

FROM Q J THOMAS, DUS(L)
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PS/Secretary of State(L)-[1]
MR STEPHENS

cc PS/PUS(L)-[2]
Michael Ancram(L)-[3]+
Mr Deverell-[4]*
— Mr Cooke-[5]
Mr Rickard-[6]*
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IGC: JOINT DECLARATION INITIATIVE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

There are some awkward substantive and handling issues concerning the forthcoming IGC. It is clear that, on the Irish side, they look forward to a discussion of the implications of the Hume/Adams situation, largely in the tete-a-tete. Although the Irish side at one time talked about proposals, I hope they accept that it would be a discussion of the implications without any suggestion that anything has been put to us or will be put to us.

Handling

2. On handling, one idea is that the discussion of the Joint Declaration should take place at the end of the normal tete-a-tete, and slightly expanded perhaps to bring in two officials on each side (Mr Chilcot and me on ours and presumably Mr Dorr and Mr O hUiginn on the Irish side). The Irish side would want to include Mrs Geoghegan-Quinn as well as Mr Spring and they do not in general seem enthusiastic about the pattern of having a parallel tete-a-tete between Sir John Wheeler and Mrs Geoghegan-Quinn. My understanding is that Sir John Wheeler has not been briefed on the Joint Declaration Initiative at this

stage and the Secretary of State may wish to consider the implications of that.

3. Following the tete-a-tete, with this possibly expanded session at the end, we envisaged in discussion with Irish officials yesterday that there might then be the political development discussion with the "Talks teams" on each side, (or it could come after the Restricted Security Session). This is a pattern we have used at some Conferences in the past and it avoids talking about this sensitive subject - perhaps usually more sensitive from the Irish side than for us - in front of the full Plenary Session. I think the Irish side would want Mrs Geoghegan-Quinn to be present at such a discussion.

Substance

4. There will be separate fuller briefing on both political development and on the Joint Declaration Initiative. But it may be helpful to make one or two comments in this note about the cross-currents and inter-actions, and to suggest how the threads might be pulled together in terms of the communiqué.

5. On political development, the two sides will no doubt wish to share ideas about progress on the Ancram Round, the fall out from Hume/Adams on the wider political scene and the work of the Liaison Group. On the latter, the Irish side have yet to produce specific ideas or a paper though we were yesterday offered "abject apologies" for this failure. (They had hoped to clear a paper on Wednesday evening with the Tanaiste to give us at the meeting in Dublin. They still hope to get it to us before the IGC.) The proper outcome from our point of view is I think continued commitment to the Talks process; looking forward to further work bilaterally in the Ancram Round; and inviting the Liaison Group to continue their work in the hope

that they can produce a joint report, as indeed it had been hoped they would do at this IGC. It is just possible that the nature of the Irish paper, if we see it before the IGC, will show that their approach is so divergent from ours that a pretty firm message to that effect will be needed at political level before the Liaison Group could hope to make much sense of its task. There is a good chance that the Irish side will not show much of their hand at this stage, despite the Taoiseach's recently repeated public statement (at Bodenstown) that it is for the two Governments to provide the framework. We know that the real focus of interest is on the Joint Declaration Initiative; that they are profoundly disappointed by the position things have reached; and that they remain deeply worried about the alleged deal with the UUP and the effect it may have both on political development and the Joint Declaration Initiative. (The Irish Times story that Mr Molyneaux met the Prime Minister on Hume/Adams will not help.) All of that may make them cautious, if not sceptical and hostile. They will also, to some extent, take their cue from John Hume who will be profoundly set back by the failure, when it is known to him, of the Joint Declaration Initiative.

6. On the Joint Declaration Initiative, we need to work to ensure that the Irish side continues to maintain a public position which does not threaten HMG, or force the two governments into mutual recrimination. The aim should be a continued reduction of public expectations, with graceful acknowledgement of Mr Hume's bold and imaginative work, but with the Irish Government at some point making it clear not only that it does not wish to put the Hume/Adams report to HMG (as has already been said in the Dail) but that they do not think in itself it at present offers a way forward.

7. The best hope of achieving that may lie in persuading the

Irish side that, despite the rejection of the Joint Declaration in its current form, and as contaminated by the public expectations arising from the Hume/Adams demarche, HMG remains seriously interested in taking any proper steps to bring about peace.

8. One early step which the Secretary of State may wish to consider and to mention to Mr Spring is a speech repeating some of our key policy points on this matter: an updated version of Coleraine informed by subsequent policy work on political movement. Unless the Irish side see some evidence of the potential for working with us over political movement, I believe they will quickly become negative (or even hostile) over political development; and that any tendency to this effect will be greatly exacerbated, or validated, once they see evidence that the UUP's agenda is being addressed (for example when it is first announced that the Select Committee on Procedure is to re-examine the question of a Select Committee for Northern Ireland).

9. Against that background I believe that the key elements of this crucial opening section of the communiqué might be these:

- (i) Strong condemnation of terrorism, and joint commitment to work to take the necessary measures to deal with it;
- (ii) a reference to discussion of the implications of Mr Hume's work with Adams; a re-affirmation of the interest both Governments share in any proper measure which would bring terrorism to an end, emphasising: rejection of violence; the impossibility of either government talking or negotiating with those who perpetrate, threaten or support violence for

political objectives; and the centrality of the consent principle;

- (iii) re-dedication to the Talks process, with work being done bilaterally with the parties and between the two Governments.

[SIGNED]

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 22 October 1993
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