

HUME/ADAMS

Points to make

1. You will have seen that in the Joint Statement at Brussels on 29 October, the Taoiseach signed up to the proposition that "there could be no question of adopting or endorsing" the report of the Hume/Adams dialogue that was given to the Taoiseach.
2. When I met Mr Hume on 5 November I reiterated this.
3. Mr Hume gave me a general description of his reasons for believing there is a real opportunity for peace in Northern Ireland. I stressed to him that there could be no departure from the six points set out in paragraph 6 of my Joint Statement with the Taoiseach on 29 October; and that the central element in the Government's policy was to intensify the political dialogue involving the four main Northern Ireland constitutional political parties.
4. I passed no messages through Mr Hume.
5. I have not invited Mr Hume to report back to me after further contacts with Adams. Mr Hume's contacts are a matter for Mr Hume alone. But he is well aware that I will not get involved in direct or indirect negotiations with those who support the use of violence. I have simply told Mr Hume that my door remains open to him: that, of course, is the position for all four of the Northern Ireland main constitutional party leaders.
6. I am aware of the Taoiseach's BBC 'On the Record' interview on Sunday lunchtime, in which he appeared to say that peace must come before further Talks, and that the two Governments alone must bring this about. But I believe that the Taoiseach stands by paragraph 7 of the Brussels statement, which describes the Talks

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process as "vital" and its objectives as "valid and achievable". In his speech on Saturday night, after the 'On the Record' interview was recorded, Mr Reynolds said "I also believe the Talks process must be resumed immediately". He also said that "In the event of an overall settlement, but not unilaterally, balanced constitutional change can take place".

Further points for Mr Molyneux only, if needed

7. I have explained clearly to the Taoiseach that the text which I showed you on Privy Council terms on 18 October will not run.
8. He fully understands this, but is under pressure for not adopting or endorsing Hume/Adams. He still hopes to start some kind of peace process.
9. I shall continue to hold firmly to the position that peace, stability and reconciliation are best pursued through intensified political dialogue involving the four main Northern Ireland parties. That need not, of course, preclude direct work between the two Governments on Strand 3 and constitutional matters, in the way that you have yourself advocated on a number of occasions.
10. The Taoiseach has taken on board my assessment of the likely reaction of "the greater number" [Mr Molyneux's preferred term for the unionist majority] in Northern Ireland to a Joint Declaration on the lines which you saw. But he has told me that he has taken some soundings of his own.
11. In particular - and I should be grateful if you would treat this in absolute confidence - I understand that he has sounded Archbishop Eames. I do not know whether Archbishop Eames has been, or will seek to be, in touch with you. But if he does, you

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should be aware that I have not disclosed to the Taoiseach that I showed you the Joint Declaration text.

12. Have you in the meantime had any further thoughts yourself on this subject?

13. I will continue to follow the approach taken in the Joint Statement of 29 October in dealing with any further developments.

PS/SECRETARY OF STATE(L) (1)  
(Jonathan Stephens)

MEETING OF BUTLER/MILLY GROUP - 4 OCTOBER 1972

attach a copy of the note of the meeting.  
Sir Robin Butler had on 4 October with Mr. Donald Mills and Mr Sean O hUiggin.

As the note records in more detail, the main items of discussion were:

- (i) seek to contact Mr. Hume and his report and to see what consent was to knowledge report to him and to ensure Mr Hume from approaching DSI;
- (ii) seek the Taoiseach's agreement to the text as they provisionally agreed to amend it in the light of discussion (i.e. JDI);
- (iii) seek from the Taoiseach, possibly in the form of a letter to the Prime Minister, confirmation that there are no hidden deals beneath the surface of the text.

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