- Tuesday, 19 October 1993, at 12:00
Northern Ireland Downing Street Joint Declaration (1993)
This project models the series of formal and informal negotiations which led to the publication, in December 1993, of a declaration issued jointly by the British and Irish Governments. The Joint Declaration was a critical policy document which paved the way for a ceasefire and the entry of Sinn Féin into formal talks. It also laid out a shared set of principles – including, crucially, self-determination for the people of Ireland subject to the consent of the people of Northern Ireland – which would come to underpin the Belfast Good Friday Agreement and provide a framework for its ratification.
British Government
This committee has been created to model internal British Government documents and meetings.
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Session 21719: 1993-10-19 12:00:00
[Exact time unknown] Briefing material was created for a meeting between Robin Butler and Albert Reynolds. The British Government were refusing to proceed on the basis of JD12.
Membership (at session start):
Michael Ancram, Kenneth Baker, Tony Beeton, David Blatherwick, John Blelloch, Ian Burns, Robin Butler, John Chilcot, Ken Clarke, David Cooke, Jim Daniell, Timothy Daunt, John Deverell, David Fell, William Fittall, David Gillmore, Christopher Glyn-Jones, Richard Gozney, Michael Howard, Douglas Hurd, Roderic Lyne, John Major, Jonathan Margetts, Peter May, Patrick Mayhew, John McConnell, David McIlroy , Danny McNeill, R. O. Miles, Anthony Pawson, Christopher Prentice , Stephen Rickard, Malcolm Rifkind , A W Stephens, Jonathan Stephens, Quentin Thomas, Stephen Wall (37 total)
Representing 1 delegations:
No imported or exported documents
Resources (8):
Resource Collections (0):
None
Resource Items (8):
Enclosure: Speaking Note for Robin Butler's Meeting with Albert Reynolds on 20 October 1993 - (file)
Robin Butler was to convey the message from John Major that JD12 would not work, and that the whole initiative was not seen by the British government as a viable option at this point. This conclusion was to be justified with reference to the hostile climate created by knowledge of the Hume/Adams dialogue, and a predicted upsurge in Loyalist terrorism were the British government to go ahead with a Declaration in green language. It also specifically makes the inclusion of the constitutional guarantee in the crucial paragraph 4 a breaking point.
Enclosure: Speaking Note for Robin Butler's Meeting with Albert Reynolds on 20 October 1993 - (file)
Robin Butler was to convey the message from John Major that JD12 would not work, and that the whole initiative was not seen by the British government as a viable option at this point. This conclusion was to be justified with reference to the hostile climate created by knowledge of the Hume/Adams dialogue, and a predicted upsurge in Loyalist terrorism were the British government to go ahead with a Declaration in green language. It also specifically makes the inclusion of the constitutional guarantee in the crucial paragraph 4 a breaking point.
Enclosure: Transcript of an Exchange between Ian Paisley and John Major at Prime Minister's Questions on 19 October 1993 - (file)
This transcript records John Major's response to an irate Ian Paisley in the House of Commons. Paisley probes the perceived hypocrisy of the British government in claiming to eschew negotiation with violent actors whilst engaging with the agreement reached between John Hume and Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin. Major responded by distancing himself from the outcome of the Hume/Adams talks and claiming that this was a matter exclusively for the interest of the Taoiseach, with whom the British government has regular contact. He repeated his conviction to never negotiate with terrorists.
Enclosure: Transcript of an Exchange between Ian Paisley and John Major at Prime Minister's Questions on 19 October 1993 - (file)
This transcript records John Major's response to an irate Ian Paisley in the House of Commons. Paisley probes the perceived hypocrisy of the British government in claiming to eschew negotiation with violent actors whilst engaging with the agreement reached between John Hume and Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin. Major responded by distancing himself from the outcome of the Hume/Adams talks and claiming that this was a matter exclusively for the interest of the Taoiseach, with whom the British government has regular contact. He repeated his conviction to never negotiate with terrorists.
Letter from David McIlroy to Melanie Leech Enclosing a Speaking Note for Robin Butler and a PMQ Response from John Major to Ian Paisley - (file)
A letter from David McIlroy to Melanie Leech with two enclosures. The second one is a transcript of a question asked by Ian Paisley during PMQs and John Major's response. The first one is a speaking note for Robin Butler's use during a meeting with Albert Reynolds, to be held on 20 October 1993. Robin Butler was to convey the message from John Major that JD12 would not work, and that the whole initiative was not seen by the British government as a viable option at this point.
Letter from David McIlroy to Melanie Leech Enclosing a Speaking Note for Robin Butler and a PMQ Response from John Major to Ian Paisley - (file)
A letter from David McIlroy to Melanie Leech with two enclosures. The second one is a transcript of a question asked by Ian Paisley during PMQs and John Major's response. The first one is a speaking note for Robin Butler's use during a meeting with Albert Reynolds, to be held on 20 October 1993. Robin Butler was to convey the message from John Major that JD12 would not work, and that the whole initiative was not seen by the British government as a viable option at this point.
Note Outlining the British Line on the Talks between Gerry Adams and John Hume - (file)
This short memo outlines the British position of refusing to negotiate with terrorists whilst emaining open to carefully considering any proposal which might advance the peace process. It appears to have been produced as a prompt for governmental figures when pressed on apparent contradictions in their stated policy (i.e. perhaps for John Major at PMQs).
Transcript of an Exchange between Ian Paisley and John Major at Prime Minister's Questions on 19 October 1993 - (file)
This transcript records John Major's response to an irate Ian Paisley in the House of Commons. Paisley probes the perceived hypocrisy of the British government in claiming to eschew negotiation with violent actors whilst engaging with the agreement reached between John Hume and Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin. Major responded by distancing himself from the outcome of the Hume/Adams talks and claiming that this was a matter exclusively for the interest of the Taoiseach, with whom the British government has regular contact. He repeated his conviction to never negotiate with terrorists.
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