The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United .Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communique which announced the launching of "a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations." in Northern Ireland.1
One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known ason the political track.
The other track concerned decommissioning, and was elaborated as follows in paragraphs five through eight of the communique:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an iInternational Body to provide and independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such" We arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within is remit, to consider such eveidence on its merits."
We are that body. This our assessment.
To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings, in Belfast, Dublin and London; the first December 15 through 18, 1995, the second January 110 through , 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other relevant persons. A list of all of those with whom we met is attached as Annex B. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Submissions in particular from those who suffered losses during the period of troubles but are stronglThey commited to the peace process were especially moving. The submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
WDespite the short time we were given to deal with this complex issue. Nevertheless,, we believe that we have been able to obtain enough information and insight to enable us to meet our remit on schedule.
For nearly a yearIn addition to asking us to provide an independent a half,ssessment of the guns have been largely silent in Northern Ireland. During that time the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have preventeddecommissioning issue, the Governments asked us to answer two specific questions:
(1) "to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and" (2) "to report whether tghere is a clear commeceitment of alln the party negotiations intended of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve an agrteed[their removal from the political settlement. That is undequation.]"
(1) [Inserst landable. But it is,, in someguage to respects, unfortunate. For it has tendedond to first question; draft to obscure the wprovidespeard agreements tby General de Chat exist - so widespeard, in fact, thatelain.]
(2) We cannot answer they tend to be taken for granted.
Mo second quest importantly is widespread support for the peace itselfthout reference to timing. That is one thing on which all with whom we spoke agbecause we have concluded that thereed. it was the dos a clear comminant theme int on the many letters and calls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant.
The Gopart of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achievernments and their relevant parties should not underestimate the valuemoval from the political equation as part of the proconsensus for peace, and the fact thaof all-party negotiations but no significant group is actively seekingt as a prior condition to end itsuch negotiations.
We foundbelieve that a deconsensus on confidence-building measures as the key to continuedmmissioning of arms will not occur priogress in the peace process. Suggestions on useful confidence-building measures covered a broad range; many were beyondo all party negotiations. That was the view of the vast majoremity of the Internorganizational Body. Confidence-building measures and individuals whose views we heard thatreceived. It was the two Governmentunanimous and relevavehemently exparties could consider in the coursesed view of the peace reprocess include but are not limited toentatives of the following areas: prisoners, We welcome the commitment ofpolitical parties closely associated with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, as stated in paragraph 9 ofparamilitary organizations on both sides.2 Most tellingly, it was the Communique, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised byanimous view of the leadership of their respective security authoritiforces, as the threat reduces."
With rnorth and south. The highespect to decommissioning, everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with decommissioning. Tleadership of both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and there Gare obvious deep differences on timingdai were clear and context of decommissioning -unequivocal indeed it is those differences which led toeir views that the creationleaders of this Body - but they shose political parties could not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support which exists ftain a prior decommissioning.
We answer as of arms, even if the two issues specified in paragraph seven ofy wanted to.
It is possible to debate the Communique as follows:
(1) Modmorality or wiesdom of Decommissioning
The decommissioningsuch a circumstance. It is not processible to should suggest neither victory nor defeat
Theeriously debate its reality. It is a hard fact with which all concerned must deal.
Although decommissioning process should be supervised by, and should take place to the saof arms will not occur prior to all party negotisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission, which cs, it does not follow, logically or morally, that such talks should beginclude members drawn from outside Ireland and without further commitment. To the United Kingdom, would becontrary, it is appoinropriate and by the Britishnecessary to establish certain principles and Irish Governpractical requirements on the basis of consultations withto which all parties must commit before the other parties to thecommencement of such negotiationg process. The commission and its members and staff should be able to operate without hindrance in both jurisd
Accordingly, we recommend that each party to such talks publictions, should enjoy approexpriate legal status and immunity.
