The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
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Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
DRAFT welfth DraftFOURTEEN
INTRODUCTION
On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."
One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.
The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
We are an outside group with no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help.
We considered our task in the light of its responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations should be able to be realized; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the Briish and Irish governments.
To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, December 15 through 18, 1995; the second, January 11 through 21, 1996. In addition, we held an organizational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organizations, institutions, and individuals. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences of opinion among us.
Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed, so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Ministers John Major and John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organizations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
DISCUSSION
I. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been largely silent in Northern Ireland. All with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. They want lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. It was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people, north and south, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. The events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire. That knowledge encourages us in making our recommendations.
Notwithstanding recent reprehensible punishment killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the ceasefires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.
Since the ceasefires the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread, in fact, that it tends to be taken for granted. Indeed, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.
II. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning. It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a larger problem; the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issue - will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mindsets in Northern Ireland. Establishing trust will require courage and involve risk. But the risks of a continued lack of trust are much greater.
III. (add language to the effect that what we say or do will not fully solve the problem)
III. EWe are satisfied that everyone with whom we spokle agrees in principlEtisfd that eryone with wkom we spoke agrees in princthe need to iple with decommissioning. There ariffssioning. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support whices on thh exists for the timing and context - indeed those differences led to the creation of this Body - mbut they shtal amnd verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organizations. That mtil it is achieved ust continue to be, a paRECOMMENDATIONS
PRINCIPLES
IV. The parties seek negotiations to reach an agreed political settlement. They want the gun taken out of Irish politics. If they arenot be allowed to obscureachieve those objectives, there must be public commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Aluniversal those who aspirsupport which exists for the to participattal and verifiable disarmament of all- paramilitary organegotizations should affirm. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to be, a paramount objective.
IV. With pct to the fisof their commitment to such specific questions contained in paragraph seven of the Communiqué, the modalities of decommissioning, we recommend the following principles.
Accordingly, These recommendations reflect what we recommeunderstand to be accurate estimates of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question. We believe the partirinciples should be acceptable to suchall who would participate in the negotiations publicly affirm their total and absolute commitment:. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation.
1. Tohe decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeatic
The ceasefires and exclusively peaceful meanthe peace process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness tof addresolvings differences through political issues;
2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary orgarnizations;
3. To agmeans. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalirties of the decommissioning process, which should not require that suchany party lose face.
The decommisarmament mustsioning process should be verifiabled by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission;
4. T acceptable to all parties. The commission wounce forld be appointed by themselves, British and to oppose any effort byIrish Governments on to basis consultations with the other parties, to use force, or threatenthe negotiating process.
The commission should be able to use force, to influeoperate without hindrance in bothe course or the outcome of all party negotia jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In additions;
5. To agre to having available to abide by the termit independent sources of any agreement reached in all-party negotiationslegal and technical advice and toadequate field resorturces to democraticreceive and audit armaments and exclusively peaceful methods to observe and verify the decommissioning process, tryinghe commission should be able to call upon the resources any aspecd the relevant of technical expertise outcome wf the British which they may disagreand Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
6. V. Another prdividuals 6rganizations wishingdeposit armaments (including weapons, explTo urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
Another principleosives, ammus publiclynitiondetonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which would result in the ded. We joissioning of arma, have the optiondoing so through the commission or through the designated representatives ofe British or Irish Governments, religious leaders, and many ot. Parties would also have the option of destroying their weapis needed. , subject to verification by the commission2. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly ignvolved in the decommissioning process should be protected from prosecution relating to the possession of those armament kills, on the basis of amnesties established ings law ind beaoth jurisdictiongs. They contribute to the fear thaArmaments made available for decommission ing, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of those who have used violence to resolve politicale decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups in thmay designate past willrticular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.
3. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety and to generating confidence in the future.peace process and in all-party negotiation They have
he decommissining process could encompa variety of methods, subjgoiation, including: the transfelace in a lawful soof armameto th commis or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of informatciety. to:
6. To urge the coission or to designated representat of eieveeading to he discovey of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction,y thecommission or by reresetives of eitr gorment; and heestructn of armaments by hose urrently in pession om.
