

SECRET AND PERSONAL



10 DOWNING STREET
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From the Private Secretary

30 November 1993

John Jonathan,

cc PS/SofS (B)
PS/Michael Ancram (L+B)
PS/PUS (L) Mr Cooke
PS/Mr Fell Mr Maccabe
Mr Thomas Mr Rickard
Mr Beverell Mr Beeton
Mr Williams

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH ARCHBISHOP EAMES

Archbishop Eames telephoned on the afternoon of 30 November. We had a guarded conversation in preparation for his visit to Dublin to see the Taoiseach on 1 December.

This letter should have the usual restricted distribution.

Eames wanted to check one particular point. He had heard that some changes might have been made over the past day to the document (viz: the British draft Joint Declaration) which we had passed to him. I said that, to my knowledge, we had had no negotiations about the text since its delivery to Dublin last Friday. As he had probably heard (he had), the text had not been well received.

I filled Eames in on the absence of agreement, at the time of writing, on the holding of the Dublin Summit; and on the bilateral political environment. I said that rumours and misplaced conspiracy theories were putting the relationship under strain. It would be absurd if our serious dealings with the Irish Government were to be affected by over-reaction to wild stories in the media. One should remember Metternich's approach to the death of the Russian Ambassador at the Congress of Vienna. Above all, we should keep our eyes firmly fixed on the ball which really mattered. Anything which Eames could do in this direction would be most welcome to the Prime Minister.

I also told Eames that the Irish still seemed to find it hard to understand how essential it was to distance our process from Hume\Adams, if it was to be accepted by the Unionists. He agreed that this was essential. I asked him to give the frankest possible view of feelings among the Unionists. There was a tendency on the part of the Irish Government to maintain that our reading of

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Unionist feelings was wrong, or that we were using presumed Unionist objections as an excuse to suit our own purposes. Eames indicated that he did not feel that the Irish understood the Unionists well.

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Eames said that he would let us know how he got on tomorrow.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Sawers (FCO) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

Yours truly,

Roderic Lyne

RODERIC LYNE

MEETING BETWEEN THE TANAISTE AND UNIONIST REPRESENTATIVES
THE INFORMATION IN THIS LETTER WAS PROVIDED BY MR JAMES MOLYNEAUX IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. IT SHOULD BE PROTECTED VERY CLOSELY AND MUST NOT BE QUOTED TO THIRD PARTIES.

Jonathan Stephens Esq
Northern Ireland Office

...the discussion which Mr Michael Ancram MP and I had with Mr Molyneaux this morning about the Joint Declaration.

At the beginning of our meeting, Mr Molyneaux said that he wanted to "come clean" on one piece of information, but requested that it should be treated very privately. This was that on Sunday last, 28 November, Mr Ken Maginnis MP and the Lord Mayor of Belfast, Reg Empey, had been to Dublin for a meeting with the Tanaiste. Significantly, Sean o hUiggin had been present in Spring was not free-lancing. I believe that Spring's political adviser, Finlay, was not there.

Spring had said that the "Brits out" formula was no longer a runner: there was no attempt now to seek language about the eventual British withdrawal.

o hUiggin had put forward a thesis that the Irish Government was in a much stronger position domestically than a year ago. The implication was that the present Government was well placed to take difficult decisions affecting the North.