Northern Ireland Forum

for

~~~~~~~~~

ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR

Presented to the Northern Ireland Forum for Political

Note

DRAFT REPORTS

This report has been prepared by the Committee on Electoral

Reform for the consideration of the Northern Ireland Forum for

Political Dialogue. Until adopted by the Forum in accordance

with its Rules, this report may not be reproduced in whole or in

part or used for broadcast purposes.

CONTENTS

Section Page

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, TERMS AND

METHODS 4

3. OTHER ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS 5

- FORUM ELECTION

- DEVOLUTION FOR SCOTLAND AND WALES

4. VALUES AROUND WHICH ELECTORAL

SYSTEM SHOULD BE BASED 11

5. SYSTEMS PROPOSED BY EACH PARTY 13

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23

ANNEXES

A MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITTEE

B ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

C GLOSSARY

D TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH

DR S ELLIOTT

E PRESENTATIONS/SUBMISSIONS FROM

PARTIES

F SUMMARY TABLE OF PREFERRED

ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR ANY FUTURE

NI ASSEMBLY

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 At the plenary meeting held on Friday 13 June 1997 the Forum

debated the issue of electoral irregularities and resolved to refer the

matter to a Committee to recommend methods of countering these

irregularities with a view to submitting such evidence to the Secretary

of State for Northern Ireland for consideration within the

Government’s review procedure. The Committee met for the first

time on 23 June 1997. Membership of the Committee is attached at

Annex A.

1.2 The Committee on Electoral Reform reported to the Forum on

13 October 1997 and following the presentation of the report to the

Government on 3 December 1997, the Forum at the plenary meeting

on 23 January 1998 agreed to amend the Committee’s terms of

reference as follows:

"(a) to monitor the Government's review on electoral reform in

Northern Ireland;

(b) to make a contribution to the Government's review of the

electoral system to be used for parliamentary elections;

(c) to consider and recommend an appropriate system for any

future election for a Northern Ireland Assembly;

and report to the Forum."

1

1.3 The Committee has been and will be continuing to liaise with the

Government regarding their review on electoral reform and has written

to the Independent Commission on the Voting system which was set

up by Government to consider any appropriate system or

combination of systems in recommending an alternative to the present

system for Parliamentary elections.

1.4 The Committee agreed that in view of the longer deadline for the

review of an electoral system for Parliamentary elections and for the

publication of the Government’s report on electoral reform that it

should in the first instance concentrate on the issue of considering an

appropriate electoral system for any future election for a Northern

Ireland Assembly.

1.5 The Committee sought advice from Dr Sydney Elliott, Queen’s

University, Belfast regarding the type of voting systems which could

be adopted. The Committee would like to thank Dr Elliott for all his

help and advice on this matter.

1.6 The Committee also wrote to the political parties asking for oral

presentations/submissions on the electoral system favoured by each

party. Seven parties responded, however the Committee was

disappointed to note that no reply was received from either the United

Kingdom Unionist Party nor the Social Democratic and Labour Party.

1.7 This report is based on the advice received from Dr Elliott and on the

presentations/submissions from the political parties. A transcript of

2

the meeting with Dr Elliott is included at Annex D with

presentations/submissions at Annex E.

1.8 The Committee also considered the electoral systems in relation to the

proposed devolution arrangements for Scotland and Wales, details of

which are set out in paragraphs 3.12-3.23 of this report.

3

2. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, TERMS AND METHODS

2.1 As will be seen in the next chapter, all the systems put forward by the

parties were under a Proportional Representation system the main

objective of which is to award seats in proportion to votes. This

effectively rules out the First Past the Post system (a Plurality

system) which is currently used in Westminster elections.

Proportional Representation allows for several options such as:

Single Transferable Vote

List Proportional Representation

Additional Member System

2.2 Explanations as to how the electorate votes under each of the

aforementioned systems (including First Past the Post), how the votes

are counted and the result of using each system is given in an extract

from a publication ‘Electoral Systems - An Introductory Guide by

Andy Reynolds’ which is attached at Annex B.

2.3 A glossary at Annex C sets out the definitions of terms and methods

used throughout the following chapters.

4

3. OTHER ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS

3.1 The Committee believes that it may be useful at this stage to look at

the system used in the Forum elections and the electoral arrangements

for the proposed devolution for Scotland and Wales.

Forum Election

3.2 A list based system was used for the Forum elections in May 1996.

The Forum is comprised of 110 delegates, based on five delegates

returned from each of the 18 Parliamentary constituencies and a

'top-up' of twenty delegates from Northern Ireland as a whole.

3.3 Parties were asked to produce separate lists of at least 2 and not more

than 5 candidates for all or any of the constituencies (constituency

list) and, if a party submitted at least three constituency lists, they

could also submit a list of at least 2 and not more than 10 candidates

for Northern Ireland as a whole (regional list).

3.4 Parties’ regional lists had to include at least 2 candidates who were

not on a constituency list for that party.

Voting

3.5 The elector was asked to cast one vote for a party named on the

ballot paper for the constituency.

5

Constituency Delegates

3.6 For each of the 18 Parliamentary constituencies the total number of

votes given, the quota for the constituency and the number of votes

given for each party was calculated.

3.7 The quota for each constituency was calculated using the following

formula:

T + 1

6

where T was the total of votes given.

3.8 If the number of votes given for a party equalled or exceeded the

quota the first candidate on the constituency list was elected as a

delegate. If the number of votes equalled or exceeded a multiple of

the quota, a corresponding number of candidates were elected as

delegates, up to the number appearing on the constituency list.

3.9 If, after having applied this formula, fewer than five delegates were

elected, a quotient was calculated for each party (excluding any of

those whose constituency list was exhausted) using the following

formula:

V

N + 1

where V was the number of votes given for the party and N was the

number of party delegates already elected under the previous

calculation. The candidate on the list with the highest quotient was

elected. If after having applied this formula fewer than 5 delegates

6

were elected, it was applied again taking into account the additional

delegates elected using this formula until 5 delegates had been elected

or until all constituency lists had been exhausted.

3.10 Delegates were elected in the order in which they appeared on the

party lists.

Regional Delegates

3.11 The aggregate number of votes given in all constituencies was

calculated for each party that submitted a regional list. The top two

candidates (excluding any who had been elected under the

constituency list), from each of the ten parties with the largest

aggregates, were elected as delegates.

Proposed Devolution for Scotland

3.12 Scotland is to have its own Parliament with 129 members (MSPs), 73

members elected directly on a constituency basis plus 56 additional

members allocated to ensure the overall result more directly reflects

the share of the votes cast for each party.

