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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE  
18 OCT 1993  
SIL DIVISION

FROM: S QUINN  
CENT SEC PLANNING UNIT

DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1993

1. In attendance on the British side were Mr Bell, Mr Williams, Mr Quinn; and from the Irish side, Mr O'Donovan and Mr Donaghy.  
2. A reasonably businesslike session, to 4.00 pm, in which:  
(a) the Irish did not provide a list of revisions to our "Framework Document"; but  
(b) they made specific drafting suggestions on some aspects of the document which we are now considering;

- cc PS/SofS (L&B) - B
- PS/Michael Ancram (DENI, L&B) - B
- PS/PUS (L&B) - B
- PS/Mr Fell - B
- Mr Bell - B
- Mr Watkins - B
- Mr Williams - B
- Mr Cooke - B
- Mr Maccabe - B
- Mr Brooker - B
- Mrs Collins - B
- Mr Morrow
- Ms Lodge - B
- Mr Beeton - B
- Mr Archer, RID - B
- HMA Dublin - B

MR THOMAS - B

LIAISON GROUP: 14 OCTOBER 1993

A note of the meeting is attached.

[Signed SQ]

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LIAISON GROUP: 14 OCTOBER 1993

Summary

1. In attendance: On the British side, Mr Thomas, HMA Dublin, Mr Bell, Mr Williams, Mr Cooke, Mr Maccabe and Mr Quinn; and from the Irish Side, Mr OhUiginn, Mr Small, Mr O'Donovan and Mr Donoghue.
2. A reasonably businesslike session, lasting from 11.00 am to 4.00 pm, in which:
  - (a) the Irish did not provide a full set of textual revisions to our "Framework Document" or an alternative document; but
  - (b) they made specific drafting suggestions on some aspects of the document which we are now considering; and
  - (c) there was also useful discussion of other elements of our draft.
2. There was an extended discussion of whether/how a successor to the IGC should/could act as guarantor/monitor/default mechanism in relation to new NI institutions, to deal with deadlocks or general gridlock.
3. There was also some discussion of constitutional issues, with the Irish suggesting that the "over-simplifications" of the traditional positions need to be qualified to create positions which could be reciprocally endorsed.
4. Next steps: the Irish are to use their best endeavours to provide a full revise of our "Framework Document",

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including constitutional issues, in time for a Liaison Group discussion on Thursday 21 October. The objective remains the presentation of an agreed document to Ministers prior to the 27 October IGC, but this looks ambitious.

Detail

5. The meeting began with News from the Road:

(a) Mr Maccabe referred to the DUP's meeting with Michael Ancram, ostensibly to discuss "Breaking the Logjam" but which focussed on the allegation that HMG was now engaged in a process which also involved Sinn Fein;

(b) he also reported that Michael Ancram had written to the UUP, SDLP and APNI on 1 October, identifying issues for further discussion in Ancram II. A meeting with Mr Alderdice was fixed for week commencing 18 October; the SDLP was agreeable in principle to a further meeting; the UUP was researching the points in Michael Ancram's letter but was focussing on Hume/Adams and its own party conference;

(c) Mr Maccabe confirmed that Martin Smyth's statement on Sinn Fein had reflected Glengall Street policy and that, despite some grassroots criticisms, the line would be endorsed by Mr Molyneaux at the party conference;

(d) Mr OhUiginn reported that the Tanaiste had written to Mr Molyneaux in September and that his reply did not rule out further contact, but indicated that the Hume/Adams issue had intervened: nothing specific had been arranged.

