

C O N F I D E N T I A L



FROM: PUS
30 NOVEMBER 1993

...my expectation was that the...
...a conversation...
today's Irish Cabinet meeting and that as far as I could see there
was no reason on the British side why the Summit should not go
ahead early next month. Mr Hume sounded somewhat relieved - I
think he had feared that the combination of British policy and
the disclosure crisis would lead to...
further movements.

- cc. PS/Secretary of State (L&B) - B
- PS/Michael Ancram (L,B&DENI) - B
- PS/Mr Fell - B
- Mr Thomas - B
- Mr Bell - B
- Mr Williams - B
- Mr Deverell - B
- Mr Wood (L&B) - B
- Mr Brooker - B
- Mr Cooke - B
- Mr Maccabe - B
- Mr Beeton - B
- Mr May - B

4. He added that he had seen the... Joint Communiqué
which we had given to the Taoiseach... not think such of
it. I said it had to be read first...
much of the content was drawn from...
with an eye to saleability to all... no good answer
saleability to one side with the... losing it on
another. I emphasized that it was... text and the
important thing was for work to re...

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

MR HUME

Signed:

I spoke to John Hume (he was in Derry) late last night. I
asked him how he was: he sounded a bit mournful but said that he
was coming along 'so so'.

2. He told me he had deliberately stayed away from the House of
Comons for yesterday's Statement on the grounds that his presence
might have provoked not only the DUP but some members of the UUP
into what might have been unhelpful statements which could have
damaged the Government's position on the search for peace. He had
gone out of his way to ensure that Mr Kevin McNamara did not
attack the Government. He had been sorry therefore that the
Secretary of State had made a party point in answering Mr McNamara
but I said that I knew the two had had a word outside the Chamber
to mend any misunderstanding. I said that the way Mr McNamara had
put his own question was not exactly free of sting and bite.

3. He then said he was very concerned indeed that the prospects
for peace despite the Government's very strong stand and support
around most of the House of Commons for it, was in danger of being
lost. I said that the next step with the flurry about disclosure
out the way was for the two Governments to return to their

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JEN/L/11/112/48319

dialogue and my expectation was that the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach would be having a conversation in anticipation of today's Irish Cabinet meeting and that as far as I could see there was no reason on the British side why the Summit should not go ahead early next month. Mr Hume sounded somewhat relieved - I think he had feared that the combination of British policy and the disclosure crisis would lead to our locking the door on any further movements.

4. He added that he had seen the text of the Joint Communiqué which we had given to the Taoiseach, and did not think much of it. I said it had to be read first with the realisation of how much of the content was drawn from the JD initiative, and second with an eye to saleability to all sides. It was no good ensuring saleability to one side with the certainty of losing it on another. I emphasised that it was negotiable text and the important thing was for work to resume.

MR
Mr McKerrill

NORTHERN IRELAND, SUMMIT ETC

I had lunch today with Fergus Flisley, Dick Spring's Special Adviser.

Signed:

J A CHILCOT

30 NOVEMBER 1993

Effect of revelations about HMG's provisional contacts
1. He had come straight from the Cabinet meeting which was still going on. As a result of the revelations about HMG's contacts with the Provisional movement, the Taoiseach and Flisley were both angry and frustrated. Spring was furious that while (as he had put it) he had hauled over the coals and humiliated in the summer by Sir P Mayhew for suggesting that joint authority might feature in any solution, the Taoiseach had been exchanging detailed notes with the Provisionals. The Taoiseach believed his peace process had been side-lined by the revelations, possibly deliberately. He and Spring had taken severe risks in distancing themselves from John Hume (Spring had been told he would be bowed off the stage if he turned up at last weekend's SDLP conference despite the long standing SDLP-Labour Party links). They had been made to look fools. They could not trust the British. They might, he thought, calm down after the Cabinet meeting.

Being business with HMG
2. It was essential to establish clearly whether HMG really believed that the peace process had to be pursued between the two governments, and no one else, or whether we still thought we could do a direct deal with the Provisionals.

4. On the positive side, the Irish government had been struck by the way in which the Prime Minister and Sir P Mayhew had "sailed through" the House of Commons on 29 November. Surely this would relieve some of the British government's anxieties, and lead them to be a bit more daring in the run up to the Summit.