Path to peace 'diverted by listening to e

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n the late 1960s, the New Ulster Movement supported moderates L in various parties, but quickly learned that such politicians rarely lasted in sectional parties. In unionism, Terence O'Neill and Brian Faulkner were dumped and, in the SDLP, the same fate befell people like Gerry Fitt and Paddy Devlin. Others survived by bending towards the extremists in their own parties. or within their broader community - hence for many years the unhealthy relationship of the Ulster Unionists with Ian Paisley's DUP, or in more recent times the over- explains the current dilemma in weening concern of John Hume with Sinn Fein. The early recognition of this problem created the Alliance party, bringing Protestants and Catholics together in an anti-sectarian party - a political home for pluralism in a divided community.

I recount this background because our experience, regularly confirmed since 1970, led me to warn Peter Brooke in 1991 that his Inter-Party Talks would not reach agreement. We might make progress, but we would not reach an agreement if we required all parties to agree to everything. It remains my view that an

agreement might be possible among the Ulster Unionist party, the SDLP and Alliance, but including the more extreme elements will stymie progress. In the Middle East, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat have not made progress by addressing the extremes of the political spectrum. On the contrary, Mr Rabin had to turn his back on Jewish fundamentalists, and Mr Arafat had to accept the resignation from the PLO executive of hard-liners who would not accept agreement with Israel.

Failure to recognise this principle Northern Ireland. In December 1993 John Major, the prime minister, and Albert Reynolds, the taoiseach, achieved a remarkable advance. They agreed that the people of Northern Ireland had the right to determine their own future, and that London and Dublin would guard and facilitate that right. They affirmed that the people's decision should not be subject to coercion. They confirmed that full participation in the democratic process was open to all parties that eschewed violence.

The Downing Street Declaration, which set out these principles, reJohn Alderdice argues that London and Dublin should avoid trying to please all of the people all of the time in their efforts to bring peace to Northern Ireland

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ceived the support of all the main parties in London and Dublin, and the approbation of Europe and America, but by winning the enthusiastic support of the SDLP and Alliance, and cautious acceptance by the Ulster Unionists, it also achieved an unprecedented level of consensus in Northern Ireland. These three parties took 70% of the vote in the last election. All observers agreed: Sinn Fein and the DUP had been marginalised. This was the moment to capitalise on success, and build on the new agreement. But four months later. Sinn Fein is confident of victory, Ulster Unionists panic that their support is leaching away to Ian Paisley's Euro-campaign, and the prospects of Inter-Party Talks are now negligible. The reason lies in the failure of both governments to

extremists.

Let us take the matter of clarification. I recall during the 1991 Inter-Party Talks warning Peter Brooke that on no account should they capitulate to Ian Paisley's demands for a meeting with the prime minister to "clarify" matters. They replied that there would be no difficulties. They had been assured that the Unionists simply required this meeting for political purposes, to enable them to move forward. I told them I was not reassured, and that it would spell the end for the talks. The result was a vintage Paisley dust-storm in Downing Street. It took two weeks for the minutes of the meeting to be agreed. By then the talks were dead.

understand how to deal with tive call for a direct meeting, for the purpose of clarification. Mr Adams, like Dr Paisley is a fundamentalist. and so are his people. He too is a genius with words, but even were they pragmatists, neither could lead their people where they will not go.

Mr Adams asks for clarification but he refuses to clarify or even to publish the Hume/Adams Document which he says is different from the Downing Street Declaration, despite SDLP assertions to the contrary. Mr Adams refuses to clarify the questions which Mr Major must answer to put his mind at rest. Why not publish the list of questions, and let the government give a public answer? Mr Adams tells us that after the three-day truce republicans must go back to the drawing board, but will Now I hear Gerry Adams' seduc- not clarify what is so wrong with

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simply ceasing violence. Let us clar- should produce proposals for the inify our minds about Mr Adams' position. He says he cannot speak for the IRA, but he is only of interest to the two governments because they believe that he speaks for the IRA. Assume he is telling the truth. Then arrangements for co-operation beis it wide of the mark to believe that tween Belfast and Dublin, and be-Mr Adams will not suggest to the tween London and Dublin. This IRA that they cease their violence for good, or even for more than a derisory three days, because he suspects his own clout is based, not on his party's elected mandate, but on search for the Holy Grail of unanimits espousal of the lever of terrorism.

What then can be done? Is the Joint Delcaration a failure? That depends on the two governments. If they continue to concentrate on the response of Sinn Fein, they will strengthen both Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley. The door must remain open for each of their parties of course. If IRA violence is brought to an end, then Sinn Fein can participate fully in the democratic process with the same rights as everyone else. If Dr Paisley chooses to re-engage in talks then he must have that right. Meantime Mr Major and Mr Reynolds should focus on building Dr John T Alderdice is leader of the on the Joint Declaration. Mr Major Alliance party.

ternal government of Northern Ireland, based on power-sharing and the protection of minority rights, and together with Mr Reynolds, clear agreements must be reached on the process must not be done secretly, as in 1985, but in consultation with those parties which are prepared to partipate. It is now clear that the ity between Mr Adams, Dr Paisley. and everyone in between is dangerously futile. The governments must build on the Joint Declaration, for the sake of the majority of good Northern Ireland people on both sides, and in the middle.

Footnote: If Mr Major were to take this advice and, with Mr Reynolds, resolve the Ulster problem with firm and judicious conviction, he will help Ireland and create a future for himself. He may also come to understand how to deal with extreme views in his own party.