Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue

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ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR WESTMINSTER ELECTIONS

A REPORT BY COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

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Presented to the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue

on 3 April 1998

Note

DRAFT REPORTS

This report has been prepared by the Committee on Electoral Reform for the consideration of the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue. Until adopted by the Forum in accordance with its Rules, this report may not be reproduced in whole or in part or used for broadcast purposes.

CONTENTS

Section Page

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. BACKGROUND 4

3. VALUES AROUND WHICH ELECTORAL

SYSTEM SHOULD BE BASED 7

4. ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 9

5. ELECTORAL SYSTEM 11

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16

ANNEXES

A MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITTEE

B TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH

DR S ELLIOTT

C PRESENTATIONS/SUBMISSIONS FROM

POLITICAL PARTIES

D ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

E GLOSSARY

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 At the plenary meeting held on Friday 13 June 1997 the Forum debated

the issue of electoral irregularities and resolved to refer the matter to a

Committee to recommend methods of countering these irregularities

with a view to submitting such evidence to the Secretary of State for

Northern Ireland for consideration within the Government’s review

procedure. The Committee met for the first time on 23 June 1997.

Membership of the Committee is attached at Annex A.

1.2 The Committee on Electoral Reform reported to the Forum on

13 October 1997 and following the presentation of the report to the

Government on 3 December 1997, the Forum at the plenary meeting on

23 January 1998 agreed to amend the Committee’s terms of reference

as follows:

‘(a) to monitor the Government’s review on electoral reform in

Northern Ireland;

(b) to make a contribution to the Government’s review of the

electoral system to be used for Parliamentary elections;

(c) to consider and recommend an appropriate system for any future

election to a Northern Ireland Assembly

and report to the Forum.’

1

1.3 The Committee has been and will be continuing to liaise with the

Government regarding its review on electoral reform. The Committee

notes the recent publication of a report by the Northern Ireland Affairs

Committee on Electoral Malpractice in Northern Ireland and hopes for

a speedy outcome to the Government's review.

1.4 With regard to an electoral system for a Northern Ireland Assembly,

the Committee presented its report to the Forum on 13 March 1998 and

will shortly present the report to the Government.

1.5 This report outlines the deliberations by the Committee in considering

an electoral system for the Parliamentary elections. This will be

forwarded to the Independent Commission on the Voting System which

was recently set up by the Government to consider and recommend an

alternative electoral system for Parliamentary elections.

1.6 Before commencing any structured deliberations the Committee sought

advice from Dr Sydney Elliott, Queen’s University , Belfast regarding

the type of voting systems which could be adopted. A transcript of the

meeting with Dr Elliott is attached at Annex B of this report. The

Committee would like to thank Dr Elliott for all his help and advice on

this matter.

1.7 The Committee also sought submissions from each of the political

parties participating in the Committee on the electoral system favoured

for Parliamentary elections. Four parties put forward submissions and

these are included at Annex C of this report. In addition the Committee

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also considered as part of its deliberations a publication by Robert

Blackburn ‘The Electoral System in Britain’.

1.8 Explanations as to how the electorate votes under first past the post and

each of the systems put forward by the political parties, how the votes

are counted and the result of using each system is set out in Annex D of

this report.

3

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Under the method of first past the post which is currently used for

elections to Parliament the person who achieves the highest number of

votes cast in each of the 651 Parliamentary constituencies (18 of which

are in Northern Ireland) is declared the elected representative for each

constituency. However the first past the post system (more properly

called the simple plurality system) is the one which least conforms to

the principle of proportional representation. Robert Blackburn in his

publication ‘The Electoral System in Britain’ states

‘First past the post voting is peculiarly disproportionate in its

translation of votes into Parliamentary seats and this has a number

of highly significant ramifications with regard to the composition

and operation of Britain’s Parliament with political leadership in

Government’.

2.2 The following table shows the degree of variation between the total

national votes cast for each of the four main parties and the

parliamentary seats each party received in the 1992 General Election

under the first past the post method.

Party % total vote % seats

Conservative 41.9 51.6

Labour 34.4 41.6

Liberal Democrat 17.8 3.1

SNP/PC 3.5 1.1

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2.3 The Labour Government in its manifesto promised that it would

establish an Independent Commission on the Voting System to

recommend an alternative to the first past the post voting system.

Details of this Commission were announced on 1 December 1997 by

Home Secretary, Jack Straw.

2.4 The terms of reference of the Commission are as follows:

The Commission shall be free to consider and recommend any

appropriate system or combination of systems in recommending an

alternative to the present system for Parliamentary elections to be

put before the people in the Government’s referendum.

The Commission shall observe the requirement for broad

proportionality, the need for stable government, an extension of

voter choice and the maintenance of a link between MPs and

geographical constituencies.

2.5 The Commission was asked to report within 12 months.

2.6 The Independent Commission on the Voting System visited Belfast on

12 March 1998 to hear evidence from the public and interested

organisations on alternatives to the current first past the post system

which is used for Parliamentary elections. However the Committee was

disappointed with the lack of notice given for this visit. The Chairman

of the Committee was however able to meet with the Chairman of the

Commission to inform him of the Committee’s work and was

5

encouraged to note that some members of the Commission were well

versed in the Committee’s report on Electoral Abuse.

6

3. VALUES AROUND WHICH AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

SHOULD BE BASED

3.1 As the Committee indicated in its report on an electoral system for a

Northern Ireland Assembly, it is important to identify the values around

which the design of an electoral system can take place.

3.2 When considering these values the Committee had to bear in mind the

terms of reference of the Independent Commission which tasked the

Commission to observe

the requirement for broad proportionality;

the need for stable government;

an extension of voter choice;

the maintenance of a link between MPs and geographical

constituencies.

3.3 The Committee agreed that the values which were outlined as being

important for any Assembly election in Northern Ireland were valid for

elections to Westminster. However given the very much smaller

number of seats the Committee accepted that there would be

differences in emphasis.

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3.4 The majority of the Committee recommends that future

Parliamentary elections should be constructed around the

following five values:

- the relationship between seats held and votes cast;

- the link between an elected member and the constituency;

- the need to give the voters a real choice on the ballot paper;

- simplicity and understanding by voters of the voting system;

- the need for stable government.

With regard to the value identifying the need for stable

government the Committee however noted that all the parties that

could form the Government do not stand for election in Northern

Ireland.

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) however felt that the key

criterion should be the link between an elected member and a

single member constituency ahead of other considerations.

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4. ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

4.1 The people of Northern Ireland over the last 28 years have had

experience of using three different types of electoral systems. First past

the post (FPTP) (or Simple plurality) is used for Parliamentary elections

and was used for elections to the Northern Ireland Parliament and local

councils between 1929 and 1972.

4.2 The Single Transferable Vote (STV) was introduced in Northern

Ireland in 1973. Since then STV has been used for council elections

and since 1979, for elections to the European Parliament , even though

first past the post was used in other parts of the United Kingdom.

4.3 STV was also used for Northern Ireland regional elections in 1973 (for

the Power-sharing Assembly), in 1975 (for the Constitutional

Convention) and in 1982 (for the Assembly). The 1996 Forum/Talks

elections used a Constituency list system plus top-up.

4.4 One of the first issues the Committee considered was whether the

system selected for the Parliamentary elections should be the same in

Northern Ireland as in other parts of the United Kingdom. Under the

current arrangements the first past the post system is used throughout

the United Kingdom on general election day and separate electoral

contests are fought in the 651 Parliamentary constituencies within the

United Kingdom, 18 of which are situated in Northern Ireland.

4.5 The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) indicated in its presentation to the

Committee that the party was committed to the unity of the United

9

Kingdom and did not therefore favour a different type of electoral

system in Northern Ireland from that which was applied in the rest of

the United Kingdom.

4.6 The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) indicated during deliberations

that, as a first preference, the party would favour a system which was

applied throughout the United Kingdom.

4.7 The Alliance Party however believed there was no valid reason why

Northern Ireland should not use a different electoral system from the

rest of the United Kingdom. The Alliance Party pointed out that this

was already the case for elections to the European Parliament and

district councils where STV is used in Northern Ireland and first past

the post is used in other parts of the United Kingdom. The Party

additionally pointed out that prior to 1950, there were MPs elected by

the single X-vote, double X-vote (two member constituencies), limited

vote (two Xs in three member constituencies) and University MPs

elected by STV.

4.8 The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) also indicated that it would

favour the same system being applied throughout the United Kingdom.

