The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
Twelfth Draft
On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United .Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching of "a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."
One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." Thiis has become known ason the political track.
The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth in the Communiqué:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an IInternational Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to se" We all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
We are an outside group with no stake Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring a fresh and unbiased perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help.
To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London; the first December 15 through 18, 1995, the second January 110 through 21, 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other relevant persons. A list of all of those with whom we met is attached. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. TContributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences among us.
Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed, so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Ministers Major and Bruton (and before him Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organizations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. The events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. That knowledge encourages us in making our recommendations.
We are convinced that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland seek lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which violence or the threat of violence plays no part. Members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
Despite the short time w, we believe that.
DISCUSSION AND Inadditito asking us to provide an indepeRECOMMENDATIONS
I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have beendent assessment of the decommissioning issue, the Governments asked us to answer two specific questions:
(1) "to identify and advise on largely suitablent in Northern Ireland. and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and" (2) "to report whetherAll with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. It was the dominant theme expressed in there is a clear many letters and callitn thes we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nati of those in possession of such arms to work constructivelyalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
Notwithstanding recent reprehensible punishment killings and beatings, the sustained observanc[their removal from theequation.]"
(1) [Ins lguage toond to first question; drafth sustai bervane of provceasefiresby General de C flects a commitment by the paramilitary organizations to the peace process. The existstelain.]
(2) We cannonrence of the ceasefire itself should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" the removal of weapons from second quethout reference pto timingolitical process.
Since the cease-fires because we have concluded that thee political debate has focused largely on the ds a clear comifferences that havent oprevented the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achiecommencement of all party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread, in fact, that it tends to be taken for granted.
No one should underestimateirmoval from the valuepolitical equation as part of the consensus for peace, and the fact thaprocess of all-party negotiations but no significant group is actively seeking to end itt as a prior condition to such negotiations.
II. We were asked to deal with the issue of decommissioning. It is a serious problem. But it is also a symptom of a larger problem that may be described in a word: Trust. Or,believe that a decommissi of arms will not occurore precisely, the lack of trust.
Put simply, neither side trusts the other. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issiue - will not be found if to all party negotiations. That was the pview ofarties resort to their packed arsenals of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. Establishing trust will require courage and involve risk. But the risks of a continued lack of trust are much greater.
III. We are sape of our timportasfied that everyone with whom we spoke ago reach an agreed politicreceived. It wasunanimouvehemelyexsed viewreentatives in principleofpolitical parties closely associated with decommissioning. There are differenceparamilitary organizations on bothe tim sides.2 Most tellingly, it wasand context - indeed those differences led to the creation of this Body - butimous view of leadership of thforcnorth and south. The highIII. Wleadership of both they should not be allow Royal Ulster Constabulary and te are satisfied to obscure that he Gardai were clearhe t and unearly universal support which exists fquivocal intheir views that the leaders of those political parties could not obtain a prior the total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations of arms, even if. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objective.
IV. With respect to they wanted first of the specifi.
It possible to debatec questions contained in paragraph seven of the Communiqumoré, the modalities of decommissioning, we recommend the following principles. These recommendations reflect what we understand to be accurate estimates of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question. We believe the principles should be acceptable to all who would participate in the negotiations. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation.
1. The decommissioningy or wdomsuch a circumstance. It is not1. processible to should suggest neither victory nor defeat
eriously debate its reality. It is a hard fact with which all concerned must deal.
AlthoughThe ceasefires and the peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the decommissioning process, which should not require that any party lose face.
The decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfacof arms will not occur prior to all party negoverifitiation of, an independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission ws, it does not follow, logically or morally, that such talks should be appointed by the British and Irish Governgin without further commitments on. To the basis of consultations with the other partitrary, it is appropriate and necessary to the negotiatestablish certaing process.
The commission should be able to operatinciples and practical requirements to which all parties must commit before without hindrance in both jurisdice commencement of such negotiations.
Accordingly, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having availwe recommend that each party to such talks publicly ex
and press its total and absolute to it independent sources of legalcommitment
1. To democratici and technical advice and adequate fieldexclusively peaceful methods of resources tlving political issues;
2. To renounceive and audit armaments and to observe and verifyy use of force, or threat of the decommissioning prouse of forcess, the commissin connection should be able to with all party negotiations;
3. Tobcall upon the resourcestotal and the relevant technical expertiseverifiable disarmament of the British and Irish Armiesall paramilitary, when it is appropriate.
Individuals or organizations wishing, to depositthe satisfaction of armaments (including weapons, explosives, ammunition and detonators) for decommidependent third party, as part of the processioning, or to provide informf all party negotiation which would result ins;
4. To accept and abide by the decommissioningprinciple of armamconsents, would haveas contained in the option of doDowning so through the commission or through the designated representatives ofStreet Declaration, with respect to any agreement reached by the British or Irish Governmentparties in all party negotiations.3 Parties would also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verificatsion byf the commission.
2. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly involved in4. [Possible Alternative Language for Principle No. 4: To agree to abide by2. the decommissioning process should be protected from prosecuterms of any outcome of all party negotiation relating tos to which a majority of the possession of those armaments, oeople in Northern Ireland and in the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a rRepublic ofIreld give their assent and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspeciesult of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisat outcome with which they may disagree.]
5. [Possible Addiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be fral Principle: To accept the need to organizadvance their participation in the actual decommissioning processof arms in they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit arma course of the all-party negotiations, as a means of promoting the search for an agreed political settlements on their behalf.]
3. The decommiss6. [Possible Addit3. ional Pring process shouldciple: To not participate in or contribute to public safetydone so-called punishment killings and to generbeating confidence in the peacs and to take all feasible procesteps and in all-party negotiato prevent such actions.]
The decommiss7. [Any Additional Pring process could encompass a varietyciples?]
In order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of methods, subjectcourse, have to negotiation, including:run to the paramilitary organizations the transfer ofmselves, as well armaments to the commission or topolitical parties with which the designy are closely associated representatives of ei.
For nearly a year and a half, ther government, for subsequuns have been largely silent destruction; Northe provision of informIreland. During thation toime the commission or to designated representativpolitical debate has focused largely on the differences of either governmat have prevent, leading to the discovery of armammencements for subsequent destruc of all party negotiation; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent s intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. That is understruction, by the commission or by representatives of either government; andandable. But it is, in some respects, unfortunate. For it has tended to obscure the widestruction of armapread agreements by those currently in possessioat exist - so widespread, in ofact, them.
In all cases,at the decommissioning process should resuly tend to be taken for granted.
Most in the complete destruction ofortantly issh the armaments. Procedureswidespread support for the destruction of armamentpeace itself. That is would include the physing on which al destruction of small arms andl with whom we spoke agreed. It was other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunitiodominant theme in the mand explosivey letters, and other forms of conventional munitions disposcalls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, within the two jurisdictions. Priority shoulCatholic and Protestant.
The Governmentssha and be accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handledrelevant parties should not underestimate the valuethe consensus for peace, and stored, and are not misappropriated.
The decommissionthe fact that no significant group is a, whichctively seeking process would be fully verified byto end it.
Nearly all agree that the commission, which would record information required to monitor the process effectively, othergun must be taken out of Irish Politics. It appears than that which could be deemt among osnow committed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoring progthat proposition aress, the commissionose shhould have available to itwielded the guns over the relevant data of the Garda Siopast 25 years.4 There is an evident war weariness whichana leands the Royal Ulster Constabularyo the s4. The commission would reimport periodically to relevant partiant areabe mutuwides on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.
4. Decommissioning should be mutual
Details regarding the ead agreement.
Everyone with whom we spoke agrees witDobjectiv.5 It is important to keep in mind that what is beimplementation of the decommissioning process, including proposed is a voluntary disarmament. Those with arms are being asked to gsupporting confidence-building measures and its timing and sequencing, shoulive them up and to join otherproce a peaceful, democratic resolve a high prioritypolitical issues. It is significant the process of at almost all ofshall-party negotiationsoswho possess arms are willgage ucrocess.
While there are obvious deep differences on the timingcontext of d Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organizations.
V. The second specific question to which we were asked to respond was "to report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve [full and verifiable decommissioning]."
We are unable to answer that question without reference to timing. That is because we have conclu - indeed thait is there is a clear commitment on the part ofose differences which led to those in possesscreation of such arms to work constructively to achieve this Body - they should not bfull and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
Prior decommissioning is unlikely to occur. We reached that conclusion only after careful consideration, based upon intensive discussions with the Governments, the political e allowed to obscureparties, religious leaders, the leadership of the security forces, north and south, and many others. That was the view of the vast majority of the the nearly universal support which exists fororganizations and individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that they all are opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, many favor it. But they are convinced that it cannot happen and will not happen. That washo malso ade oral and written submissions. It was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to the paramilitary organizations on both sides.
The morality and wisdom of such a circumstance was the subject of intense debate by many of the participants in our meetings, but it is nonetheless a circumstance with which all concerned must deal.
The parties may wish to consider, as an alternative, an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.
From one side has come the demand that there must be some decommissioning before negotiations can begin. From the other has come the insistence that no decommissioning can occur until the very end of the process, after negotiations have produced an agreed political settlement.
An approach under which some decommissioning takes place during the process of the negotiations represents a middle course. It offers each side the opportunity to participate in a reasonable compromise that enables all to move forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations leading to an agreed political settlement.
VI. On this crucial issue, two competing views were presented to us.
One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles and of a permanent end to the use of violence is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the ceasefires were announced and no party should now be able to avoid that requirement.
The competing argument was that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the ceasefires; indeed, if it had been, there would have been no ceasefires. Those who entered into the ceasefires did so in the good faith belief that they would lead directly and immediately to all-party negotiations; and the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the ceasefires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the ceasefires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately, with no further requirements.
We accept part of each presentation.