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Draft Framework Document

6. Mr OhUiginn opened by asking that paragraph 1 be amended to say that Liaison Group would "use its best endeavours" to draft a joint paper for the 27 October IGC, reflecting the Irish view that this was a tall order.
7. The Irish suggested a number of specific amendments, mainly the introduction of text from the 9 October 1992 Strand 3 paper "Possible Principles for a new Agreement" into the General Principles section. The British side undertook to consider these, but they did not seem obviously problematical.
8. These exchanges highlighted Irish concern that the para 5 reference to "fully [taking] account of the views of the ..... parties in NI" implied that the parties would have a procedural veto on the development of British/Irish relationships even if the Talks process failed. Mr Thomas emphasised that his draft was being produced within the Talks process. He noted that one of the paragraphs the Irish Side suggested taking in from the paper of 9 October 1992 referred to a new agreement "arrived at through direct discussion and negotiation between all the parties concerned". Accordingly, there might not be a substantive difference between the two sides.
9. The Irish side undertook to provide an expansion of paras 12 and 13, which they indicated should emphasise equality of esteem for the nationalist ethos and the need to reflect all the relationships, with these ideas "entrenched" in a new Agreement. The Irish undertook to provide draft text (which seems likely to draw heavily on the New Ireland Forum Report).

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10. Mr Thomas and Mr Bell registered that there could be both technical and political difficulties in entrenchment. Mr Thomas said that the language would therefore be particularly important.
11. In response to questioning, Mr OhUiginn said that reciprocity on issues such as human and communal rights was not ruled out a priori, but it would involve a "deep change" in the AIA approach. He recognised that the notion of communal rights would be difficult for any Government. Mr Thomas recalled that he had suggested at the last meeting that, at the level of principle, it was difficult to see why statements should not bite on both jurisdictions, even if machinery applied only in respect of NI.
12. In a brief discussion of the Devolution section, Mr OhUiginn suggested that APNI and the Conservatives had been "over catered for"; the Irish would suggest a revision to para 14.
13. A fuller discussion took place on the section dealing with North/South Institutions. During this Mr O'hUiginn made the point that, if certain functions were vested in North/South institutions by Westminster legislation, then they would be protected to some extent if the NI leg of the North/South body collapsed. (In this exchange, it seemed as if the Irish side might be satisfied with something making it clear that the British Government or Panel took the view that a particular matter was apt in principle for vesting in North/South institutions, even if the permanency of such institutions could not in practice be guaranteed).

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14. Mr Thomas asked if the Irish were seek to achieve political resonance rather than functional advantages, and whether the Irish had a list of specific functions which should go to a North/South body. Mr OhUiginn said that such arrangements should not result in "the worse administration", but did not venture any specific proposals.
15. Mr Thomas suggested that, if political resonance was the primary objective, then the identification of specific functions could best be left to a different process. Sunningdale (particularly the Council of Ireland idea) broke down because it did not have the legitimacy of public support; the unionists would have to want to play this game if the institutions are to be successful. Mr OhUiginn accepted that the institutions would not work without goodwill, but suggested that if unionist agreement was necessary, very limited functions would go to a North/South body, and that an "empty" structure would not help with a constitutional referendum. However, he also accepted that issues of operational efficiency, finance and policy would need to be resolved - to which he added the need for democratic scrutiny. Mr Thomas indicated that we would examine Irish text with interest.

Intergovernmental Relations

16. This part of the discussion majored on the role of the successor to the IGC in the context of a new set of institutional arrangements. Mr OhUiginn indicated that it was common ground that transferred matters would not be on the IGC agenda; that the involvement of the NI administration (probably via the Panel) in IGC deliberations would not create any difficulty in the

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generality of cases; but that "sensitive areas" such as security should be handled on a purely intergovernmental basis.

17. Mr Thomas queried whether it was necessary, for this paper, to choose between the Panel and Heads of Department as the NI administration's interface with the IGC. It was a matter to be settled in the negotiations bringing Strand 1 to a conclusion.

18. The discussion then centred on Mr OhUiginn's proposal that there shall be a continued Irish Government input on transferred matters, by giving the IGC a "fire brigade capacity" but applying strict tests to how and when it should come into effect.

19. Mr Thomas said that, if gridlock occurred in new NI institutions (Mr Williams added North/South institutions) then naturally the two Governments would discuss the position at the IGC, and that any action would be taken (implicitly by the British Government) after consultation. Consultation with the NI administration, if it were still operational, would also be appropriate and necessary. But a formal right of oversight would be very different and would almost certainly be unacceptable to other Talks participants; it could also discourage the new institutions from working out consensual solutions if it were possible to appeal to the IGC (more likely to be attractive to nationalists). Mr Thomas and Mr Bell also referred to the various procedural and legal protections which would be incorporated in a new dispensation.



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20. The Irish also expressed concern about the unanimity requirement for Panel decisions. If this took the form of an "affirmative resolution", then the power of the nationalist representative would provide a substantial safeguard. However unanimity might also prevent the redress of a perceived abuse. Moreover the involvement of the nationalist member in some unanimous decisions could put him/her in an awkward position. The British side reminded the Irish side that it was the SDLP which had advocated unanimity and asked if the Irish had an alternative proposal (none was forthcoming). The second concern seemed to be that Panel members would have to take responsibility for their actions - which was inescapable.
21. Mr OhUiginn accepted that the IGC should not be invoked or invokable for frivolous or tactical reasons, and that the "triggers" would need to be carefully defined and circumscribed. The Irish side referred to Section 75 of GOIA, which preserved the supreme authority of the Westminster Parliament over the proposed Southern and Northern Ireland Parliaments.
22. Both sides noted that the issues relating to oversight/IGC intervention etc could be made easier if they were looked at in a tripartite context. A number of tripartite models were mentioned, on which different Talks participants might have different views, but neither side sought to press any specific approach.
23. At the end of this exchange, Mr OhUiginn indicated that the Irish would "think about" the issues.

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Constitutional Issues

24. Mr OhUiginn said that this was the area of the HMG draft which the Irish side found most difficult to accept as a basis for drafting. It embodied a "model" which two successive Irish Governments had judged to be impossible to accept. Constitutional change was not incumbent on one side alone, and should affect the unionist as well as the nationalist position. He went on to identify a number of points which had been represented to the Irish Government:
- (a) if Articles 2 and 3 were changed, the British perception of NI as part of the UK would stride the field uncontested. Everywhere and everyone in NI would be "British" - including the Derry GAA team! The Irish view of Irish unity would become a remote and distant contingency;
  - (b) the door on Irish unity would be closed or the route to it complicated (sic);
  - (c) the Irish Government would lose the "right of regard" given to it in the AIA;
  - (d) NI nationalists' rights of Irish citizenship would be compromised.
25. Mr Bell observed that concerns about citizenship, right of regard and closing the door on Irish unity were all either without foundation or addressed in the Framework Document.
26. Mr OhUiginn suggested that some positions could not take their place in a "shared understanding": the British could not accept the "constitutional imperative", whereas the

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Irish could not accept that NI is part of the UK if this was not qualified by recognition of the divided nature of NI society. It would be necessary to "depart from the over-simplifications and get closer to reality". He referred warmly to Mr Hurd's references to Britain and Ireland being in "partnership" and not "rivals for sovereignty".

27. Mr Thomas reminded the Group that, although the UK would not require a constitutional referendum, it would be necessary to obtain Parliamentary endorsement and to carry all the Talks participants, therefore it was necessary to aim for a zone of convergence. In his view, the main issue seemed to be defining the present status of NI. HMG could acknowledge other aspirations, acknowledge the divisions in NI society, acknowledge the legitimacy of the nationalist ideal etc, and could offer warm language in connection with the idea of an outcome of unity by consent and without intimidation; or with something which created conditions enabling a united Ireland; or with something encouraging a more general process, such as overcoming differences, healing divisions or stimulating mutual respect. It could not, on the other hand, contemplate language implying that conditions should be made conducive to a united Ireland.

28. On the question of NI's present status, Mr Thomas observed that the question could be avoided, as in 1985, but it would be very difficult to get a solution if this was not settled. This may be an inescapable, crunch issue.

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29. Mr Thomas then asked if some kind of mutual recognition formula would be helpful: the Irish Government might recognise that it is the British Government's position that NI is part of the UK; the British Government might recognise that the Irish Government takes a different view. Mr OhUiginn said that this was worth looking at, but he would wish to see the British status of NI qualified by recognition of the divisions in NI society and the Irish dimension. Mr Thomas suggested that the less the Irish side was able to recognise NI's present status as part of the UK, the more explicit would need to be an indication of the form amendments to Articles 2 and 3 would take. He pointed out that, if there was to be an aspiration to a united Ireland (a possibility widely canvassed in the ROI) it must logically imply that NI's current status is outside the ROI.