4.9 The Committee concludes that it would be preferable if the same

system was applied throughout the United Kingdom for

Parliamentary elections.

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5. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

5.1 The requirements identified in the terms of reference of the

Independent Commission and the values identified by the Committee

dictated to some extent which electoral system could be considered as

a viable alternative.

5.2 The first of these was the requirement for broad proportionality. The

majority of the Committee agreed that this requirement effectively

ruled out First Past the Post, Alternative Vote and Second (or

Multiple ballot) which requires a second ballot to be held one week

after the first if no candidate has succeeded in gaining 50 per cent of

the vote on the first ballot.

5.3 As no party proposed a List PR system, the choice of electoral system

considered by the Committee was therefore restricted to:

Single Transferable Vote;

Additional Member System;

Alternative Vote.

5.4 As was the case regarding the type of electoral systems proposed by

each political party for an election for an Assembly in Northern Ireland,

there again was a broad range of systems favoured by parties for an

alternative system for Parliamentary elections. As an alternative

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system the Alternative Vote was favoured by the UUP, Single

Transferable Vote (STV) was favoured by the Democratic Unionist

Party (DUP) and the Alliance Party with the Additional Member

System being favoured by the NI Women’s Coalition (NIWC).

5.5 The UUP supported the status quo and favoured the continuance of the

first past the post system linked in with the current 18 Parliamentary

constituencies. The Party believed that this system ensured there was a

direct link between the parliamentary representative and the

constituency as only one representative was elected for each

constituency. The Party also believed that from a point of view of a

central Government, PR systems, such as STV, tended to weaken the

link between the elected representative and the constituency as the

current constituencies would have to be grouped into very large

constituencies.

5.6 However given the requirement for proportionality the UUP indicated

that the closest to the first past the post system would be the

Alternative Vote in which the current 18 constituencies would be

retained with the top two candidates in each constituency going into a

second ballot. The Party pointed out that this system would at least

maintain some degree of link between the elected representative and

the constituency but stressed that this system was very much a second

option.

5.7 Both the DUP and the Alliance Party supported the use of the Single

Transferable Vote which they believed adequately satisfied all the

Commission's criteria and the values identified by the Committee. The

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use of this system would require either grouping the present 18

constituencies into a small number of new constituencies or new

constituencies being drawn up by the Boundary Commission.

5.8 The Alliance Party recognised that the Additional Member System

achieved broad proportionality but pointed out that this system

generally involved a closed list which meant that voter choice is limited

to the constituency vote. The Party also pointed out that this system

additionally diminished the link between the elected representative and

the constituency and created two classes of MPs, those with

constituency links and those without.

5.9 The Alliance Party did not believe that the Alternative Vote system

satisfied the fundamental requirement of proportionality and argued that

this option should therefore be ruled out of consideration.

5.10 The Alliance Party also believed that within a divided society such as

Northern Ireland, STV reduced the tendency towards polarisation of

the communities and was an incentive to pluralism. The Party

indicated that should STV not be recommended as the alternative

system for the election of all members of the House of Commons it

should be recommended for the election of the Northern Ireland MPs.

5.11 The NIWC recommended the use of the Additional Member System for

Parliamentary elections. The Party believed that this system allowed for

the maintenance of the elected representative link with the constituency

while ensuring the worst disproportional ties were removed. The Party

indicated that the list could be drawn up on a regional basis to ensure

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greater sensitivity to local needs while the relative proportions of

constituency and additional members could be determined according to

the degree of proportionality required. The Party also pointed out that

this system was relatively straightforward and easy to use allowing

voters a clear idea of the consequences of their choices thus preserving

accountability.

5.12 The NIWC recognised that STV is favoured by many reformers for the

Parliamentary elections but the Party indicated that there might be some

problems in adapting this system to a large electorate. The Party

pointed out that constituencies might have to be so large as to lose any

meaningful link between the elected representative and the constituency

while ballot papers might contain so many names as to introduce

confusion and make transfers incoherent.

5.13 The NIWC also indicated that some reformers have advocated the

Alternative Vote system but the Party recognised that while this system

kept the link between the elected representative and the constituency it

was not very proportional.

5.14 The PUP did not wish to make a written submission but indicated

during deliberations that the Party supported any form of Proportional

Representation.

5.15 No response was received from either Labour or the Ulster Democratic

Party.

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5.16 The majority of the Committee concludes that the required core

values identified by the Committee are best addressed by the

Single Transferable Vote based on a small number of

constituencies and therefore recommends STV as an alternative to

the present system for Parliamentary elections.

5.17 The Committee further recommends that, should STV be accepted

as an alternative to the present system for Parliamentary elections,

political parties should be fully consulted about the grouping of

constituencies or the drawing up of new constituencies.

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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 This chapter provides a summary of the conclusions and

recommendations contained in this report.

The majority of the Committee recommends that future

Parliamentary elections should be constructed around the

following five values:

- the relationship between seats held and votes cast;

- the link between an elected member and the constituency;

- the need to give the voters a real choice on the ballot paper;

- simplicity and understanding by voters of the voting system;

- the need for stable government.

With regard to the value identifying the need for stable

government the Committee however noted that all the parties that

could form the Government do not stand for election in Northern

Ireland.

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) however felt that the key

criterion should be the link between an elected member and a

single member constituency ahead of other considerations.

(Paragraph 3.4)

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The Committee concludes that it would be preferable if the same

system was applied throughout the United Kingdom for

Parliamentary elections. (Paragraph 4.9)

The majority of the Committee agreed that the requirement for

broad proportionality effectively ruled out First Past the Post,

Alternative Vote and Second (or Multiple ballot). (Paragraph 5.2)

The majority of the Committee concludes that the required core

values identified by the Committee are best addressed by the

Single Transferable Vote based on a small number of

constituencies and therefore recommends STV as an alternative to

the present system for Parliamentary elections. (Paragraph 5.16)

The Committee further recommends that, should STV be accepted

as an alternative to the present system for Parliamentary elections,

political parties should be fully consulted about the grouping of

constituencies or the drawing up of new constituencies.

(Paragraph 5.17)

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ANNEX A

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MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITEE

118

ANNEX B

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TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING

WITH

DR SYDNEY ELLIOTT

(QUB)

19

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE _____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 22 January 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Dr S Elliott

(The Queen’s University of Belfast))

on

ELECTORAL REFORM

The Chairman: First of all, on behalf of the Electoral Reform Committee, may

I welcome you here today. We have been investigating electoral abuse, and we have more or

less followed the Howarth investigation across the water. We have been looking at elections

in Northern Ireland from a Northern Ireland perspective. I understand that you will be telling

us about the types of voting systems that could be adopted, and we will of course look at

those in greater detail at a future date.

Dr Elliott: Thank you very much for the invitation.

I would like to make a couple of initial remarks about electoral systems in general.

There is very little that is not known about electoral systems nowadays. We tend to think that

this is a new subject, but the high point for the construction of electoral systems was probably

the 19th century. For example, you will hear about a Belgian lawyer called D’Hondt who

constructed his system in the 1870s, but there were an enormous number of other systems at

that time. For instance, in 1909 the Royal Commission on Systems of Election looked at about

1,000 different methods of allocating seats. So the theoretical part is known.

On the practical side, scholars like Arendt Lijphart or D W Rea have examined the

empirical effects of different electoral methods on post-1945 western European countries.

This provides an indication of the level of proportionality that a particular system will produce,

what the impact might be on a party system and various other empirical details.

When trying to construct a system it is important to introduce values around which the

design can take place. First, if your value is to have a close relationship between seats and

votes then that will take you down the road of proportional representation. On the other

hand, if your priority is the link between a member and his constituency then that will take you

down a different road. While you can have a link between a Member of Parliament and a

multi-member constituency, it is not as direct a link as with a single-member district. So, if

that is your value you will to consider a system which employs single-member districts. If

your choice is that and proportionality, then there may be some difficulty because that may

lead to a majority method of election.

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There are mixed methods of election. One of the most notable is the system used in

Germany since 1949 — the additional-member system. In this system half of the members are

elected by plurality while the other half are elected by a list system throughout the whole of

Germany — each individual has two votes. The seats to votes relationship is very

proportional.

There are several ways of looking at it. You may value the district link, and value

fairness in terms of the allocation of seats, but you may also value your level of choice on the

ballot paper. So, if you want the voter to have a choice of one, two, three or four candidates

between the various parties, and a similar level of choice between the various individuals

within each party, the different sexes within each party, and the different colours within each

party, then you are talking about having some form of preferential ballot. On the other hand,

if you want to mark an “X” against a single candidate’s name, then you are talking about

having a categorical ballot.

But none of these things run on exactly the same line. If you want very strict

proportionality then you would select a list system with the largest territory as possible, but

people would be ticking a list and not voting for an individual, so the amount of choice for the

voter would be restricted. But if you were to consider having a single transferable vote or

alternative vote system, then this would introduce the preferential ballot. So, you can have a

preferential ballot with a majority form of election, which is slightly advanced on plurality, but

you do not normally have a preferential ballot with a list form of proportional representation.

It becomes far too complicated.

To summarize, the three values to consider are: fairness and the seats-to-votes

relationship; the link to the constituency; and the level of choice for the voter. It is a

combination of those values that you might want to look at.

The electoral systems for Scotland and Wales have already been defined, but I do not

know whether this will place a constraint upon you in anyway. I am quite happy to talk about

them. I have looked at the principles involved, and there are parts which I do not think can be

adopted in Northern Ireland in exactly the same way.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That was helpful. We will be looking at the

development of devolution in Scotland and Wales, so it would be useful if you were to outline

the systems which will operate there.

Dr Elliott: Scotland is to have its own Parliament with 129 members. The Bill for

Scotland is before Parliament at the moment. The basic principle will be to take the existing

Scottish seats at Westminster and to divide the Orkney and Shetland seat, giving

73 single-member districts. Members will be elected to those seats using the simple plurality

system as currently used for Parliamentary elections. The Scottish parliamentary seat will, by

and large, be the Westminster seat, with the exception of Orkney and Shetland. The additional

56 members will be decided on what could theoretically be called a regional list basis. They

will be allocated on the basis of Scotland’s eight European seats. So, for each of those eight

seats there will be seven additional members — a system with which Forum Members will be

familiar.

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How will these seats be allocated? Elections to this Forum have been pejoratively

described in a number of ways, although when there is another Northern Ireland Assembly one

or two of those people might be embarrassed by what they said. We used a quota allocation

at the front end employing the Droop quota. There were five seats allocated to each of the

Westminster constituencies, and this might have determined two or three of the seats, and

occasionally four, with any remaining seats allocated using the highest average or D’Hondt.

But the net effect of that mixed method of allocating seats could be attributed almost entirely

to D’Hondt. It was nonsense to include two separate calculations. There was no rationale in

doing that. I apologize if someone in this room designed that system; I do not know anybody

who will own up to it. I think it was done behind closed doors in London and at the NIO. A

long time ago I spoke to the Electoral Reform Society a long time ago, who said that they had

submitted a paper and that was the last they had heard of it. I suspect that the responsibility

for it lies quite close to home.

In the Forum election, the Droop quota was used at the front end and D’Hondt was

used at the back end. Both help larger parties. With the exception of the 20 additional seats,

there was nothing in that system to help the smaller parties. Therefore since it was going to

help the larger parties we might as well have gone for D’Hondt and been quite clear about it.

The system for Scotland makes some changes to that. The seats which are won in the

single-member districts — the ordinary constituency seats — will be part of the calculation.

For instance, when allocating seats by D’Hondt you normally begin with the divisor one, then

two, then three and the seat is allocated to the person who has the highest average at each

stage. In Scotland and Wales any seats won under the simple, single-member system will be

counted.

Mr Paisley: Those are the 73 seats?

Dr Elliott: Yes. So, if a party has won two of the seats in a “European constituency”,

then the party’s divisor begins at three. On the other hand, if a smaller party has not won a

single-member district, then its divisor will remain at one — its chances of winning a seat are

improved at that stage of the system. It is a question of whether it is preferable to use

D’Hondt, which would continue to help the larger parties (except in so far as the number of

seats are still taken into account), or whether it should be by something like the greatest

remainder, which would help the smaller parties.

Another method would be to use the St Lague formula, which is probably the most

proportional of the formulae. While the D’Hondt divisors always proceed by one, the

St Lague formula does not do that; it begins at about 1.4 and moves to 2.7. This means that

the seats are allocated more proportionately than you would get with D’Hondt, which

everyone recognizes is helpful to the larger parties.

That is how the system for Scotland is set out, and the same applies to Wales.

Scotland has 73/56 seats — 129 in total. In Wales the constituency basis is different. It has

forty Westminster constituencies and it is proposed that twenty additional seats will be

allocated, again on the basis of the European constituencies. So we will have to start thinking

in terms of these new European constituencies which may all come into effect simultaneously

in 1999. For Wales this will mean a 50% increase on the existing number of Westminster

seats. Twenty extra seats will be allocated on the basis of four additional members for each of

the five European constituencies in Wales. Each European constituency will be allocated four

22

extra seats regardless of the number of MPs covered by that area, which varies from seven to

nine. This methodology will favour the larger parties, and although the four additional seats

will help even out some of the problems, in terms of advancing proportionality the system

does not work well.

The Chairman: Can a candidate for a Westminster constituency also stand for a

European seat?

Dr Elliott: Yes, but he can only stand for one Euro seat. And if he is elected for the

single-member district he is automatically removed from the European constituency list, with

the nomination going to the next person. It is a bit like the system under which you were

elected to the Forum. But it is an additional member system not unlike the German model,

though there the split is 50:50 between the single-member districts and list districts. The

breakdown of seats in Scotland and Wales is not quite 50:50, but the principle is broadly the

same.

The Chairman: We all agree that whatever system is devised here, it will be based on

proportionality. Members should steer clear of questions today on the details and intricacies

of the various systems, which can be better addressed at a later date as we gather more

information.

Dr Elliott: I would be quite happy to prepare a paper for the Committee.

The Chairman: That would be greatly appreciated.

Ms Purvis: You mentioned at the start that the systems to be used for both Scotland

and Wales could not be applied to Northern Ireland because of some differences. What are

they?

Dr Elliott: The first difference lies with the number of parliamentary constituencies,

of which we have 18. If we were to calculate the additionality system for members on a ratio

basis similar to that of Scotland or Wales there would be, say, 14 seats on top of the existing

18 constituencies to give an Assembly of 32 members — and that would be nowhere near

enough. That falls way short of the number of members — 90 — currently provided for in the

Northern Ireland Constitution Act.

There is a degree of uniformity about the method of election being suggested for the

Parliament in Scotland and the Assembly in Wales, but there does not need to be uniformity

over the number of members. People in Wales might not be too happy if we had a 90-member

Assembly against 60 for theirs. That is one of those difficulties. I assume that it is down to

politicians here to press that case.

If the election was constituency-based, some might argue that in order to have

representation from all groups the threshold needs to be set at a certain level. If there were

only 32 seats — for example, even if the election was conducted on a Northern Ireland-wide

list, you would still need 3% of the vote to be sure of a seat. On the other hand, if you have

90 members you need just over 1% of the total vote to be elected. These are considerations

that you should bear in mind when arguing for a number other than the 90 that is provided for

in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.

23

It would be difficult to apply the principles that have been adopted for Scotland and

Wales here because we have only 18 Westminster seats, and you would have an inordinate

number of additional member seats. Arguments could be made for an election on a Northern

Ireland-wide list, or a Northern Ireland divided into three or four with the seats determined by

one, single method of election and not plurality. I do not know whether the Government are

considering changing the Westminster form of election, but they may decide to create three or

four new constituencies from which members could be elected to a Northern Ireland

Assembly.

Mr Gardiner: Thank you, Dr Elliott, for a very enlightening presentation this

morning. What form of election would you recommend for a Northern Ireland Assembly?

Dr Elliott: It is a matter of striking a balance. I was initially very sceptical about the

effect of the single transferable vote and its impact, but people have got used to it and it

works. We are used to it in local government and there are things to be said for it.

I am concerned though about the sheer number of people who have difficulty using this

system and who unwittingly invalidate their vote. There were almost 17,000 spoiled votes in

the 1993 local government election, whereas although the system of election to the Forum

attracted a lot of criticism, the use of the simple X vote produced less than 4,000 invalid votes.

It is therefore important that people can understand the system and can use it effectively. If

there had been 12,000 personated votes in that election we would all be jumping on the table.

But it is a matter of concern that 12,000 people more were not able to express themselves

properly and validly under the single transferable vote system in the 1993 election than in the

Forum election, where the simple X vote system was used.

Mr Paisley: Was there a difference in turnout?

