

FROM: Q J THOMAS, DUS(L)  
 7 October 1993  
 DUSL/JEN/MR/42287

Copy no	.....	[13]
cc Michael Ancram(B)*		[2]
PS/PUS(L)		[3]
Mr Deverell*		[4]
Mr Cooke		[5]
Mr Rickard*		[6]
Mr C Glyn-Jones+		[7]
Mr Beeton		[8]
Mr May*		[9]
PS/Sir Robin Butler+		[10]
Sir Timothy Daunt+		[11]
Mr Roderic Lyne+		[12]
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PS/SECRETARY OF STATE(L) [1]  
 (Jonathan Stephens)

**MEETING OF BUTLER/NALLY GROUP - 6 OCTOBER 1993**

I attach a copy of the note of the meeting that Sir Robin Butler had on 6 October with Mr Dermot Nally and Mr Sean O hUigin.

2. As the note records in more detail, the next step is for the Irish side. They will:

- (i) seek to contain Mr Hume and his report and for the moment make no <sup>ac</sup> knowledge<sub>h</sub>d report to HMG and discourage Mr Hume from approaching HMG;
- (ii) seek the Taoiseach's agreement to the text as they provisionally agreed to amend it the light of discussion (i.e. JD11);
- (iii) seek from the Taoiseach, possibly in the form of a letter to the Prime Minister, confirmation that there are no hidden deals beneath the surface of it; that

the Irish Government regard the Joint Declaration as compatible with the talks process and that they will remain committed to it; that they do not expect Sinn Fein to become instantly eligible to join the talks; and that it is the Taoiseach's judgement that if the Joint Declaration is made it will lead to a cessation of violence (though with the acknowledged possibility that some rump of the Republican movement would fight on).

3. If the Irish side communicate that the Taoiseach is content with JD11, or something like it, and confirm the understandings mentioned above, it is envisaged the Secretary of State might put the matter to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary (at least in the first instance). Following Ministerial consideration we might tell the Irish side that the scheme, and the text, is acceptable in principle. At that point the Taoiseach would put the text to the Provisionals through their intermediaries, without indicating that the British Government had seen or approved it. The Irish Government would put it forward on the basis that it represented the Irish Government's judgement of the limit of what might be acceptable to the British Government. If the proposal is judged unacceptable, both sides agreed on the need to co-operate to achieve a "soft landing".
4. It was noted that the EC Summit meeting on 29 October, if it takes place, might provide an occasion for a private word between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, though it would certainly not be suitable for making the Joint Declaration.
5. It was also noted that the Tanaiste and the Secretary of State might be attending an event together on 13 October; and that this, and the proposal for a separate tete-à-tete, might be difficult



given the public expectations following Mr Hume's briefing of the Irish Government. In general the Irish side were well-seized of the difficulties which the Hume/Adams demarche has caused, and the need as far as possible to channel matters in a way which does not overtly involve HMG for as long as possible.

[SIGNED]

Q J THOMAS  
DUS(L)  
7 OCTOBER 1993

1. It went on to explain how Mr Adams had attempted to reassure Mr Molyneux by the fact that the British side were restrained than would otherwise have been the case. It was noted that progress Ministers had a meeting with Mr Adams on a visit to Privy Council House. It was noted that the meeting of that nature had not taken place in the previous 14. They were however reassured that the British side did not make the JDF dependent on the British side's approval. It was noted that the Irish side could see the value of a meeting with Mr Molyneux.

4. Mr Adams then explained that the British side had been either from this meeting or as a result of a meeting with Mr Adams personally on a number of points: