RECORD OF A PLENARY MEETING HELD AT PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS ON 17 JUNE 1991

Government Team	Alliance Party	UDUP
Secretary of State	Dr Alderdice	Dr Paisley
Minister of State	Mr Close	Mr Robinson
PUS	Mr Neeson	Mr McCrea
Mr Fell	Mrs Bell	Mr Wilson
Mr Pilling	Mr Morrow	Mr Vitty
Mr Thomas	Mr McBride	Mr Dodds
Mr McNeill	Mr Dickson	Mr Campbell
Talks Secretariat	SDLP	UUP
Mr D J R Hill	Mr Hume	Mr Molyneaux
Mr Marsh	Mr Mallon	Mr Cunningham
Mr Pope	Mr McGrady	Mr Nicholson

- 1. A plenary meeting of the first strand of the Talks took place in the Conference Room at Parliament Buildings between 14.36 and 15.42 hours on 17 June 1991.
- 2. Following the presentation of the Alliance Party's position paper, the UUP queried the suggestion that Unionists believed that the British Isles as a whole should constitute a single political entity saying that unionism did recognise the existence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as discrete political units. He then asked whether the Alliance party favoured an all embracing British/Irish Agreement to regulate relationships between the two countries. It was explained that the first point, reflected the Alliance Party's understanding of the Unionist position and would await the UUP's presentation of their position. The second point was more relevant to Strands Two and Three although it had been covered in the Alliance Party paper and a close reading would establish their position.

(NB: The Alliance Party position paper was then circulated and is at Annex 'A' to this record.)

IN CONFIDENCE

- 4. Following a brief discussion on the nature of the questioning to follow presentations and the order of it, it was agreed that questions of clarification could be taken immediately while questions and comments on substance should be taken after the completion of all presentations.
- 5. The DUP delegation then asked a series of questions:
 - a. Would the Alliance party describe their stance on the Union as "Unionist"?
 - b. What was the Alliance Party's view on limits to the application of "self-determination" to the people of Northern Ireland?
 - c. Was it the case that the Alliance Party wished the relationship established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement to continue?
 - d. Was the form of "power-sharing" adumbrated by Mr de Klerk in the speech which had been quoted acceptable to the Alliance Party?
 - e. Did the Alliance Party attach importance to the ability of a local administration to control security matters or to be able to have an input to the arrangements by which these matters were controlled? Where did the Alliance Party stand on the issue of community support for the activities of the security forces?
 - f. Did the Alliance Party see a requirement for community support to any agreement that the parties might arrive at? How could such agreement be measured or expressed?
- 6. The Alliance Party said that the people of Northern Ireland had the right to look at and vote on alternatives to the present system of Government. While the DUP suggestion that this might result in some form of independence or exit from the United Kingdom was hypothetical it remained the case that the Alliance Party would not

set limits on the extent of "self-determination". So far as the Anglo-Irish Agreement was concerned, its content was not and its genesis had not been satisfactory. It had not been drafted on the basis of the Alliance Party's principles but had to be made to work. The failure to implement Article 4 and the lack of involvement of Northern Ireland representatives in the Anglo-Irish Conference meant that the Agreement remained flawed. quotation from President de Clerk's speech was concerned, it had referred to principles and not to structures. The Alliance Party's view on power-sharing was well set out in the Party's second founding principle. On control of the security forces, no regional government could be worthy of the name unless it had some input to security issues and to the administration of justice. He noted the Government's position and commented that the issue would be one for intense and difficult discussion at a later stage in the process. The possibility that parties might come to a different conclusion on this matter than the Government could not be ruled out. Cross-community and cross-political support for the security forces would be essential. So far as community support for any political agreement was concerned, this too was essential. The question of how best it might be measured and expressed remained, as yet, unanswered. The issue of "widespread support" could only be addressed if all parties were aware of the mechanisms to be used for measuring it.

- 7. The <u>Government Team</u> asked whether the omission of economic issues from the Alliance Party presentation implied that these were seen as of secondary importance. The <u>Alliance Party</u> said that they believed that the issue was one for negotiation and discussion between the various parties and had thus not sought to develop their arguments on it at this stage.
- 8. There then followed a discussion about the possibility of making public the contents of the various position papers. The <u>Alliance Party</u> said that his paper had not been published but that he could see no difficulty in so doing. The UUP and UDUP adopted similar positions in terms of their papers but the <u>SDLP</u> suggested that publication could lead to wider exposure to the media of the day to

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day proceedings of Strand One - this should be avoided. Following discussion the <u>Secretary of State</u> proposed that there should be no publication of position papers until the end of the first round of presentations. Were, however, all or any part of any parties' position papers "leaked" to the media, the "wronged" party would be entitled to publish their paper in its entirety in order to set in context any selective quotation. <u>The proposition was agreed</u>.

