Dermot Nally Papers

UCDA P254/92

	Historical Context Cohlishin	Notes	11/3
	We need to show that selling objectives has an effect		
	Late 80's talks with the SDLP		
	1990 SF decision to externalise and make politics		
	Development of the Broad front strategy		
1	Intervence in the Feace debate- reclaim the word peace for Republicans *Scenario for Peace Put perace on the political agenda		
	•Towards a Lasting Peace - pushing out the peace debate promoting the document getting an overview of the terrain talking to various groups gaining political strength		
	•Continued to talk to John Hume 1st Joint statement		
	Language of the debate changed		

development of the internal and external debate	
Joint statement 25th Sept.	

Strategic objectives 1989

A number of broad objectives have guided us for many years,

To ensure that Irish National democracy becomes a priority in the overall political agenda		CALC .
 To bridge the gap between Stan Féin and the sympathetic attitude of the anti-imperialist population by regularly reviewing tactics and activity by setting realistic short term objectives. 	Sroad front Fianna Fáil base	\$15
To bolster the validity and credibility of Sinn Féin's objectives and to develop the ability to achieve them	•review what we do •Censorship •How people see us	
 To define and project Sinn Féin's strategy and aims in a manner that will be clearly understood by the broad base of Irish national and international opinion. 	•Work in USA, Europe,EU,Britain •Using Towards a Lasting Feace •Gerry Adams visit to USA •Tom Hartley, Mitchell, councillors etc in Britain •Our initiative	
 To ensure that all elements of Sinn Féin activity are mutually complementary 		
6 To influence British public opinion	*warweary, raising awareness, positive image *Effect on John Major *British will move *Downing Street decaration	

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 To develop an on-going strategy to address Unionism

•Never leave the unionists out ·Section in Towards a Lasting Peace · Most underdeveloped part of

SF strategy

*national reconciliation - our need for longer view of

To establish a permanent and persistent international strategy

•Change of Image in the international arena · last year unending war but this year Peace Dobate ·delegations - are they

successful? ·Link SA, Palestine, Ireland

Main points

The main points to be noted are

- The political value of the Southern Nationalist consensus or agreement and John Hume's central position of political importance.
- Our need to develop the political strength and skill to sustain this once achieved
 - That latent Irish nationalism will take a lead. That lead must be given and given regularly to meet changing situations.
- That the British government is unwilling to change its policy at this time
- That Dublin 4/the revisionists/ the ideological "Free Staters" can be confronted and isolated.
- That Inter-unionist rivalry is intense but the UUP is on board with the British government
- 7 That reassurance of Unionists has been carried to exaggerated lengths. Six County nationalist sensitivities and aspirations have suffered as a result.
- 8 That there is an assute political control over loyalist murder squads
- 9 That public debate about real issues in Ireland, Britain and internationally can be created.
- 10 That we must strive to get our internal political communication resolved and to improve our structures in order to enhance external activities
- 11 That the political situation remains fluid
- 12 That Judicious political risks can pay dividends

Considering the Future - Exploring the Options

The situation is fiuld. The opportunities to lay out our stall are multiple if not infinit in terms of time available to us.

The context

- The British government is perceived in many areas as
- There is a reasonable balance to media reporting. Again this is not infinite but we can influence it. 3.
- Sinn Féin position / arguments are getting a reasonable and probably unprecedented airing. This can only be of benefit in a general way to our peace strategy. 4
- Its difficult to assess how all of this impacts on our main target audience - all Irieland nationalist opinion.
- 5. Effective political communication with the membership and the base of support remains a problem as does our ability to Improve our external structures so that we are able to constantly put our case in a developing situation and to dictate how this develops,

Where we are now

- We have a moral and political obligation to explore the Downing Street declaration to see what contribution if any it can make to the development of a peace process aimed at
- We have publicly committed ourselves to a process of internal and external consultation and have conducted
- We have a clear Peace Strategy.

- Downing Street may be a first step towards lasting peace or a way of avoiding confronting Dublin and a means to put
- if it is not the first step we should not let this unduly influence us when we are considering the political risks,
- Whatever the duration of this fluid situation it is not important to speculate on this - it is important to reach a conclusion about our objectives and strategies for the

Defensive/Offensive Strategy in the Current Situation A defensive strategy for the future is of the utmost importance and has a broad focus taking in our external as well as our internal politics. Relatively speaking this is not so difficult

An offensive strategy on the other hand is difficult and risky but necessary because we need to come to a conclusion,

it must involve high political risk because it brings directly into play what we have to offer

- as a political incentive
- a bargaining counter
 - as a means of rallying domestic and international support to our position so as to put pressure on the British government and the unionists.
- as a combination of the above.
- in relation to this there are three alternatives 1. to retrench behind a defensive strategy
- 2. to give precedence to a defensive strategy and attempting to edge forward - which has a low risk
- to attempt to develop a defensive / offensive political strategy where the risk involved -b

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There alternatives seen in the context of Downing Street became five options for Sinn Fáin.

- Sinn Féin could accept the Downing Street Declaration with or without clarification
- Sinn Féin could publish the detail of the Irish Peace Iniative and let popular and political opinion make their decision
- 3. Sinn Péln can la the short term continue to edge forward in the politically cautious manner it has adopted since the declarations made on Dec15th client could attempt to build on the conditions created by the Irish Peace Individual the conditions of the Country of the Cou
- 5 Sinn Féin could reject the Downing Street Declaration - with or without the clarification requested.

Recommendations

There are two related recommendations

Recommendation(a)

To attempt to establish specific objectives and strategies for the incoming period in the general context of

- the established broad objectives and analysis laid our in part 1 of the paper and option 3/4
- (ii) (3) Sinn Féin can attempt to build on the considerations created by the Irish Peace Initiative and the Downing Street Declaration

(4) Sinn Féin can choose the middle course in all of this by attempting to edge forward in the politically cautious manner it has adopted since the declaration was made on Dec 15th