3.13 The 73 members will be elected on the basis of one member from

each of the current 72 Parliamentary constituencies except that

Orkney and Shetland (which form one constituency at the moment)

will become two separate constituencies thus making 73 in total.

7

3.14 The 56 additional members will be selected from party lists drawn up

for each of the current 8 European constituencies - there will be 7

additional members from each of the European constituencies.

Voting

3.15 Each elector will be entitled to cast two votes: one for the

constituency MSP and one for the party of his/her choice.

Constituency MSPs

3.16 The 73 constituency MSPs will be elected using the First Past The

Post system in the same way as for elections to Westminster which

means that the candidate who receives the most votes will be elected.

Additional MSPs

3.17 Additional member seats will be allocated correctively ie account will

be taken of the number of constituency members which have been

elected within the European Parliamentary constituency, using the

following formula:

E

D + 1

where E is the number of votes cast for each party within the

European constituency and D is the number of constituency MSPs

gained in the Parliamentary constituencies contained within the

European constituency.

8

3.18 The party with the highest total gains the first additional member.

3.19 The second to the seventh additional members are elected in the same

way but additional members are included in the calculation (therefore

D in the above formula becomes the number of constituency MSPs

gained in the Parliamentary constituencies within the European

constituency plus the number of additional members elected).

Proposed Devolution for Wales

3.20 Wales is to have an Assembly of 60 members, 40 members will be

elected on constituency basis and 20 additional members elected

under the additional member system to ensure that the number of

seats gained by a party more accurately reflects the votes cast for it.

3.21 The 60 members will be elected on the same basis as Scotland ie one

member will be elected from each of the 40 current Parliamentary

constituencies and 20 additional members based on 4 additional

members from each of the 5 current European constituencies.

Voting

3.22 Voting will be on the same basis as Scotland - electors will have two

votes - one for a candidate within the constituency and another for a

party list.

9

Election of Members

3.23 The 40 constituency members and 20 additional members (4 from

each of the European constituencies) will be elected using the same

formulae as Scotland.

10

4. VALUES AROUND WHICH ELECTORAL SYSTEM

SHOULD BE BASED

4.1 There are several factors which influence the choice of an electoral

system such as, for example, the purpose for which that system is

being designed and the values around which the design can take place.

4.2 The numbers to be elected to a body is a consideration which also

has to be taken into account. There was a very broad consensus

within the seven parties which provided responses to the Committee

that the numbers in any future Assembly could be in the range of 90

to 128 members.

4.3 It was however pointed out that some people might argue that a 90

member Assembly was too big when compared with the

proportionate size of Scotland and Wales who have 129 members and

60 members respectively for communities of 5 million and 2.9 million

compared with a population of 1.6 million in Northern Ireland. Most

parties accept this point but believe that it would not be feasible to

suggest a reduction in the 90 members provided for under the

Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.

4.4 As Dr Elliott indicated in his evidence there are about 1,000 different

electoral systems which could be employed when allocating seats and

advised that when trying to construct a system it is important to

introduce values around which the design of a system can take place.

Dr Elliott advised that there were three values which the Committee

should consider namely, fairness and seats-to-votes relationship; the

11

link to the constituency and the level of choice for the voter. The

values identified by each of the parties when considering their

preferred system are set out in the summary at Annex F of this report.

4.5 The Committee recommends that any future electoral system

for a Northern Ireland Assembly should be constructed around

the following four values:

- a link between the elected member and the constituency;

- a result that is as proportional as possible;

- a wide level of choice of representation;

- simple and understandable.

12

5. SYSTEMS PROPOSED BY EACH PARTY

5.1. There was a very broad range of electoral systems favoured by the

parties, with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Alliance Party

being the only two parties advocating the same basis for any electoral

system. A summary of the systems suggested by each party together

with the advantages offered by each party in support of the system is

attached at Annex F.

5.2 While recognising the varied range of electoral systems suggested, it

should be noted that the seven parties who made

presentations/submissions all proposed a system which works under

the principle of Proportional Representation and which is based on

the return of several members for each of the 18 Westminster

Constituencies, although the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) also

put forward a suggestion based on 50 single member constituencies.

5.3 The Committee recommends that any proposed electoral system

for a Northern Ireland Assembly should be on the basis of a

Proportional Representation system.

5.4 The Single Transferable Vote (STV) (see Annex B), on its own, was

proposed by UUP and the Alliance Party and combined with some

form of top-up by Labour, NI Women’s Coalition and the

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP).

5.5 STV was not ruled out by the DUP but the Party had some

reservations about this system which are outlined later in this chapter.

13

5.6 The Single Transferable Vote has been used in Local Government

Elections since 1973, in European Elections since 1979, for Assembly

elections in 1973 and 1982 and for the Convention election in 1975.

5.7 When advising the Committee Dr Elliott recognised STV as a system

with which the electorate are familiar but pointed out that one of the

disadvantages with STV is its high threshold (see glossary) of 16.67%

for a seat within a five-seat constituency. Dr Elliott explained that no

more than four parties across Northern Ireland command more than

16.67% support and that, in his opinion, STV might not therefore be

helpful to smaller parties.

5.8 One other criticism Dr Elliott had of STV was that people appeared to

have difficulty in using the system and unwittingly invalidated their

vote. He informed the Committee that there were almost 17,000

spoiled votes in the 1993 local government election whereas the

system of election for the Forum which required a simple X vote

produced less than 4,000 invalid votes.

5.9 However the Alliance Party pointed out that it believed that the

presiding officers at the polling stations made a point of explaining the

voting procedures at the Forum election and that at other elections

there did not seem to be the same degree of attention given to

ensuring that people were clear as to how to vote. Dr Elliott

accepted that this was a possibility for the decrease in the number of

spoiled votes at the Forum election and advised that it was noticeable

that little educational material comes from the Chief Electoral

Officer’s office before a PR election to guide people.

14

5.10 The Committee agrees that an obligation should be placed on

the Government to educate the electorate effectively regarding

whatever system is being used for any election. The Committee

therefore recommends that the Government should effectively

promote and produce educational material about whatever

electoral system is adopted for a Northern Ireland Assembly.

5.11 During the presentation to the Committee the UUP argued for the use

of STV on the basis of the 18 Westminster Constituencies with five

seats per constituency. The Party believes that this system retains the

link between the member and the constituency, gives the electorate the

opportunity to vote for independent candidates and for preferred

candidates within parties and produces a broadly proportional result.

The UUP also points out that STV is also a system which voters are

used to.

5.12 The UUP believes that alternative PR systems such as list systems or

additional member systems destroy the link between the member and

the constituency and weaken the opportunity for voters to vote for a

particular candidate within a party or for an independent candidate.