Mr Lynch: The turnout for the Forum was 66% against 56% or 57% in the local

government election. In relation to the point you made about spoilt votes, officials were

highly assiduous in the Forum elections — presiding officers in the polling stations made a

point of explaining voting procedures. But there does not seem to be the same degree of

attention and care with other elections, be they for Westminster or local government, to

ensure that people are clear as to what exactly they are doing. Do you think that aspect needs

to be emphasized more forcefully in relation to presiding officers’ training?

Dr Elliott: That is possible. It is noticeable that very little educational material comes

from the Chief Electoral Officer’s office immediately before a PR election to guide people.

The other problem with the single transferable vote system is that, with its high

threshold of about 16.67% for a seat, it might not be helpful to the number of new parties

which have now come on to the political scene.

No more than four parties across Northern Ireland command more than 16.67%

support — the Forum includes 10. And there are many others who are close to some of the

smaller parties in terms of share of the vote. So that is a consideration to bear in mind when

trying to determine the form of election to an Assembly.

24

Mr Gardiner: You would make a good politician; I asked you a question and you

avoided it. I asked you directly what system you would adopt for Northern Ireland. You

talked round it and made various points.

Dr Elliott: Since you are at a new beginning, if I were you I would opt for a system

where the threshold was set relatively low to include as many people as possible without

disadvantaging the large parties who have their own bloc vote. Since I do not know what the

exact number of members will be for a Northern Ireland Assembly, I am a bit reluctant to

advocate an additional-member system because I do not think that would work in our

circumstances. I would probably go for a single transferable vote system, but my constituency

basis for it might be different.

The Chairman: That is really helpful, but we are still really only dealing with systems

rather than reaching any final conclusions.

Mr Coulter: Thank you, Dr Elliott, for a most enlightening presentation. In view of

the fact that there will probably be a European dimension to whatever system is brought in,

would Northern Ireland be viewed as a single region or as a triple region?

Dr Elliott: In Scotland the parliamentary constituency is portrayed as the basis, with

additional seats allocated over the wider European constituency. In reality the constituency is

the European constituency with, in Scotland’s case, an average of nine single members elected

by plurality and the seven additional members. I think that the European constituency is going

to be the new basis for elections. If that is the case, then Northern Ireland, as a single

European constituency, cannot be treated in the same way. There is no decision yet to change

the method of election for Westminster to proportional representation using, say, three

multi-member units which could be used as a constituency base for an Assembly. Therefore,

the additional members would be allocated from the whole of Northern Ireland. Since there

are only 18 Westminster constituencies, I think the base would be quite clearly the European

constituency. It could not be portrayed, as in Scotland, as 73 single-member districts with a

top-up on a regional basis from the European constituency of an extra seven. In Northern

Ireland, it would be the whole of the European constituency — that is, the whole of Northern

Ireland using a regional list. Eighteen single-member districts could be added to it, but I think

there would not be any real sense in that. It would be better simply to take the whole of

Northern Ireland and have one form of election, not plurality. That would be more rational. I

am not saying I would prefer it.

Mr Robinson: Are you not forgetting something in all of this? The elections are not

the important thing — it is how you run the country after the elections that is important. The

elections are only the means by which the politicians end up running the country. And if it is

to be a body that represents the people through constituency work, one of the key areas that

has to be protected is the constituency. You cannot have fifty or a hundred people running

around regarding the whole of Northern Ireland as their constituency. With regard to

management of resources it is madness; it is a shocker.

You must have constituencies that are clearly identified and as small as possible. If

you want to introduce the fairness of proportionality, you can do so quite reasonably. But we

should not get away from the small constituency where people can identify with their elected

25

representative and have someone to whom they can take their problems. The alternative is to

have politicians chasing their tails across the province.

Dr Elliott: There is a theoretical response to that: there is nothing to prevent the

party members elected in a large constituency being allocated territory to look after.

Mr Robinson: It does not work that way.

Dr Elliott: I know that t does not. It tends to work round those who are active —

they have the most territory. In other words, the territorial bit is not necessarily important for

the formation of a Government, but it is very important with regard to representation.

Rev William McCrea: People want to have someone they can go to if they have a

problem. Surely you could not turn round and tell them to go round the whole country. That

would be a nonsense.

Mr Robinson: Let me add to that. As most of us know, the reality is — that a

constituent who goes to one elected representative is likely to go to them all, and you will

have a hundred people chasing up the same problem. The constituent will just send a circular

of his problem to all the Assembly members, and all of them will go to the Department with

the same problem. The work will not only be duplicated but also multiplied by the number of

representatives involved. It is just crazy — the Government will be writing the same letter to

dozens of people. This happens already in the councils. Those politicians who are reputed to

be the best constituency workers and those who are the best-known will get all the work.

What are the principles that need to be taken into account? We can weigh them by

whatever factor we want, but you have already mentioned two or three. For example, you

said it was important to have a system that people could use easily — that is a principle that

we need to take account of. It is also important that we have one that people can understand.

Nobody understood how the Forum election worked. It is important to have one that is fair

and proportional; it is important that it be representative and that people can identify with

those whom they have elected. What are the principles that we should take into account?

Dr Elliott: It is for you to choose those values. They determine the type of electoral

system that is to be used. If the seats/votes link is more important than anything else, you are

going down the road of proportionally. And if the MP/constituency link is more important,

you are probably going in the direction of a majority method of election. You could either

stay with plurality or use an alternative vote system. If no candidate is elected after the first

round, people express their preferences down the ballot paper — one, two, three, four — just

as they do under the single transferable vote system.

Mr Robinson: You are bringing up another issue — that of making the system more

complex. You put forward a good argument about the Forum system. As far as the elector is

concerned, it does not really matter about all the calculations behind it — at least he

understands it. Is it not important to ensure that people do not lose their votes because they

do not understand how to work the system?

Dr Elliott: They would not lose their vote; they would express a preference.

26

Mr Robinson: Thousands lose their votes because they do not understand how to use

the system.

Dr Elliott: That is the single transferable vote system. If you were introducing an

alternative vote, you would educate people in case they did not understand it. The alternative

vote system would ensure that whoever was elected from the single-member district would

have the support of more than 50% of the people who voted in that constituency. That is not

something you can necessarily say for a single member district at Westminster.

Which of the values is the most important? Is it proportionality, the constituency link,

or the level of choice which the elector wants?

Mr Robinson: Let me tell you how you can avoid them being mutually exclusive.

What principle is lost — and this is just one example — when you have fifty seats from

single-member constituencies and fifty from a regional list based on proportionality?

Dr Elliott: Absolutely none.

Mr Robinson: It is easy to work; all people have to do is put in one X.

Dr Elliott: Two Xs; you have to vote from a list as well.

Mr Robinson: If people want to stand, they put their name on the ballot paper for the

single-member constituency, and it is the parties that have the vote in the single-member

constituency. It is complicated more by giving electors two votes, but there is nothing to say

that if they vote for the Labour Party in constituency A that that vote is not also considered as

a vote for the Labour Party on the list.

Dr Elliott: You could if you wished to, but that is not how it would be expressed in

any form of elections. You would simply have one single vote for a single-member district.

Mr Robinson: It is a top-up system that you would be operating. You would have

single constituencies, and you would work out the number of votes for each party.

Dr Elliott: But you have voted in the single-member district of East Belfast — that is

all you have voted for.

Mr Robinson: You have voted for a party as well.

Dr Elliott: Yes, there is a party label attached to the individual. However in this form

of election you would be voting for the individual and not simply for the party. The other one

would have to be taken as a separate form of election.

Mr Robinson: It does not have to be.

Dr Elliott: As a body, you can draw it up as you wish.

27

The Chairman: I want to seek clarification about the whole question of spoiled votes

under the single transferable vote system. Has any investigation ever been carried out in to

how the votes were spoiled? As someone who has been involved in elections since 1977, the

big problem that I have come across is people putting Xs beside the names and that spoils the

vote.

Dr Elliott: That is not necessarily regarded as a spoiled vote.

The Chairman: But what about a series of Xs? Is that the predominant problem?

Dr Elliott: The Chief Electoral Officer could probably tell you. They are usually

invalid for a number of reasons, and statistics used to be kept of the reasons why votes were

regarded as spoiled. However, the returning officers usually try to operate a consensus

system. Votes which are doubtful are kept to the end of the stage, and the parties get together

to examine them and agree whether or not they should be taken into consideration.

