The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
Version 6
On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United .Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communique which announced the launching of "a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations"in Northern Ireland."
One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." Thiis has become known ason the political track.
The other track concerned decommissioning, and was set forth as follows, in paragraphs five through eight of the Communique:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an IInternational Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on th" We arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
We who constitute the International Body form an outside group with no stake in the issue of Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict there and in the ability of its people to live in peace. If we have a useful role to play in the current process it is to bring a fresh and unbiased perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help.
To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings, in Belfast, Dublin and London; the first December 15 through 18, 1995, the second January 110 through , 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other relevant persons. A list of all of those with whom we met is attached as Annex A. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Submissions from those who suffered losses during tThe period of troubles but are strongly commited to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences among us.
Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who have briefed us or who have made written representation to us, convince us that not only is there no simple solution to the problem, but that the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already well-known to the parties involved. While we can indicate the way we believe these factors should be handled, so that decommissioning of arms and a move to all-party negotiations can proceed, only a resolute approach to the issues by the parties themselves, including the commitment to trust and, where necessary, the acceptance of some degree of risk, will allow substantial progress to be made. It is clear from our discussions and from the submissions received that the depth of pain and distrust is such that no single gesture can be sufficient to overcome each community's deep suspicion of the other, and that the trust and confidence required to bring about the removal of the gun from Irish politics can only be developed through a process of engagement involving both words and deeds.
We are aware of the enormous contribution made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to the stage it is now. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister Major, and of Taoiseachs Bruton and |Reynolds have been essential precursors to a lasting peace. We recognize as well have the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organizations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the twenty-five years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. The events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus is to remain on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. That knowledge alone encourages us in making the suggestions we do in this report, suggestions which may not please everybody but which nonetheless we feel are necessary in pointing the way towards a lasting solution.
After all our interviews and our reading we remain convinced that the shared will of the vast majority in Northern Ireland is to seek a just and lasting peace and the establishment of a democratic process of government in which violence or the threat of violence can play no part. Members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe. The path to an honourable and lasting solution is there for those courageous enough to take it.
Despite the short time w, we believe that.
DISCUSSION AND Inadditito asking us to provide an indepeRECOMMENDATIONS
I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have beendent assessment of the decommissioning issue, the Governments asked us to answer two specific questions:
(1) "to identify and advise on largely suitablent in Northern Ireland. and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and" (2) "to report whetherPeople want peace. That is one thing on which all with whom we spoke agreed. It was the dominant theme expressed in there is a clear many letters and callitn thes we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nati of those in possession of such arms to work constructivelyalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
Notwithstanding reprehensible punishment killings and beatings which have occurred,[their removal from the sustained observancequation.]"
(1) [Ins lguage toond to first question; drafth sustai bervane of provceasefire for nearly a year and by General de C half reflects a commitment by the paramilitary organizations to the peace process. The existstelain.]
(2) We cannot answerence of the ceasefire itself should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" the removal of weapons from second quethout reference pto timingolitical process.
Since the ceasefires because we have concluded that thee political debate has focused largely on the ds a clear comifferences that havent oprevented the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achiecommencement of all party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This has tended to obscure the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread, in fact, that it tends to be taken for granted.
No one should underestimateirmoval from the valuepolitical equation as part of the consensus for peace, and the fact thaprocess of all-party negotiations but no significant group is actively seeking to end itt as a prior condition to such negotiations.
II. We were asked to deal with the issue of decommissioning. It is a serious problem. But it is also a symptom of a larger problem that may be described in a word: trust. Or,believe that a decommissi of arms will not occurore precisely, the lack of trust.
Put simply, neither side trusts the other. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issiue - will not be found if theo all party negotiations. That was the view ofartis resort to their packed arsenals of historical recriminations. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. In this situation, trust can only be built if all parties are willing to take steps that build confidence in others. This will require courage and involve risk. But the risks of a continued lack of trust are much greater.
