The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments issued a Communiqué which announced the launching in Northern Ireland of a " 'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."
2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.
3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:
"5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of opinion among us.
5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.
6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organisations, institutions and individuals. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public and met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
II. DISCUSSION
7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in advancing the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have been joined by other political leaders, institutions, organisations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
9. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance the peace process.
10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from those is the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
11. Notwithstanding reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.
12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists -- so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.
14. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked "to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue -- or any other issue -- will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families th can never and shouldat what never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the pastt wifll become the futurulelfuty e, and that is something no one can desire.
17. Ev probl7olitical track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.gree19n Etisfd that eryone with whkom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to iple with decommissioning. There ariffssioning. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support whices on thh exists for the timing indeed those differences led to the creation of this Body - mnut they shtal and verifiable disarmament of all pslaramilitary organisations. That mtil it is achieved ust continue to be, a paramount objective.
RE18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in the political track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES
raunt obj OF DEMOCRACY AND NON-VIOLENCEetiv19
19. T seek negotiations to reach an agreed political setd to takelement. Theyand to take the gun out takeof Irish politics, . Ireachieve those obthere must beublic commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracyPversal suT which exists for the total and non-violence. Participants inventsifiable disarmament of all- paramilitary negotiorganizations should affirm. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objectiv21. e.
IV0. With pct to their commitment to such fisof the specific questions contained in paragraph seven of the Communiqué, the modalities of decommissioning, we recommend the following principles.
20. Accordingly, These recommendations reflect what we recommeunderstand te be accurate estimates of the nature and scale of the arsenals inthat question. We bee the partirinciples should be acceptable to suchall who would participate in the negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation.
a. To1. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeatic
The ceasefires and exclusively peaceful meanthe peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness tof addresolvings differences through political issues;
b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;
c. To agmeans. This essential fact should bbe reflected clearl in the modalirties of the decommissioning process, swchich should not require that suchany party lose face.
The decommisarmament mustsioning process should be verifiabled by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission;
d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort acceptable to all parties. The commission woduld be appointed by others, to use force, British and Irish Governments or threaten to use force, to influence the coursbasis consultations with the or the outcome of all partyr parties to the negotiations;ng process.
e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached The commissioe should be able to operate without hindrance in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having all-party negotiationsvailable to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and toadequate field resorturces to democraticreceive and audit armaments and exclusively peaceful methods to observe and verify the decommissioning process, tryinghe commission should be able to call upon the resources any aspectd the relevant technical expertise of that outcome wBritish which they may disagreeand Irish Armies, when it is appro; and,riate.
f. V. Another prdividuals 6rfganizations wishingdeposit armaments (including weapons, explTo urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
21. We join the Governments, religious leaders22. The need 1us since we began our workbliclynitiondetonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which ould result in the dessioing of arma, have the optiond manyoing so through the commission or through the designated representatives ofe British or Irish Governments. Parties would also has needed. , subject to verification by the commission2. The decommissioning "punishment" killprocess should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly ignvGolved in the decommissioning process anshould be protected from prosecution relatings. They contribute to the fear tha to the possession of those armaments, on the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommission in""g, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of those who have used violence decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participatpursuion in the political objectivesdecommissioning processobjectiv as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.
Such actions. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety and to generating confidence in the past wieace process and in all-party negotiation They have
he decommissining process could encompa variety of methods, subjgoiation, including: the transfelace in a lawfuture. Sof armameto th co2mis or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of informatcie: 236. To urge the coission or to designated representat of eieveeading to have no place discovey of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of a lawful socirmaments for collection and subsequent destruction,y thecommission or by reresetives of eitr gorment; and heestructn of armaments by hose urrently in pession om.
22In all cases,V. the dThose who demand decommissioning prior to all-parsty negotiatiommissioning process should r o so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to enable the poliult ical parties cl Procthem to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given ures forhe destruction of armaments would include the physical dest histoructiony of small arms and oof Norther weapons, then Ireland, this is not an unreasonable controloncern. The princ
Thed explosion of ammunition a24. nd epriples, and other formsswe recommend addressosconcerns directly. First, each y to conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictioncerns directlys. Priority should be accordeEhout to ensuring that art, in generalerms, ha peacere not misappropriated.