30. Mr Thomas then asked if the Irish would accept that a united Ireland would not be implemented against the wishes of a majority in NI. Mr OhUiginn said that this would be easier to contemplate if it was embedded in a complex network of arrangements, but he was speculating outside his mandate.

31. It was noted that it might be necessary to put the text on these issues in square brackets for presentation to Ministers.

Next Meeting

30. It was agreed that Liaison Group should next meet at 10.20 am on 21 October in Dublin. It would be necessary for the Irish side to circulate its proposed revise of the Framework Document in advance.

Status of Paper

1. British and Irish officials were instructed at the meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference on 10 September to use their best endeavours to draft a joint illustrative working paper, without commitment on either side and ad referendum to Ministers, whose object was to seek to identify, as a basis for discussion, aspects of a possible outcome, consistent with the agreed statement of 26 March 1991, likely to prove acceptable to all parties to talks. They were also instructed to submit their conclusions for discussion at the next meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference on 27 October.

2. The Secretary of State informed the Conference that Michael Ancram would be continuing, within the same time frame, his bilateral discussions with the NI political parties.

3. The following joint paper represents the outcome of discussions within the Liaison Group for consideration by Ministers in the Conference. It is accepted on both sides that this joint paper and the discussions related to it will not be the subject of discussion, still less negotiation with the NI parties unless both Governments agree beforehand whether and how this should be done.

General Principles

4. The British and Irish Governments are partners together in a unique relationship. They are each other's closest neighbour. They are both members of the European Community.

5. Both Governments are both deeply affected by continuing conflict in Northern Ireland, and the legacy of their difficult historical relationship. They share a deep concern to find a solution to this tragic problem. They are committed in these talks to the search for

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a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands. [They accordingly look forward to further developing the partnership that already closely links both countries in ways that take account of the views of the main constitutional parties in Northern Ireland and the wishes of its people.]

6. The two Governments agreed in 1980 that the best prospect of achieving peace, reconciliation and stability and of improving relations between the peoples of their two countries was to address the totality of relationships within these islands. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council was established in 1981 with this purpose in view.

7. In the Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed in 1985, the two Governments set out a basis, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council, for dealing on a regular basis with a range of issues concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland.

[8. The Agreement reflects their common desire to work together to achieve the aims of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries; and improving co-operation in combating terrorism.]

9. The preamble to the Agreement sets out a number of principles which the two Governments hold in common and on which the Agreement is based:

- recognition of the major interest of both our countries and, above all, of the people of Northern Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving lasting peace and stability;

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- recognition of the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who wish for no change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other hand by those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement;

- their total rejection of any attempt to promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence and their determination to work together to ensure that those who adopt or support such methods do not succeed;

- recognition that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between unionists and nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights;

- recognition of and respect for the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, and the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful and constitutional means;

- their commitment to a society in Northern Ireland in which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance, and with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of government.

10. The Agreement established an Intergovernmental Conference in which the Irish Government puts forward views and proposals concerning states aspects of Northern Ireland affairs; in which the promotion of cross-border co-operation is discussed; and in which determined efforts are made to resolve any differences between the two Governments. Both Governments agree that these elements of the present Agreement, and the way in which it gives institutional expression to a legitimate concern and role for the Irish Government in relation to Northern Ireland, must be fully provided for in any new and more broadly based agreement.

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11. Both Governments re-affirm their full commitment to all the provisions of the Agreement and to its shared understandings and purposes set out in the preamble and in the Agreement itself as well as in the Hillsborough Communique of 15 November 1985. As its signatories, they are also prepared to consider a new and more broadly based agreement or structure if such an agreement can be arrived at through direct discussion and negotiation between all the parties concerned. They agree that any new agreement should enhance the structures of co-operation established between the two Governments under the Agreement.

