump to change 233 Jump to change 234 Jump to change 235 Jump to change 236 Jump to change 237 Jump to change 238 Jump to change 239 Jump to change 240 Jump to change 241 Jump to change 242 Jump to change 243 Jump to change 244 Jump to change 245 Jump to change 246 Jump to change 247 Jump to change 248 Jump to change 249 Jump to change 250 Jump to change 251 Jump to change 252 Jump to change 253 Jump to change 254 Jump to change 255 Jump to change 256 Jump to change 257 Jump to change 258 Jump to change 259 Jump to change 260 Jump to change 261 Jump to change 262 Jump to change 263 Jump to change 264 Jump to change 265 Jump to change 266 Jump to change 267 Jump to change 268 Jump to change 269 Jump to change 270 Jump to change 271 Jump to change 272 Jump to change 273 Jump to change 274 Jump to change 275 Jump to change 276 Jump to change 277 Jump to change 278 Jump to change 279 Jump to change 280 Jump to change 281 Jump to change 282 Jump to change 283 Jump to change 284 Jump to change 285 Jump to change 286 Jump to change 287 Jump to change 288 Jump to change 289 Jump to change 290 Jump to change 291 Jump to change 292 Jump to change 293 Jump to change 294 Jump to change 295 Jump to change 296 Jump to change 297 Jump to change 298 Jump to change 299 Jump to change 300 Jump to change 301 Jump to change 302 Jump to change 303 Jump to change 304 Jump to change 305 Jump to change 306 Jump to change 307 Jump to change 308 Jump to change 309 Jump to change 310 Jump to change 311 Jump to change 312 Jump to change 313 Jump to change 314 Jump to change 315 Jump to change 316 Jump to change 317 Jump to change 318 Jump to change 319 Jump to change 320 Jump to change 321 Jump to change 322 Jump to change 323 Jump to change 324 Jump to change 325 Jump to change 326 Jump to change 327 Jump to change 328 Jump to change 329 Jump to change 330 Jump to change 331 Jump to change 332 Jump to change 333 Jump to change 334 Jump to change 335 Jump to change 336 Jump to change 337 Jump to change 338 Jump to change 339 Jump to change 340 Jump to change 341 Jump to change 342 Jump to change 343 Jump to change 344 Jump to change 345 Jump to change 346 Jump to change 347 Jump to change 348 Jump to change 349 Jump to change 350 Jump to change 351 Jump to change 352 Jump to change 353 Jump to change 354 Jump to change 355 Jump to change 356 Jump to change 357 Jump to change 358 Jump to change 359 Jump to change 360 Jump to change 361 Jump to change 362 Jump to change 363 Jump to change 364 Jump to change 365 Jump to change 366 Jump to change 367 Jump to change 368 Jump to change 369 Jump to change 370 Jump to change 371 Jump to change 372 Jump to change 373 Jump to change 374 Jump to change 375 Jump to change 376 Jump to change 377 Jump to change 378 Jump to change 379 Jump to change 380 Jump to change 381 Jump to change 382 Jump to change 383 Jump to change 384 Jump to change 385 Jump to change 386 Jump to change 387 Jump to change 388 Jump to change 389 Jump to change 390 Jump to change 391 Jump to change 392 Jump to change 393 Jump to change 394 Jump to change 395 Jump to change 396 Jump to change 397 Jump to change 398 Jump to change 399 Jump to change 400 Jump to change 401 Jump to change 402 Jump to change 403 Jump to change 404 Jump to change 405 Jump to change 406 Jump to change 407 Jump to change 408 Jump to change 409 Jump to change 410 Jump to change 411 Jump to change 412 Jump to change 413 Jump to change 414 Jump to change 415 Jump to change 416 Jump to change 417 Jump to change 418 Jump to change 419 Jump to change 420 Jump to change 421 Jump to change 422 Jump to change 423 Jump to change 424 Jump to change 425 Jump to change 426 Jump to change 427 Jump to change 428 Jump to change 429 Jump to change 430 Jump to change 431 Jump to change 432 Jump to change 433 Jump to change 434 Jump to change 435 Jump to change 436 Jump to change 437 Jump to change 438 Jump to change 439 Jump to change 440 Jump to change 441 Jump to change 442 Jump to change 443 Jump to change 444 Jump to change 445 Jump to change 446 Jump to change 447 Jump to change 448 Jump to change 449 Jump to change 450 Jump to change 451 Jump to change 452 Jump to change 453 Jump to change 454 Jump to change 455 Jump to change 456 Jump to change 457 Jump to change 458 Jump to change 459 Jump to change 460 Jump to change 461 Jump to change 462 Jump to change 463 Jump to change 464 Jump to change 465 Jump to change 466 Jump to change 467 Jump to change 468 Jump to change 469 Jump to change 470 Jump to change 471 Jump to change 472 Jump to change 473 Jump to change 474 Jump to change 475 Jump to change 476 Jump to change 477 Jump to change 478 Jump to change 479 Jump to change 480 Jump to change 481 Jump to change 482 Jump to change 483 Jump to change 484 Jump to change 485 Jump to change 486 Jump to change 487 Jump to change 488 Jump to change 489 Jump to change 490 Jump to change 491 Jump to change 492 Jump to change 493 Jump to change 494 Jump to change 495 Jump to change 496 Jump to change 497 Jump to change 498 Jump to change 499 Jump to change 500 Jump to change 501 Jump to change 502 Jump to change 503 Jump to change 504 Jump to change 505 Jump to change 506 Jump to change 507 Jump to change 508 Jump to change 509 Jump to change 510 Jump to change 511 Jump to change 512 Jump to change 513 Jump to change 514 Jump to change 515 Jump to change 516 Jump to change 517 Jump to change 518 Jump to change 519 Jump to change 520 Jump to change 521 Jump to change 522 Jump to change 523 Jump to change 524 Jump to change 525 Jump to change 526 Jump to change 527 Jump to change 528 Jump to change 529 Jump to change 530 Jump to change 531 Jump to change 532 Jump to change 533 Jump to change 534 Jump to change 535 Jump to change 536 Jump to change 537 Jump to change 538 Jump to change 539 Jump to change 540 Jump to change 541 Jump to change 542 Jump to change 543 Jump to change 544 Jump to change 545 Jump to change 546