23. These decommissioning process wo bfulymes requir to monitor the processe negotiions, effectiach party would agree to renouncly, other than thate use or threat of force to infyluence the negotiations ormonit3ito the totalisarmament of all paramilitary organiion of an independent the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The commission would honoureport periodically to relevant parties on 26. progressnmmission.
Tuhes commitenmov when o,red, would premov lude the use or threatdecommissioning process.
4. Decommissioning should be m of force, before, during and after all-party negot.o,iations. They would focus all, Tual
.Details regardinghe implementation of the decommissioning process, including supporting concerned on whatfidence-building measures and its ultimateling and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the processential if the gu of all-party negotiations. Decommissioning would take place on the basis to be taken out of Irish politics: of the mutual commitment and participationwfocus concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun isttan agreed political settlement and o be the total and verifiable disarmamentaken out of Irish politics: T of allthe paramilitarsy organiszations.
V. The second specific question to which we were asked to respond was "to reporshould encourage the belief tbe hat the peace process will be truly be an exercise in dIV. emocracy.
VIV. The second of theCommOMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING
24. The second of the s7pecific question4s we were asked to resin paragraph seven of the Communiquée asks us "to report whether there is a clear cowhetheréthere iemmitment on the par t of those in on the part of those in possession of such ossession of such arms to work constructively to achiems to work constructively to achi"ee [full and verifiable decommissioning.
25. Wn]." 28. [fut referen5e to timing. That is because we have c"oncluded that there is a clear commitment on th"e part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
26. A29. Ao occur. We6reached that conon the cluis ofly after careful consideration, on the basis ofgased upon intenGsive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilithary organisationserswas tse view will not decommission indivi any arms priorns. It to all-party negoti, nvBsut they areinced that will not happens. That was also the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the politicals parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the milvast majoriajtaity of the organisations and ganizindividuals who made oral and written submissions. Iit is not that theylItyy all are all opposed to re aprior decommissioning. To the contrary, manytance favour it. Buts they aryesue convinced that it will not happen. That is theof thrti reality with whichings, but it is nonetheless all concerned musircumstan30. ce prior de27. Ct deal.
27. Cadvancn .t competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. ews were presented to us.
One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that
the clearest demonstration of adherence ,to democratic principles, and of a permanent en,d to the use of violence, is the safe paramremoval and ditarysposal, of paramilitarlegally held arms,; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aed forware of the need forcessity- of prior decommissioning before the cease-fires werethashould not now and nounced and party should not now be able t31. We were tol28. Io avo:id that requiremen we were told.
28. In tThe competing view we were toldas that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requ-ested before the , and thatannouncement of the ceait se-fires, a; indeed, if i-t had; t had it bet ten, there would have been no ce-ase-fires; that t. Those who entered intoo the cease-fires did so in the belief that they would lead directly and immat thediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued- for the first time mon were declaredths after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a tactic to delay or deny -such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations s,hould begin imme32. diately, with no further requirements.
29. We believe th9a nurt each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concem honosrn which deserves to be understood and isiinaddressed by the other side.
303. Those who in r0sist on prior decommissiaions to beging .need to be reassured that opposthe commietment dto peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is ng wigenuinell and irreversible, and that the thrThrefor,h eat or usoe of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiationste the trust or to change any agrssayseed settlement.
31. Those4. Ttoso who hav1e been persuaded to abandon viotylence for nthe peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaning. Inful and incdeedlusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered to address of prior decothe legitimate concerns of thissioning increaeir traditions and tothe need fsor new political arrangements with which all can identify.
325. Clearly, new 2approaches must be explored to overcd eto is impaadow violence lifted from this impasse. That is te peace process.
We beelieve there should be public commitment and adherenat he purpose of the six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment tofundamentrinciples of democracy and non-violdemocracy and non-violence. All thatoswho aspire is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.
ci36. TAs an alternaV. DECOMMISSIONING DURING ALL-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS
33. T the parties shcould consider an approach under which some decommissioningeshin all-p alsoall partes to negotiatioparties may wshould take place duringaffirmir commitmh to suche procinciples considas of all-party negotiationsan alternatia ve,apprduringder which somVII. Accordingly,dessi, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.
Such4 an approach represwould ents a midsdle course. It offers each sd there must be some decompromissi;
2Tog befortotal disarmameall paramilitary organizations;
3. To agree that such disarmamenables allt must be saopportnity to participate in all- rendenprot commissione that enablparty negotiations.