5.13 The UUP further believes that a list system tends to produce

disproportionate results as they feel was evident in the Forum election

and stated that it would be concerned if there were to be a move

towards a list system in Northern Ireland. The Party point out that as

there has traditionally been a differential turnout particularly between

the western and eastern parts of the Province, such a list system

15

would tend to give a disproportionate say to people in the west and

south of the Province and the electorate’s true wishes would not be

reflected.

5.14 The UUP does not favour any form of top-up as additional members

elected by way of the top-up system are not directly linked in with

constituencies. The Party believes that a top-up system like the one

used for the Forum election, where each party regardless of size gets

the same amount of extra seats, works disproportionately to the

advantage of the smaller parties and is artificial and undemocratic.

5.15 The DUP sees the issue of members elected under a top-up system

not being linked in with constituencies as an advantage under its

proposed system. The DUP favours a model which retains as strong

a link as possible between the elected member and the constituency

together with a top-up from a regional list on a province-wide basis

and suggests two possible options viz either 50 single member

constituencies with a top-up of 50 or three members from the 18

Westminster constituencies with a top-up of 46. The DUP suggests

that following the election in the constituencies, parties would be

allocated seats from the regional list so ensuring that there was a

proportionate correlation between the overall percentage of the vote

for that party and the number of seats won.

5.16 The DUP recognises that there could be difficulties with the setting up

of the 50 single member constituencies if there was a very limited

timeframe for an election to take place but stresses that if it was

believed to be the right system, it should not be ruled out.

16

5.17 The DUP also believes that it would be advisable when introducing

such a regional list system to establish a minimum percentage

threshold of vote, for example, 4% or 5%, in order to qualify for

representation from the regional list. This would ward off the

possibility of hundreds of smaller groups forming in the hope of

qualifying for a seat from the regional list but would increase the

chances of smaller parties being elected compared to their chances

under the STV system where, as has already been explained, they

would have to obtain a much higher percentage of the vote to have

any chance of being elected.

5.18 The DUP indicates that the advantages in its proposed system are that

it retains the link between the constituency and the member, it ensures

fairness and proportionality and it is a straightforward system which

can be easily understood by the electorate. The DUP also points out

that it is line with the systems advocated for Scotland and Wales and

therefore it is more likely to be saleable to Government.

5.19 In addition the DUP believes that its proposed system combines

giving the voters a good level of choice on one hand, with on the

other hand the ability of parties to bring in people through the regional

list, who the Party may not want to be burdened down with

Constituency work but who are deemed to have special qualities

through which they can make a useful contribution to an Assembly.

5.20 The DUP further points out that where there is a by-election for a seat

previously held by one of the small parties the biggest party will win

the seat as it becomes a straight election. However such an event can

17

be provided for under a regional list as you can draw the next person

on that party list to fill the seat thereby avoiding the need for a

by-election.

5.21 The DUP does not rule out STV as a possible electoral system for the

18 Westminster Constituencies of three seats but indicates that it

believes that the link between the member and the constituency which

is strong under a single member constituency is diluted under STV

and that STV is not a simple and understandable system for the

electorate, quoting the evidence provided by Dr Elliott regarding the

large number of spoiled votes as support for this argument. The

other disadvantage identified by the DUP is that under STV smaller

parties will probably lose their seat in the event of a by-election for a

seat previously held by one of the small parties.

5.22 As with the UUP, the Alliance Party, in their presentation to the

Committee, argued for STV based on 18 Westminster Constituencies

but based on either five or six seats. The Party maintains that STV

reliably produces a broadly proportional result, gives the electorate

greater choice, not only preserves but enhances constituency

representation as voters can approach any of the members they feel

more comfortable with and that it is particularly useful in divided

societies as it tends to reinforce the centre as the extremes tend to

give their transfers inwards.

5.23 The Alliance Party believes that virtually every party has sufficient

geographical support to win seats with the exception of the

micro-parties but the Alliance Party doubts that any electoral system

18

could be manipulated to include such groups. The Party has

recommended that the number of representatives to be returned in

each constituency could be raised from 5 to 6 thereby reducing the

threshold from 16.7% to 14.3% which increases the chances of

smaller parties being elected.

5.24 The Alliance Party recognises that list-based systems are the most

proportional of all the PR systems but believes that this advantage is

more than outweighed by the numerous disadvantages in the system.

5.25 The Alliance Party stated that while proportionality virtually guarantees

smaller parties seats when the list is applied on a national basis, it

stressed that once the number of seats within a constituency get too

small ie electing anything less than 20 per constituency, then

proportionality is lost. The Party believes that this was the case in the

Forum election where the DUP and UUP took all five seats in Lagan

Valley but only won 60% of the vote between them and where in

Foyle the SDLP and Sinn Fein took all five seats with only 70% of the

vote.

5.26 The Alliance Party also believes that list based systems give political

parties tight control over who gets elected, as they overly favour those

who work to serve the party interests rather than the constituency

interests. In addition the Party believes that any conception of

constituency representation is lost as voters select parties rather than

individuals.

19

5.27 The Alliance Party also rejects the Additional Member System (see

Annex B) as it believes that such a system creates two classes of

elected members - those with a constituency mandate and those

without.

5.28 Labour also favours STV based on 18 Westminster constituencies of

five seats but also propose a top-up to maximise representation. The

Party suggests that for the first election to any future Northern Ireland

Assembly it may be best to retain the practice introduced in the

Forum election of awarding 2 seats to the 10 largest parties. However

Labour recognises that this system is artificial and recommends that it

should not be retained beyond the first election. Therefore for future

elections Labour recommends a top-up based on the number of seats

already gained in the constituency and the percentage of the total vote

polled.

5.29 Labour believes that this system would ensure that all significant

parties would get members elected, that the link between the member

and the constituency would be retained, that small parties or

independents who are popular in a particular area would have the

possibility of getting elected and that all major parties would obtain

elected members throughout Northern Ireland.

5.30 Labour rejects the system used for the Forum election because the

Party believes that it effectively excluded independent candidates who

may have had strong support within a single constituency, that it led

to the elimination of important parties in particular constituencies, that

it increased polarisation as voters ignored smaller parties and voted

20

for the larger parties to ensure their side maximised its representation,

that it greatly reduced the link between the member and the

constituency and that it gave the party machine too much power in

drawing up the list.

5.31 Labour also rejects a list system for the whole of Northern Ireland

because the Party believes that it eliminates independents ie only

parties can stand, that it breaks the link between the member and the

constituency and that it gives the party machine too much power in

compiling the list as they are only likely to select candidates who will

rigidly adhere to the party line.

5.32 The NI Women’s Coalition favours STV plus a top-up Additional

Member System determined by Greatest Remainder (see glossary) but

did not specify any arguments for their preferred system or against

any other system.

