EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AND CAPTIVE CHAIRMEN

This paper looks at an "Executive Committee" model of devolution, such as proposed by the UUP and UDUP. As they recognise, to be acceptable to the SDLP, this model has to amount to more than just another version of majority rule.

UUP and UDUP proposals

2. Both provide for Committees and Chairmen to be selected in proportion to the parties' strengths in the Assembly. So there will be a unionist majority on each committee. Both provide that it is the Committee which shall direct the relevant department. But both give the "day-to-day running" of the department to the Chairman of the Committee.

3. Neither proposal specifies how Committees are to reach decisions. The UUP proposal gives no detail on the relationship between the Chairman and his Committee. But it is clear that the Committee sets the policy and the Chairman implements it.

4. The UDUP proposal does clarify the relationship. Chairmen would be responsible for the day-to-day running of the department, but "within the policy and decisions agreed by the Committee". The Chairman would at all times be accountable to the Committee, and the Committee to the Assembly (who could overturn a Committee's decision).

5. As described, this amounts to majority rule.

Freeing Chairmen

6. Within the basic UUP and UDUP model in which power is devolved to the Committee, it is possible to build up the Chairman's independent role in a variety of ways.

- The Chairman could be given sole control of the Committee's procedure and agenda. This would enable a Chairman to prevent a Committee from taking certain actions, simply by not allowing them to discuss it. But it would not allow the Chairman to pursue his own agenda because that would still require the approval of the Committee. Moreover, allowing the Chairman to block discussion against the wishes of a majority of his Committee looks undemocratic. The SDLP would not be satisfied with it.

- The Committee might be required to take decisions by weighted majority - say, two thirds. If any decision required two thirds support, that would ensure that it was not supported just by one side or another. But it would hand either side a veto over the actions of Chairmen from the other side. That could well be a recipe for Government by indecision, or for a boycott by one side or the other.

- That might be avoided if the Committee had to operate by a two-thirds majority whenever it wished to overturn a decision of its Chairman. Chairmen would then be free to get on with the running of their departments unless two thirds of their Committee wished to overrule them. This would free SDLP Chairmen from their unionist majority. But it would mean that the SDLP minority on another Committee would only have a chance of overturning a decision of the unionist Chairman if there were wholesale unionist disaffection on that Committee.

- The Chairman could be given more votes than the other members. On a Committee of ten, for example, the Chairman might have five votes and the other Committee members one each. The justification would have to be that the Chairman was responsible for the day-to-day running of the department and that his view should therefore carry greater weight within the Committee. But its democratic credentials are rather tenuous. It would mean that, with the support of his own party, an SDLP Chairman would have a majority on his own Committee. But it would also mean that a unionist Chairman, together with other unionists on his Committee, could well be able to rely on more than two thirds of the votes in his Committee.

Appeal to the Assembly

7. Another possibility is a power of appeal to the Assembly. This might be triggered either by a Chairman, or by a significant minority (say 30 per cent) of the Committee.

- The Assembly could have power to overturn a Chairman's decision, or to confirm a Committee's decision to do so. If this only required a simple majority, it would leave Chairmen captive to the Assembly. But a requirement for a two-thirds majority would leave Chairmen with greater freedom.

- The Assembly could have power to overturn a Committee's decision. Some Committee decisions, for example those to overturn a Chairman's decision, might require the Assembly's approval. Again, this would only assist captive Chairmen if a weighted majority was required.

8. Apart from delay and an extra level of complexity, it is difficult to see what an appeal to the Assembly achieves. Weighted majorities in the Committees would work just as well as a weighted majority in the Assembly.

Shifting power to Chairman

9. These variations all start with giving power to the Committee, who then delegate it to the Chairmen. An alternative approach would be to give Executive power to the Chairman, but subject to some constraining powers of his Committee.

10. The starting point would be to give the Chairman the powers of the Head of Department. Possibilities for the role of the Committee include:

- Scrutiny powers only. This would leave Chairmen largely "free" of their Committee. But it would be difficult to present this as a genuine Committee-style of Government. It could be too close to a power-sharing Executive model for the unionists' comfort.