Mr Dodds: My question is about spoiled votes. If you were to add the number of

spoiled votes to the number of people who are not able to vote because of problems with

identification and identity documents, and add that to the number of fraudulent votes due to

personation, and then, perhaps, toss in all those who do not vote, you would not get a very

accurate reflection of what people really want. There are many problems which, I hope, will

be tackled.

There was an article in last Monday’s ‘Times’ about the working group that is going to

look at the mechanics of elections — how we actually go about voting in the polling booth.

There is talk of introducing electronic voting, similar to the system in America which involves

pulling down a lever but if we have a single transferable vote system, that will preclude the

implementation of easier methods of voting. Why should we go through this ridiculous count

thing when votes could be automatically counted by computer? In some American states the

result of an election is known the moment the polls close because the count is automatic.

There are different groups all working separately; they need to be more co-ordinated.

Dr Elliott: That is very true. I read that article. I attended a meeting yesterday and

that was the first time I had heard of the George Howarth report — nobody on the committee

ever mentioned it to me. Just like the Secretary of State’s revealing that she had not sent an

interim report, even by courtesy, to the chairman of another committee which was going to be

reporting to her, this is another case of the left hand not knowing what the right is doing.

That type of system may be considered, although it would take a very sophisticated,

smart chip to be built into your swipe card to enable you to vote on a preferential basis. That

may well have an implication on people’s thinking.

If I were trying to guess the direction of the current Labour Government, I would look

at the major report which they commissioned whilst in Opposition — that done by Lord Plant.

Now Lord Plant was quite clear on a couple of issues; for a parliament — in other words, a

legislating body — he was quite clear that he would not recommend plurality, the current

system, nor would he recommend proportional representation, he would recommend the

alternative vote which kept the constituency link, or an additional member system and in a

28

sense, any time the Government have declared their hand post-election, they have been

consistent with that. They are going towards the additional member system for the Scottish

Parliament and the Welsh Assembly but are not necessarily looking towards a change in

respect of the national Parliament. Apparently Cabinet members hold differing views on that.

Tony Blair is a bit reluctant to steer towards any form of proportional representation, but if he

were to do so, it could be an additional-member system which would keep that constituency

link which is so ingrained in Britain nowadays that it would be very hard to depart from. The

principle which Plant was trying to establish was that, in a way, the form of election to bodies

which were less than legislating ones did not matter; there could be diversity there. But he

was quite clear about what he preferred for the national Parliament, and it was not

proportional representation nor plurality, the current system.

Rev William McCrea: I am saying this tongue in cheek. If you were to devise a

system which, in reality, was rigged, a system that would get you the result that you wanted

— and this is probably what the Government have in mind for any election here, if the past is

anything to go by — what would you come up with?

Mr Paisley: Lowest threshold.

Dr Elliott: No, it would probably not be the lowest threshold. It would depend on

what way you wanted to rig it. This is off the top of my head — I have not looked at this

recently — but it would be possible to do this by using a variety of St Lague. By having a

differential interval in your divisors, you could produce circumstances in which all the seats

would go to four parties, or whatever — I hesitate to say to three parties, given the way

structures —

Rev William McCrea: That is not what the Government will be looking for.

Dr Elliott: I do not know what they might be looking for. What might have been a

preferred option in days gone by has never measured up to the threshold level required by the

single transferable vote in five-member districts at the minute. If they were thinking of

lowering the threshold in a single transferable vote system, the Government might have to

think of, shall we say, half the number of Westminster constituencies — in other words, nine

— to be sure that most of the parties that they might want in would get representation. In

other words, if it was not a five-member district, but a ten-member district you are talking

about, say, 10% within that area and probably close to 1% over all of Northern Ireland —

I have no idea.

Rev William McCrea: Thank you for your submission, Dr Elliott. It was very

helpful.

Mr Peter Robinson: Are there times when the number of seats is as much a factor as

the electoral system, in terms of bringing small parties in?

Dr Elliott: The boundaries are important. Let us say there is to be an Assembly with

90 members. If the whole of Northern Ireland is one constituency, and you are operating a list

system, just over 1% need to be elected, but if those 90 members are elected in

18 constituencies, at five members per constituency and if you use, say, the Droop quota, then

29

you are talking about 16·67%, which is quite a high threshold for most people to attain. So

the numbers are important as well. If the Government decides on 33 members then —

Mr Peter Robinson: They will decide on a number of around 100.

Dr Elliott: That seems to be sensible. When Parliamentary redistributions were being

done in the past, the number of members was not usually reduced, and every member that

currently held a seat was given the chance of winning another one. That may or may not apply

to an Assembly, but that was what parliamentary boundary commissioners did in the past.

The Chairman: You have only to think back to the 1982 Assembly elections. South

Antrim was a 10-seat constituency, I think, and there was the longest electoral count in

history.

Dr Elliott: I have enjoyed this exchange of views and will be happy to provide further

material or advice about what Committee members might consider. I will try to direct you in

terms of values and if you want to bounce things off me, you will find that what you say to me

and vice versa will be in the strictest confidence. That is the way I operate.

The Chairman: This has been very helpful. We would appreciate your letting us

have a paper on this.

It all comes back to your opening remarks on the whole question of values. The

problem is that the word “values” might mean different things to different people, but at least

it is a starting-point.

Once again, thank you very much for your help.

ANNEX C

30

~~~~~~

PRESENTATIONS/SUBMISSIONS

FROM PARTIES

31

ORAL PRESENTATION

~~~~~~~

ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY

32

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE _____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 29 January 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Mr P Weir (Ulster Unionist Party))

on

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Chairman: Welcome to the Committee; we look forward to your submission.

Do you intend to make a written submission at a later stage?

Mr Weir: We want to keep open the option of making a written submission at a later

stage.

In considering electoral systems there are two things which strike one immediately.

First, no matter what system is advocated for a body, there can be no perfect electoral system.

That has been the experience of democracies throughout the world because they have come up

with a wide and wonderful range of options.

Secondly, there are a very wide range of options available. The Ulster Unionist Party

has looked at the principle ones which might be used both in Westminster elections and

elections to a future Northern Ireland Assembly — the first-past-the-past system of single

transferable vote, the additional member system, the alternative member system and the list

system, which could be applied either to constituencies or on a province-wide basis. Finally,

there is the top-up system which was used for the Forum.

When one considers an electoral system, one has to look at the purpose for which that

system is designed. And there are, broadly speaking, two different types of systems. The

traditional system which is used in Westminster elections is first-past-the-post. Its principle

advantage is that it is easy to use and tends to produce strong Governments. Generally it

tends to avoid coalition Governments. All the other systems represent some form of

proportional representation in which the aim is to try to produce a proportional Parliament or

Assembly, but often it does not lead to the same type of strong Government.

In judging what is best for both Westminster and a Northern Ireland Assembly there

are several criteria which need to be applied to any system which is selected. First, you have

to look at the nature of the Parliament or Assembly which you are electing. Secondly, any

system selected has to have broad, public acceptance. Thirdly, any system selected has to be

broadly democratic and, in our view, rely on the elected representation side of things. Some

33

parties have suggested, particularly with regard to Northern Ireland, some sort of upper

chamber made up of people nominated by interest groups or whatever. That is not something

we favour. We want to concentrate any system on the idea of elected representatives.

Fourthly, there should be the widest choice of representation for the voter, both in terms of

parties and of individuals and independents having the opportunity to put their names forward

for election. Any system selected should have as few anomalies and quirks as possible.

Additionally, a key determinant should be a direct link between those elected and the

electorate. It should be a simple system which ensures that voters are not confused.

We are committed to the unity of the United Kingdom, and we believe that the system

selected for the Westminster elections should be the same throughout the whole of the United

Kingdom. We do not favour there being some sort of unusual system for Northern Ireland

which is not applied throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. That is one criticism that we

have of the system for the European elections in which, up until now, there have been PR

elections on the STV model in Northern Ireland but individual constituency elections in the

rest of the United Kingdom.

The Ulster Unionist Party is, broadly speaking, a party which supports the British

Constitution. The British Constitution has been an evolving process, particularly with regard

to elections. We support the status quo as regards Westminster elections. We favour a

continuance of the first-past-the-post system linked in with the current constituencies. We

believe that this has the broadest degree of public support throughout the United Kingdom.

Members may argue about that, but we feel that it is a simple system which people understand.

While there may be agitation and support for change among political parties, it is perhaps not

reflected as widely among the British public. The British Constitution, with the exception of

terrorism in Northern Ireland, has provided a stable framework for the United Kingdom. We

have been able to avoid some of the instability that has appeared in other parts of the world

and other parts of Europe.