5.33 The PUP, in their submission to the Committee, argued for STV on

the basis of six seats (thereby reducing the threshold from 16.7% to

14.3%) coupled with a league system of awarding two seats to the top

ten political parties, similar to that used in the Forum election. The

Party also suggests that the present formulae for calculating STV are

unfair and suggests the use of Greatest Remainder instead.

5.34 The PUP also describes the same advantages as those identified by

the UUP and the Alliance Party and additionally points out that its

system would ensure that an Assembly would have as diverse a range

21

of political opinion as possible and that any significant group would

have a voice in such.

5.35 The Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) advocates some form of PR

based on 18 Constituencies of five seats plus a top-up of 20 seats by

D’Hondt system taking into account seats already won by parties.

5.36 The UDP argues that such combined electoral systems have several

advantages for Northern Ireland’s society which should not be

ignored. These are that such systems accommodate both larger and

smaller parties thereby enabling for a fairer and more accurate

representation of all sections of the community, would function

similar to the additional member system in Scotland and Wales and

would ensure that all sections of the community can participate and

that their interests would be protected.

22

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The following provides a summary of conclusions and

recommendations identified in the previous chapters of this report:-

The Committee recommends that any future electoral

system for a Northern Ireland Assembly should be

constructed around the following four values:

- a link between the elected member and the

constituency;

- a result that is as proportional as possible;

- a wide level of choice of representation;

- simple and understandable. (Para 4.5)

The Committee recommends that any proposed electoral

system for a Northern Ireland Assembly should be on the

basis of a Proportional Representation system. (Para 5.3)

The Committee agrees that an obligation should be placed

on the Government to educate the electorate effectively

regarding whatever system is being used for any election.

The Committee therefore recommends that the

Government should effectively promote and produce

23

education material about whatever electoral system is

adopted for a Northern Ireland Assembly. (Para 5.10)

6.2 The Committee recommends that the Government should

continue to fully consult with parties as much as possible

regarding any proposed electoral system for a Northern Ireland

Assembly.

6.3 The Committee strongly recommends that whatever electoral

system is adopted effective action be taken to combat the

various aspects of electoral abuse which have been identified in

the Committee's previous report on Electoral Irregularities, so

that the result will truly and accurately reflect the wishes of the

electorate.

6.4 However as a result of time constraints the Committee has not been

able to engage in a detailed examination of any one system.

24

ANNEX A

MEMBERSHIP OF

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Ulster Unionist Party - Mr K Maginnis MP

Mr R Coulter

Mr S Gardiner (Vice-Chairman)

Mr R Stoker

Democratic Unionist Party - Mr P Robinson MP

Mr N Dodds

Rev W McCrea

Mr I Paisley

Alliance Party - Mr S Neeson (Chairman)

*Mr D Ford

Ulster Democratic Party - *Mr F McCoubrey

UK Unionist Party - *#Mr J Dudgeon

Labour - Mr H Casey

NI Women's Coalition - Ms P Sagar

Progressive Unionist Party - *Ms D Purvis

* attend the Committee on behalf of the party under Rule 14(4)(a) of the

Forum Rules of Procedure.

# party resigned from Forum on 16 September 1997.

25

ANNEX B

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

B. ΠFirst Past The Post

B.  Single Transferable Vote

B. Ž List Proportional Representation

B.  Additional Member System

(Extracts from publication

Electoral Systems - An Introductory

Guide by Andy Reynolds)

26

ANNEX B.1

FIRST PAST THE POST (FPTP)

How you vote:

Under First Past the Post the voter simply places an X by the candidate of their choice.

Only one X is allowed and any other mark will usually invalidate the ballot paper.

How is it counted?

First Past the Post uses single-member constituencies which means that one MP is

elected from each defined constituency. All the ballot papers in a constituency are

counted and the candidate with the most votes is elected, regardless of whether they have

received an absolute majority of the votes (ie over 50% of the vote).

What is the result?

FPTP usually produces two main parties in Parliament with a number of other

geographically concentrated parties with a few seats (with the exception of some third

parties such as the Liberal Democrats in Britain). The system means that political parties

need a geographical spread of support if they are to form a government. FPTP will

usually produce a government with a clear parliamentary majority, although this is by no

means always the case.

27

ANNEX B.2

SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE (STV)

How you vote?

A single transferable vote ballot paper asks the voter to list candidates in order of

preference by using numbers instead of a simple X vote. A voter may number one, some

or all of the candidates on the ballot paper. There is no need to vote for all the candidates

of one party, the voter is free to number candidates in a way that cuts across party lines.

How is it counted?

Under STV MPs are elected from multi-member constituencies, ranging from

approximately 3 to 12 members in size. A quota for election is worked out which is the

minimum number of votes required by a candidate to be elected. If there are 5 MPs to be

elected from the constituency then the quota will be just under 17% of the vote. The first

stage of the count is to total all the first preferences received by each candidate. Any

candidates who have reached the quota are automatically elected at this stage. If there

are still places to be filled then the surplus votes of winning candidates (those in excess of

the quota needed for election) are redistributed to the candidates left in the race. These

votes would be transferred to the candidate who appears 2nd on the ballot paper. If the

winning candidate's surplus was 10 votes and they had 100 votes to transfer then all these

votes would be transferred at a value of 1/10th of a vote.

If this still fails to fill all the places up for election then the lowest polling candidate is

eliminated and his or her votes redistributed to the candidate who appears next on their

ballot paper. This process continues in this way until all places have been filled.

What is the result?

STV means that the elector can exercise a wide degree of choice through their ballot

paper. They can choose between both parties and candidates of the same party. STV

would imply larger constituencies than in FPTP but in Parliament the number of MPs

gained by each party would more closely mirror the national percentage vote that party

won. Smaller minority parties would also be more likely to be represented in Parliament.

Once again the resulting proportionality of Parliament would make coalition government

more likely.

28

ANNEX B.3

LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (LIST PR)

How you vote:

The simplest forms of List PR systems ask the elector to vote for one political party by

placing an X (as in Israel and Namibia). However there are variations in which voters

can vote for candidates rather than parties, choose more than one party or reorder the

party list.

How is it counted?

The main objective of all PR systems is to award seats in Parliament in proportion to

votes gained in the country. List PR is in a way the purest version of this principle as a

party winning 40% of the vote is awarded 40% of the seats. The elected MPs come

from ordered party lists which are presented to the electorate before the election

(although the voter may not necessarily be able to influence the party's list). If there was

a Parliament of 200 members and a party won 40% of the vote then the top 80 names on

their candidate list would be elected. These members are elected from large

multi-member constituencies, either on a regional basis, or in some cases a national basis

where the entire country forms one enormous constituency (eg Israel).