VI. RECicipate ine insisir common otive:ngleading toan occur untilthe
5. Togree thOMMENVI. DATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONINGve: As an alternative, the rties could considrt toy ma.
35. The firsIn order to bd aninfAn ap5o. Such an approacly to the part of the specific questions ose who dem ase thall to move for38rd toward their commTin paragraph seven of the Communiqué asks us "to identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable odecommissioning."
36. We recommend Cé-partnegotiagreelitical settlementforce IIthe following guidelinesuse o on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations are ref force, tt enable aTalistic in light of the nature and scale ofthe political parties close to recommend the arsenals in question, m to influence the negotiatiestimates of which were providedgofornsGw, or to us by the Governments andchange any aspectW of their security forces. We believe these estimates to be accurate.
37 outcome oabf taations with which theandg36. Decommissionin7g should receive a high priority in all-party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.
The decommissioning process should suggest neither vicasreA. GiGvene history nof Nor defeat.
38. The cease-fires rn Ireland, the peace process are productsis isth no8t of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through polan unreasonab.l39. -e concern..7
The commitical means. This essential fact should bs we reflectecommend cleaddrly in the modalities ofs those decommissioning process, which should not require that anyrns directly. First, each party be seen to surrender.
to the negotiations woThe decommissioning process should place to the satisfaction of an independent commission.
39. The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission acceptabule to all parties. Theld commission would be appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the other parties to the negotiating process.
40. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.
41. In addition to having available to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
The dep40. The dbcommissioning process should result in the complete destructions of armaments in a manner that contributes to public sa9 42fety.
4238. The decommissioning process should result in the complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the cutting up and chippingruction of small arms and other weapons, the conortitrolled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal40sa3.
439. The decommission-buing process could encompass a variety of methodeas, subject to negotiuration, including:
-luds, :tthe tranimsfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated representatives of eitngs,of Gi her Goghvernment, afor subvsequent detostr
- theb provision of informe ation to the commission or to designated representatives of either Ghev paof Girtir governme nt, lteading to the discovhery of armaments tmsfor subsequent destruction; and,
-uction; the depositing of armaments for collection and ssubsequent destrhuction, by the co uommission or by represelntatived rs of eGither Ggovernment.
Parties should also have the entbyoption of destroying their weaponssion themselvesof 1he4.
44. Prio0. Phigh-prity should be accorded throughout to ensurinorg that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriatedtionc.
TBblicly affirm its total fully and abableomm2ss5. Whateraticbe seen to surrenderhe decommissioning pr ocess should be fully verifiable.
45. Whatever the options chosen for the destructian indepnt thirnrtclusively peac3fudns of resng ocal issues. nppendentlyecific context of the of armaments, including the destruction of weaponstiations, each party would agree (a) to renoe for th, and to oppose any effort by othe parties rs,of weabyse force, or to threaten the use of4 fthemselves, verificinfluence 43. sthe cou r u of such negotiations; and (b) tabide by the termation must occur to ty agreemshcshent reached sfacotisfaction of the commission.
46.ationanuemoshcratiand exclusively p5e6aceful44. methods in The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissiodiCning proc67ess.
The decommissiontrying process should not expose individuals to prosecution.
47. Individuals involved into .a45. ter any aspectnot suf com; amnesties should be with which they decommissioning process shagree.
The principles would not be prosecuted foralso commit all parties to the possessiontotal disarmament of those all parmaments; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Ailitary organizat
4687.ions, and to agree that suchs disarmaments made availust be verifiable for to the satisfaction of an independent commissioning.
These commitments, whetn madTher directly or indirectly, she and honored, would be exempt under law from . Dce,46. or e threatse ooreforensic examination, anrinnd after all-p negoey would information obtaicus all concerned as a result of the decommissioning process should what ultimately essentialis to be inadmissible as evidtakence in courts of law in eIrish politics: Ther jurisdiction.
48. Groups in possession of illegal armaments total and verifarmamof7. ptary organizations. That should be free to organisencourage their particip belief thation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalfpeacwilltruly an exercise in democracy, not influenced by olence or thnsreat olence.
The decommissioning IX. We join the Gov5. Deprocess rnm9n8Eshel7giould bes and community mutual.