III. We are sape of our timportasfied that everyone with whom we spokeo reach an agrees in principle with decommissioning. There are differencd politicreceived. It wasunanimouvehemelyexsed viewreentatives on timing and context of decommissioning - indeed it is those differences which led to the creation of this Body - butfpolitical parties closely associated withparamilitary organizations on both sides.2 Most tellingly, it wasanimous view of leadership of thforcnorth and south. The highIII. Wleadership of both they sho Royal Ulster Constabulary and not be allowed to obscurere satisfied that he nearlyGardai were clear and unequiversal support which exists focal in their views that the leaders of those political parties could not obtain a prior decommissioning.
IV. With respect to they wanted first of the specifi.
It possible to debatec questions contained in paragraph seven of the Communique, mor,the modalities of decommissioning, we recommend the following principles, recognizing that specific details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation:
The decommissioningy or wdomsuch a circumstance. It is not processible to should suggest neither victory noreriously debate its reality. It is a hard fact with which all concerned must defeat
Although decommissioning process should be supervised by, and should take place to the saof arms will not occur prior to all party negotisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission ws, it does not follow, logically or morally, that such talks should be appointed by the British and Irish Governgin without further commitments on. To the basis of consultations with the other partitrary, it is appropriate and necessary to the negotiatestablish certaing process.
The commission should be able to operatinciples and practical requirements to which all parties must commit before without hindrance in both jurisdice commencement of such negotiations.
Accordingly, and should enjoy appropriate legalwe recommend that each party to such tatus and immunity. In addition to having availlks publicly ex
and press its total and absolute to it independent sources of legalcommitment
1. To democratici and technical advice and adequate fieldexclusively peaceful methods of resources tlving political issues;
2. To renounceive and audit armaments and to observe and verifyy use of force, or threat of the decommissioning prouse of forcess, the commissin connection should have available to itwith all party negotiations;
3. To the resourcestotal and the relevant technical expertverifiable disarmament of the British and Irish Armies.
Individuals orall paramilitary organizations wishing, to deposit armaments (including weapons, explosives,the satisfaction of ammunition and detonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which would result in the decommissioning of armaments, would havindependent third party, as part of the process of all party negotiations;
4. To accept and abide by the optionprinciple of doing so through the commissioconsent, as contained in or through the designatede Downing Street Declaration, with respect to any agresentatives ofement reached by the British or Irish Governmentparties in all party negotiations.3
The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly involved in4. [Possible Alternative Language for Principle No. 4: To agree to abide by the decommissioning process should be protected from prosecuterms of any outcome of all party negotiation relating tos to which a majority of the possession of those armaments, oeople in Northern Ireland and in the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a rRepublic ofIreld give their assent and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspeciesult of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisat outcome with which they may disagree.]
5. [Possible Addiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be fral Principle: To accept the need to organizadvance their participation in the actual decommissioning processof arms in they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit arma course of the all-party negotiations, as a means of promoting the search for an agreed political settlements on their behalf.]
The decommi6. [Possible Additional Pring process shouldciple: To not participate in or contribute to public safetydone so-called punishment killings and to generbeating confidence in the peacs and to take all feasible procesteps and in all-party negotiato prevent such actions.]
The decommiss7. [Any Additional Pring process could encompass a variety of methods, subjectciples?]
In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of course, have to negotiation, including:run to the paramilitary organizations the transfer ofmselves, as well armaments to the commission or topolitical parties with which the designy are closely associated representatives of ei.
For nearly a year and a half, ther government, for subsequuns have been largely silent destruction; Northe provision of informIreland. During thation toime the commission or to designpolitical debate has focused representativlargely on the differences of either governmat have prevent, leading to the discoverymmencement of armaments for subsequent destrucll party negotiation; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequs intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. That is understruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; andandable. But it is, in some respects, unfortunate. For it has tended to obscure the widestruction of armapread agreements by those currently in possessioat exist - so widespread, in ofact, them.
In all cases,at the decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction ofy tend to be taken for granted.
Most importantly issh the armaments. Procedureswidespread support for the destruction of armamentpeace itself. That is would include the physing on which all destruction of small arms andwith whom we spoke agreed. It was other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunitiodominant theme in the mand explosivey letters, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdiccalls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nations. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaalist, Catholic and Protestant.
