Quill
  1. Overview: Northern Ireland Brooke/Mayhew Talks 1991-1992
  2. Full Record: Northern Ireland Brooke/Mayhew Talks 1991-1992
  3. Committee:Political Structures Sub-Committee
  4. Session: 1992-06-01 12:30:00
  5. Event type: CREATE

Northern Ireland Brooke/Mayhew Talks 1991-1992

WORK IN PROGRESS - IN THE FINAL STAGES OF EDITING A series of talks launched by Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern in Ireland, which began in April 1991, and were carried on intermittently by Brooke and his successor, Patrick Mayhew, until November 1992.

Political Structures Sub-Committee

Editor's Note: This sub-Committee was initially commissioned by the Plenary to discuss proposals for new political structures in Northern Ireland. By 26 May, the Talks have run into difficulty and the Business Committee sets a fresh agenda and terms of reference for the sub-Committee. It is asked to focus on the impasse in the Talks, and it is agreed that minutes will not be taken or papers circulated beyond the membership of the sub-Committee and the Party Leaders. As there appears to be continuity within the Committee rather than a complete reconstitution, we model the sessions from 27 May as being part of the same sub-Committee. Records for this later period are, however, more scarce since formal minutes were no longer produced.

The Committee Secretary's View The Committee Secretary's View

To see the full record of a committee, click on the corresponding committee on the map below.

Document introduced in:

Session 11665: 1992-06-01 12:30:00

Document View:

New Political Institutions in Northern Ireland

(Showing state at moment e865941)
There are 0 proposed amendments related to this document on which decisions have not been taken.

NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

(2 June)

Possible Outline Framework (to assist discussion)

1. There could be a single, unicameral Assembly elected by proportional representation and separate elections to a panel with significant consultative, monitoring, referral and representational functions.

2. The institutions could have executive and legislative responsibilities over at least as wide a range of subjects as in 1973 with scope for further transfers if the arrangements proved stable, durable and there was agreement on how to exercise such powers. The political Heads of Departments would be drawn from the Assembly.

3. The Secretary of State would remain accountable to Westminster for matters which were not transferred.

4. The Assembly could be presided over by a Speaker, elected by a weighted majority of the Assembly. The Assembly could exercise its powers through a system of Departmental Committees, with Chairmanships, Deputy Chairmanships and memberships allocated broadly in proportion to party strengths in the Assembly. The Heads of Departments could be chairmen of the Committees. Other Committees could include a Business Committee and a General Purposes Committee with a co-ordinating function.

5. Legislative procedures could be prescribed by the constitutional legislation. All legislation could require the support of (at least) a majority of both the relevant Committee and the full Assembly. Certain important legislation (eg a financial measure, one with constitutional implications, or significant implications for community relations), could require weighted majority approval (of 70% or more). Other measures might be dealt with on the basis of majority decision unless the Business Committee determined they were contentious or a motion to that effect secured a certain threshold of support in the Assembly.

6. The constitutional legislation for establishing new institutions could provide for machinery to deal with and correct grievances and provide for the further entrenchment of individual and community rights which the Assembly could not amend.

7. The allocation of chairmanships between Committees might be made in accordance with party strengths. Any acceptable option for allocation must however ensure that the system of government provides an appropriate, fair and significant role for representatives of all main traditions in Northern Ireland.

8. Chairmanships might normally last for the whole term of the Assembly. The Chairmen of the Departmental Committees might be members of the General Purposes Committee. A Code of Practice might specify the respective roles and decision taking powers of Departments, the Committee Chairmen and other members of their Committees. Other means might be canvassed for preventing Chairmen from becoming "captives" of majorities on their Committees. Chairmen could be expected to have the legal powers of a Head of Department, and be free to take day-to-day administrative decisions (including making certain appointments) as well as many policy decisions. They could be accountable to the Assembly, including through answering questions.

9. Departmental Estimates, policies and actions could be subject to scrutiny by the relevant Committee, which would have the power to compel attendance, call for papers etc. But only Chairmen (and possibly under certain circumstances, Deputy Chairmen also) might have access to Departments fully equivalent to that which would otherwise be enjoyed by Ministers. The Assembly would debate reports from, and the minutes of, each Committee.

10. A mechanism could be incorporated to exclude from any share of executive power, or more generally, any individuals or representatives of parties who condone the use of violence for political ends.

The Panel

11. There could be direct elections to a small body with significant consultative, monitoring, referral and representational functions.

12. The panel might have a general duty to consult, formally and informally, with the Assembly and with the Secretary of State and to give advice. Its rights and powers would need to be carefully defined. It could have powers in respect of proposed legislation including a statutory duty to determine (ie to accept, reject, give an opinion on or propose amendments to) any proposed legislation referred to it by a threshold vote in the Assembly. It might, by consensus, refer any proposed legislation for some form of judicial consideration.

13. It could have a role in the public expenditure cycle, liaising with the Secretary of State and with the Heads of Departments and the Finance Committee over total expenditure and the allocation of resources.

14. The panel might have power, by consensus, to approve all public appointments made by the Committee Chairmen and to make, on its own initiative, certain appointments of particular sensitivity.

15. It could also have powers in relation to administrative actions or proposed actions, perhaps on the basis of a referral by a threshold vote within the Assembly. In such cases it might have powers to examine the Chairman of the relevant Committee and request papers. It might have powers to refer matters back for reconsideration, with or without advice or recommendations.

16. The panel could have a duty to prepare regular (annual) reports on the operation of the new political institutions, including recommendations for any further development of the arrangements or increases in the range of transferred matters, which could be considered by the Assembly and the Secretary of State.

17. The panel could also have a major representational and promotional role. It could have a special commitment to the economic development of Northern Ireland, through participation in joint promotional activities in collaboration with the appropriate agencies, whether Province-wide or more local.

18. The panel might secure its share of resources from the Secretary of State independently from the rest of the "transferred" block in order to ensure both its financial independence, and that its resources were sufficient to carry out the full range of its statutory functions.

Decisions yet to be taken

Document Timeline

Other Actions

View text build components