In all cases,V. the dThose who demand decommissioning prior to all-parsty negotiatiommissioning process should r o so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to enable the poliult ical parties cle the complete destruction of the to armaments. Procthem to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given ures forhe destruction of armaments would include the physical dest histoructiony of small arms and oof Norther weapons, then Ireland, this is not an unreasonable controloncern.
The cod explosion of ammunitments ion and explosives, and other formsswe recommend address those concerns directly. EFirst, each y to conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictions. Priority should be accordeEhout to ensuring that armaments are safnegotiations would publicly affirm its total and absolute commitment, in general terms, handled and stored, and democratic and exclusively peacefre not misappropriated.
The decommissioning process would bfulymeans of resolving political issues. With specifWies Then, in reference toic context ofed by the , which would referencecord information requir to monitor the processe negotiations, effectiach party would agree to renouncly, other than thate use or threat of force to influence the negotiations or to change the outcome.
The principles wich could be deemed to constitute forensic evidence. In monitoring progress, sould also commit all parties to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to should have available to it the srelevant data of the Garda Siochanasasfaction of an independent the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The commission would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved inmmission.
These commitments, when made and honored, would preclude the use or threatdecommissioning process.
4. Decommissioning should be m of force, before, during and after all-party neg.otiations., Tual
Details regardinghey w implementation of the decommissioning process, including supporting confidence-building measures and its timing and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the process of all-party negotiations. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutuall commitment and participationwfocus concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is tto be taken out of Irish politics: the total and verifiable disarmament of allT of the paramilitary organizations.
V. The second specific question to which we were asked to respond was "to reporshould encourage the belief tbe hat the peace process will be truly be an exercise in democracy.
VI. The second of theCommitment to Decommissioning
VI. The second of the specific questions we were asked to resin paragraph seven of the Communique asks us "to report whether there is a clear cowhether there iemmitment on the part of those in on the part of those in possession of such ossession of such arms to work constructively to achiems to work constructively to achi"ee [full and verifiable decommissioning]."
W [fut reference to timing. That is because we have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiAo occur. We reached that conclusions.
A only after careful consideration, based upon intensive discussions with the Governments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilithary organizationserswas the view will not decommission indivi any arms priorns. It to all-party negoti, nvBsut they areinced that will not happens. That was also the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the political parties close to paramilitary organizations on both sides. It was also the view of the milvast majoriajtaity of the organizations and ganizindividuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not that thelityy all are opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, manytance favour it. Buts they aryesue convinced that will not happen. Thaof thrti realityings, but it is nonethe realityless a circumstance with which all concerned must deal.
VI. On this issue, competing views were presented to us.
One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that
the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles and of a permanent end to the use of violence is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity of prior decommissioning before the ceasefires were announced and no party should We were told in tow be able to avoid that requirement.
We were told in tThe competing view was that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested before the announcement of the ceasefires; indeed, if it had been, there would have been no ceasefires. Those who entered into the ceasefires did so in the good faith belief that they would lead directly and immediately to all-party negotiations; and the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first time months after the ceasefires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the ceasefires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately, with no further requirements.
We believe tha nurt each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concem honosrn which deserves to be understood and isiinaddressed by the other side. Those who at present refuse to engage innecesngaae ry inclusive dialogue witho-paitrtut prior decommissiations to beging .need to be reassured that opposthe commietment dto peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is ng wigenuinell and irreversible, and that the thrThrefor,h eat or usoe of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiationste the trust or to change any agreed setssayse tlement. Thosetoso who have been persuaded to abandon viotylence for nthe peaceful political path need to be reassured that a mea. Iningful and incdeedlusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered to address of prior decolegitimate concerns of thissioning increaeir tradition and tothe need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.
Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcd etome this impaadow of violence lifted from the peace processe.
That isWe beelieve there should be purpose of tblic commitment and adherenat he purposee six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment tofundamentrinciples of democracy and non-violdemocracy and non-violence. All thatoswho aspire is intended to reassure all parties to the negotiations.
cipaAs an alternative, the parties could consider an approach under which some dee in all-p all partes to negotiatioparties may wshould affirmir commissioning would take place tmh to such principles considas a part of the process of all-party negotiationsn alternatia ve,approach under which somVII. Accordingly,dessi, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.