- 9. The SDLP asked whether and when the parties could question the Government Team on economic matters, security and the financial subvention. The Secretary of State confirmed that an opportunity would be given and also confirmed that copies of his opening statement would be circulated as an annex to the "aide memoire" which recorded the pre-lunch discussion. His opening statement would not be issued to the press.
- 10. The delegation then broke for coffee prior to the SDLP's presentation.

TALKS SECRETARIAT
18 June 1991

THE ALLIANCE PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS

An Introductory presentation from
Alliance Leader, Dr John Alderdice
to the Inter-Party Conference
at Parliament Buildings, Stormont

17 June 1991

principle which refers to the contribution of those who live outside Northern Ireland.

PRINCIPLE 1

"We support the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. We know that this belief is shared by the overwhelming majority of our people and that provocative debate about it has been the primary cause of all our most fundamental troubles. The union is in the best economic and social interests of all citizens of the state. It also implies British standards of democracy and social justice, which will be energetically secured and steadfastly upheld. We are firmly committed to the principle of devolved government."

This first principle expresses our view that Northern Ireland, despite its obvious divisions, is a community, and like any other community, has the right to decide its future, and be fully involved in its own governance.

Article 1, Clause 1, of the United Nations Convention on Human Rights expresses the right of peoples to freely determine their own political status, and pursue their own economic, social and cultural development. The view is often expressed that when this clause is applied to Northern Ireland it means that the decision about self-determination must apply to all the people Others have expressed the opinion that it on the island. applies to all those who lives on these islands. Nationalism maintains the former position, and expressed itself in the desire for an Irish Republic with jurisdiction over the whole island. British Nationalism, or Unionism, held to the latter, expressed as a desire to maintain the United Kingdom, with its loyalty to the British Monarch. The underlying view of Unionism changed only slightly after 1922. Post-partition Unionism regarded the position of the Free State much as one regards the black sheep in a family. On the one hand disowning it completely, and at the same time having maintained in its legislation and in practice that the Republic of Ireland was not a foreign country, and hence extending to all the citizens of the 26 counties, rights and privileges of a unique nature.

Both these analyses regard the natural geographical boundaries of the island, or the islands, as being the crucial factor. This is tidy, and has a romantic conviction about it at a very deep level. As Ernest Jones pointed out many years ago, the islandness of Ireland has a crucial role to play in the its unconscious and irrational elements of political Despite the fact that Irish Nationalism would psychology. regard itself as fundamentally different from Unionism, the only real difference is the question of whether one uses the physically bounded island, or the physically bounded archipelago, as the arbiter of the community which has the right of self-determination.

The Alliance analysis is quite different. We take the view that the boundary of a community is a much more complex and less tidy matter.

We believe that in the long history of the people of the North-East of the island there has developed a sense of separateness from the rest of the island, and also a strong affinity with the people of South-West Scotland. It is not surprising that there is a closer relationship with Scotland than with the people of the rest of Ireland for in days gone by it was much easier to travel by boat to Galloway than to get to Dingle or even Dublin. Some people maintain that this is all due to the Plantations, and further argue that the manifest injustice of these settlements robs the settlers descendants of any claim or rights. In actual fact the evidence is that such a position is more romantic than objective. There were also plantations in Leix & Offaly, in Munster, in South Leinster, and indeed the situation of the Scots in Antrim and Down was by no means regarded as satisfactory by the Government, precisely because they were not seen as dependably loyal to England, and their settling had not arisen through the 'due processes'.

The situation almost certainly did not just arise with the Plantation. However far back one goes it is clear that the people of the North-East had a tendency to separateness from the rest of the people of the island. Long before England was England, Cuchulainn was defending Ulster against Queen Maeve, and when Congal of Ulster was fighting with Domnal of Meath as far back as 637AD his support came from the Scots. The Kingdom of Dalriada extended across the North-East of Ireland and the South-West of Scotland. Indeed I have often wondered if the highly ambivalent attitude which many Ulster Loyalists feel towards Britain is not due to their loyalty being to the Scottish rather than the English Crown, and the confusion being caused by the fact that for almost four hundred years the same person has worn both crowns.