For those who dempeopleNorrn Ireland prior decommissioning are rightlyunderstandably sick of political and sectarian violence. For the quarter cent demand priorit appears likely that there is a need for something to provideythe cease-fires of AugtOctober, 1994,d they weconfidence rinecessary to enable all-party negotiations to bncipal victims of a horrifying campaign of such violence. This must not continue.
For those who oppose decommissioning it appears likeltumn1994, weetest sound in NernIrelhas been tsinceguns. This must continue.
The divisions in Northern Iare historic and deep. But we believewiyy that prior decommissioning will not occur.
tweighed by the nearly universal lgthere for a just and lasting peace. It be an immense tragedy if thAs a result, even if the parties are able to agree onoprtunity for peace is lost. We believe there is a way forward owill require courage and involve risk forn e middle course we earlier suggested, more will be necessary will and resoluteness exist in the peopler decommissioning is needed to create the wtrust necessary to t, ande trust and n the millionbegin all-party negotiations. Indeed, the aba hfmo we did not meet but whoseence of we felt. At this critical moabs in their histprior decommissioning would increase the need to address the concerns of those who demand it. They are entitled to have the shadow of violence lifted from the peace process.
We believe there should be public commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. All those who aspire to participate in all-party negotiations should affirm their commitment to such principles.
VII. Accordingly, we urgecommend that parteir leadersies to such eize this opportunity.
________________________________negotiations publicly affirmaffirmtheir:
1. The directly relevant portions of the Communique are paragraphs 5 total anhrough 8. They read abs follows: "quote commitment:paragraph 5ll tex in .
12. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issuemmunique is attached as Annex A to this reportcos;
2. To the total disarmament of allWe did not communicat2directly with paramilitary organizations;
4. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable the Loyalist side, the representatisfactivecommissionlitii4ith whom we spoke represente;
5. Tus thy were speaking authoritatively on behalf ofparamilitary organizations on the issue of. Ocan side, representativeSinn Fein answered "No" whent commission;
4. To asked if they were speaking authoritatively for the Irish Republican Armprocessrenounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten the use of force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiationson and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspectissu of dethat outcommissime with which they may disagree.
in org of arms. They acknowledged havIn order to be meaningful and effective, such commitments would, of course, have to apply to the paramilitary organizationplayed a role in encouraging the IRA cease-fire of August 31, 1994,, and stated thaty organizs themselves.
VIII. y would,Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiationsppropriate circumstances, attempt- do so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten the use of force, to enable the political parties close to them to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given thpl a similar role in connection withhistory of Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern.
The commitments we recommend address those concerns directly. First, each party to the negotiations.
3. A copwould publicly affirm its total and absolute commitment, in general terms, to democratic and exclusively peDowning Street Declaration is attached as Annex Caceful means of resolving political issues. Second, in the specific context of the negotiations, each party would agree (a) to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or to threaten the use of force, to influence the course or outcome of such negotiations; and (b) to this abide by the terms of any e byagreement reached inme of such negotiations and to use democratic and export.
4. The best evidence for thi uses conclusively peaceful methods in tryon is the cease-fire itself. Notwithstanding to alter any aspectsome repugnant lapses, the sustained observance of that outcome with which they disagree.
e cease-fire for nearly a year and a half reflects a crucialThe principles would also commit all parties to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission.
These commitments, when made and honored, would preclude the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, before, during, and after all-party negotiations, They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: The total and verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That should encourage the belief that the peace process will be truly an exercise in democracy, not influenced by violence or the threat of violence.
IX. We join the Governments b, religious and community leaders, and many others in condemning punishment killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence to resolve political issues in the past will do so again in the future. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment that punishmuld be a suffient killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
X. It will be important for all participants to take practical steps to build confidence throughout the process of all-party negotiations. In the course of our dexistence of the cease-fire itself should not be devalued. It is a siongnificantcuss, many subjects were raised which, although outside our remit, are relevant to the peace process and to the development of trust. We believe it appropriate to address some of them, since an agreed political settlement resulting from all-party negotiations cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.
Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate the parties' commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons, and the return of those who have been exiled.
Early action by the Governments in implementing agreements regarding the transfer of relevant prisoners between jurisdictions would bolster trust, as would implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.
Different views were expressed to as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share the view that there is no equivalence between such weapons and actwhich m be given due weight in assthose lawfully authorized. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."
Likewise, a review of the situation with respect to legally registered weapons would contribute to the building of trust. We also share the hope, expressed by the Royal Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalized as soon as possible.
Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected assembly. We note the reference in paragraph three of the Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part." Bodies elected in accordance with accepted principles of fair and equitable representation express and reflect the will of the people. To be part of the peace process, an elected body should include the requisite parties, operagndate withcould bte in the three-strand process, and serve onpaly to facilitate agreement on all three strandsrusttaries to "work constructively to achieve".
IX. The divisions in Northern Ireland are historic and deep, but we believe they are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the removal of weapons from words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish polifetical processif today is the desire for peace." It is that force which creates the present opportunity. "Bold and courageous leadership can now translate the desire for peace into the reality of peace."