Such an approach would represent a middle course. It offers each sidd takocess of hastheir come:
1. Tthat there must be some decommissi;
2Tog befortotal disarmameall paramilitary organizations;
3. To agree that such disarmament must be saopportnity to participate in a reasonable ependenprot compromissione that enables all to move forward towardas come the insisir common objective: all-party negotiations ecommissioningleading to an agreed political settlement.
5. Togree the very end of the proc[elternative: As an alternative, the parties could consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place as a part of the process of ss, afterall-party negotiations have produced an agreed political settlementresort toy ma.
In order to be mewould aninfAn approach under which nd effective, suall-party negotiate decommissions, rather than before or after as the partiesantiin now urge. Such an approach would represent takes place asments would, of course, hav apply to the part of the pocess ofvnegos reprVIII. ose who dem a middle course. Itommissioning prioffer tos each side the opportunity to participate in a reasonable compromise that enables do so out of]ball to move forward toward their common objective: all-party negotiations leadcling to an agreed political settlement.]
VII. With respect to the first of force IIthe specific questions contained in the communique, we recommend the following guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning. These recommendations arf force, to enable arealistic in light of the nature and scale ofthe political parties close to recommend the arsenals in quesm to influence the negotiation, estimates of which were providedgoforns, or to us by the governments and their schange any aspecurity oforces. We believe these estiamtes to be accurate. The de outcome oabf tails of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the partiestiations with which themselves and should receive high-priority in all-partyy negotiations.
1. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeatdisagsree. GiGven the history of Northern Ireland, this isth not an unreasonab.le concern.
The ceasefires andommitments we recommend address those peace proncess are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness to address differences through porns directly. First, each party to the negotiations would publiticaly affirmeans. Thits essential fact should be reflected clearlytotal and absolute commitment, in the modgeneralities of the decommissioning pr.emocess, which should not require that any party icbe seen to surrender.
2. The decommissioning process should be verified by an independent commission.
The decommissioning process should be verified by,third party and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to alexclusively peaceful means of resolving political partissues. The commission would, be appointed by the British aspepend Irish Governments on the basis oflyecific consultations with the other parties totext of the negotiating process.
The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and shs, each party would enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In additionagree (a) to having available to it independent srenources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receihemselve and audit armaments, and to obpposerve and verify effort by othe decommissioning process, the commission ushould be able to call uponforce, or to the resources and the relevant technical expertihe use of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
Individualsforce, to influence the course or organizations wishing to deposit armaments (including weapons, explosives, ammuniutcome of such negotiations; and detonators(b) for decommissioning, or to provide information which should result inabide by the decommissioningterms of armaments, should have the option of doing so through the commission or through tny agreemshshe designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.
ached in such negotiations and to use demoshcratic and exclusively peaceful methods in The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioning process.
3. The decommissiontrying process should not expose individuals to prosecution.
Individuals directly involved into .alter any aspect of that outcome with which they decommissioning process shagree.
The principles would be protected fralso commit all parosecution relatinges to the possession of those total disarmaments, on the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Af all paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such disarmaments made avail must be verifiable for decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examinato the satisfaction, and informatio of an obtained as a resuldependent of the decommissioning process should be in.
These commitments, when madmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction. Groups in posnd honored, would. rce, or the threat of the usession of illegal armaments shouldforce, be foree to organize thei, during, and after all-party negoticipation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups s, They would focus all concerned on what is ultimately dessentignal if the particulargun individuals to deposit armambe takents on their behalf.
4. The decommissioning process should contributut of Irish politics: The to public safety.tal and to genverating confidence in the peace process.
The decommissioning process could encompass a variety of methods, subject to negotiaTisarmament of all paramilitary organization, including: the transfer of armaments tos. That should encourage the commission or tobelief that the designated repeace procesentatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision ofwill be truly an exercise in democracy, not information to the commissionluenced by olence or to designated he threpresentatives of either government, leadviolence.