This tendency for the people of the North-East to be somewhat different, has tempted some people to elaborate notions of a separate racial group, in order to give reason or justification for the establishment of a separate jurisdiction. I must make it clear that I am not entertaining such arguments. They are simply fruitless disputes about nationalisms. The essence of nationalism is the attempt to establish a border within which are contained all the people of a particular racial or ethnic group, which can be separated off from 'the others'. Our contention is that such a process is unhelpful, and indeed dangerous. It is the rationalisation that is given for discrimination against, or prejudice against minorities find themselves within the borders. The struggle of Irish, Ulster or British Nationalists for the creation of national homelands is very deeply powerful as a myth, but is only ever possible at great cost to minorities, and in our case is an injustice to our diverse heritage.

Our people come from many different origins, Celts, Picts, Vikings, Saxons, Angles, French, but we are all totally mixed, intermarried, and related with each other. Nothing illustrates this more than our names. Take that most ancient and illustrious Ulster family, Magennis. We have Ken Maginnis amongst the Unionists, Alban Maguinnes in the SDLP, Danny McGuinness in Alliance, and even Martin Maguinness in

Sinn Fein. Or to look at it a different way. Molyneaux is obviously French, Paisley and Alderdice come from Scotland. Of course Hume is also a lowland Scottish Presbyterian name, but we have all been living for generations in Ireland. Perhaps too, despite the seriousness of our work today, I might be permitted to observe that we have John and Seamus leading the SDLP, John and Seamus leading Alliance, and Ian and James leading the Unionists. We are all more part of each other, than of anyone else. Alliance believes that our task is to nourish the sense of common community, and appreciate the shared and rich diversity of our roots.

It is also our belief that for a community to be politically healthy, there must be a focus of democratically elected power and responsibility. In local communities this is Local Government. At a regional level this is Provincial Government, and so on. Such a government in Northern Ireland benefits the unionist section of the community who realise that they remain part of the United Kingdom. It is of importance to nationalists to know that important issues are being decided by Northern Irish people, in Northern Ireland. And for those whose loyalty is primarily to the province of Northern Ireland, there is an immediate sense of identity.

This whole central principle might be stated thus:

Alliance sees the people of Northern Ireland as a community, however divided, and like any other such community, our people have the right to determine their own future, and participate directly in their own governance. A Provincial Government is necessary to provide a common focus of identity, and an opportunity to share in self-government.

PRINCIPLE 2

"Our primary objective is to heal the bitter division in our community by ensuring:

Equality of citizenship and human dignity,
The rooting out of discrimination and injustice,
The elimination of prejudice by a just and liberal appreciation
of the beliefs and fears of different members of the community,
Equality of social, economic and educational opportunities,
The highest standards of democracy at both parliamentary and
local government level, and
Complete and effective participation in our political,
governmental and public life at all levels by people drawn from
both sides of our present religious divide."

If our first principle maintains that our community, whatever its historical coherence, is characterised by differences, then our second principle presents our primary objective to be the protection and the valuing of minorities.

It is our firm conviction that the currently central question in the onward march of democracy, whether in South Africa, in Central and Eastern Europe, in the European Community or here in these islands, is the problem of how to protect the rights

and culture of minority communities. Redrawing borders simply creates different minorities. In Northern Ireland there is a nationalist minority. The creation of a so-called United Ireland solves their problem only at the cost of creating an even larger minority of non-nationalists in the new framework. Nothing is solved. A dictatorship of the majority is no less oppressive for the individual than an oligarchy. Surely not only Catholics in Northern Ireland in the past, and dissenters at all times, but also unionists in a United Kingdom which imposed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, must appreciate the iniquity of a dictatorship of the majority. The essential difference between populism and democracy is precisely how minorities are treated. Alliance believes in just such democracy.

All the parties to these talks are minority parties. The Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Alliance Party, vary considerably in size, but none on its own is a majority party, and of course within the United Kingdom, and within this island, none represents more than a small minority of the population. We ought all therefore to have a concern about the Rights of Minorities. If we can find ways of valuing and protecting minorities we will not only enrich our community, and develop our democracy, but we will also advance our own self-interest.

Let me read something to you:

"We are convinced that power-sharing based on full participation by everyone, as well as protection against domination, offers the only feasible answer. Full participation includes equal treatment and opportunities for all citizens of the country, regardless of their colour, culture or descent. It means that all citizens must be entitled to the rights and privileges which citizenship of a democratic country normally entails. In the nature of things it entails a vote of equal value for every adult citizen.

Full participation is one leg of power-sharing. The other leg is protection against domination. This includes the constitutional protection of minorities, collective values and individuals within the constitution, as well as a Bill of Rights.

