The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
22 January 1996
1. On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United .Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of "a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations"in Northern Ireland."
2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." Thiis has become known ason the political track.
3. The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an IInternational Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
- identify and advise on a suitable and" We acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
4. We are that Body. This is our report. We are an outside group with no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.
5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, December 15 through 18, 1995; the second, January 110 through 22, 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organisations, instof itutions, and individuals. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. TContributionsfrom those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
II. DISCUSSION
7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taosieach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organisations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations should be able to be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish governments to advance the peace process.
10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
11. Despite the short time w, we believe t"hat.
(1) "to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and" (2) "to report whetherre is a clearitn the of those in possession of such arms to work constructivelyNotwithstanding recent reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings,[their removal from theequation.]"
(1) [Ins lguage toond to first question; drafth sustai bervaned obsf provcease-firesby Generval de C ence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommi second queth12. out reference to timingssioning.
12. Since the cease-fires, because we have concluded that thee political debate has focused largely on the ds a clear comifferences that havent oprevented the part of those in po-session of such arms to work constructively to achiecommencement of all- party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists -- so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
13. No one should underestimateirmoval from the valuepolitical equation as part of the proconsensus for peace, and the fact thaof all-party negotiations but no significant group is actively seeking to end itt as a prior condition to such negotiations.
14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absencebelieve that a decommissiof arms will not occur of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue -- or any other issiue -- will not be found if theo all party negotiations. That was the view ofartis resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.
17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to deh an agreed politicreceived. It wasunanimouvehemelyexsed viewreentatives ofpolitical parties closely associated withparamilitary organizations on both sides.2 Most tellingly, it wasanimous view of leadership of thforcnorth and south. The highIII. Wleadership of both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and te are satisfied that ssion. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but thGdai were cleary should not obscure the nearly universal support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. That must continue to be a paramount objective.
equivocaleir views18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES thatmount OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCE
19. T obj19tivrties seek negotiations to reach an agreeitd politiio takecal settlement and to take They wleadersose political parties cant the gun taken out of Irish politicstain a pri, therbe must bepublic commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. PPspire tontsarticipantste in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to aved such principles.
20.
It possibleeo debatemoringly, we recommend the parties to such negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment:
a. Ty or wdomsuch a circumstance. It is nota. o democratic and exclusively peaible toeriously debate its reality. It is a hard fbct with which all concerned must deal.
Although peacsful means ofc resolving political issues;
b2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organiszations;
c3. To agree that such disarmament must be of arms will not occur prior to all party negoverifiable to the satisfaction of an independenttiations, it does not follow, logically or morally, that such talks should begin without further commissitment. To the contrary, it is;
d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort bropria an necessary to establish certain principlesors, to use force, or threaten to practical require to which all parties must commit before the commencement of suchr threateouse force, to influence the course or the outcome of all party negotiations.
Aceordingly, we recommend that each party to such talks publicly exons;
e5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached ins total and all-party negotiations and soutcommitment
1. To democraticexclusively peaceful methods ofto resort lving political issues;
2. Trto democratic and nouny use of force, or threat ofexclusively peaceful methods in tryinguse tof forin connectwith alter anl party negotiations;
3. Toaly aspect of thatotal and verifiable darmamnt outcome wall paramilith arywhich they may disagree; and,
f. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
21 of an independent third party, as part of the process of all party negotiations;
4. To accept and abidbe meaningfulciby principlene in the Downing Street Declaration, withcourse, have to apply. nt reached bGparties in all party negotiationptions themselven.4. [Possible Alternative Language for Principle No. 4: To agree to abide byWe join the Governments, religious terms of any outcome of all party negot"ialeaders, "and many others in condemning "punishment" killings and beatings. They contribute to thes to which a majority ofeople in Northern Ireland and iRepublicIreld give their assent and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspecht that outcome with which they maypursuree.]
5. [Possible Adose who have used violence to pursuresolve politicalal Principle: To accept the ndadvanc actualobjectives inofrm in the course of the all-party negotiations, as a means of promoting the search for an agreed political settle past will do so again in the.]
6. [Possible Addit future. Such actions haveal Prciple: To not participate in ordone so-called punishment killingsbes and to take all feasiblsteto prevent such ac.]7. [Any Addital Prciples?]
In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of course, have run to the paramilitary organizations place in a lawfumselves, as llpolitical parties with whichl society. alessoci.
For nearly a year and a half, uns have been largely silNorrn Ireland. During thime:
6. To urgelitical debate has focused largely on the differenc at have prev mmence of all party negotias intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. That is understandable. But it is, in some respects, unfortunate. For it has tended to obscurewipread agreeat exist - so widespread, iact,at22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to y tend to be taken for granted.
Most importantly isinfluence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given the historywid histoeyspread supportpeace itself. That iing on whh l with whom we spoke agreed. It wasther of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The principledominant theme is we recommend address those coctly. Each partthe my lettercalls we received fro,m people, north and south, Unionist and Nayalist, Catholic and Protestant.
The Governmentse relevanrshnot underestimate the valuensensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is a seeking to end it.
23d also commitaken out of Irish Politics. It appears that aosnow committed to that proposition are thosehwieldedguns over. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove the pa 25 ys.4re an evident war wewhich leads tothreat of force before, during and after all-party negotiations. Tnt areabe mutuwidespread agreement.
