

22/11/93 (40)

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1A 2AA

November 1993

CONVERSATION WITH MR MOLYNEAUX: 21 NOVEMBER

I attach my Secretary of State's account of a phone conversation he had with Mr Molyneux yesterday. As you know, Sir Patrick gave the Prime Minister an account of the conversation over the phone yesterday.

Copies of this letter go to John Sawers and Melanie Leach.

JONATHAN STEPHENS
Private Secretary

hcc

- PS/Sofs (B&L) - B
- PS/Michael Ancram (B&L) - B
- PS/PUS (B&L) - B
- PS/Mr Fell - B
- Mr Thomas - B
- Mr Bell - B
- Mr Watkins - B
- Mr Williams - B
- Mr Brooker - B
- Mr Cooke - B
- Mr Maccabe - B
- Mr Quinn
- Mr Caine - B
- Mr Archer, RID - B
- HMA Dublin - B

CONFIDENTIAL

CONVERSATION WITH JIM MOLYNEAUX: 21 NOVEMBER 1993

I spoke to Mr Molyneaux on Sunday morning 21 November.

2. I said I was aware that, in the instability caused by the leaked Irish document, he would feel the need to cover his back within the disrupted unionist family.

3. He said that the UUP were getting bad vibes on the ground. Middle class electors in Hillsborough were speaking to him dubiously about whether he was not risking being betrayed. Working class unionists were as hostile to any accommodation with Dublin as ever. It was the width of the sceptical spectrum that worried him. His party would not be "getting back into the pockets of the DUP" - but they would have to be seen to be narrowing the gap. He would have to postpone 'for a few weeks' any meeting with Mr Spring or Mr Reynolds.

4. I said that of course the Government know nothing of the leaked document before it was printed in the Irish News - and nor did Dr Eames. He accepted that. I said we had been expecting a document, having furnished our own suggestions in September.

5. Molyneaux said he had heard the journalist who had published the document say on the radio that the Irish Government had intended to give us the document in time for the IGC, but that Reynolds had ordered it to be put on ice. She had said it had been handed to her by a high Irish official, who had told her this. I did not tell him of any collateral on this from Mr Spring. Molyneaux speculated on the purpose on leaking it and said it was a mystery.

6. I asked him what his own statement meant, in particular the reference to diplomats. He said he had "agonised" about the word. He had not wanted to criticise the Government nor NIO officials, in whom he had great confidence. But he suspected FCO officials and the Cabinet Secretary had a critical approach to the Government's policies: there were allusions to the Anglo-Irish Agreement here.

assured him I had not the slightest experience of any such thing, and that the Government was rock solid on no bargaining, no joining the persuaders and no joint authority.

7. The conversation was exceedingly amicable. He was relaxed, and said he was very grateful for a valuable talk. It was clear to me that his statement was a typically crafted exercise in showing the unionist family that he was still the same old Jim, whose trustworthiness was not to be doubted.

*Mr Thomas
P/M Fell
Mr Beverell
Mr Cooke
Mr Rickard
Mr ...
Mr May*

NORTHERN IRELAND: PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TAOISEACH AND WITH JAMES MOLYNEAUX MP

22 November 1993

At 10.15 pm, the Prime Minister spoke on the telephone to Albert Reynolds on the evening of Saturday 20 November, and to James Molyneaux on the afternoon of Sunday 21 November.

The Taoiseach

The Prime Minister said that he had been moderately optimistic after his meeting on 18 November with Archbishop Eames. However, the subsequent leak of an Irish Government document on 19 November, and Hume/Adams statement on 20 November, had had a disastrous effect. They had pushed the British Government into a corner and had provided a target for the unhelpful ones. The Hume/Adams document made it appear to people that, despite the action taken by the British and Irish governments in Brussels on 29 October, Hume and Adams were back in tandem. We had to make it clear that we were not backing up the House of Hume/Adams. The Prime Minister hoped the Taoiseach would do to us his Prime programme. He also hoped that Reynolds might be able to persuade Hume to shut up. It would be hard if Hume gave the impression that he would negotiate concessions for Adams. There was a serious risk that was becoming the biggest danger in the process.

The Taoiseach said that he had spoken to ... and had also asked others to ... After his meeting with the Prime Minister in