Report of the International Body

22 January 1996

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments. issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of "a " 'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations"in Northern Ireland."

2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." Thiis has become known ason the political track.

3. The other track concerned the the decommissioning of arms of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:

"5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an IInternational Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.

6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on th" We arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.

7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:

- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and

- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.

8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."

4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.

5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 110 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.

6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials and representatives of other organisations and instof itutions. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. TContributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.

II. DISCUSSION

7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.

8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.

9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.

10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.

11. Despite the show, we believe t"hat.

Inad"ditito asking us to provide an indepeentssessment ofdecommissioning issue, the Governments asked us to answer two specific questions:

(1) "to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and" (2) "to report whetherre is a clearitn the of those in possession of such arms to work constructivelyNotwithstanding recent reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings,[their removal from theequation.]"

We answer as follows:

(1) [Ins lguage toond to first question; drafth sustai bervaned observaf provcease-firesby General de C ence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommi second queth12. out reference to timingssioning.

12. Since the cease-fires, because we have concluded that thee political debate has focused largely on the ds a clear comifferences that havent oprevented the part of those in po-session of such arms to work constructively to achiecommencement of all- party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists -- so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.

13. No one should underestimateirmoval from the valuepolitical equation as part of the consensus for peace, and the fact thaprocess of all-party negotiations but no significant group is actively seeking to end itt as a prior condition to such negotiations.

14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absencebelieve that a decommissiof arms will not occur of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.

15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue -- or any other issiue -- will not be found if theo all party negotiations. That was the view ofartis resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.

16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.

17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to deh an agreed politicreceived. It wasunanimouvehemelyexsed viewreentatives ofpolitical parties closely associated withparamilitary organizations on both sides.2 Most tellingly, it wasanimous view of leadership of thforcnorth and south. The highIII. Wleadership of both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and te are satisfied that ssion. There are differences on the timing and context --- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but thGdai were cleary should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a principle objective.

ivocaleir views18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES thatmount OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE

19. T obj19tivrties seek negotiations to reach an agreeitd politiio takecal settlement and to take They wleadersose political parties cant the gun taken out of Irish politicstain a pri, therbe must bepublic commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. PPspire tontsarticipantste in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to aved such principles.

ramount objective

20.