- Scrutiny and consultative powers only. The Chairman would be required to consult his Committee in advance on all but the most urgent decisions. The Committee could call for an Assembly debate and, possibly by weighted majority, delay it for a limited period of time. This would give more of a role to the Committee. It would open decisions to scrutiny in advance. But it would not significantly impede a determined Chairman.

- The Committee could have certain veto powers over a Chairman's decision. These could be limited either by a requirement for a weighted majority to overrule a Chairman, or by restricting them to certain types of decision (eg financial authorisation, public appointments but not day-to-day running of the department). This would make the distribution of power between the Chairman and the Committee more balanced, while leaving the initiative firmly with the Chairman. However, when Committees divided on sectarian lines, minority Chairmen would always be at greater risk of having their decisions overruled than majority Chairmen.

The last option is close to some of the options in which power lies formally with the Committee, but the Chairman is allowed a fairly free hand.

Creating a natural majority for Chairmen

11. Another way around the problem of "captive chairmen" would be to create a natural supporting majority for Chairmen from minority parties. This could be done without breaching the principle that membership of the Executive Committees as a whole should be in proportion to the strength of the parties in the Assembly. The minority parties would be allowed to concentrate their Committee members in those Committees where they also held the chairmanship. In this way, each Chairman would have a natural supporting majority on his own Committee.

12. So the problem of "captive Chairmen" would be solved. But there would need to be some constraint on the powers of individual Committees or Chairmen. This could take the form of an appeal by a minority of the Committee to the Assembly. But this would be largely ineffective:

- The minority parties would have to create a majority on the Committees where they held the chairmanship. This would mean denuding the other Committees of minority party members. There would be very few nationalists on unionist controlled Committees. To be effective, therefore, any appeal mechanism would have to have a very low trigger. But such a low trigger would enable unionists on nationalist controlled Committees to frustrate the nationalist majority by regular appeals to the Assembly.

- In the Assembly the unionist majority would still prevail. Although this could be weakened by the requirement for a weighted majority to overturn a Committee's decision, nationalist Committees would always be at greater risk of having their decisions overturned than unionist Committees.

Legislation

13. The Assembly itself would have some role in legislation. There could be a requirement that any legislation secure a two thirds majority in the Assembly as a whole. That would allow either side to veto legislation. But it would also make it more difficult for a minority Chairman to achieve a positive programme of legislation.

14. But decisions by simply [sic] majority in the Assembly as a whole, could mean a minority Chairman being confronted with legislation fundamentally at odds with the policies he wished to pursue. This could be overcome by a variety of devices.

- All legislation could require the approval of the relevant Chairman, effectively giving him a veto. A slightly weaker version would allow the Assembly to continue with legislation against the Chairman's wishes but only on a weighted majority.

- Procedural devices to limit time for Private Members' legislation. Priority on the floor of the Assembly could be given to legislation introduced by Chairmen of Committees. Time for Private Members' legislation could be deliberately squeezed. Or it could require the approval of the relevant Committee, with the Chairman able to use his ability to set the agenda for the Committee, to delay any such Bills if necessary.

Conclusion

15. There clearly are ways of allowing an Executive Committee model to work so that minority Chairmen are not "captive" to the natural majority in either their Committee or the Assembly.

16. The model can be designed so as to give a wider range of results:

- from virtual majority rule, in which minority Chairmen are little more than procedural figureheads;

- to a system which gives minority Chairmen effective powers as Heads of Department, subject only to scrutiny by the majority in their Committee.

17. But there is a basic rule. You can free a minority Chairman from the majority on his Committee. But each step you take in this direction also reduces the influence of the minority on a majority Chairman.

SC/SIL/19494

• Executive Committees and Captive Chairmen (introduced on 1992-06-05 09:00:00 - CREATE - e898522) [This document]

• Executive Committees and Captive Chairmen (introduced on 1992-06-05 09:00:00 - CREATE - e898522) [This document] [view current proposal at this moment]