In addition to havings total and availabsolute to them independent sources of legalcommitment
1. To democratic and technical advice and adequate fieldexclusively peaceful methods of resolving political issurces t;
2. To renounceive and audit armaments and to observe and verifyy use of force, or threat of the decommissioning prouse of forcess, the commissin connection should have available to itwith all party negotiations;
3. To the resourcestotal and the relevant technical expertiseverifiable disarmament of the British and Irish Armies.
Individuals orall paramilitary organizations wishing, to deposit armaments (including weapons, explosives, ammunition and detonators) for decommithe satisfaction of an independent third party, as part of the processioning, or to provide informf all party negotiation which would result ins;
4. To accept and abide by the decommissioningprinciple of armamconsents, would have the option of doas contained in the Downing so through the commission or through the designated representatives ofStreet Declaration, with respect to any agreement reached by the British or Irish Governments.
The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly involved inparties in all party negotiations.3
4. [Possible Alternative Language for Principle No. 4: To agree to abide by the decommissioning process should be protected from prosecuterms of any outcome of all party negotiation relating tos to which a majority of the possession of those armaments, oeople in Northern Ireland and in the basisRepublic of Irelan amnesty established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a resuld give their assent and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisat outcome with which they may disagree.]
5. [Possible Addiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be fral Principle: To accept the need to organizadvance their participation in the actual decommissioning processof arms in they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf. course of the all-party negotiations, as a means of promoting the search for an agreed political settlement.]
The decommiss6. [Possible Additional Pring process shouldciple: To not participate in or contribute to public safetydone so-called punishment killings and to generbeating confidence in the peace process and in all-party negotias and to take all feasible steps to prevent such actions.]
The decommiss7. [Any Additional Pring process could encompass a varietyciples?]
In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of methods, subjectcourse, have to negotiation, including:run to the paramilitary organizations the transfer ofmselves, as well armaments to the commission or topolitical parties with which the designy are closely associated representatives of ei.
For nearly a year and a half, ther government, for subsequuns have been largely silent destruction; Northe provision of informIreland. During thation toime the commission or to designpolitical debate has focused representativlargely on the differences of either governmat have prevent, leading to the discoverymmencement of armaments for subsequent destrucll party negotiation; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequs intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. That is understruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; andandable. But it is, in some respects, unfortunate. For it has tended to obscure the widestruction of armapread agreements by those currently in possessioat exist - so widespread, in ofact, them.
In all cases,at the decommissioning process would resuly tend to be taken for granted.
Most in the complete destruction ofortantly is the armaments. Procedureswidespread support for the destruction of armamentpeace itself. That is would include the physing on which al destruction of small arms, andl with whom we spoke agreed. It was the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosivedominant theme in the many letters and other forms of conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictions. Priority would be accorded thcalls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Proughout to ensuring that armaments were safely handled and stored,.
The Governments and that they were not misappropriated.
The decommissioning process we relevant parties should be fully verified by membersnot underestimate the value of the commissionnsensus for peace, and/or their staff, who would record information required to monitor the decommission fact that no significant group is actively seeking process effectively, otherto end it.
Nearly all agree than that which couldt the gun must be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoritaken out of Irish Politics. It appears that among those progress of the decommissioning process, the commissionnow committed to that proposition are those whould have available to itwielded the guns over the relevant expertpast 25 years.4 There ise and data of the Garda Sio evident war weariness whichana leands the Royal Ulsther Constabulary. The commission would reimport periodically to relevant partiant area of wides on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.
Decommissioning should occur in the course of all-party negotiations
Everyone with whom we spoke agrees with the attention which the issuobjective of decommissioning has attracted, details regarding the modalities of the decommission.5 It is important to keep in mind that what is being process, including the timetable for decommissioning, should receive a high priority inposed is a voluntary disarmament. Those with arms are being asked to give the all-party negotiations. A practical measurem up and to join others during the initial stage of the decommissioning a peaceful, democratic process could include the provision of inventories by paramilitary groups, to be followed by the inspection, by commission members and/or their staff, of selected existto resolve political issues. It is significant that almost all of those who possess arms are willing depositories. Decommissiongage ing should take place simultaneously between Loyalists and Republicans.
(2) Commitment to Duch a process.
While there are obvious deep differences on the timing and context of decommissioning
We have concluded tha - indeed it is those differe is a clear commitment onnces which led to the partcreation of those in possession of such arms to work constructivelyis Body - they should not be allowed to achievobscure their removal from the political equations as part of the process of all-party negotiations. However, no physical nearly universal support which exists for decommissioning will not occur prior to such negotiations.
