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The problem of forbidding re-election
by Dr Nicholas Cole (npcole)
Cite as: Dr Nicholas Cole, ‘The problem of forbidding re-election’ in N. P. Cole, Grace Mallon and Kat Howarth, The Creation of the Electoral College, Quill Project at Pembroke College (Oxford, 2016), item 70.
The Creation of the Electoral College
(To read a specific commentary item, please click on its link.)
- The choice of the president in the national legislature
- Election by the people and the merits of election by Congress
- The 'chimerical' nature of election by the people
- The first idea of an electoral college
- A role for state legislatures
- Independence via ineligibility
- An accountable executive
- Concerns of the Committee of the Whole
- An equal voice for all states?
- A democratic magistrate
- The merits of popular election debated
- The problem of forbidding re-election
- A President for life?
- A summary of the difficulties presented by the creation of the executive
- The electoral college proposed for a second time
- The electoral college agreed to
- Election by National Legislature reinstated
- An element of chance
- Alternative modes of election
- The President to be chosen by the State Governors
- Madison's comment on various modes of election
- Committee of detail report
- The idea of an electoral college reintroduced
- The electoral college as a tool for the Separation of Powers
- Limitations of the Electoral College
- Ineligibility and the Electoral College
- Qualifications for Electors
- A role for the House of Representatives instead
- The final iteration of the electoral college
Commentary
Although the Committee of the Whole had agreed to a proposal to limit the executive magistrate to one term only, so as to secure his independence from the legislature (and thereby implementing a well-understood principle of 'rotation in office'), such a measure could be read as giving the holder of the office too little incentive for best behaviour. These two ideas were simply in tension with one another, and here the Convention reversed its previous position, fearing a magistrate unconcerned about re-election more than one too eager for it.
Approved for publication
None