The International Body on Arms Decommissioning was appointed as part of the twin-track process. It was led by the people who would later become the Independent Chairmen of the 1996-1998 peace talks. They produced the Mitchell report, which set out, amongst other recommendations, a list of principles which all parties signed up to as the basis for the talks.
This Committee was appointed by the British Government to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Committee wrote their report between Friday 19th January and Monday 22nd January. They sent one copy each to the British and Irish Governments on the evening of the 22nd January. The report was released to the public at a press conference on Wednesday 24th January at 1000.
To see the full record of a committee, click on the corresponding committee on the map below.
Version 1 of the Mitchell Principles. Date of creation unknown
DRAFT welfth DraftFIFTEEN
REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL BODY
22 January 1996
INTRODUCTION
1. On November 28, 1995, the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland issued a Communiqué which announced the launching of a "'twin track' process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations."
2. One track was "to invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed at a political settlement based on consent." This has become known as the political track.
3. The other track concerned decommissioning and was set forth as follows in the Communiqué:
"5. In parallel, the two governments have agreed to establish an International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue.
6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will ask the International Body to report on the arrangements necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes.
7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body to:
- identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
- report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.
8. It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on its merits."
4. We are that Body. This is our report. We are an outside group with no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help.
5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and London: the first, December 15 through 18, 1995; the second, January 11 through 21, 1996. In addition, we held an organisational meeting in New York on December 9, 1995.
6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in writing from dozens of government officials, political leaders, church officials, and other organisations, institutions, and individuals. We received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. We thank all for their submissions. Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process were especially moving. All the submissions have been carefully reviewed and considered.
7. This assessment represents our best and our unanimous judgement. There are no differences of opinion among us.
8. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who made written representations to us, convince us that while there is no simple solution to the problem, the factors on which a process for peace must be based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only resolute action by the parties themselves will produce progress.
9. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution already made by individuals and groups in getting the process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert Reynolds) are essential steps to a lasting peace. We commend as well the individual actions of some political parties and their leaders and of other institutions, organisations, and individuals in the promotion of peace.
10. We considered our task in the light of our responsibility to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the people to be reassured that their democratic and moral expectations should be able to be realised; and in the spirit of serious efforts made by the British and Irish governments to advance the peace process.
DISCUSSION
11. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent in Northern Ireland. All with whom we spoke agreed that people want peace. They want lasting peace and reconciliation in a just society in which paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received from people North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
12. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for collaboration with those they hold responsible for their loss and pain. Surely the events of the past and the continued suffering and bereavement of individuals and of families can never and should never be forgotten. But if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the future, and that is something no one can desire.
13. Notwithstanding recent reprehensible "punishment" killings and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the paramilitaries to "work constructively to achieve" full and verifiable decommissioning.
14. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused largely on the differences that have prevented the commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured the widespread agreement that exists - so widespread that it tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their differences than they believe.
15. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively seeking to end it.
I6. In paragraph five of the Communiqué we were asked to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning. It is a serious problem. It is also a symptom of a larger problem: the absence of trust. Common to many of our meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and hostility.
17. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue - or any other issue - will not be found if the parties resort to their vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was put to us several times, what is really needed is the decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much work remains on the many issues involved in.
. (add lanage to t effect that what we say or do will not fully solve problpolitical track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.
19. Evgree19n Etisfd that eryone with whkom we spoke agrees in principle with the need to iple with decommissioning. There ariffssioning. There are differences on the timing and context -- indeed, those differences led to the creation of this Body -- but they should not be allowed to obscure the nearly universal support whices on thh exists for the timing indeed those differences led to the creation of this Body - mnut they shtal and verifiable disarmament of all pslaramilitary organisations. That mtil it is achieved ust continue to be, a paramount objective.
RECOMMENDATIONS: PRINCIPLES
seek negotiations to reach an agreed political setd to takelement. Theyand to take the gun out takeof Irish politics. Ireachieve those objetiv, there must be public commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence. Those who aspirluniversal suT which exists for the to participattal and verifiable disarmament of all- paramilitary negotiorganizations should affirm their commitme. That is, and until it is achieved must continue to such principlesbe, a paramount objectiv21. e.
