



FROM: PUS  
25 NOVEMBER 1993

- cc. PS/Secretary of State (L&B) - B
- PS/Michael Ancram (L,B&DENI) - B
- PS/Mr Fell - B
- Mr Thomas - B
- Mr Deverell - B
- Mr Cooke - B
- Mr Rickard - B
- Mr Beeton - B
- Mr May - B

NOTE FOR THE RECORD


CONVERSATION WITH MR JOHN HUME

Mr Hume called on me this morning, 25 November, at his own request. His principal purpose was to continue to press the arguments for a JDI-based approach, to warn of the imperfect understanding and expression contained in the present Irish documents (he has clearly seen their most recent version of the JDI) and to press on us his drafting services and skills for any document that might emerge from the Summit between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach.

2. On the latter point, he said he could in half an hour deal with the issues which had led the Irish Government to produce yards and yards of pointless waffle (I did not dissent) in the mouth of the Taoiseach when what was needed was a short and simple expression of the need for agreement rather than for unity on the part of the people of Ireland and for the need for separate Northern Ireland majority consent to that agreement. I took polite note.

3. Warming to his theme, he spoke of the deficiencies of Martin Mansergh both as draftsman and intermediary, of the fact that it would take the Irish Government a fortnight to consult the Provisionals on a text or variation of text which they needed whereas he, Hume, could do it very quickly; he said he had great faith in Dermot Nally, and saw a good deal of Sean O hUiggin.

4. He showed no awareness of the problem of the Hume/Adams 'taint' attaching itself to anything that might emerge from the Summit, but for all that was keen to emphasise that if there were particular difficulties of language he saw no reason why they could not be addressed and still win acceptance by Adams and the Provisionals. I reminded him of what he had said to the Prime Minister at their last meeting, which was that if Hume/Adams label was simply too difficult the important thing was to put in any statement from the British and Irish Governments the key



principles which he had listed on that occasion: the end of any 'selfish, strategic and economic interest' on the part of HMG; the right of the people of the island of Ireland to seek agreement on their future without that outcome being subject to veto by the British people, Parliament or Government; and the commitment by both Governments to promote that agreement (but not, he emphasised yet again, to promote agreement on a particular solution).

5. He then said that he had made his own contribution to the 'Panorama' programme to which he understood Gerry Adams had also contributed and in ways that we would be likely to find surprisingly positive. He said that he had had a conversation with Sir Edward Heath and advised him to give the Prime Minister the benefit of his wisdom privately (not saying to Sir Edward Heath what he said to me, which was that any public intervention would only be too likely to bring a backlash from the anti-Maastricht members of the Conservative party, and thereby exacerbate the Prime Minister's difficulties). Finally, he said that he would be addressing his own Ard Fheis this weekend in a speech that, from the description he gave me, will bear some resemblance to the analysis he has given on more than one occasion over the years (but see separate PAB reporting that he may go beyond the single transferable speech).

COPIES FOR THE RECORD

Signed:

CONVERSATION WITH DR ALDERDICE

Dr Alderdice called on me on Monday 22 November at his request in Stormont.

J A CHILCOT

25 NOVEMBER 1993

2. He had recently seen the Prime Minister (I was present) and he said that the main reason for calling was to be updated on developments since that meeting, so as to enable him to continue to play his chosen role of helping the official Unionists, in particular Jim Molyneux, to hold their forward-looking and progressive positions both on the search for peace and on the resumption of talks.

3. So far as the search for peace was concerned, he said that he had been consulted by the Taoiseach. The Taoiseach had wanted, in effect, to get Dr Alderdice's assessment of the feeling and mood in the Protestant community, its willingness to respond to a peace initiative, and the extent to which he and Dr Alderdice could both help to assess official Unionist opinion and help to support it in coming forward. Dr Alderdice said he believed the Taoiseach was genuine in his approach; he also said he was convinced that Jim Molyneux had complete confidence in the Prime Minister, though very anxious about the scale and difficulty of the issues which the search for peace presented to him in particular.