12. Both Governments also accept that the Nationalist and Unionist identities are equally valid, and that the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and parity of esteem for all their citizens must be upheld and applied. They will continue to work to ensure that, within their respective jurisdictions, these principles will be fully upheld.

13. Against this background, both Governments wish to continue to work with the parties to reach agreement by peaceful negotiation and dialogue in ways in which differences are respected; divisions healed; the legitimate interests and aspirations of all the people of the island of Ireland peacefully accommodated; and the key relationships relevant to Northern Ireland resolved. They are both ready to take steps which will help the process of finding agreement.

Devolution

14. Both Governments continue to support the policy of transferring, within Northern Ireland, executive and legislative responsibilities over a wide range of subjects, with scope for further transfers, to locally accountable political institutions - provided such institutions command assent across the whole community and provide opportunities for representatives of both main communities and other groupings which attain sufficient electoral support to participate fully in the structures and processes of Government in a society in which all may live in peace.



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15. Both Governments reaffirm that this policy should be carried forward through dialogue and negotiation involving the main Northern Ireland constitutional parties, as part of a process encompassing wider relationships including the relationship between new agreed political institutions within Northern Ireland and the Westminster Parliament, among the people of the island of Ireland, and between the Governments.

16. Both Governments envisage that any new devolved institutions in Northern Ireland are likely to incorporate significant measures to promote consensual approaches and protect minority interests, and that there will be greater formal protection for human and civil rights.

North/South Institutions

17. Both Governments envisage that new institutions might be created, in the context of a comprehensive new agreement, which would enable representatives of the various communities, North and South, to enter into new, amicable and constructive relationships. The two Governments would hope that those new relationships would be based on mutual respect and trust, would progressively reduce the feelings of distrust which have characterised relationships in the past, and would lead to greater and closer friendship among the people living on the island of Ireland.

18. Both Governments are accordingly prepared, in the context of such an agreement, to promote the necessary legislation in their respective Parliaments to establish a new institutional framework to bring together representatives of the Irish Government and representatives of new agreed political institutions in Northern Ireland.

19. Both Governments reaffirm their view that such an agreement should be sought through dialogue and negotiation involving the main Northern Ireland constitutional parties as part of a wider process.

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20. Both Governments believe that the legislation should provide, within the framework, for:

- (i) clear institutional identity and purpose, and
- (ii) the ability, within defined parameters, to discharge or oversee mandated executive functions.

21. Both Governments envisage that the framework would include a joint administrative support unit, staffed by members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Irish Civil Service.

22. Both Governments envisage regular and frequent meetings within the new framework to consider issues of concern; co-ordinate approaches to the EC (where appropriate, in consultation with the British Government) and cross-border projects; consider and recommend co-operative action and the establishment of cross-border or all Ireland executive agencies by the respective legislatures.

23. They also expect that the framework would have or be able, subject to democratic approval, to discharge or oversee suitable cross-border executive functions. There would also be a programme of reviews within the framework into the scope for enhancing communication, co-operation and service delivery within the island of Ireland.

24. Both Governments also envisage that all decisions within the framework would be by agreement between the two sides, appropriately mandated, and that there would also be input from representatives of the UK Government and Parliament as appropriate.

25. Both Governments envisage that this framework should serve to help heal the divisions among the communities on the island of Ireland; provide a forum for acknowledging the respective identities and requirements of the two traditions; express and enlarge the mutual acceptance of the validity of those traditions; and promote understanding and agreement among the people and institutions in both parts of the island.

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26. Both Governments also expect that there would be a Parliamentary Forum, with representatives from agreed political institutions in Northern Ireland and members of the Oireachtas, to consider a wide range of matters of mutual interest.

Intergovernmental relations

27. Both Governments seek a new Agreement, enhancing the structures of co-operation between them and reflecting the totality of relationships between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic. Both Governments believe that there should be general provision in such an agreement for liaison between the two Governments on bilateral matters not covered by other specific arrangements, perhaps through an Intergovernmental Council. Such an agreement should be widely acceptable across the community in Northern Ireland, as well as in the rest of Ireland and of the United Kingdom.