The Governments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.
The decommissioning process wlevant parties should be fully verified by not underestimate the valuethe commission, which would record information required to monitor the decommissioning process effensensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is a, whichctively, other than seeking to end it.
Nearly all agree that which could be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In the gun must be taken out of Irish Politics. It appears that amonitoring those progress of the decommissioning process, the commissionnow committed to that proposition are those shhould have available to itwielded the guns over the relevant expertpast 25 years.4 There ise and data of the Garda Sio evident war weariness whichana leands the Royal Ulsther Constabulary. The commission would reimport periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved inant area of widespread agreement.
Everyone with whom we spoke agrees with the decommissioning process.
Dobjective of decommissioning should occur in the course of all-party negotiations
In view of.5 It is important to keep in mind the attention which the issue of decommissionat is being has attracted,proposed is a voluntary details regarding the modalities of the decommissioning process, includmament. Those with arms are being asked to gpractical confidence-building measures and a timetable for decommissioning, should receive a high priority them up and to join otherD all-party negotiations. Decomm peaceful, democratic to resolve political issues. It is sioning shouldgnificant that almost all ofshoccur in the course of all-party negotiations and should take place simultaneously between Loyalistsoswho possess arms are willgage such a process.
While there are obvious deep differences on the timing and Republicans.
context of dV. With regard to the second of the two specific questions in paragraph seven of the Communique, we have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of - indeed it is those differences which led to those in possesscreation of such arms to work constructively to achievethis Body - their removal from the political equation as part ofy should not be allowed to obscure the process of all-party negotiations, but not prior to such nearly universal support which exists for, butnegotiations.
The viewpeople of Northe vast majorn Ireland are rightly of the organizationsand understandably sick of political and individuals whosectarian violence. For the quarter cent made oral and/or written submissions was that a decommissioning of arms would not occury prior to all-party negotiations. the cease-fires of Aug-This was the unanimous and emphaticallust and October, 1994, they wexpressed view of the representativeincipal victims of the political parties close to the paramilitary organizations on both sides. a horrifying campaign of such violence. This must not continue.
Sinceclose toWe reached this conclusion only after careful consideration based upon intensive discussions of theautumn1994, weetest sound in NernIrel has been tbject with sinceguns. This must continue.
The divisions in Northern Iare historic and deep. But we believewiGovernments, the political py arties, the religious leaders, the leadership of the secutweighed by the nearly universal lty forces, north and south, and with many others.
It is possible to debate the moralgthere for a just and lasting peace. It be an immense tragedy if this opportunity for wisdom of such a circumstancepeace is lost. We believe there is a way forward, but it will require courage and involve risk fornonetheless a fall concerned. But we believe th which all concerned must deal.
e necessary will and resoluteness exist in the peopleEven though there will not be decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations, it does not follow that such negotiations should begin without further whom we met, andcommitments by the participants. On the contrary, it is necessary to affirm certain principleshe million and practica half morequirements to which all we did not meet but whose parties should adhere before the commencence we felt. At this critical moadhement of such negotiationsin their hist, in order to create the trust and confidence necessary to the success of all-party negotiations. On the basis of our discussions, we are satisfied that all parties that would participate in all-party negotiations are able to reaffirm commitment to such principles.
VI. Accordingly, we recommend that each partyurge their leaders to such eize this opportunity.
________________________________negotiations publicly reaffirm its total and absolute commitment
1. Tohe diremoctly relevant portic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;
2. To renounceons of the Communique are paragraphs 5 through 8. They read as follows: "quote paragraph 5 for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threathrough 8." The full texten the use of force, to influence the course of Communique is attached as Annex A to this reportcor the outcome of all party negotiations;
3. To the total and verifiabl2. We did not communicate disarmament of allrectly with paramilitary organizations,. On the Loyalist side, the representatisfaction of an independentvelitiies with whom we spoke represented to us thagry were speaking authoritatively on behalf of third paramilitary, organd to agree thatizations on the issue of decommissioning of arms. Oshould occur in the course of all-party negotiations;
4. To aRepublican side, representativeSinn Fein answered "No" when asked if they were speaking authoritatively for the Irish Republican Armgree to abide by the terms of any outcome of all-party negotiations to which a majority of the people in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland, respectively, give on their assent and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspectissu of dethat outcommissime with which they may disagree.