21. AcIV. With pct to the fisof the specific questions contained in paragraph seven of the Communiqué, the modalities of decommissioningly, we recommend the parties to such negofollowing principles. These recommendations reflect what we understand te be accurate estimations publicly affirm theires of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question. We believe the principles should be acceptable to all who would participate in the negotal and absolute commitment:iations. The details would have to be determined by the parties themselves through negotiation.
a. To1. The decommissioning procratic and exclusivelyess should suggest neither victory nor defeat
The ceasefires and the peaceful mean process are products not of surrender but rather of a willingness tof addresolvings differences through political issues;
b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;
c. To agmeans. This essential fact should bbe reflected clearl in the modalirties of the decommissioning process, swchich should not require that suchany party lose face.
The decommisarmament mustsioning process should be verifiabled by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission;
d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort acceptable to all parties. The commission woduld be appointed by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, British and Irish Governments on to influence the coursbasis consultations with the or the outcome of all partyr parties to the negotiations;ng process.
e. To agreThe commissioe should be able to abide by the terms of any agreement reached operate without hindrance in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having all-party negotiationsvailable to it independent sources of legal and technical advice and toadequate field resorturces to democraticreceive and audit armaments and exclusively peaceful methods in tryingto observe and verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be able to call upon the resources any aspectd the relevant technical expertise of that outcome wBritish which they may disagreeand Irish Armies, when it is appro; and,riate.
fV. Another prdividuals 6rfganizations wishingdeposit armaments (including weapons, explTo urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
22. The need for this last principlsives, ammushas become especially clear to us since we began our work. Wbliclynitiondetonators) for decommissioning, or to provide information which would result in the dessioing of arma, have the joptiondoing so through the commission or through the designated representatives ofe British or Irish Governments, religious leaders, and man. Parties would also have the option of destroyi weapis needed. , subject to verification by othe commission2. The decommissioning process should not expose individuals to prosecution
Individuals directly ignvGolved in the decommissioning "process should be protected from prosecution relating to the possession of those armament" killings and beatings. They contribute to the fear thas, on the basis of amnesties established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for decommission in""g, whether directly or indirectly, should be exempt under law from forensic examination, and information obtained as a result of those who have used violence decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either jurisdiction. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organize their participatpursuion in the polidecommissioning processobjectiv as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate particular individual objectivess to deposit armaments on their behalf.
3. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety and to generating confidence in the past wieace process and in all-party negotiation They have
he decommissining process could encompa variety of methods, subjgoiation, including: the transfelace in a lawfuof armameto th commis or to the designated representatives of either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of informatcie: 236. To urge they have no place in a lawful soci coission or to designated representat of eieveeading to he discovey of armaments for subsequent destruction; the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction,y thecommission or by reresetives of eitr gorment; and heestructn of armaments by hose urrently in pession om.
23In all cases,V. the dThose who demand decommissioning prior to all-parsty negotiatiommissioning process should r o so out of concern that the paramilitaries will use force, or threaten to use force, to enable the poliult ical parties cl Procthem to influence the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with which they disagree. Given ures forhe destruction of armaments would include the physical dest histoructiony of small arms and oof Norther weapons, then Ireland, this is not an unreasonable controloncern.
Thed explosion of ammunition a24. The nd eprinciples, and other formsswe recommend address those concerns directly. EFirst, each y to conventional munitions disposal, within the two jurisdictions. Priority should be accordeEhout to ensuring that armaments are safnegotiations would publicly affirm its total and absolute commitment, in general terms, handled and stored, and democratic and exclusively peacefre not misappropriated.
The decommissioning process would bfulymeans of resolving political issues. With specifWies Then, in reference toic context ofed by the , which would referencecord information requir to monitor the processe negotiations, effectiach party would agree to renouncly, other than thate use or threat of force to infyluence the negotiations or to change the outcome.
25. The principles wich could be deemed to constitute forensic evid25. ence. In monitoring progress, sould also commit all parties to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organiszations, and to agree thast such disarmament must be verifiable to should have available to it the satirelevant data of the Garda Siochanasasfaction of an independent the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The commission would report periodically to relevant parties on 26. progress achieved inmmission.
26. Tuhese commitments,mov when made and honoured, would premov lude the use or threatdecommissioning process.
4. Decommissioning should be m of force , before, during and after all-party negot.o,iations, Tual
Details regardinghey w implementation of the decommissioning process, including supporting confidence-building measures and its timing and sequencing, should receive a high priority in the process of all-party negotiations. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the mutuall commitment and participationwfocus concerned on what is ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and verifiable disarmamento be taken out of Irish politics: T of allthe paramilitarsy organiszations.
V. The second specific question to which we were asked to respond was "to reporshould encourage the belief tbe hat the peace process will be truly be an exercise in democracy.
VI. The second of theCommOMMITMENT TO DECOMMISSIONING
27. The second of the specific questions we were asked to resin paragraph seven of the Communiquée asks us "to report whether there is a clear cowhetheréthere iemmitment on the part of those in on the part of those in possession of such ossession of such arms to work constructively to achiems to work constructively to achi"ee [full and verifiable decommissioning.
n]." 28. W[fut reference to timing. That is because we have c"oncluded that there is a clear commitment "on th"e part of those in possession of such arms" to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such negotiations.
29. A29. Ao occur. We reached that conon the cluis ofly after careful consideration, on the basis ofgased upon intensive discussions with the gGovernments, the political parties, religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we have concluded that the paramilithary organisationserswas tse view will not decommission indivi any arms priorns. It to all-party negoti, nvBsut they areinced that will not happens. That was also the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the representatives of the politicals parties close to paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the view of the milvast majoriajtaity of the organisations and ganizindividuals who made oral and written submissions. it is not that thelityy all are opposed to prior decommissioning. To the contrary, manytance favour it. Buts they aryesue convinced that it will not happen. That is theof thrti reality with which all concerned must deal.
ings, but it is nonetheless a circumstan30. Once prior decommissioning , all concerned must deal.
advancn .t competing views were advanced. presented to us.
One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-party negotiations. We were told that
the clearest demonstration of adherence to democratic principles and of a permanent end to the use of violence is the safe removal and disposal of illegally held arms; and that at this time only a start to decommissioning will provide the confidence necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this view, all parties were aware of the necessity- of prior decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and no party should 31. We were told, in tow be able to avo:id that requirement.
31. We were told, in tThe competing view: was that decommissioning of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requ-ested before the , and thatannouncement of the cease-fires, and that; indeed, if i-t had be; that ten, there would have been no ce-ase-fires; that t. Those who entered intoo the cease-fires did so in the belief that they would lead directly and immat thediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued- for the first time months after the cease-fires, is merely a tactic to delay or deny -such negotiations. In this view, the cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately, with no further requirements.
32. We diabelieve tha nurt each side of this argument reflects a core of reasonable concem honosrn which deserves to be understood and isiinaddressed by the other side.
33. Those who inrysist on prior decommissiations to beging .need to be reassured that opposthe commietment dto peaceful and democratic means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated violence is ng wigenuinell and irreversible, and that the thrThrefor,h eat or usoe of such violence will not be invoked to influence the process of negotiationste the trust or to change any agreed setssayse tlement.
34. Thosetoso who have been persuaded to abandon viotylence for nthe peaceful political path need to be reassured that a meaning. Inful and incdeedlusive process of negotiations is genuinely being offered to address of prior decothe legitimate concerns of thissioning increaeir tradition and tothe need for new political arrangements with which all can identify.
35. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome thd eto is impasse. That isadow violence lifted from the purpose of teace process.
We beelieve there should be public commitment and adherenat he purposee six principles we recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to fundamentrinciples of democracy and non-violdemocracy and non-violence. All thatoswho aspire is intended to reassurepartici36. TAs an alternae, the parcoulde in all-p alsoall parties to the negotiations.
36. The parties cmay wshould affirmir commitmh to such principleso consideras an alternatia ve,approach under which some decommissionVII. According wouly,d take place as a part of the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge.
Such an approach would represent a middle course. It offers each sidd takocessu of hasthe oppir come:
1. Tthat there must be some decommissi;
2Tog befortotal disarmameall paramilitary organizations;
3. To agree that such disarmament must be saopportnity to participate in a reasonable comependenprot commissione that enables all to move forward to come the insisir common otive: all-party negotiations ecommissioningleading to an agreed political settlement.
5. Togree the very end of theRECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONINGve: As an alternative, the rties could considrt toy ma.