28. They also envisage that they would agree to maintain arrangements whereby there is a standing Intergovernmental Conference involving, but not always only attended by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and an appropriate representative of the Irish Government. It would be supported by a permanent secretariat staffed by UK and Irish Civil Servants (see para 33 below).

29. Both Governments envisage that representatives of agreed political institutions in Northern Ireland should have formal rights to know in advance what is to be discussed in the Conference, to express views to either Government and to receive progress reports from Governments. These representatives should attend parts of the meetings of the Conference at the invitation of both Governments.

30. The two Governments envisage that matters for which responsibility is transferred to new political institutions in Northern Ireland should be excluded from consideration by the Conference, except to the extent that the continuing responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland are

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relevant or matters are brought to the attention of both Governments by the proposed new framework. It would, therefore, remain open to the Irish Government to put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland which remain the direct responsibility of the British Government.

31. Both Governments also envisage that the Conference should be concerned with other matters affecting Northern Ireland, including relations and co-operation between the two Governments and the policies of both Governments so far as these have implications for the cross-border or all Ireland aspects of matters which have not been devolved to agreed political institutions in Northern Ireland. In particular, the Conference should provide a forum for furthering the commitment of both Governments to ending terrorism, maintaining and advancing effective security co-operation, promoting justice, and enhancing confidence in and support for the security forces on the part of both traditions and achieving lasting peace and stability.

32. Both Governments accept an obligation to make determined efforts to resolve any differences between them. There would, however, be no derogation from the sovereignty of either Government: each will retain responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction.

33. Both Governments also envisage a standing Secretariat, jointly staffed by Civil Servants from the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, to support the Conference and provide a channel of communication between the two Governments on matters within the remit of the Conference. The Secretariat could liaise with the joint administrative support unit established to support the new institutional framework (and other new North/South institutions) described above. Both Governments also believe that the working of the Conference (and Secretariat) should be the subject of periodic review.

34. Both Governments also believe that there should be such continued Interparliamentary liaison as the Westminster Parliament and Oireachtas decided upon.

Constitutional Issues

35. Both Governments have a shared understanding of the constitutional issues which they believe reflects a balanced accommodation of the differing positions of the two main traditions. This includes the elements described in the following paragraphs.

36. Both Governments accept that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, in accordance with the present wishes of a majority of its people and that it would be wrong to change that status without the consent of such a majority.

37. The British Government affirms that it has no selfish strategic or economic interest in retaining Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom against the wishes of its people.

38. The British Government acknowledges that a significant minority of the people of Northern Ireland wish for, either immediately or at some time in the future, a united Ireland and that they have the right to pursue that aspiration from a basis of parity of esteem, by peaceful and democratic means and without impediment.

39. Both Governments are agreed that if, in the future, a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, both Governments will introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.

40. The British Government will work to ensure efficient, effective and even handed government in Northern Ireland unless and until it may cease to be part of the United Kingdom in the circumstances envisaged in the preceding paragraph.

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41. Against this background, the Irish Government declares that, if there is an agreed outcome from the process of dialogue established by the statement of 26 March 1991 consistent with these principles, it will put forward proposals for the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution to reflect the understandings in this document and seek the necessary support for their implementation. It envisages that the amendments would provide...

42. The British Government similarly declares it will take the necessary steps to initiate and support changes in UK constitutional legislation to reflect the same understanding.

Endorsement

43. Both Governments are agreed that any new agreement reflecting these principles would need to be acceptable to the people.

1. I am grateful to David Watkins for his note of 4 October, summarising the important policy points about North/South Bodies and related institutions which arose from the Irish side's comments on the framework document at the Liaison Group meeting on 1 October.

2. Stephen Weiss has helpfully dealt with the first of these topics in his memo of 12 October. This note deals with the second.

3. David Watkins records the essence of the Irish side's suggestion as being that "the JSC should have powers of guarantee and monitoring of new local institutions and that in the event of complete default in new local institutions, then the exercise of the powers is question (and conceivably all the powers at the disposal of new local institutions) should revert to the JSC."

4. I very much agree with David Watkins' comments on this proposal. The main points seem to me to be these: