DRAFT

SUB-COMMITTEE (8 JUNE 1992)

(A paper by the Government Team to serve as a basis for discussion)

"CODE OF PRACTICE II"

1. The discussion paper circulated by the Government Team on 5 June sought to illustrate questions which would need to be addressed in distinguishing the respective roles, responsibilities and decision-taking powers Departments, Assembly Committees and the Assembly at large.

2. Further questions that may need addressing in this context include means of preventing Chairmen becoming captives of their committee. (This was envisaged in para 9 of the paper "New Political Institutions in Northern Ireland"). This supplementary paper seeks to provide a basis for preliminary discussion of such issues.

3. It was envisaged in the 'New Political Institutions' paper that the Assembly could exercise its powers through a system of Department Committees, with Chairmanships, Deputy Chairmanships and memberships allocated broadly in proportion to Party strengths in the Assembly. This would not, however, necessarily provide an appropriate, fair and significant role for representatives of all main traditions in Northern Ireland so far as Committee Chairmen were concerned.

4. Further means of ensuring this, and in particular preventing Committee Chairmen from becoming "captives of their committees" could include one or more of the following, some suggested in "Code of Practice II" - para 9:

(a) Chairmen could possess certain statutorily unfettered powers of independent decision (which also could, in certain cases, be subject to approval by the Panel); or

(b) a Committee could be required to operate by a, say, two-thirds majority whoever it sought to overturn a decision of its Chairman;

[(b) a variant of the principle of proportional allocation to Committees and their officers, might be the allocation of a majority on a particular committee or committees to a single party, subject to proportionality across the Committees as a whole; or,]

(c) the ability of the Chairman (provided he or she could secure a certain threshold of, say, 30% or an agreed a number of members of the Committee) to refer any matter for decision on his or her part to the full Assembly; or,

(d) Any matter might subsequently be referred by the Assembly to the Panel, provided a petition to that effect secured a certain threshold of, say, 30% support in the Assembly;

(e) the Assembly cold [sic] have power to overturn a Chairman's decision but only subject to a weighted majority of, say, 70%.

5. Such mechanisms could apply in a range of circumstances, including where:

(a) the Chairman's powers of decision were subject to ratification by the Committee; or,

(c) [sic] the Chairman could only act with the approval of the Committee, [including matters where decisions were for a Committee as a whole].

6. Such mechanisms would not exclude a more general device enabling any significant minority on a Committee to defer the consideration of proposed legislation or administrative actions, or to refer such issues for consideration by the Assembly at large. There could also be provision for weighted majority voting in certain circumstances; as well as for dissenting report.

7. Does the sub-group agree that:

(a) such mechanisms are desirable in principle?

(b) if so, might any of those suggested in para 4 above be acceptable?

(c) does the sub-group wish to suggest others.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

• HMG Code of Practice Supplementary Paper (introduced on 1992-06-08 09:00:00 - CREATE_FROM - e898535) [This document]

• HMG Code of Practice Supplementary Paper (introduced on 1992-06-08 09:00:00 - CREATE_FROM - e898535) [This document] [view current proposal at this moment]