Important methods of preventing domination are situated inter alia in the decentralisation of power, the imaginative devolution of authority, constitutional checks and balances, the requirement of consensus on contentious matters, systems which are conducive to consensus, and a strong independent judiciary. And then the list is by no means complete."

This statement is not from an Alliance Party document. It is not the proposal of a liberal opposition group fighting for a place in the sun. It is a recent direct quotation from Mr F W de Klerk, State President of the Republic of South Africa. It is his proposal for the future government of that divided community.

PRINCIPLE 3

"We firmly believe that without universal respect for the law of the land and the authorities appointed to enforce it, there can be no measurable progress. We therefore intend to secure the rapid achievement of such respect and the absolutely equal enforcement of the law without fear or favour, in every part of the state. Equal justice will be guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their political or religious persuasion."

That was written twenty years ago, but the elusive prize of widespread acceptance and respect for the administration and enforcement of the Rule of Law is yet to be achieved. There are nagging questions. 'How could it be possible that the British system of justice has not only failed to defeat the terrorists who continue to murder innocent people with apparent impunity, but even to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction by the courts?' It seems to us that the answer seems to us to lie with people's involvement in and identification with the creation, the administration and the execution of the law. Where people are not, or do not feel themselves to be involved in the law at all of these levels, through their own representatives, there is not confidence, ownership and respect.

There is no future for any community, no security for any family or individual, and no prospect of economic improvement without such respect. At every level those who take positions of responsibility and represent all strands in our community, must have, and must exercise, confidence in the law and in those who administer it.

This is an immensely thorny question, and the principle is more easily stated that incarnated, but it is a central issue for all of us in these talks, and without its resolution, there will be no resolution.

PRINCIPLE 4

To these expansions of three of our Four Founding Principles, I would add one more.

"There is a contribution to be made, and a price to be paid for peace in our community, not only by those who live here, but also by those who live outside of Northern Ireland, in the rest of the United Kingdom, and in the Republic of Ireland, and further afield."

I should wish to remind you of Leviticus Chap 16 verses 21-22. "He shall lay both his hands on its head, and confess over it, all the inquiries of the Israelites and all their acts of rebellion, that is all their sins, and he shall lay them on the head of the goat, and send it away into the wilderness in charge of a man who is waiting already. The goat shall carry all their iniquities upon itself into some barren waste and the man shall let it go, there in the wilderness." This is of course the account original 'scape goat', and to it I will return.

This year, 1991, is the three hundredth anniversary of the ending, on the west coast of Ireland with the battles of Aughrim and Limerick, of those struggles which had such profound significance for the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom. The so-called Glorious Revolution changed irreversibly the relationships between the Monarch, Parliament and People.

The last couple of years have also seen the eightieth anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles which brought the First World War to such an inauspicious end, and the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War. While in Belfast there were commemorations of the terrible Battle of the Somme fought in the First World War, and the fiftieth anniversary of the Blitz and of call-up of Ulstermen to serve in the Second World War, throughout the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe, remarkably little was said or done to commemorate these events. We must wonder why commemorations should continue to exercise their hold in this island, when in other places they, and other even more significant events, are either forgotten, or lose their overt violence and become ritualized into a common and shared culture. What, we must ask, is the driving, motivating and maintaining force behind the ill-concealed violence of the commemorations on this island? But there are many other questions which the observer must ask about the relationships between these Western European islands.

Why should they need to be governed by a special and very particular Agreement despite, and subsequent to, both of them joining the European Community on the same day, January1, 1973?

What is the significance of the fact that this new Agreement was described as an Anglo-Irish Agreement, rather than a British-Irish Agreement?

In respect of the Agreement itself, surely it is at least curious that such an Agreement should come about which seems to refer only to one part of the combined territory, and yet have failed to include any participation by the majority of people who live in that part of the archipelago.

The historical revolution of the people of these islands was one of a developing influence of the people of the South East of England over the rest of the communities of the archipelago. Although it eventually became known as the United Kingdom, it has always been a union of diverse system. The developing constitutional arrangements are complex and difficult to analyse because of the absence of a written constitution. Unlike most communities held together by common political, legal and religious arrangements, there is no integrated political system, no single legal system and no universal ecclesiastical system in the United Kingdom. One could point to the very British characteristic of 'living by conventions', but the argument could be made that the single most unifying fact is both hidden, and at the same time glaringly explicit, in the name – the United Kingdom. It is perhaps the enormous symbolic significance of the Royal family

which holds the United Kingdom together. The ancient tie with the Principality of Wales is maintained by the eldest son who is heir to the throne, and the more recent Union with Scotland is affirmed by the fact that with the accession of James VI of Scotland to the English throne as James I of England in 1603, all British monarchs wear both the English and Scottish crowns. The Union with Ireland however was never forged with such a powerful symbol. The only partial exception to this was the ancient historical connection with the north-east of Ireland, since it was the extension of the Ulster kingdom of Dalriada into Scotland that provided one of the early roots of the Scottish royal lineage of later years.

