



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

16 November 1993

Dear George,

283/S4K3

I have seen a copy of the statement on Northern Ireland which you issued today.

I am enormously grateful for the support which you have expressed with such strength and clarity.

Though I have not drawn attention to this aspect, for obvious reasons, I have not neglected the Churches in my latest round of consultations on Northern Ireland. I value the wise advice which I have invariably received from that quarter, and I know how influential the Church leaders, including Archbishop Eames, are within that troubled community.

As I said at the Guildhall, the history of the past quarter century does not encourage optimism. We must not be daunted by this, or afraid to take risks as a result. I believe that the shock of the latest sectarian killings, on top of the weariness which the people of Northern Ireland must feel after so many years of pain and disruption, has created a climate of support for peace. If there is a viable opportunity to use this to achieve a permanent cessation of violence

and progress towards a political settlement, I am determined to take it. At the time of writing I have only the first day's reactions to my appeal, but they are not discouraging.

Yours Ever,
John

cc: Mr. Bell
Mr. Thomas
Mr. Watkins
Mr. Bell
Mr. Williams
Mr. Cooke
Mr. Macdonald
Mr. Branker
Mr. Archer, CID
Mr. Cairns

Mr. McEvelly

MCGIMPSEY RESOURCES, DUBLIN 17 NOVEMBER

1. They were here for a talk Christopher McGimpsey gave at the Mansion House in Dublin. I spent an hour with them beforehand.
2. Michael McGimpsey told me that he had talked to Martin Mansergh last week, and been surprised to be given a detailed account of what appeared to be a strategy by the British to "flush out" the IRA. Mansergh had told him that the Irish Government had decided they could not live with Sinn Féin, neither in substance nor outward form. They were putting proposals indirectly to the IRA that amounted to little more than a seat at the conference table if they gave up violence. They were drafted in terms of reasonable British could object to, Mansergh had said. This process was designed to force them to put up or get up, in a tight enough timetable to clear the air before the event, and not interfere with or quash the pitch for the Inceps fund etc. In domestic political terms, Mansergh could not be seen to have rejected a chance of peace. This process would be off that hook. If the IRA rejected it, as Mansergh had implied he believed they would.
3. The McGimpseys were clearly very nervous about all this, but believed Mansergh portrayed the British correctly. It was very hard to see how Mansergh could be seen to be backing

His Grace The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury

4. The situation now leaves me seriously concerned that Belfast - dangerously so in the light of the only bid to violence, but also more politically sensitive. Mansergh had, genuinely, at last been to the heart of the matter himself to a meeting with Spring and the IRA, and subsequent