What is the result?

The size of constituencies, the nature of any threshold (see Glossary) and the ability of

voters to influence the party lists will all determine the results under a list PR system.

However in most cases list PR will allow for small, minority parties to be represented in

Parliament in proportion to their national strength. Coalition governments are more likely

as a party would have to win an absolute majority of the popular vote to rule alone. List

PR is much more likely to lead to a multi-party Parliamentary system.

29

ANNEX B.4

ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM (AMS)

How you vote:

An additional member ballot paper gives the voter the chance to cast two votes. The first

vote is for a constituency representative and the second is for a political party. The voter

places one X by their chosen candidate and one by their chosen party, they do not

necessarily have to be from the same party. It is perfectly legal to vote for the candidate

of the Small Hat Party and with the second party vote choose the Big Head Party.

How is it counted?

The Additional Member System is effectively a combination of First Past the Post and

List Proportional Representation. Half the MPs are elected from single member

constituencies whilst the other half of the Parliament is elected from each party's "list" of

candidates. In the constituencies seats are won by the candidate who receives the most

votes, as in First Past the Post. However your second vote is the most crucial one as this

determines how many seats each party is awarded in Parliament. Each party's number of

seats are "topped up" with Additional Members until they equal the percentage of second

votes they received nationally. To be awarded additional member seats, a party may need

to pass a threshold. In Germany, which uses AMS, this is 5% of the total (second) votes

cast. Such a threshold guards against the over-splintering of Parliament and means that

only parties with significant minority support will gain Parliamentary representation. The

imposition of a threshold is likely to make the resulting Parliament not perfectly

proportionate.

AMS is best illustrated by the example below:

Constituency 2nd Votes Total Parl. List

seats won entitlement seats

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Party A 235 44% 319 84

Party B 91 33% 239 148

Party C 1 11% 79 78

(NB: Parliament of approx. 640 members, half elected from Constituencies

and the other half from the party lists.)

The Additional Members are chosen from Party Lists which are presented on a regional

basis. Each ballot paper will have the top five candidates of a party's list printed on it

although there is no ability to influence the order of the party list.

What is the result?

The Additional Member System will produce a Parliament roughly proportionate to the

popular vote in the country (bearing in mind the 5% threshold for representation).

Therefore to form a government alone a party would have to win over 50% of the votes.

Such a high level of vote needed makes coalition governments far more likely. Some

MPs would have constituency responsibilities whilst the Additional Members would have

none.

30

ANNEX C

GLOSSARY:

Additional Member System

A combination of List Proportional Representation and First Past the Post single member

constituencies. Additional Members are allotted to bring a party's parliamentary seats up

to the level of their national percentage vote. In Germany half the parliament are

constituency members and the other half additional members.

Constituency

The geographical division of the electorate. Constituencies may be single member or

multi-member in size. In some cases an entire country forms one enormous constituency

for the purpose of returning MPs.

D'Hondt Rule (or Highest Average)

The principle whereby seats are allocated one by one on the basis of the highest average.

The method requires that each party vote total be divided initially by 1, and thereafter by

one more than the number of seats won, until all the seats are filled.

Party Vote Divisor Average

Example: List A 8700 1 8700*

B 6800 1 6800

C 5200 1 5200

D 3300 1 3300

List A wins the first seat and its divisor becomes 2.

Divisor Average

List A 8700 2 4350

B 6800 1 6800*

C 5200 1 5200

D 3300 1 3300

List B gets second seat and its divisor becomes 2.

Divisor Average

List A 8700 2 4350

B 6800 2 3400

C 5200 1 5200*

D 3300 1 3300

List C gets third seat and its divisor becomes 2.

Divisor Average

List A 8700 2 4350*

B 6800 2 3400

C 5200 2 2600

D 3300 1 3300

List A gets fourth seat and its second and divisor becomes 3.

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Divisor Average

List A 8700 3 2900

B 6800 2 3400*

C 5200 2 2600

D 3300 1 3300

List B gets fifth seat .

Result: List A 2 seats

List B 2 seats

List C 1 seat

The example and experience where D'Hondt is used reveal that it helps large parties.

First Past The Post

Winning candidates simply receive the most votes cast in their constituency. This system

predominates in Britain, and countries historically influenced by Britain, such as: Canada,

India, New Zealand, the United States of America and South Africa.

Greatest Remainder

Method using a simplified Quota to distribute seats. It requires the division of the total

valid polls by the number of seats to fill. This Quota is then divided successively into each

party vote total, awarding seats for each complete Quota. Remaining seats are allocated

to the parties according to the magnitude of their remainder.

Highest Average

See D'Hondt Rule.

List Proportional Representation

Seats are awarded in proportion to votes cast for each party. The elected members are

taken from ordered "party lists" which are drawn up before the election by the party

headquarters. List PR systems range in size of constituencies they use and the ability

they give to voters to reorder the party lists.

Multi-Member Constituency

Any constituency which elects more than one MP. Most forms of PR use multi-member

constituencies.

Proportional Representation

The term for all electoral systems that seek to award seats in parliament in proportion to

votes cast nationally. The larger the constituencies the more proportionate parliament will

be.

Quota

The number of votes required to win a seat under the Single Transferable Vote form of

PR. The formula (known as the Droop Quota) is: [votes/(seats + 1)] + 1.

Single Member Constituency

A constituency that just elects one MP to Parliament. Single member constituencies are

used under First Past The Post and the Additional Member system.

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Single Transferable Vote

A combination of preferential voting and multi-member constituencies. This system, used

in Ireland, gives a roughly proportionate result whilst allowing voters to choose between

candidates from the same party as well as choosing between parties themselves.

St Lague

Formula for calculating the highest average. The procedure is the same as for D'Hondt

Rule. However, the initial divisor is 1.4, then 3, 5, 7 etc. The effect is to limit the

advantage to large parties and suppression of smaller party representation. It is presumed

to help middle-sized parties

Threshold

The level of percentage vote required, under most PR systems, in order for a party to be

entitled to parliamentary representation.

33

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE _____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 22 January 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Dr S Elliott

(The Queen’s University of Belfast))

on

ELECTORAL REFORM

The Chairman: First of all, on behalf of the Electoral Reform Committee, may I welcome

you here today. We have been investigating electoral abuse, and we have more or less followed the

Howarth investigation across the water. We have been looking at elections in Northern Ireland

from a Northern Ireland perspective. I understand that you will be telling us about the types of

voting systems that could be adopted, and we will of course look at those in greater detail at a

future date.

Dr Elliott: Thank you very much for the invitation.

I would like to make a couple of initial remarks about electoral systems in general. There is

very little that is not known about electoral systems nowadays. We tend to think that this is a new

subject, but the high point for the construction of electoral systems was probably the 19th century.

For example, you will hear about a Belgian lawyer called D’Hondt who constructed his system in

the 1870s, but there were an enormous number of other systems at that time. For instance, in 1909

the Royal Commission on Systems of Election looked at about 1,000 different methods of allocating

seats. So the theoretical part is known.

On the practical side, scholars like Arendt Lijphart or D W Rea have examined the

empirical effects of different electoral methods on post-1945 western European countries. This

provides an indication of the level of proportionality that a particular system will produce, what the

impact might be on a party system and various other empirical details.

When trying to construct a system it is important to introduce values around which the

design can take place. First, if your value is to have a close relationship between seats and votes

then that will take you down the road of proportional representation. On the other hand, if your

priority is the link between a member and his constituency then that will take you down a different

road. While you can have a link between a Member of Parliament and a multi-member

constituency, it is not as direct a link as with a single-member district. So, if that is your value you

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will to consider a system which employs single-member districts. If your choice is that and

proportionality, then there may be some difficulty because that may lead to a majority method of

election.

There are mixed methods of election. One of the most notable is the system used in

Germany since 1949 — the additional-member system. In this system half of the members are

elected by plurality while the other half are elected by a list system throughout the whole of Germany

— each individual has two votes. The seats to votes relationship is very proportional.

There are several ways of looking at it. You may value the district link, and value fairness in

terms of the allocation of seats, but you may also value your level of choice on the ballot paper. So,

if you want the voter to have a choice of one, two, three or four candidates between the various

parties, and a similar level of choice between the various individuals within each party, the different

sexes within each party, and the different colours within each party, then you are talking about

having some form of preferential ballot. On the other hand, if you want to mark an “X” against a

single candidate’s name, then you are talking about having a categorical ballot.

But none of these things run on exactly the same line. If you want very strict proportionality

then you would select a list system with the largest territory as possible, but people would be ticking

a list and not voting for an individual, so the amount of choice for the voter would be restricted. But

if you were to consider having a single transferable vote or alternative vote system, then this would

introduce the preferential ballot. So, you can have a preferential ballot with a majority form of

election, which is slightly advanced on plurality, but you do not normally have a preferential ballot

with a list form of proportional representation. It becomes far too complicated.

To summarize, the three values to consider are: fairness and the seats-to-votes relationship;

the link to the constituency; and the level of choice for the voter. It is a combination of those values

that you might want to look at.

The electoral systems for Scotland and Wales have already been defined, but I do not

know whether this will place a constraint upon you in anyway. I am quite happy to talk about them.

I have looked at the principles involved, and there are parts which I do not think can be adopted in

Northern Ireland in exactly the same way.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. That was helpful. We will be looking at the

development of devolution in Scotland and Wales, so it would be useful if you were to outline the

systems which will operate there.

Dr Elliott: Scotland is to have its own Parliament with 129 members. The Bill for

Scotland is before Parliament at the moment. The basic principle will be to take the existing

Scottish seats at Westminster and to divide the Orkney and Shetland seat, giving 73 single-member

districts. Members will be elected to those seats using the simple plurality system as currently used

for Parliamentary elections. The Scottish parliamentary seat will, by and large, be the Westminster

seat, with the exception of Orkney and Shetland. The additional 56 members will be decided on

what could theoretically be called a regional list basis. They will be allocated on the basis of

35

Scotland’s eight European seats. So, for each of those eight seats there will be seven additional

members — a system with which Forum Members will be familiar.

How will these seats be allocated? Elections to this Forum have been pejoratively

described in a number of ways, although when there is another Northern Ireland Assembly one or

two of those people might be embarrassed by what they said. We used a quota allocation at the

front end employing the Droop quota. There were five seats allocated to each of the Westminster

constituencies, and this might have determined two or three of the seats, and occasionally four, with

any remaining seats allocated using the highest average or D’Hondt. But the net effect of that mixed

method of allocating seats could be attributed almost entirely to D’Hondt. It was nonsense to

include two separate calculations. There was no rationale in doing that. I apologize if someone in

this room designed that system; I do not know anybody who will own up to it. I think it was done

behind closed doors in London and at the NIO. A long time ago I spoke to the Electoral Reform

Society a long time ago, who said that they had submitted a paper and that was the last they had

heard of it. I suspect that the responsibility for it lies quite close to home.

In the Forum election, the Droop quota was used at the front end and D’Hondt was used at

the back end. Both help larger parties. With the exception of the 20 additional seats, there was

nothing in that system to help the smaller parties. Therefore since it was going to help the larger

parties we might as well have gone for D’Hondt and been quite clear about it. The system for

Scotland makes some changes to that. The seats which are won in the single-member districts —

the ordinary constituency seats — will be part of the calculation. For instance, when allocating seats

by D’Hondt you normally begin with the divisor one, then two, then three and the seat is allocated

to the person who has the highest average at each stage. In Scotland and Wales any seats won

under the simple, single-member system will be counted.

Mr Paisley: Those are the 73 seats?

Dr Elliott: Yes. So, if a party has won two of the seats in a “European constituency”, then

the party’s divisor begins at three. On the other hand, if a smaller party has not won a

single-member district, then its divisor will remain at one — its chances of winning a seat are

improved at that stage of the system. It is a question of whether it is preferable to use D’Hondt,

which would continue to help the larger parties (except in so far as the number of seats are still

taken into account), or whether it should be by something like the greatest remainder, which would

help the smaller parties.

Another method would be to use the St Lague formula, which is probably the most

proportional of the formulae. While the D’Hondt divisors always proceed by one, the St Lague

formula does not do that; it begins at about 1.4 and moves to 2.7. This means that the seats are

allocated more proportionately than you would get with D’Hondt, which everyone recognizes is

helpful to the larger parties.

That is how the system for Scotland is set out, and the same applies to Wales. Scotland has

73/56 seats — 129 in total. In Wales the constituency basis is different. It has forty Westminster

constituencies and it is proposed that twenty additional seats will be allocated, again on the basis of

the European constituencies. So we will have to start thinking in terms of these new European

36

constituencies which may all come into effect simultaneously in 1999. For Wales this will mean a

50% increase on the existing number of Westminster seats. Twenty extra seats will be allocated on

the basis of four additional members for each of the five European constituencies in Wales. Each

European constituency will be allocated four extra seats regardless of the number of MPs covered

by that area, which varies from seven to nine. This methodology will favour the larger parties, and

although the four additional seats will help even out some of the problems, in terms of advancing

proportionality the system does not work well.

The Chairman: Can a candidate for a Westminster constituency also stand for a

European seat?

Dr Elliott: Yes, but he can only stand for one Euro seat. And if he is elected for the

single-member district he is automatically removed from the European constituency list, with the

nomination going to the next person. It is a bit like the system under which you were elected to the

Forum. But it is an additional member system not unlike the German model, though there the split is

50:50 between the single-member districts and list districts. The breakdown of seats in Scotland

and Wales is not quite 50:50, but the principle is broadly the same.

The Chairman: We all agree that whatever system is devised here, it will be based on

proportionality. Members should steer clear of questions today on the details and intricacies of the

various systems, which can be better addressed at a later date as we gather more information.

Dr Elliott: I would be quite happy to prepare a paper for the Committee.

The Chairman: That would be greatly appreciated.

Ms Purvis: You mentioned at the start that the systems to be used for both Scotland and

Wales could not be applied to Northern Ireland because of some differences. What are they?

Dr Elliott: The first difference lies with the number of parliamentary constituencies, of

which we have 18. If we were to calculate the additionality system for members on a ratio basis

similar to that of Scotland or Wales there would be, say, 14 seats on top of the existing 18

constituencies to give an Assembly of 32 members — and that would be nowhere near enough.

That falls way short of the number of members — 90 — currently provided for in the Northern

Ireland Constitution Act.

There is a degree of uniformity about the method of election being suggested for the

Parliament in Scotland and the Assembly in Wales, but there does not need to be uniformity over

the number of members. People in Wales might not be too happy if we had a 90-member

Assembly against 60 for theirs. That is one of those difficulties. I assume that it is down to

politicians here to press that case.

If the election was constituency-based, some might argue that in order to have

representation from all groups the threshold needs to be set at a certain level. If there were only 32

seats — for example, even if the election was conducted on a Northern Ireland-wide list, you would

still need 3% of the vote to be sure of a seat. On the other hand, if you have 90 members you need

37

just over 1% of the total vote to be elected. These are considerations that you should bear in mind

when arguing for a number other than the 90 that is provided for in the Northern Ireland

Constitution Act 1973.

It would be difficult to apply the principles that have been adopted for Scotland and Wales

here because we have only 18 Westminster seats, and you would have an inordinate number of

additional member seats. Arguments could be made for an election on a Northern Ireland-wide list,

or a Northern Ireland divided into three or four with the seats determined by one, single method of

election and not plurality. I do not know whether the Government are considering changing the

Westminster form of election, but they may decide to create three or four new constituencies from

which members could be elected to a Northern Ireland Assembly.

Mr Gardiner: Thank you, Dr Elliott, for a very enlightening presentation this morning.

What form of election would you recommend for a Northern Ireland Assembly?

Dr Elliott: It is a matter of striking a balance. I was initially very sceptical about the effect

of the single transferable vote and its impact, but people have got used to it and it works. We are

used to it in local government and there are things to be said for it.

I am concerned though about the sheer number of people who have difficulty using this

system and who unwittingly invalidate their vote. There were almost 17,000 spoiled votes in the

1993 local government election, whereas although the system of election to the Forum attracted a

lot of criticism, the use of the simple X vote produced less than 4,000 invalid votes. It is therefore

important that people can understand the system and can use it effectively. If there had been

12,000 personated votes in that election we would all be jumping on the table. But it is a matter of

concern that 12,000 people more were not able to express themselves properly and validly under

the single transferable vote system in the 1993 election than in the Forum election, where the simple

X vote system was used.

Mr Paisley: Was there a difference in turnout?

Mr Lynch: The turnout for the Forum was 66% against 56% or 57% in the local

government election. In relation to the point you made about spoilt votes, officials were highly

assiduous in the Forum elections — presiding officers in the polling stations made a point of

explaining voting procedures. But there does not seem to be the same degree of attention and care

with other elections, be they for Westminster or local government, to ensure that people are clear as

to what exactly they are doing. Do you think that aspect needs to be emphasized more forcefully in

relation to presiding officers’ training?

Dr Elliott: That is possible. It is noticeable that very little educational material comes from

the Chief Electoral Officer’s office immediately before a PR election to guide people.

The other problem with the single transferable vote system is that, with its high threshold of

about 16.67% for a seat, it might not be helpful to the number of new parties which have now come

on to the political scene.

38

No more than four parties across Northern Ireland command more than 16.67% support

— the Forum includes 10. And there are many others who are close to some of the smaller parties

in terms of share of the vote. So that is a consideration to bear in mind when trying to determine the

form of election to an Assembly.

Mr Gardiner: You would make a good politician; I asked you a question and you

avoided it. I asked you directly what system you would adopt for Northern Ireland. You talked

round it and made various points.

Dr Elliott: Since you are at a new beginning, if I were you I would opt for a system where

the threshold was set relatively low to include as many people as possible without disadvantaging

the large parties who have their own bloc vote. Since I do not know what the exact number of

members will be for a Northern Ireland Assembly, I am a bit reluctant to advocate an

additional-member system because I do not think that would work in our circumstances. I would

probably go for a single transferable vote system, but my constituency basis for it might be different.

The Chairman: That is really helpful, but we are still really only dealing with systems rather

than reaching any final conclusions.

Mr Coulter: Thank you, Dr Elliott, for a most enlightening presentation. In view of the

fact that there will probably be a European dimension to whatever system is brought in, would

Northern Ireland be viewed as a single region or as a triple region?

Dr Elliott: In Scotland the parliamentary constituency is portrayed as the basis, with

additional seats allocated over the wider European constituency. In reality the constituency is the

European constituency with, in Scotland’s case, an average of nine single members elected by

plurality and the seven additional members. I think that the European constituency is going to be the

new basis for elections. If that is the case, then Northern Ireland, as a single European constituency,

cannot be treated in the same way. There is no decision yet to change the method of election for

Westminster to proportional representation using, say, three multi-member units which could be

used as a constituency base for an Assembly. Therefore, the additional members would be

allocated from the whole of Northern Ireland. Since there are only 18 Westminster constituencies, I

think the base would be quite clearly the European constituency. It could not be portrayed, as in

Scotland, as 73 single-member districts with a top-up on a regional basis from the European

constituency of an extra seven. In Northern Ireland, it would be the whole of the European

constituency — that is, the whole of Northern Ireland using a regional list. Eighteen single-member

districts could be added to it, but I think there would not be any real sense in that. It would be

better simply to take the whole of Northern Ireland and have one form of election, not plurality.

That would be more rational. I am not saying I would prefer it.

Mr Robinson: Are you not forgetting something in all of this? The elections are not the

important thing — it is how you run the country after the elections that is important. The elections

are only the means by which the politicians end up running the country. And if it is to be a body that

represents the people through constituency work, one of the key areas that has to be protected is

the constituency. You cannot have fifty or a hundred people running around regarding the whole of

39

Northern Ireland as their constituency. With regard to management of resources it is madness; it is

a shocker.