The rest of Ireland had no such connection, and fought to break the link. The constitutional independence which was achieved early in this century, however did not rid Ireland of its fascination with its erstwhile conqueror. A hugely intricate matrix of connections had been elaborated over the centuries and now binds England and Ireland together in an unequal and uncomfortable magnetic field. I say England and Ireland rather than Britain and Ireland, for I do not think that there is much evidence that Wales or even Scotland plays much of a part in this aspect of the relationship.

Perhaps when it began to emerge into the preconsciousness of the political mandarins that the insolubility of the Northern Ireland problem might be due to the unresolved relationship between England and Ireland it was indeed right that there should be discussions. And when an Agreement finally came about it is quite rightly described as an Anglo-Irish Agreement, not a British-Irish Agreement, for although it has all the appearance of being about how to deal with the difficulties of Northern Ireland, the energy behind it is also based on other considerations. And herein too lies its unsatisfactoriness.

It seems to me that Northern Ireland functions as a kind of scapegoat in Anglo-Irish relations. In constructing a political device which deals only with those relationships between the two states which are mediated by Northern Ireland, but specifically excludes Northern Ireland from having any say in what goes on in the relationship, there can be no resolution difficulties; merely a maintaining of the province in position of a scapegoat. But since the problems in the English-Irish Relationship have not been resolved, the early satisfactions, must inevitably give way, in time, to a re-emergence of the problems. Hence we find that the British Government is prepared to discuss the matter of confidence in legal arrangements within Northern Ireland, but when concern about the decisions of juries in the Birmingham or Guildford issues is raised, that is altogether different. Similarly, the British Government implodes with consternation at Irish extradition arrangements. In truth the Agreement which appears to be about how to deal with Northern Ireland is perhaps just as much about Anglo-Irish Relations. Does this confusion help to clarify the irony that the Government of the Republic, which in Articles 2 and 3 of its constitution claims jurisdiction over Northern Ireland, is represented at the

Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conferences by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the United Kingdom, which regards the Conference as an international matter, sends an internal minister, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland?

But in this fascinating melange, all may not be lost. The failure of the Agreement to come to completion through the establishment of a devolved parliament in Northern Ireland, has given the two partners a chance to get used to each other. If this can be maintained, and if there can be a recognition that the 1985 arrangements do not properly attend to the problem of the relationship between England and Ireland, never mind the internal problems of Northern Ireland, much less its relationship with the Republic of Ireland, we can perhaps begin to construct a further development which can enable a growth of mutual respect between the two states, and release Northern Ireland from its bind. This would however require that Northern Ireland was no longer excluded as a scapegoat.

At present almost nobody at the meetings of the Anglo-Irish Conference comes from Northern Ireland. It would undoubtedly be uncomfortable to have us there, but then perhaps issues could genuinely begin to be resolved and Ireland could become more truely independent of England. Or, since none of us is actually independent at all, we could more truely speak of moving to a more mature interdependence in the European Community.

Let us remember too that the scapegoat is not only the one who bears the blame and goes out into the wilderness, but is also the one who has the greatest possibilities for bringing a form of salvation. A real working at a resolution of the problems of Northern Ireland will bring a new depth and self-respect in relationships within and between England and Ireland. It is precisely these considerations which led us to commit ourselves to the concept of this three-strand series of negotiations upon which we have embarked.

The introduction to Strand 1 is not the place to spell out the contribution which we must expect from Dublin or London, or indeed from Brussels. It is enough to say that we believe that all who are involved in this process, (and the two governments have made the same commitment as the rest of us) all must be prepared to make strenuous efforts, and to bear some pain if there is to be a healing of the relationships.

All of us must be involved in enabling, guaranteeing and securing a settlement.

These then are the four underlying principles which Alliance brings to the talks, and some explanation of the reasons why we hold to them. The principles are not new, but as Tom Paine said in the conclusion to his book the Rights of Man, 'the question is not whether these principles are new or old, but whether they are right or wrong.' We believe them to be right, and we hold to them.