The first-past-the-post system has a number of advantages. It avoids some of the

problems of proportional representation. Principally, it ensures that there is a direct link

between the parliamentary representative and the constituency. Now one of the advantages

that this has led to in the British parliamentary system — and the parties here can testify to this

— is that the Member of Parliament for a particular constituency is the representative of all the

people and is duty bound to represent their interests whether or not they are supporters of that

individual MP. I think that that is a very healthy process. Additionally, there are several

problems with PR when it comes to Westminster elections. There is a wide range of schemes

available for PR, so some of the criticisms I have of PR from that point of view will be

applicable to some systems and some to others.

First of all, proportional representation has a tendency — and I think we have seen this

to some extent, be it a good or bad thing — to lead to a certain fragmentation of politics.

Rather than giving the people of Britain a clear choice between a Conservative Government

and a Labour Government, it will, I think, tend to lead into smaller political parties, smaller

blocks.

Secondly, in a number of instances, particularly before they reformed the system, it has

led to unstable government. One has only to look at the number of Governments that Italy has

had down the years and at the wide variety of parties and cobbled-together coalitions in

34

somewhere like Israel. Therefore there is a danger of unstable government with proportional

representation.

Thirdly, there is a greater chance of extremist parties getting into Parliament and then

into power. We have occasionally suffered that in Northern Ireland. Under the current

system, for example, two Sinn Fein representatives got elected, but generally speaking, with

the occasional exception in Northern Ireland, it has meant that people supporting, say, a

communist or fascist platform have not been able to get into Parliament. If one looks at the

experience of continental Europe it is very different. One saw during the late 1980s and early

1990s a certain rise in support for fascist groups, and there has also been a degree of support

for communist groups. This favouring that PR gives to extremist parties is not one that we

find favour with.

Fourthly, it tends to mean that Governments are quite often dependent either on

extremist groups or on the whims of particular independents. This can happen in any system,

but it is probably particularly prevalent with PR. A Government will fall short of a majority

and be dependent upon the support either of a very extreme group to stay in power or,

alternatively, will have to pander to individual independents. At the moment in the Republic

of Ireland the Taoiseach is dependent upon three or four pro-Government independents. In an

article in ‘The Irish Times’ a couple of weeks ago those independents were listing the great

concessions that they had got for their constituencies. Any student of the political history of

the Irish Republic over the last 20 years will know about some of the deals that were done,

particularly the deal between Charlie Haughey and Tony Gregory in which, irrespective of the

national interests, an agreement was made to pump in large amounts of money into his

constituency to gain the support of that particular independent. That is not a particularly

healthy situation and it is one of the dangers of PR.

Conversely, there is the danger of a situation developing like that in Germany in which

the Government is formed in smoke-filled rooms rather than by the will of the electorate. I

think I am right in saying that virtually every German Government over the last 30 years has

been dependent in terms of support on the small Free Democrat Party, which is, broadly

speaking, a sort of Liberal Party. They supported the Social Democrats throughout most of

the 1970s. They switched in the early 1980s to the Christian Democrats who have been in

power since then with members of the Free Democrats in their coalition. Therefore, a party

which is maybe the third, fourth or fifth largest party in a country can be the real power

broker. With very little electoral support they are the people who can determine the

complexion of a Government.

There are problems with specific forms of proportional representation from a point of

view of a central Government. Many of the systems advocated tend to destroy or at least

weaken the link between the parliamentary representative and the constituency. If one moves,

for example, to a list system either on a regional basis or throughout the United Kingdom,

there is no direct link between an individual member and a particular constituency. Even with

single transferable vote, in which constituencies are grouped, the constituencies are very large,

and it weakens the link with the constituency.

Some forms of PR, particularly the list system, can actually leave the selection of

Members of Parliament very much in the hands of the parties rather than in the hands of the

individual voters. At the moment the voter can vote for a particular individual. The problem,

35

particularly with a large list system, is that people are voting purely for parties. Whoever is

number one on that particular list, depending on the situation, will have a very easy ride. The

lists will inevitably be drawn up by the parties and, to some extent, that takes the choice out of

the hands of the electorate. There are dangers with certain systems, particularly the system

used for the Forum election. Some forms of PR can deny individuals the right to stand. If

they are members of a small party or independents it makes it very difficult for them.

If there were to be some form of proportional representation for Westminster, the

closest to the first-past-the-post system would be the alternative-member system in which

essentially we would retain all the constituencies that we have at the moment with the top two,

if you like, going into a second ballot. That would be very much a second option, but at least

it would maintain some degree of link between the individual member and the constituency.

There is a different situation when one moves to a form of Northern Ireland Assembly,

and there are a number of reasons for that. There seems to be a much broader acceptance by

the public and the political parties that any future Assembly has to be based on some form of

proportional representation. That is largely accepted by most of the parties and would tend to

rule out the first-past-the-post and alternative-member systems.

In a regional Assembly, because of differences of scale, some of the problems that you

would encounter with PR in terms of central Government elections are overcome. Instead of

18 representatives from Northern Ireland you may well have somewhere in the region of 90.

As such, you could still retain 18 constituencies with five members each. Although you would

have, at that level, a PR system that maintains a strong connection between the individual and

the constituency and enables the individual to cope with the constituency work, our

preference, if there is to be some form of PR for a Northern Ireland Assembly, would be a

single-transferable-vote model of 18 constituencies of five seats. We feel that that is broadly

acceptable to most people.

Some people might argue that an Assembly with 90 members is too big when

compared with the proportionate size of Scotland and Wales. Scotland has 129 members and

Wales 60 for communities of 5 million and 3·5 million. We would be opposed to the scaling

down of a Northern Ireland Assembly from 90 members, but we would, I suppose, keep an

open mind if there were an argument for a slightly smaller body. If you were looking to retain

proportional representation and if it contained the constituency element, there might be

consideration given to the grouping of constituencies on a two-constituency basis. But, again,

that would very much be a second option. We favour retention of the current 18

constituencies with five members per constituency. In those circumstances the advantages of

single transferable vote are as follows: it retains that link between the member and his or her

constituency, which list systems do not; it gives the electorate the opportunity to vote for

independent candidates; it gives them the opportunity to vote for their preferred candidates

within parties; and it produces a broadly proportional result. That last point is one of the key

touchstones for any future Northern Ireland Assembly, and there is a great pressure for that

than perhaps there would be at central Government level. Finally, from a Northern Ireland

point of view, single transferable vote is a system that voters are used to. It has been used in

the European elections, the Assembly elections of 1973 and 1982, the Convention election of

1975 and in local government elections. Having said that, it still leads to voter confusion, and

so any move towards a new system would only result in greater confusion.

36

If we look at alternative systems it can be seen that the advantages associated with

single transferable vote do not apply. For example, list systems or additional member systems

destroy the link between the constituency member and his electorate and weakens the

opportunity for voters to vote for a particular candidate within a party or an independent.

Furthermore, a list system tends to produce disproportionate results as was evident in the

Forum election. In that election there was a range of parties with broadly similar views,

particularly on the Unionist side, which tended to dissipate the Unionist vote. Under single

transferable vote those parties would have won a greater number of seats, but that did not

happen because of quirks within the system.

We would be concerned if there were to be a move towards a list system in Northern

Ireland given the reasons I have already expressed. This is particularly true in Northern

Ireland where there has traditionally been a differential turnout particularly between the west

of the province and eastern parts of the province. Such a list system would tend to give a

disproportionate say to people in the west and south of the province, and would not reflect the

electorate’s true wishes.

Finally, I would like to mention the top-up system as applied in the Forum election, a

system whereby the top ten parties gained an additional two seats. I appreciate that it could

be argued that it was done for a specific purpose but we remain opposed to its use, and it

should certainly not apply to any form of Assembly election. I believe its use to be both

artificial and undemocratic, and I am not aware of it being applied anywhere else in the world.

It tends to increase the disproportionality of results, so that in the Forum election the smallest

party gained 5,500 votes, or 0·7% of the vote, and yet they gained two representatives.

Candidates should be elected on merit, and not rescued by use of an artificial system.

The Chairman: Dr Sidney Elliott has told the Committee that when trying to

construct a system it is important to introduce values around which the design can take place.

What would Ulster Unionists consider to be the important values?

Mr Weir: Any system must have broad public acceptance; it must be understood by

the electorate, and ideally it would be one with which they are familiar; it should retain a link

between the elected member and his constituency; and it should offer the widest possible

choice of representation, enabling the electorate to vote for the party of their choice, for

individuals within that party, and the opportunity to vote for independents.

The Chairman: I agree with your point that it is important to identify the individual

with the constituency, and that was obviously missing from the Forum elections. However, it

is the case that some people will incorrectly mark their ballot paper “1,2,3” et cetera in

Westminster elections, while others will mark their ballot paper with an “X” in local

government elections. From the electorate’s point of view, would it not be better to have the

one system for all elections?

Mr Weir: First, we believe that any electoral system in Northern Ireland should

reflect that which operates in the rest of the United Kingdom, particularly for Westminster

elections. There is certainly a need for consistency, and that is one of the reasons why

elections to a future Northern Ireland Assembly should be based on the STV model that

applies to local council elections. The introduction of a third model would only lead to greater

confusion.

37

In an ideal world the Ulster Unionists would be happy with a first-past-the-post

system, as it would bring individuals even closer to the community. However, we recognize

that this would not be the wish of the majority of parties in Northern Ireland nor may it be the

wish of most of the public. People will have different views on this, but with the exception of

some political parties I do not believe that there is a great demand in the United Kingdom for

change to the way in which MPs are elected to Westminster. However, at local level there is a

broader public acceptance of the system used in council elections.

Mr Paisley: We all realize that asking your party to present an argument against the

current system of election to Westminster is like asking turkeys to vote for Christmas. It has

been very, very good to your party in terms of electoral returns. You have said that you

favour the first-past-the-post system for Westminster elections specifically because it leads to

strong Government and it is simple. However, in a Northern Ireland context these are

misnomers because Northern Ireland parties are not going to be in Government in Northern

Ireland. Also, the idea, values and longevity of a hung Parliament are so transparent that there

is no real lasting power there anyway. Furthermore, the Northern Ireland electorate has

proved itself to be rather sophisticated and have shown themselves to be capable of embracing

a more complicated system. Therefore, do you not see that your arguments in favour of first

past the post are quite weak in that sense?

Mr Weir: No, I do not agree with that. Also, it would be perverse for any party to

argue in favour of a system which is against party’s own interests.

Mr Paisley: The Alliance Party have just voluntarily given up 1% of their vote in their

presentation.

Mr Weir: Ulster Unionists are perhaps not noted for quite the same level of

generosity.

We support the British Constitution and as such we believe that the same system of

election to Westminster should be applied throughout the United Kingdom.

You also indicated that there is relatively little that smaller parties can do when there

are hung Parliaments. While that is probably true under the current sytem, it has led to

instability in some European countries where coalitions have been formed. By contrast, the

Ulster Unionist Party believes that the first-past-the-post system has led to constitutional

stability within the United Kingdom. So we do have a certain amount of confidence in the

current system. You can always find fault with whatever system is chosen, as none is perfect;

but the first-past-the-post system is the most suitable one for the Westminster elections.

Mr Ford: You made the point that first past the post makes for strong Government.

But it is only since the 1950 General Election that the entire United Kingdom has voted by

first past the post in single member constituencies for Westminster; prior to that there were

STV university members and double-member constituencies. Since that time, eight General

Elections have produced a Government with a strong majority, and six have not. Therefore I

do not buy your argument that first past the post produces strong Governments when its

success rate is only eight out of 14.

38

Mr Weir: There has been a purely first-past-the-post system since 1950. The

university constituencies were an anomaly, which is one of the reasons why they were

abolished in the 1950s.

Mr Ford: Or in 1969, in one case.

Mr Weir: But even before 1950, most elections were based on a first-past-the-post

type system. Therefore, to drag in the university constituencies is to slightly cloud the picture.

If you look at the history of parliaments in the Republic of Ireland it is clear that the PR

system tends to exacerbate the hung-parliament situation and reduces the likelihood of a single

party holding power. Broadly speaking, the first-past-the-post and proportional

representation systems are, to some extent, designed to produce different results. First past

the post is largely designed to produce a single central Government, relying on one particular

party. Proportional representation, by its definition, is designed to produce a proportionate

Assembly or Parliament. It is therefore less likely to produce a Government of a single party;

most elections under PR tend to produce some form of coalition Government. It is very rare

for PR to produce Government by a single party.

Mr Ford: And yet the two most successful single political parties in Europe — the

Swedish Social Democrats and Fianna Fáil, at least until the last decade — have both been

consistently elected to majority Governments for most of the past 50 or 60 years. I accept

there may be a weight of evidence, but the suggestion that first past the post is the way to

produce single party stability wears a little bit thin.

Mr Weir: I think the weight of evidence though does tend to suggest that. If you

look at the Irish Republic, 1977, I think, was the last time that an election there produced a

single-party majority in the Dáil; they have had coalition Government ever since, relying

particularly on a handful of independents.

I do not know enough about the Swedish example to be able to comment, but one can

always quote exceptions to the rule. But in the vast bulk of cases, PR has produced coalition

Governments; the history of continental Europe over the last 50 years indicate that.

Mr Ford: But has coalition Government necessarily been unstable Government? We

can all poke fun at Israel and Italy, but you have cited the Scandinavian countries or

Switzerland.

Mr Weir: Again, you can pick out individual exceptions, but the weight of evidence

tends to support my argument that PR can lead to a very unstable Government. In Germany,

a very small party has essentially control over the Government. Indeed, had the Free

Democrats switched at any stage over the last 15 years you would have had a Social

Democrat Government. And so Governments are not formed, broadly speaking, through the

voter choice but through deals cut with a small number of independents, which give them a

disproportionate say in the make-up of the Government.

Mr Ford: I don’t think we are going to resolve the national issue, but I would like to

record my welcome for the fact that the Ulster Unionists are now converted to STV at local

level.

39

Mr Bolton: You referred to anomalies and quirks in the STV system. Mr Farry

referred to manipulation of the election process for any new Assembly in terms of the

proposed number of seats for each constituency. For example, if each constituency were to

return six members instead of five it would benefit the smaller parties. Who should be the

arbiter in such a situation to ensure fairness?

Mr Weir: There is clearly a problem there. Broadly speaking, most of the models

that have been considered for a Northern Ireland Assembly over the last 15 years have been

based on five seats per constituency, which would give a 90 member Assembly. That has got

the broadest degree of acceptance. I think that five members per constituency is probably

about the right number. But there will always be quirks with whatever system you operate.

On a tangent, you need also to tackle the problems of electoral fraud which has plagued the

various electoral systems here. I think most parties would tend to agree that 90 is probably

about the right size for an Assembly, with five members for each of the 18 constituencies.

Mr Bolton: The question really was who would be the arbiter if the parties did not

agree?

Mr Weir: I will have to give that some further consideration.

Mr Paisley: We are fairly emphatically opposed to the top-up system. However,

have you considered the possibility of having a top-up system that could operate on the basis

of a threshold, which would make it a little bit fairer?

Mr Weir: Again, there is a complication. Any additional members who are elected by

way of a top-up system are not directly linked in with constituencies. That is one problem.

Secondly, if you have a top-up system, as was the case in the Forum election, where each

party, regardless of size, gets the same amount of extra seats, that works disproportionately to

the advantage of smaller parties over the larger ones.

Mr Paisley: You are really opposed to the top-up under all circumstances?

Mr Weir: It is not a system which we favour.

The Chairman: Thank you, very much. It has been very helpful. If you do decide to

make a written submission it would be appreciated, but everything will be on the record

anyway.

Mr Weir: I think that the oral evidence will probably cover most things. But we may

wish to make a written submission at a later stage.

40

WRITTEN PRESENTATION

~~~~~~~

41

DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY

42

WRITTEN PRESENTATION

~~~~~~~

ALLIANCE PARTY

43

WRITTEN PRESENTATION

~~~~~~~

NORTHERN IRELAND

WOMEN'S COALITION

44

ANNEX D

~~~~~~

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

45

ANNEX D

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

D. n First Past The Post

D. o Single Transferable Vote

D. p List Proportional Representation

D. q Additional Member System

D. r Alternative Vote

(Extracts from publication

Electoral Systems - An Introductory

Guide by Andy Reynolds)

46

ANNEX D.1

FIRST PAST THE POST (FPTP)

How you vote:

Under First Past the Post the voter simply places an X by the candidate of their choice.

Only one X is allowed and any other mark will usually invalidate the ballot paper.

How is it counted?

First Past the Post uses single-member constituencies which means that one MP is elected

from each defined constituency. All the ballot papers in a constituency are counted and the

candidate with the most votes is elected, regardless of whether they have received an

absolute majority of the votes (ie over 50% of the vote).

