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FROM: J A Dew  
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DATE: 30 November 1993

cc:PS/SofS-B  
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PS/PUS-B  
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Mr Thomas-B  
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Mr Watkins-B  
Mr Maccabe-B  
Mr Cooke-B  
Mr Brooker-B  
Mr Archer, RID-B

HMA  
Mr McKervill

**NORTHERN IRELAND, SUMMIT ETC**

1. I had lunch today with Fergus Finlay, Dick Spring's Special Adviser.

**Effect of revelations about HMG/Provisional contacts**


2. He had come straight from the Cabinet meeting which was still going on. As a result of the revelations about HMG's contacts with the Provisional movement, the Taoiseach and Tanaiste were both angry and frustrated. Spring was furious that while (as he had put it) he was being hauled over the coals and humiliated in the summer by Sir P Mayhew for suggesting that joint authority might feature in any solution, the Northern Secretary had been exchanging detailed notes with the Provisionals. The Taoiseach believed his peace process had been side lined by the revelations, possibly deliberately. He and Spring had taken severe risks in distancing themselves from John Hume (Spring had been told he would be booted off the stage if he turned up at last weekend's SDLP conference despite the long standing SDLP-Labour Party links). They had been made to look fools. They could not trust the British. They might, he thought, calm down after the Cabinet meeting.

**Doing business with HMG**

3. It was essential to establish clearly whether HMG really believed that the peace process had to be pursued between the two governments, and no one else, or whether we still thought we could do a direct deal with the Provisionals.

4. On the positive side, the Irish government had been struck by the way in which the Prime Minister and Sir P Mayhew had "sailed through" the House of Commons on 29 November. Surely this would relieve some of the British government's anxieties, and lead them to be a bit more daring in the run up to the Summit.

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5. Was there any point in fixing a date until there was more clarity about the nature of any communiqué? One idea on the Irish side had been to pursue a meeting between Spring and Sir P Mayhew in the time left between now and the Summit. Another possibility was a Spring/Hurd meeting in the margins of the Special 2 December GATT FAC in Brussels.

Summit communiqué texts

6. The text we had proposed for the Summit communique had gone down badly with the Taoiseach because it had been presented to him as a text which Mr Molyneaux could accept. The Irish government believed that no text acceptable to him could possibly work the trick and induce a Provisional cessation of hostilities. For this reason he did not believe the Taoiseach had read our text with much attention (he certainly had not read the leaked Irish position paper). The Irish government believed that any outcome which could deliver peace would require HMG to stand up to, and face down, the initial Unionist reaction. He himself had spent the weekend comparing the British and Irish drafts, and believed that with a bit of work they could be reconciled in a single text - if the political will was there. The two texts were not incompatible, or too far apart. It was all a matter of atmosphere and tone.

7. There was no guarantee that the Provisionals would react positively even to the Irish draft. But if they rejected it they would find it very difficult to explain why the difference between that text and the Hume/Adams text (which would have to be published) justified them in continuing to kill people. The text contained passages drafted variously by Gerry Adams and Dr Eames: it was, in terms of Irish history, a remarkable document. It did not, in his view, commit anyone to swallowing the republican analysis.

Irish government contacts with Unionists

8. Finlay (possibly accompanied by Spring) had a positive meeting with senior UUP figures on 27 November, flying to the North by helicopter for the purpose. This had gone very well and a meeting with Molyneaux had been on the cards for Wednesday 1 December. This now looked unlikely to come off following the revelations of our contacts with the Provisionals. He had also had a lengthy meeting with the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church on 28 November, after which the Moderator had astonished him by refusing to pass on a message to Mr Molyneaux on the grounds that he was a member of the Church of Ireland.

(SIGNED)

J A Dew