38. With respectIn order to bd aninfAn appo. Such an approacly to the firspart of the specific questions contained inose who dem ase thall to move for38rd toward the Communiqué, we reir commend the following guidon objeCé-partnegoticlingagreelitical settlementforce IIthe use o on the modalities of decommissioning. these recommendations arf force, tt enable arealistic in light of the nature and scale ofthe political parties close to recommend them to influence the arsenals in quesnegotiation, estimates of which were provided to us by the governments and their security forces. we believegofornsw, or to change any aspect of these estimates to be accur outcome oabf taate.
A. The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory nor defeat
39. The cease-fires andwith which theandgsreA. GiGven the peace process are products nothistory of surrender but raNorther of a willingness to addresn Ireland, this differences through political means. This essential fact should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the dnot an unreasonab.l39. -e concern.
The commitments we recommissioning process, which should not require that anyend address those concerns directly. First, each party be seen to surrender.
to the negotiations would p40. The details of decommissioning, including supporting confidence-building measures, timing and sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves and should receive high-priority in all-party negotiations.
B. The decommissioning process should be verified by an independentblicly affirm its total and absolute commitment, in general commission.
em41. Tocraticbe seen to surrenderhe decommissioning process should be verified by, and should take place to the satisfaction of, an independent commission acceptable to all parti independent third party and exclusively peaceful means of resolvi42. The commission would be appointed byng political issues. nd, in the British aspepend Irish Governments on the basis oflyecific consultations with the other parties totext of the negotiating process.
42. The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, and shons, each party would enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity. In addition to having availableagree (a) to it indeprendent sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field resources to receihemselve and audit armaments, and to obpposerve and verify effort by othe decommissioning process, the commission ushould be able to call uponforce, or to the resources and the relevant technical expertihe use of the British and Irish Armies, when it is appropriate.
43. Individualsforce, to influence 43. sthe course or organisations wishing to deposit armaments (including weapons, explosives, ammuniutcome of such negotiations; and detonators(b) for decommissioning, or to provide information which could result inabide by the decommissioningterms of armaments, should have the option of doing so through the commission or through tny agreemshcshe designated representatives of the British or Irish Governments. Parties should also have the option of destroying their weapons themselves, subject to verification by the commission.
44.ached in such negotiations and to use demoshcratic and exclusively peaceful44. methods in The commission would record information required to monitor the process effectively. The commission should have available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically to relevant parties on progress achieved in the decommissioCning process.
C. The decommissiontrying process should not expose individuals to prosecution.
.a45. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process should not be prosecuted for the possession of those armamentster any aspectnot suf com; amnesties should be established in law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available forwith which they decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, shagree.
The principles would be exempt under law from forensic exaalso commination, and informall partion obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be inadmissible as evidtotal disarmamence in courts of law in either jurisdicall paramilitary organization. Groups in possession of illegal s, and to agree that suchs disarmaments should must be freverifiable to organise their par satisfacipation in the of an independent commissioning proc.
Thess as they judge appropriate, e.g. groupscommitments, when may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on and honored, would. Dce,46. or their behalf.
D. The decommissioning process should contribute to public safety.
46. The decommissioning process could encompass a v threat of the use of force, before, during, and after all-pariety of methods, subject to negotiations, including: the transfer of armaments to the commission or to the designated repreThey would focus all concerned on what is ultimately essentatives oial if either government, for subsequent destruction; the provision of information to the commission or to designated represun is to be taken out of Irish politics: The total and verifiaTisarmamentatives of either government, leading to the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction;all47. paramilitary organizations. That should encourage the belief that the depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent destruction, by thpeace process will be truly an exercise commission or by representatives of either government; anddemocracy, not influenced by olence or the destruthction of armaments by those currently in possession of themsreat of violence.
47. The decommissioning process should result IX. We join the complete destruction of the armaGov5. Dernments. Procedures for the destruction of armaments would include the physical destructionEsheligious and community mutual
D.48. etakinge place s,basis of small arms and other weapons, the mutual controlled explosion of ammunitionment and explosives, andparticipationny other forms ofin conventional munitions dicdemning pun and beationgs. PrioTheyrity should bute accorded throughout to ensuringto the fear that parmaments are safely handled and stored, and are not misappropriated.