What is the result?

FPTP usually produces two main parties in Parliament with a number of other

geographically concentrated parties with a few seats (with the exception of some third

parties such as the Liberal Democrats in Britain). The system means that political parties

need a geographical spread of support if they are to form a government. FPTP will usually

produce a government with a clear parliamentary majority, although this is by no means

always the case.

47

ANNEX D.2

SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE (STV)

How you vote?

A single transferable vote ballot paper asks the voter to list candidates in order of

preference by using numbers instead of a simple X vote. A voter may number one, some

or all of the candidates on the ballot paper. There is no need to vote for all the candidates

of one party, the voter is free to number candidates in a way that cuts across party lines.

How is it counted?

Under STV MPs are elected from multi-member constituencies, ranging from

approximately 3 to 12 members in size. A quota for election is worked out which is the

minimum number of votes required by a candidate to be elected. If there are 5 MPs to be

elected from the constituency then the quota will be just under 17% of the vote. The first

stage of the count is to total all the first preferences received by each candidate. Any

candidates who have reached the quota are automatically elected at this stage. If there are

still places to be filled then the surplus votes of winning candidates (those in excess of the

quota needed for election) are redistributed to the candidates left in the race. These votes

would be transferred to the candidate who appears 2nd on the ballot paper. If the winning

candidate's surplus was 10 votes and they had 100 votes to transfer then all these votes

would be transferred at a value of 1/10th of a vote.

If this still fails to fill all the places up for election then the lowest polling candidate is

eliminated and his or her votes redistributed to the candidate who appears next on their

ballot paper. This process continues in this way until all places have been filled.

What is the result?

STV means that the elector can exercise a wide degree of choice through their ballot paper.

They can choose between both parties and candidates of the same party. STV would imply

larger constituencies than in FPTP but in Parliament the number of MPs gained by each

party would more closely mirror the national percentage vote that party won. Smaller

minority parties would also be more likely to be represented in Parliament. Once again the

resulting proportionality of Parliament would make coalition government more likely.

48

ANNEX D.3

LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (LIST PR)

How you vote:

The simplest forms of List PR systems ask the elector to vote for one political party by

placing an X (as in Israel and Namibia). However there are variations in which voters can

vote for candidates rather than parties, choose more than one party or reorder the party list.

How is it counted?

The main objective of all PR systems is to award seats in Parliament in proportion to votes

gained in the country. List PR is in a way the purest version of this principle as a party

winning 40% of the vote is awarded 40% of the seats. The elected MPs come from ordered

party lists which are presented to the electorate before the election (although the voter may

not necessarily be able to influence the party's list). If there was a Parliament of 200

members and a party won 40% of the vote then the top 80 names on their candidate list

would be elected. These members are elected from large multi-member constituencies,

either on a regional basis, or in some cases a national basis where the entire country forms

one enormous constituency (eg Israel).

What is the result?

The size of constituencies, the nature of any threshold (see Glossary) and the ability of

voters to influence the party lists will all determine the results under a list PR system.

However in most cases list PR will allow for small, minority parties to be represented in

Parliament in proportion to their national strength. Coalition governments are more likely

as a party would have to win an absolute majority of the popular vote to rule alone. List

PR is much more likely to lead to a multi-party Parliamentary system.

49

ANNEX D.4

ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM (AMS)

How you vote:

An additional member ballot paper gives the voter the chance to cast two votes. The first

vote is for a constituency representative and the second is for a political party. The voter

places one X by their chosen candidate and one by their chosen party, they do not

necessarily have to be from the same party. It is perfectly legal to vote for the candidate of

the Small Hat Party and with the second party vote choose the Big Head Party.

How is it counted?

The Additional Member System is effectively a combination of First Past the Post and List

Proportional Representation. Half the MPs are elected from single member constituencies

whilst the other half of the Parliament is elected from each party's "list" of candidates. In

the constituencies seats are won by the candidate who receives the most votes, as in First

Past the Post. However your second vote is the most crucial one as this determines how

many seats each party is awarded in Parliament. Each party's number of seats are "topped

up" with Additional Members until they equal the percentage of second votes they received

nationally. To be awarded additional member seats, a party may need to pass a threshold.

In Germany, which uses AMS, this is 5% of the total (second) votes cast. Such a threshold

guards against the over-splintering of Parliament and means that only parties with

significant minority support will gain Parliamentary representation. The imposition of a

threshold is likely to make the resulting Parliament not perfectly proportionate.

AMS is best illustrated by the example below:

Constituency 2nd Votes Total Parl. List

seats won entitlement seats

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Party A 235 44% 319 84

Party B 91 33% 239 148

Party C 1 11% 79 78

(NB: Parliament of approx. 640 members, half elected from Constituencies

and the other half from the party lists.)

The Additional Members are chosen from Party Lists which are presented on a regional

basis. Each ballot paper will have the top five candidates of a party's list printed on it

although there is no ability to influence the order of the party list.

What is the result?

The Additional Member System will produce a Parliament roughly proportionate to the

popular vote in the country (bearing in mind the 5% threshold for representation).

Therefore to form a government alone a party would have to win over 50% of the votes.

Such a high level of vote needed makes coalition governments far more likely. Some MPs

would have constituency responsibilities whilst the Additional Members would have none.

50

ANNEX D.5

ALTERNATIVE VOTE (AV)

How you vote:

Under the Alternative Vote the voter is asked to list the candidates in order of preference on

the ballot paper using numbers. They may just place 1 by one candidate's name or they

could number all the candidates. Unlike STV voters would not be asked to differentiate

between candidates of the same party.

How is it counted?

AV uses single-member constituencies similar to those used under First Past the Post. The

first stage of the count is to total the first preferences of each candidate. If one candidate

receives over 50% of these votes then he or she is duly elected for the constituency.

However if no-one reaches this level then the lowest polling candidate is eliminated and his

or her votes redistributed to the next candidate listed on the ballot paper. This process

continues until one candidate reaches the 50%+ 1 needed for election.

What is the result?

The Alternative Vote has similar effects on the make up of Parliament as the First Past the

Post system. Two main parties are likely to emerge with minority parties only receiving

representation if they are geographically concentrated. AV is designed to ensure that each

MP is supported by over 50% of his or her constituents and does so by instituting tactical

voting on the ballot paper itself. Political Parties are more likely under AV to win an

outright parliamentary majority even if they do not win an absolute majority of the votes.

51

ANNEX E

~~~~~~

GLOSSARY

52

ANNEX E

GLOSSARY:

Additional Member System

A combination of List Proportional Representation and First Past the Post single member

constituencies. Additional Members are allotted to bring a party's parliamentary seats up

to the level of their national percentage vote. In Germany half the parliament are

constituency members and the other half additional members.

Alternative Vote

Preferential voting used in single member constituencies. Ensures a winning candidate

receives an absolute majority (50% +1) of the votes cast.

Constituency

The geographical division of the electorate. Constituencies may be single member or

multi-member in size. In some cases an entire country forms one enormous constituency

for the purpose of returning MPs.

First Past The Post

Winning candidates simply receive the most votes cast in their constituency. This system

predominates in Britain, and countries historically influenced by Britain, such as: Canada,

India, New Zealand, the United States of America and South Africa.

List Proportional Representation (List PR)

Seats are awarded in proportion to votes cast for each party. The elected members are

taken from ordered "party lists" which are drawn up before the election by the party

headquarters. List PR systems range in size of constituencies they use and the ability they

give to voters to reorder the party lists.

Multi-Member Constituency

Any constituency which elects more than one MP. Most forms of PR use multi-member

constituencies.

Proportional Representation

The term for all electoral systems that seek to award seats in parliament in proportion to

votes cast nationally. The larger the constituencies the more proportionate parliament will

be.

Single Member Constituency

A constituency that just elects one MP to Parliament. Single member constituencies are

used under First Past The Post and the Additional Member system.

Single Transferable Vote

A combination of preferential voting and multi-member constituencies. This system, used

in Ireland, gives a roughly proportionate result whilst allowing voters to choose between

candidates from the same party as well as choosing between parties themselves.

Threshold

The level of percentage vote required, under most PR systems, in order for a party to be

entitled to parliamentary representation.

53

• Electoral System for Westminster Elections: A Report by Committee On Electoral Reform (introduced on 1998-04-03 00:00:00 - CREATE - e841108) [This document] [view current proposal at this moment]
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