5. Not toTo not participate in or condone so-called punishment killings ang of arms. They acknowledged havbeatings, and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of course, have to apply to the paramilitary organizationplayed a role in encouraging the IRA cease-fire of August 31, 1994,, and stated thaty organizs themselves, as well as to the political parties to which they are close.
VII. A commitment to these principles by all of the partiesy would, would be significant. Those who seek decommissioning prior to all-party negotiationsppropriate circumstances, attempt- do so out of concern that those political parties associated with paramilitary organizations will use force, or threaten to use force, to get their way in the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given thpl a similar role in connection withhistory of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern.
The commitments we recommend deal directly with those concerns. Each party to the negotiations.
3. A copwould publicly express its total and absolute commitment, first in general terms to democratic and exclusively peDowning Street Declaration is attached as Annex Caceful means of resolving political issues; and then, in the specific context of the negotiations, (a) to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or to threaten the use of force, to influence the course or outcome of such negotiations; and (b) to this abide by any outcome of such negotiations and to use democratic and export.
4. The best evidence for thi uses conclusively peaceful methods in tryon is the cease-fire itself. Notwithstanding to alter any aspectsome repugnant lapses, the sustained observance of that outcome with which they disagree.
e cease-fire for nearly a year and a half reflects a crucialThis latter commitment expresses the principle of consent: the fundamental understanding that the future of Northern Ireland must be decided by the people of Northern Ireland.
We have been told repeatedly that this principle is one of profound significance and that until now it has not been accepted by all parties. If all parties do so now, it would be for the first time, and it would be a major step in helping to create a climate of trust for all-party negotiations.
Taken together, these commitments, if made and honored, would effectively preclude the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, before, during, and after all-party negotiations. They should enable all parties to enter negotiations with confidence that force will not in any way be a factor. That alone should help lead to meaningful negotiations.
But the principles we recommend go further. They would also require all parties to commit to the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, to the satisfaction of an independent third party, as part of the process of all-party negotiations, and accept the need to advance actual decommissioning in the course of such negotiations. These too would be significant steps in the confidence-building process.
The final principle deals with punishment killings and beatings. These brutal actions have been rightly condemned by the Governments b, religious and community leaders, and many others. They contribute substantially to the fear that those who have used violence to resolve political issues in the past will do so again in the future. Participants in all-party negotiations would commit not to participate in or condone such acts and to take effective steps to prevent them from occurring.
Taken as a whole, the public commitment of all participants to these peace process. rinciples - some of them for the first time - should be a sufficient basis for all participants to enter into all-party negotiations, secure in the knowledge that it will be truly an exercise in democracy, not a process skewed by violence, or the threat of violence. That will be progress.
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We note for the record that, in the course of our dexistence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a siongnificantcuss, subjects were brought up to us that are relevant to the peace process but beyond our remit. We make no recommendations but observe that subjects such as (but not limited to) paramilitary prisoners, legally held weapons in private hands, policing, emergency legislation, and human rights issues (for example, the fate of the "disappeared") offer further opportunities to build the trust and confidence that are the keys to a jact which must and lasting peace. be given due weight in assIn this connection, we welcome the commitment of the two Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communique, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."
Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected assembly. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communique to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected in accordance with accepted principles of fair and equitable representation express and reflect the will of the people. As noted, the political track is beyond the scope of our remit. But the importance of establishing trust and building confidence is not. An elected body chosen at a proper time and with ang appropriate commitment ofmandate could be a step, within the three-strand context, in the paraongoing process of establishing trust and taries to "work constructively to achieve"building confidence.
A final word: The divisions in Northern Ireland are historic and deep, but we believe they are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the removal of weapons from words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish polifetical processif today is the desire for peace." We are certain there is an opportunity to translate that desire into the reality of peace..