E. Decommissioning should be mutual.
48. Decommissioning would take place oili who save used violenctore organizatolve politic in the past will do so again in the basThis of the mutual commitmentfersure. Accordingly, wer es an oend participthation of the paramilitary organisties to suations. This offers y to uslicly affirm the parties an opportunity to usir total and absolute the process of decommissioning to build confidence incone step at a time during negotiationsytment tunishment killings and beatin49top and to take effective steps to prevent such actions..
49XII. It will be important for all participants to take steps to build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course of our discussions, many subjects, other than decommissioning,e peace process. Ins, ubjects were raised which, are relevant to the process and to the development of trust. We lthough outside our remit, are remake no recommendations on them since they are outside our remit. But we levant to the peace process and to the de velopmealbeit briefly, nt of trust. We believe it appropriate to address some of them, albeit briefly, since success in the peace process cannot be a50. chieved solely by reference to the issue of decommissioning.
50. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with participation in the democratic process. The early termination of paramilitary activities, including surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. So, too, would the provision of information on the status of missing persons,ommunities, was51. mphasized time and the return of those who have been exiled.again in establishing a lasting peace...)
51. Early action by the Governments on prisoners would bolster trust, as would implementation of the proposed review of emergency l52. egislation, consistent with the evolvio tng security situation.
52. Different views were expressed to as to the weapons to be decommissioned. In the Communiqué, the Governments made clear their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held illegally by paramilitary organiszations. We accept and share the view. There is no equivalence between such weapons and those lawfully authoriszed. However, in the context of building mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communiqué, "to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their respective security authorities, asWe share the threat reduces."
ho53. We share the hope,d expressed by the Royabl Ulster Constabulary, that policing in Northern Ireland can be normaliszed as soon as fseasible. A review of thy their respective securituation with respect to legally registered weapons, the use of plasty authorities, as the threat reduces."
Likewise, a re r ic bullets, and the continued ebalanced representation in theesenintion police force, would contribute to the cabulbuilding of trust.
licin54. Several oral g in Northern Ireland written submissions raised the idea of an elected body. We can be normalized as soon as possible.
Sbelieve that, gnote the reference in paragraph threhe of th ve Communiqué to "whether and how an elected body could play a part". Given the overwhelming commitmemrnt to peace, the al orcircumstances could be crendated for the decommission ing process wrssito proceed during ttgeall-parn sty negotiations, within theions three-stranded structure on wainhiched the parties have already agreed. The confidence to an eachieve these could in turn be created by a broadly acceptable electnote ive process.
55. Finally, in the55. discussionsour meetings, the social and economic developiment of Nortehern Irelan nd anhd its communities was emphasiszed time and agasin in the context of building confidence and omestablishing amugni lasting peace.
IX. The divisioCONCLUDING REMARKS
56. The divisions in Northern Irelano d are historic" and dewep, but whee beliteve theeyr are outweighed by the nearly universal longing for a just and lasting peace.
In the words o iss57. Last week we stood ando l
Rsirelro looked at in the centre of Belfast looitieal r conssofli king at a thirty foot high wall topped with barbed wire. Thand at wall, which has ironically come to be known as the "peace line," is a tangible symbol of the division of Northern Ireland process, a oferve only to facilinto two waritring groups. To the outsider both are warm generous, friendly. It is only with themselves.s that they are
IX. Thfearful and hostile.
58. Yet, it is now 58. clear beys eiond doubt that the n Norvast majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away froicr m the bitter past. anpdep.,They wan bt a future of peaceieve t, equality and prosperity. They are outweigheT tnivis a powerful desire for peace in of onNorthern Ireland. It is that most potentdesirce which creates the present opportunity.in Irish life today is
59. This is a criti59. cal time in the history of Northern Ireland. Either the peace process will move forward or this s society couldwill slip back to tthbaak couldhe horror of the patst quarter cen tury.
60. Rigid fadherenoce60. by the parties to their pare heiw phst positionsic will simply continue threate stalematese which has alreadty lastehd too long. In a socieoc ety as deeply divided as Northern pthrrneIreland, reachinseg across the oppopeace line retquires au willningness to take risks for peace.old and
61. We urge the par61. ties to consider the issue of decommissioning - indeed all of the issues - in this light. courageous leadership can now translate that desire into the reality of peace.