III. Accord.

It possibleeo debatemoringly, we recommend the parties to such negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment:

a. Ty or wdomsuch a circumstance. It is nota. o democratic and exclusively peaible toeriously debate its reality. It is a hard fbct with which all concerned must deal.

Although peacsful means ofc resolving political issues;

b2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organiszations;

c3. To agree that such disarmament must be of arms will not occur prior to all party negoverifiabltiations, it does not follow, logically or morally, the satisfaction of an independent comm such talks should begin without further commitment. To the contrary, it ission;

d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort bropria an necessary to establish certain principlesors, to use force, or threatenpractical require to which all parties must commit before the commencement of suchr threateouse force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations.

Aceordingly, we recommend that each party to such talks publicly exons;

e5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached ins total and all-party negotiations and soutcommitment

1. To democraticexclusively peaceful methods ofto resort lving political issues;

2. Trto democratic and nouny use of force, or threat ofexclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter anuse of forin connectwith all party negotiations;

3. Toaly aspect of thatotal and verifiable darmamnt outcome wall paramilith arywhich they may disagree; and,

f. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

21 of an independent third party, as part of the process of all party negotiations;

4. To accept and abidbe meaningfulciby principlene in the Downing Street Declaration, withcourse, have to apply. nt reached bGparties in all party negotiationptions themselven.4. [Possible Alternative Language for Principle No. 4: To agree to abide byWe join the Governments, religious terms o any outcome of all party negot"ialeaders ,"and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to thes to which a majority ofeople in Northern Ireland and iRepublicIreld give their assent and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspecht that outcome with which they maypursuree.]

5. [Possible Adose who have used violence to pursuresolve politicalal Principle: To accept the ndadvanc actualobjectives inofrm in the course of the all-party negotiations, as a means of promoting the search for an agreed political settle past will do so again in th.]

6. [Possible Addit future. Such actions haveal Prciple: To not participate in ordone so-called punishment killingsbes and to take all feasiblsteto prevent such ac.]7. [Any Addital Prciples?]

In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of course, have run to the paramilitary organizations place in a lawfumselves, as llpolitical parties with whichl society. alessoci.

For nearly a year and a half, uns have been largely silNorrn Ireland. During thime:

6. To urgelitical debate has focused largely on the differenc at have prev mmence of all party negotias intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. That is understandable. But it is, in some respects, unfortunate. For it has tended to obscurewipread agreeat exist - so widespread, iact,at22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to y tend to be taken for granted.

Most importantly isinfluence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the historywid histoeyspread supportpeace itself. That iing on whh l with whom we spoke agreed. It wasther of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principledominant theme is we recommend address those coctly. Each partthe my lettercalls we received fro,m people, north and south, Unionist and Nayalist, Catholic and Protestant.

The Governmentse relevanrshnot underestimate the valuensensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is a seeking to end it.

Nearly. all agree

23d also commitaken out of Irish Politics. It appears that aosnow committed to that proposition are thosehwieldedguns over. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the pa 25 ys.4re an evident war wewhich leads tothreat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. Tnt areabe mutuwidespread agreement.

Everyone with whom we spoke agrees witobjectiv.5 It is important to keep in mind that what is bey would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramiliposed is a vontary organisatiormamens. Thatose with should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise keedin democrac ty, not one influenced by the threat of violence..

IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING

24. The second of the specific questp ions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to report whether there is a clear coandmmitmen t on the part of those ina possession of such arpems to work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.

c re25. We have concluded thatsol willgage ucrocess.

While there are obvious a clear commitment on thedeep differences on the timingcontext of d of all paramilitary of those in possession of such armsrganizations. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objective.

We are unable to answer that question work constructivelyithout reference to timing. That is because w - indeed it is those differences which led to achieve the creation of this Body - they should not bfull and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.

26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the politicallowed to obscureparties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations earlysuniverswill not decommissionindivid any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That ho made oral and written submissions. It was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.

27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the need for prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.

28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.