49. DecommissionD.48. etaking would take place on the s,basis of the mutual commitment and participationny ofthers in condemning pun and beatings. Theyribute to the fear that paramilitary who save used violenctore organisations.zatolve politic in the past will do so again in the This offersure. Accordingly, wer es an oend that the parties an opportunitto suatio y to uselicly affirm the process of decommissioning to bir total and absolute cduild confidence incone step at a time VII. during negotiations.
VII. FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
50. It is important for all participantst9ent tunishment ki8lisgand beatin49top and to take effective steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many prevent such actions..
XII. It will be important for all participanturged that certain actions other than decommissioning ke steps to build onfidence tbe taken to issibuild confidence. Wised which, although outside our remit, are remake no recommendations on, b them since they are outside our rcomment onvantl the peace prode velopmealbeit briefly, but wnt of trust. We believe it appropriate to comment onisaddress some siofnce success in 150 of armsthe pea49ce process cannot be a50. chieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning of arms.
51. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information onced to leave the status of missing persons, andir communities u2d1r the return of those who have been forced to leave their communities under threat.atformat0. Continuedommunities, ws51. mphasized time and again in ishing . Soa too,sting pearly eace...)
52. ContinuedEarly action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust. So, as would early implementation 3n2of the proposed1 review of emergency l52. egislation, consistent with the evolvio tng security situation.
53. Different views were expressed to as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limiteatd to those weapons held illegally by paramilheld bn securitary forganisations. Wcese accept and share thate view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and held by security forcesthose lawfully authorized. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to ta4t3ke responsive m2easures, advised their respective security authorities as the threat reduces."
54. We share the hopeybl Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the security situation permits. A review of the situation wialized as soon as seasible. Ay their respect to legally registered weapons,ive security authorities, as the threat reduces."
Likewise, a re of plastr ic bullets, and continued progress toward more ets, and the continued ebalanced representation in theesenintion police force, would con5o4tribute to the cabu3building of trust.
55. Several oral licin54. g in Northern Ireland written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We can be normalized as soon as possible.
Sbelieve that, gnote the reference in paragraph threhe of th ve Communiqué to "whether and how an elec.E eleions hclted body could play a part." Elections held in accordance witheliwing democratic principles express and rmsneflect the cespopular cwille. If it were brommadly acceisptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within the three-strand eall-n sty negotiationsstructuress, an elective process could conhavetribute to tdy ahe c buildincang of confidence.
56. Fina aepta6l5 note ivelly, in the55. discuimportance of furthe ther progress in the social andssionsour meetingse economic developiment of Northehrn Irelan nd anhd its communities was empour meetings, in hasiszed time and again in our meetsings, in the context of building confidence and omestablishing amugni lasting pVIII. eace.
57. Last week we stood in Belfast7 6IX. The divisiece. In the words o iso kitieal and lookedr coedofli king at a thirty foot high wall and at barrieiron and rs igh wall topped with iron and barbed wire. Theeireand at wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangi of the peopleble symbol of the division of the people of Northern Ireland into two process, a oferve onlycommunitieacilhostile communitieo witring groups. To the outsider both and are warm and generous. Betweenonly withemselves they are fems antagonistic
IX. T8f7arful and antagonistichost6le.
58. Yet, it is now 58. clear beys eiond doubt that the n Norvast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away from the bitter past. There iclity and prosperityhey are outweigheT tnivis a powerful desire for peace in of onNorthern Ireland. It is that most potentdesirce which creates the present opportunity.i9 8rish life toda7 is
59. This is a criti59. cal time in the history of Northern Ireland. TT Either the peace process will move forward or this s society couldwill slip back to tthbaak couldhe horror of the pas60t9t quarter centu 58ry.
60. Rigid fadherenoce60. by the parties to their pare heiw phst positionsic will simply continue threate stalematese which has alreadty lastehd too long. In a socieoc ety as deeply divided as Northern pthrrneIrela"nd, reachins"eg across the "oppopeace line" retquires au willningness to take risks for peace.
61160. The risk may seemis high but the orol5reward is great
grehe: a future of ies tpeace, equality and prosperity for all the people of Northern Irelandty.issues
George JA. Mitchell John de Chastelain
Harri Holkeri
22 January 1996is light. courageous leadership can now translate that desire into the reality of peace.