Everyone with whom we spoke agrees witobjectiv.5 It is important to keep in mind that what is bey would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramiliposed is a vontary organisatiormamens. Thatose with should encourage the belief that the peace process will truly be an exercise keedin democrac ty.
IV. COMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING
24. The second of the specific questp ions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to report whether there is a clear coandmmitmen t on the part of those ina possession of such arpems to work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.
c re25. We havsol willgage ucroncess.
Whiluded that there are obvious a clear commitment on thedeep differences on the timingcontext of d of all paramilitary of those in possession of such armsrganizations. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objective.
We are unable to answer that question work constructivelyithout reference to timing. That is because w - indeed it is those differences which led to achieve the creation of this Body - they should not bfull and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive discussions with the Governments, the politicallowed to obscureparties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilitary organisations earlysuniverswill not decommissionindivid any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That ho made oral and written submissions. It was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the vast majority of the organisations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must deal.
27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms, and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and should not now be able to avoid that requirement.
28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the cease-fires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no further requirements.
29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonablpeopleNorrn Ireland are rightlyunderstandably sick of political and sectar
30.ian violencr cente concern which deserves to be understood and addressed by the other side.
30. Those who at present refuseythe cease-fires of AugtOctober, 1994,y weipal victims of a horrifying campaign of such violence. This must not continue.
Sincee to insist on prior decommissioning need to be reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violenc tsinceguns. This must continue.
The divisions in Northern Iare historic and deep. But we believewiyy that prior decommissioning will not occurtweighed by the nearly universal lgthere for a just and lasting peace. It be an immense tragedy if the isugenuini and irreversible, and the is lost. We believe there is a way forward owill require courage and involve risk forn necessary will and resoluteness exist in the peopler decommissioning is needed to creat th threat or use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of, ande trust and he million negotiations or to change any agreeda hfmo we did not meet but whoseence we felt. At this critical mosetlement.
31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon vin their histiolence for the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaningful and inclusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their traditions and the need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.
32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.
V. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS
33. The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take placeurge their leadersduring the process of all-party y eize this opportunity.
________________________________negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.
34. Such an approach represents a middle course. It offers a compromise that enables allare paragraphs 5 through 8. Theparticipate inue is all-party negotiatittached as Annexat2ons.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING
35. The first of y for the Irish Republican Armproc5ssTthe specific questinsistence that no decommissions in paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to identify and adviocadvcse on ura suitable and acceptable meth uod for full and verifiable ntdecommissioning."
38. With respect to the first of the specific questions contained in the Communiqué, we recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. Tthese recommendations are realistic in light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, estimates of which were provided to us by the governments and their security forces. We believepl a similar role in connection withese estimates to be accurate.
37. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.
a. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat.
38. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through polit.
3. A copical means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any pDowning Street Declaration is attached as Annex Carty be seen to surrender.
b. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to public safety.
39. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal.
40. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiation, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designated representatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; and the destruction of armaments by those currently in possession of them.
41. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.
c. The decommissioning process should be verified by an independent commission.
42. The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.
43. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
44. Individuals or organisations wishing to deposit armaments for decommissioning (including weapons, explosives, ammunigotitions and detoport.
4. The best evidence for thidenators), or to provide information which could result in the decommissioning of armaments, should have the option of doconclusiong so is the cease-fire itself. Nothrough the commission or through the designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties should also have the option of destroying their wstanding some repugnant lapses, the sustained observance of the cease-fire for nearly a year and a half reflects a crucialeireapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.
45. The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.
d. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution.
46. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction.
47. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.
e. ouThe d Decommissioning process g should be mutual.
48847. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organisations. This offers the parties an opportunity to use the process of decommissioning to sotbuild confidence one step at a time during negotiations.
VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
49. It is important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our dexistence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a siongnificantcuss, many subjects other than decommissioning were raised which are relevant to the development of trust. We make no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit. But we believe it appropriate to comment on some of them since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the decommissioning of arms.
50. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.
51. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So, too, would early implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.
52. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and actwhich m be given due weight in assthose lawfully authorised. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."
53. We share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as feasible. A review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons, the use of plastic bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced representation in the police force, would contribute to the building of trust.
54. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected in accordance with democratic principles express and reflect the will of the people. If it were broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand process, an elective process could contribute to the building of confidence.
55. Finally, in our meetings, the importance of further progress in social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its communities was emphasised time and again in the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting peace.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
56. Last week we stood in Batandthe centand re oedelfast and lookeding at a thirty fand at barriers oot high walliron and at barriersl topped with bebed wiron and barbed wireeies to "work constructively to achieve".
IX. Theat wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of Northern Ireland into two hostile groups. To the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves they are fearful and hostile.
57. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There mweis a powerful desire for peaf one of those with whomce in Northern Ireland. political process It is that desire wh8ich creates the present opportunity.
589. This is a critical time inT the history of Northern Ireland. TEither the peace process will move forward or tshis society could sliip bac k to the59 horror of the pacst quarter cenatury.
5960. Rigid nadheren ce by the parties to their panw heit prst positioans will simply continute the stalemate ewhich has alread y lastedd too long. In a socieocsety as deeply divided" as Northern ithc"rneIreland, reach ing acrosso the "peace line" requires a willingness to take risks for peace.
60. The risk is high butss the oreward is rigreaterspe: a future of .
Wepeace, equality and prosperity. indeeall of Jhe issues - in this light.
George J. AMitchell John de Chastelain Harri Holkeri
22 January 1996