29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonablpeopleNorrn Ireland are rightlyunderstandably sick of political and sectar

30.ian violenc cente concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.

30. Those who at present refuseythe cease-fires of AugtOctober, 1994,y weipal victims of a horrifying campaign of such violence. This must not continue.

Sincee to insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violenc tsinceguns. This must continue.

The divisions in Northern Iare historic and deep. But we believewiyy that prior decommissioning will not occurtweighed by the nearly universal lgthere for a just and lasting peace. It be an immense tragedy if the isugenuini and irreversible, and the is lost. We believe there is a way forward owill require courage and involve risk forn necessary will and resoluteness exist in the peopler decommissioning is needed to creat th threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of, ande trust and he million negotiations or to change any agreeda hfmo we did not meet but whoseence we felt. At this critical mosetlement.

31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon vin their histiolence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.

32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.

V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.

34. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take placeurge their leadersduring the process of all-party y eize this opportunity.

________________________________negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to move forward. This approach provides them that opportunity.

35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to use tgraphe process of decommissioning to build confidence one step at a tTime during negohtiations. As eprogress is made on political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in a progressive pattern of mountinAneg trusxt and confidence.

at2onVI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

36. The first of the specific questy for the Irish Republican Armproc6ssTthe insistence that no decommissions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to identify and adviocadvcse on ura suitable and acceptable meth uod for full and verifiable ntdecommissioning."

37. Wommon objective: all-party negotiationsoleading to an agreed political settTementectis[slternative: As an alternative, the parties could consider auutsagreAn approach under which knmeodewledgwould ssioing takes place asllarti the total all-partyarmament of a,llather than before or aft r as the paatira now urge. Such an approach would representtplayed a role in encouraging the IRA cease-fireof August 31, 1994,, and stated that of the process of the negotiations repreounts a middle course. It offeisneach side the opportunity to nd afterppropriate circumstances, attemptMODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

38. With respect to the first of the specific questions contained in the Communiqué, we recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. Tthese recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the Governments and their security forces. We believepl a similar role in connection withese estimates to be accurate.

38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to determined by the parties themselves.

The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.

39. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through polit.

3. A copical means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any pDowning Street Declaration is attached as Annex Carty be seen to surrender.

The decommissioning process should place to the satisfaction of an independent commission.

40. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.

41. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.

42. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.

The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.

43. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the cutting up and chipping of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.

44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including:

- the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either Government, for subsequent destruction;

- the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either Government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,

- the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either Government.

Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.

45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.

The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.

46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, ves andport.

4. The best evidence for thirification must occuconclusois the cease-fire itself. Notr to the satisfaction of nding some repugnant lapses, the sustained observance of the cease-fire for nearly a year and a half reflects a crucialeir commission.

47. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.

The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.

48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.

49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.

The d Decommissioning process g should be mutual.

5047. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to use the process of decommissioning soto build confidence one step at a time during negotiations.

o preventions,

VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

51. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our dexistence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a siongnificantcuss, many urged that certain actions other than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning of arms.

52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.

53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.

54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and actwhich m be given due weight in assthose held by security forces. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."

55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force would contribute to the building of trust.

56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Elections held in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand structure, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.

57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

58. Last week we stood in Batandthe centand re oedelfast and lookeding at a thirty fand at barriers oot high walliron and at barriersl topped with bebed wiron and barbed wireeies to "work constructively to achieve".

IX. Theat wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and antagonistic.

59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There mweis a powerful desire for peaf one of those with whomce in Northern Ireland. political process It is that desire wh60ich creates the present opportunity.

6059. This is a critical time inT the history of Northern Ireland. TEither the peace process will move forward or tshis society could sliip bac k to the61 horror of the pacst quarter cenatury.

610. Rigid nadheren ce by the parties to their panw heit prst positioans will simply continute the stalemate ewhich has alread y lastedd too long. In a socieocsety as deeply divided" as Northern ithc"rneIreland, reach ing acrosso the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks for peace.

62. The risk may seem high butss the oreward is rigreats: a future of .

Wepeace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Ireland. indee

all of Jhe issues - in this light.

George J. A

Mitchell John de Chastelain Harri Holkeri

22 January 1996

Decisions yet to be taken

Document Timeline