

SECRET and PERSONAL

FROM: TONY BEETON
TPU
29 September 1993
ACB/MR/42076

1. Mr Thomas-[1]-Agreed
2. PS/Secretary of State(L&B)-[2&3] cc Michael Ancram(B)-[4]*
(MR STEPHENS)*/+ PS/PUS(L)-[5]
Mr Deverell-[6]*
Mr Cooke-[7]+
Mr Rickard-[8]*
Mr C Glyn-Jones-[9]*
Mr May-[10]*
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copies]
* Mufax via Liaison(L)
+ via Liaison(L)

JOINT DECLARATION INITIATIVE: SPEAKING NOTE FOR NI,
30 SEPTEMBER 1993

The Secretary of State is to discuss the Joint Declaration Initiative with the Prime Minister in the margins of NI tomorrow. I attach a Speaking Note for this meeting.

2. Your letter of 27 September to Roderic Lyne set out in detail our present understanding of both strands of the Joint Declaration Initiative: the Hume/Adams demarche and the latest text (JD.8) of the Declaration handed to Mr Thomas by Mr O hUiginn last week. The letter set out the Secretary of State's belief that we should try to develop this initiative, and that, although there remain many serious questions about the text, if the Joint Declaration - suitably amended - could secure peace it would be at an acceptable price. The letter also reported the Secretary of State's belief that we should concentrate on this latest text and how we might secure the changes necessary to make it acceptable to us, and his suggestion that the Irish Government might need discreet drafting help now and that this should be offered.

- 1 -

SECRET and PERSONAL

DUSL/MR/42076-29.9.93

SECRET and PERSONAL

3. At our recent VCR meeting on this subject the Secretary of State mentioned difficulties in the JD.8 text apart from those in the key paragraph 4. I attach a brief note on the text as a whole which indicates where further work might be necessary if the Prime Minister agrees to authorise textual exchanges with the Irish.

[SIGNED]

TONY BEETON
TALKS PLANNING UNIT
29 SEPTEMBER 1993
OAB EXT 6564

3. The Munn/Adams demarche, coupled with the latest Irish text (JD.8), means that it may not be possible to maintain our exchanges on that discreet and uncommitted footing. I judge that we need either to disengage or to decide, perhaps initially through officials, on a more active attempt to bring the text to an acceptable form. This is only worth doing if the scheme it contains is acceptable in principle.

4. Engaging and delivering the Joint Declaration, if agreed, carries high risks - publicly, in the party, with the Unionists, and in the House. Much may depend on careful private handling of Mr Helynears.

5. On the other hand the prize is very great. The present text (JD.8) does not ask us for very much. I believe we could make further progress on the text to produce something which would

- 2 -

SECRET and PERSONAL

DUSL/MR/42076-29.9.93