IX. We joing to the discGov5. Dery of armanments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by the commission or by representativeheligious and community mutual
Detake place s,basis of either govern mutual commitment; and the destrucparticipation of armaments by othose currentlyers in possessicon of them.
The decommissioning process should result in the compleun and beatings. Theyribute destruction of the fearmaments. Procedures for the destruction of at parmaments would include the physical destruction of small arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional munitions disposal. Priority should be aili who have used violenctore organizatolve politic in the past will do so again in the This offersure. Accorded throughout to ensuring that armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriingly, wer es an oend that the parties to suated.
5. Decommissioning should be mutual
Decommission would take place on the basis of the mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary organizations. This offers the parties an opportunity y to uslicly affirm their total and absolute cduild confidence incrementallytment tunishment killings and beatings stop and to use the process of decommissioningake effective steps to build confidence incrementally.
FURTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDINGprevent such actions..
VXIII. It will be important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many subjects were raised which, although outside our remit, are relevant to the peace process and to the development of trust. We believe it appropriate to address some of them, since success in the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.
Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons,ommunities, was emphasized time and the return of those who have been exiled.again in establishing a lasting peace...)
Early action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust, as would implementation of the proposed review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving security situation.
Different views were expressed to as the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organizations. We accept and share the view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authorized. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, as the threat reduces."
We share the hope,d expressed by the Royabl Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalized as soon as feasible. Ay their review of thspective securituation with respect to legally registered weapons would contribute toy authorities, as the threat reduces."
Likewise, a review of the building of trust. situation with reSo, too, would the relly r wview of the woulduse of plastic bullets, and the continued expansion of the representation of minorities in the poler tice force.
Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We abulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normalized as soon as possible.
Sbelieve that, givene the ovverwhelming commitmeemrnt to peace, the al orcircumstances could be crendated for the decommission ing process wrssito proceed during ttgeall-parn sty negotiations, within theions three-stranded structure oain whiched the parties have already agreed. The confidence to an eachieve these could in turn be created by a broadly acceptable electnote ive process.
Finally, in the discussions we had, the social ande economic developiment of Nortehrn Irelan nd and its communities was emphasized time and again in the context of building confidence and omestablishing amugni lasting peace.
IX. The divisions in Northern Irelano d are historic" and dewep, but whee beliteve theeyr are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish life today is the desire for peace." It is that force rtwhich cre."ates the pr Bodiesent opportunity. Bold and courageous leadership canco now translate that dresire into the redanality of peace.
However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, th at alone will acceptenot lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains to be done on the many issues involved in the political track. The partr and ies must recognize that a critical turning point has been reached in the peace itable reprocessentat. It will either move forward on Northern Oreland will regress to of the horror of the last 25 years.
Rigid adherence by the parties. To be to their past positionshe will simply continpacue the prostalemate. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, reaching across the vast gulf which for so long has separated the twonctwl traditions requires a willingness to take risks for peace. We urge the parties to consider the issue opf decommissionineg, and allrate of thwie issues in the political track, in this light.
Last week we stood in the center of Belfast looking at a thirty foot high wall topped with barbed wire. Thand at wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of Northern Ireland process, a oferve only to facilinto two waritring groups. To the outsider both are warm generous, friendly. It is only with themselves.s that they are
IX. Thfearful and hostile.
Yet, it is now clear beys eiond doubt that the n Norvast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn awayicr from the bitter past. anpdep.,They wan bt a future of peaceieve t, equality and prosperityhey are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace. In the words of one of those with whom we spoke: "The single most potent force in Irish life today is the desire for peace." It is that force which creates the present opportunity.
This is a critical time in the history of Northern Ireland. Either the peace process will move forward or this s society will slip bacthbaak to the horror of the patst quarter cen tury.
Rigid fadherenoce by the parties to their pare heiw phst positionsic will simply continue threate stalematese which has alreadty lastehd too long. In a socieoc ety as deeply divided as Northern pthrrneIreland, reachinseg across the oppopeace line retquires au willningness to take risks for peace.old and
We urge the parties to consider the issue of decommissioning - indeed all of the issues - in this light. courageous leadership can now translate that desire into the reality of peace.