The viewpeople of Northe vast majority of the organizationsrn Ireland are rightly and individuals whose views we received was that a decommissioning of arms will not occunderstandably sick of political and sectarian violence. For the quarter century prior to all party negotiations. It was the unanimothe cease-fires of August and emphatically expressed view ofOctober, 1994, the repy weresentatives of the political parties closely associated with the paramilitary organizations on both sides.2 Most tellingly, it was the unanimous view ofrincipal victims of a horrifying campaign of such violence. This must not continue.
Since the leadershipautumn of 1994, the security forces, nweetest sound in Northern Ireland south. The highest leadershiphas been the silence of both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Gardai wee guns. This must continue.
The divisions in Northern Ire clear and unequivocal in their views that the leaders of those political pare historic and deep. But we believe they arties could not obtain a prior decommissitweighed by the nearly universal longing of arms, regardless of theirthere for a just and lasting peace. It willingness to do so.
It be an immense tragedy if this oppossible to debate the morality or wisdom of such a circumstancertunity for peace is lost. We believe there is a way forward. It is a hard fact with whichwill require courage and involve risk for all concerned must deal.
Iit does not follow, logically or morally, that substantive alll party talks should begin without further commitment. To the contrary, it. But we believe the necessary will and resoluteness exist in the people with whom we met, and is necessary to affirm certain principleshe million and practica half morequirements to which all we did not meet but whose parties should commit or recommit before the commenceence we felt. At this critical moment of such negotiations.
Accin their histordingly, we recommend that each partyurge their leaders to such talks publicly express its total and absolute commitmenteize this opportunity.
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1. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
2. To renounce any use of force, or threat of the use of forcehe directly relevant portions of the Communique are paragraphs 5 through 8. They read as follows: "quote paragraph 5 through 8." The full text of the Communique is attached as Annex A to this report.
3. To the total and verifiabl2. We did not communicate disarmament of allrectly with paramilitary organizations, to. On the satisfaction of an independLoyalist side, the representatives of thirde political party, as part of thies with whom we spoke reprocess of all party negotiented to us that they were speaking authoritatively ons, and to accept behalf of the need to advanceparamilitary organizations on the actualissue of decommissioning of arms i. On the course of all-party negotiations, as a meanRepublican side, representatives of promoting the search for an agreed political settlement;
4. To accept and abide bSinn Fein answered "No" when asked if they were speaking authoritatively for the Irish Republican Army on the principlissue of deconsent, as contammissioning of arms. They acknowledged having played in tha role Downing Street Declaration, wi encouraging the IRA cease-fire of Auguspect to any agreement reach31, 1994,, and stated by the partiesat they would, in all party negotppropriations.3
4. [Possible Alternative Language for Principle No. 4: To agreecircumstances, attempt to plabide by the terms of any outcome ofa similar role in connection with all party negotiations to which a majorit.
3. A copy of the people in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland give their assent andDowning Street Declaration is attached as Annex C to this resport.
4. The besto evidemocratic and exnce for this conclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome is the cease-fire itself. Notwith which they may disagree.]
5. To not participate in or condonstanding some repugnant lapses, the so-called punishment killings ained beatings and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.]
In order to be meaningfulobservance of the cease-fire for nearly a year and effa half reflective, s a cruchial commitments would, of course, have to appl by to the paramilitary organizations themselves, as well as to the political parties with which they are closely associated.
eace process. The divisions in Northern Ireland are historic and deep. But we believe they are outweighed by the nearly universal longingexistence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a significant factor a jwhich must and lasting peace. we believe the necessary will and resolutenbe given due weight in assess exist ing the people with whom we met, and incommitment of the paramillion and a half more we did not meet but whose presence we felt. At this critical moment intaries to "work constructively to achieve" their history we urge removal of weapons from their leaders to seize this opportunity political process.
5. Different views were expressed to us as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communique, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share that view. There is not equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorized. If there is to be any discussion of lawfully authorized weapons it must occur elsewhere, not in this Report.