

CONVERSATION WITH ARCHBISHOP EAMES: 20 NOVEMBER 1993

I spoke to Dr Eames in the afternoon of Saturday 20 November.

2. The Archbishop had seen Jim Molyneaux the previous day. He had been very agitated; frightened, even. At Glengall Street he had been asked whether he was not being led by the nose, and was questioned on the lines of "What have you agreed to?". On Thursday 18 November his secretary had been questioned similarly by David Burnside at a party: had he "given the nod" to another document? (That is to say, an alternative to the one he was known to have turned down.)

3. In the light of the Irish Press leak, Molyneaux said he would be 'finished' if it were known he had been consulted on a further document, or that he had had a letter from the Taoiseach. The leak had jeopardised former positions, and he had to run for cover. He wanted "to ponder" replying to the letter.

4. Dr Eames emphasised that he had shown Molyneaux only the three paragraphs 9-12, so Molyneaux could truthfully say he had not seen the whole document. It was these paragraphs with which Molyneaux had taken serious issue. But he could not possibly provide an alternative text in present circumstances.

5. Dr Eames was very anxious that I should reassure Molyneaux:

- (a) that he had intervened only by invitation;
- (b) that when the two of them had conferred, Dr Eames had had no knowledge that the Irish had already prepared the leaked document - as to which he felt considerably let down; and
- (c) that Molyneaux was central to the process and that Dr Eames was in no way a competitor.

I undertook to pass these messages on.

6. The Archbishop said he had suggested to Molyneux that he should speak to me. Molyneux had asked "would that be welcomed". Dr Eames had said he was sure it would be. He concluded by emphasising to me how important it was to reassure Molyneux of his centrality, and of his importance to the Government.

Mr Thomas
Mr Mackinnon
Mr Williams
Mr MacCabe
Mr Coker
Mr Brooker
Mr Archer
Mr Cairns
Miss Neville Jones

PM

22 November 1993

NORTHERN IRELAND: IRISH OUTLOOK ON THE SURREY

1. Geraldine Kennedy, Political Correspondent of the Irish Times, gave me a run-down on the present situation. She is following the issue full time, and has been variously briefed by Eames, Adams and Albert Reynolds in some depth.

2. The Irish Government had concluded that there were strong grounds to believe that the IRA (or at least a large majority of them) would stop their campaign in exchange for a "simple" formula, based on what had come out of Eames/Adams, and that this could and should be articulated by both Governments at the 17th December Summit, to achieve peace. Without this there was no prospect of successful political negotiations.

3. The key elements were:
a) self-determination: recognised that this was a matter for the people of Ireland as a whole, but expressed separately North and South. It might seem very simple to us, but modern Irish history had been all about finding forms of words to end fighting, and doing it separately North and South guaranteed that neither Ireland would ever be the 32 as long as the other had a majority. It was to be seen as a "one" or "mirror" because it strongly emphasised the "one" existing question. But the IRA were happy enough with it, and it that was what it