

From: Roderic Lyne
Date: 9 December 1993

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH JAMES MOLYNEAUX, 1315 9 DECEMBER: ROUTE
MAP

1. Introductory

- I believe Sir Patrick Mayhew briefed you on the Dublin Summit over the weekend. I wanted to bring you up to date as, one way or the other, the exercise with the Irish Government is nearing its end.
- Michael Ancram has shown me your draft "**blueprint for stability**". Have not yet had time to read it properly, but was struck by the carefully balanced views of the prominent businessmen in your appendix. Very important that we should continue to emphasise the talks process, and handle it and the Joint Declaration as complementary exercises. Will come back to that later.

2. What are our common objectives?

- Worth reminding ourselves what we are trying to achieve through the Joint Declaration.
- If we can achieve a cessation of violence without compromising our principles or any points of fundamental importance to both of us, obviously worthwhile. There is a chance of this. But the odds must be against it, at least in the short term. So we must consider what happens if there is no cessation.
- Even without a cessation of violence, there are considerable attractions to a Joint Declaration so long as the substance is acceptable:

- Would put PIRA on the defensive.
- Turning it down would mean that PIRA was rejecting a very reasonable position endorsed by the Irish Government - and which seems certain to attract wide support, e.g. from clergy of different persuasions, moderate businessmen, US Government, etc.
- Would expose PIRA as continuing to fight only for extreme and unattainable ends. Should demoralise the organisation and reduce its wider support among Catholics and in the South.
- Would lock the Irish Government into our position, and to language which goes much further than they have ever gone before - e.g. on the consent principle and not imposing a settlement.
- Document would not have conceded any steps towards joint authority, or any recognition of the value/legitimacy of a united Ireland. Would have reinforced right of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future.
- Would also wind up the initiative, rather than leave it hanging in the air.
- On this basis, I and my senior Ministerial colleagues agree that we should now go to the end of the road with Albert Reynolds, if he is prepared to concede the remaining points of difficulty to us. We are awaiting his definitive reply to points I put in Dublin - many of them stemming from your discussion of the text with Michael Ancram - and I cannot be certain how he will respond.

3. The Joint Declaration text

- I would be happy for Michael Ancram to go through the latest text with you today, as he did before. This could be another non-discussion. Could make it easier presentationally for both of us. But entirely up to you.
- The headline points are:
 - We put all of your points to the Irish, and some extra points of our own.
 - The signs are that they are likely to concede on all the fundamental points, and on a number of subsidiary points.
 - The constitutional guarantee will be reaffirmed.
 - We have satisfactory reflection of the three-strand process.
 - The self-determination formula will make clear that consent must be given freely and concurrently in North and South - i.e. between the two parts respectively and not treating the island as a single entity.
 - Nothing in the text lines HMG up ~~was~~ a "persuader". The only reference to persuasion is in a new sentence but ~~on~~^{to} "those who favour this outcome persuading those who do not".
 - There is a very good new sentence in which the Taoiseach recognises that "it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland in the absence of the freely-given consent of the majority of

the people of Northern Ireland".

- Perhaps the biggest remaining problem is over the Irish Convention. Paragraphs 10 and 11 are still in the text, in square brackets. I have told the Taoiseach that we cannot accept them, and will not put our names to a text which mentions the "Irish Convention" by name, even as a unilateral Irish device.
- His argument is that the Convention is simply a device for the Irish Government's post-cessation dialogue with Sinn Fein, comparable to the British Government's proposals for exploratory dialogue after three months.
- I have no objection to that, so long as the British Government is not ^{associated} ~~assisted~~ with the Convention, and it is not established as a body in which all parties are expected to participate.
- We have therefore suggested that the Irish Government should ^{separate} ~~support~~ their Convention from the Joint Declaration, and that the JD would only refer to them making their own arrangements for political dialogue with Sinn Fein.

4. Further steps: JD launch/talks process/Select Committee

- Will have a short and, if possible, low-key meeting with Reynolds in Brussels.
- If he then accepts the points we have tabled, we shall have agreement on a text, subject to any final confirmation.

- Final step would be for us to meet in London around the middle of next week to put out the joint declaration.
- I would make clear then that we must also go all out for further, early progress in the talks process.
- I shall keep the Irish Government under pressure to play their part in supporting the talks process.
- I understand your concerns about democratic deficit within Northern Ireland, and the importance of working to achieve democratic institutions to fill it.
- While this must be part of an overall settlement involving all three Strands, I share your view that useful emphasis can immediately be put on Strand 1. Your blueprint will help with this.
- Separately, you have discussed the Select Committee with Richard Ryder. As you know, we believe the time has come for the Select Committee, and will aim to move this to a vote in the New Year. Hope you will find this a useful balancing element.

RODERIC LYNE

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