You must have constituencies that are clearly identified and as small as possible. If you

want to introduce the fairness of proportionality, you can do so quite reasonably. But we should not

get away from the small constituency where people can identify with their elected representative and

have someone to whom they can take their problems. The alternative is to have politicians chasing

their tails across the province.

Dr Elliott: There is a theoretical response to that: there is nothing to prevent the party

members elected in a large constituency being allocated territory to look after.

Mr Robinson: It does not work that way.

Dr Elliott: I know that t does not. It tends to work round those who are active — they

have the most territory. In other words, the territorial bit is not necessarily important for the

formation of a Government, but it is very important with regard to representation.

Rev William McCrea: People want to have someone they can go to if they have a

problem. Surely you could not turn round and tell them to go round the whole country. That would

be a nonsense.

Mr Robinson: Let me add to that. As most of us know, the reality is — that a constituent

who goes to one elected representative is likely to go to them all, and you will have a hundred

people chasing up the same problem. The constituent will just send a circular of his problem to all

the Assembly members, and all of them will go to the Department with the same problem. The

work will not only be duplicated but also multiplied by the number of representatives involved. It is

just crazy — the Government will be writing the same letter to dozens of people. This happens

already in the councils. Those politicians who are reputed to be the best constituency workers and

those who are the best-known will get all the work.

What are the principles that need to be taken into account? We can weigh them by

whatever factor we want, but you have already mentioned two or three. For example, you said it

was important to have a system that people could use easily — that is a principle that we need to

take account of. It is also important that we have one that people can understand. Nobody

understood how the Forum election worked. It is important to have one that is fair and

proportional; it is important that it be representative and that people can identify with those whom

they have elected. What are the principles that we should take into account?

Dr Elliott: It is for you to choose those values. They determine the type of electoral

system that is to be used. If the seats/votes link is more important than anything else, you are going

down the road of proportionally. And if the MP/constituency link is more important, you are

probably going in the direction of a majority method of election. You could either stay with plurality

or use an alternative vote system. If no candidate is elected after the first round, people express

their preferences down the ballot paper — one, two, three, four — just as they do under the single

transferable vote system.

40

Mr Robinson: You are bringing up another issue — that of making the system more

complex. You put forward a good argument about the Forum system. As far as the elector is

concerned, it does not really matter about all the calculations behind it — at least he understands it.

Is it not important to ensure that people do not lose their votes because they do not understand how

to work the system?

Dr Elliott: They would not lose their vote; they would express a preference.

Mr Robinson: Thousands lose their votes because they do not understand how to use the

system.

Dr Elliott: That is the single transferable vote system. If you were introducing an

alternative vote, you would educate people in case they did not understand it. The alternative vote

system would ensure that whoever was elected from the single-member district would have the

support of more than 50% of the people who voted in that constituency. That is not something you

can necessarily say for a single member district at Westminster.

Which of the values is the most important? Is it proportionality, the constituency link, or the

level of choice which the elector wants?

Mr Robinson: Let me tell you how you can avoid them being mutually exclusive. What

principle is lost — and this is just one example — when you have fifty seats from single-member

constituencies and fifty from a regional list based on proportionality?

Dr Elliott: Absolutely none.

Mr Robinson: It is easy to work; all people have to do is put in one X.

Dr Elliott: Two Xs; you have to vote from a list as well.

Mr Robinson: If people want to stand, they put their name on the ballot paper for the

single-member constituency, and it is the parties that have the vote in the single-member

constituency. It is complicated more by giving electors two votes, but there is nothing to say that if

they vote for the Labour Party in constituency A that that vote is not also considered as a vote for

the Labour Party on the list.

Dr Elliott: You could if you wished to, but that is not how it would be expressed in any

form of elections. You would simply have one single vote for a single-member district.

Mr Robinson: It is a top-up system that you would be operating. You would have single

constituencies, and you would work out the number of votes for each party.

Dr Elliott: But you have voted in the single-member district of East Belfast — that is all

you have voted for.

41

Mr Robinson: You have voted for a party as well.

Dr Elliott: Yes, there is a party label attached to the individual. However in this form of

election you would be voting for the individual and not simply for the party. The other one would

have to be taken as a separate form of election.

Mr Robinson: It does not have to be.

Dr Elliott: As a body, you can draw it up as you wish.

The Chairman: I want to seek clarification about the whole question of spoiled votes

under the single transferable vote system. Has any investigation ever been carried out in to how the

votes were spoiled? As someone who has been involved in elections since 1977, the big problem

that I have come across is people putting Xs beside the names and that spoils the vote.

Dr Elliott: That is not necessarily regarded as a spoiled vote.

The Chairman: But what about a series of Xs? Is that the predominant problem?

Dr Elliott: The Chief Electoral Officer could probably tell you. They are usually invalid for

a number of reasons, and statistics used to be kept of the reasons why votes were regarded as

spoiled. However, the returning officers usually try to operate a consensus system. Votes which

are doubtful are kept to the end of the stage, and the parties get together to examine them and agree

whether or not they should be taken into consideration.

Mr Dodds: My question is about spoiled votes. If you were to add the number of spoiled

votes to the number of people who are not able to vote because of problems with identification and

identity documents, and add that to the number of fraudulent votes due to personation, and then,

perhaps, toss in all those who do not vote, you would not get a very accurate reflection of what

people really want. There are many problems which, I hope, will be tackled.

There was an article in last Monday’s ‘Times’ about the working group that is going to look

at the mechanics of elections — how we actually go about voting in the polling booth. There is talk

of introducing electronic voting, similar to the system in America which involves pulling down a lever

but if we have a single transferable vote system, that will preclude the implementation of easier

methods of voting. Why should we go through this ridiculous count thing when votes could be

automatically counted by computer? In some American states the result of an election is known the

moment the polls close because the count is automatic.

There are different groups all working separately; they need to be more co-ordinated.

Dr Elliott: That is very true. I read that article. I attended a meeting yesterday and that

was the first time I had heard of the George Howarth report — nobody on the committee ever

mentioned it to me. Just like the Secretary of State’s revealing that she had not sent an interim

report, even by courtesy, to the chairman of another committee which was going to be reporting to

her, this is another case of the left hand not knowing what the right is doing.

42

That type of system may be considered, although it would take a very sophisticated, smart

chip to be built into your swipe card to enable you to vote on a preferential basis. That may well

have an implication on people’s thinking.

If I were trying to guess the direction of the current Labour Government, I would look at the

major report which they commissioned whilst in Opposition — that done by Lord Plant. Now Lord

Plant was quite clear on a couple of issues; for a parliament — in other words, a legislating body —

he was quite clear that he would not recommend plurality, the current system, nor would he

recommend proportional representation, he would recommend the alternative vote which kept the

constituency link, or an additional member system and in a sense, any time the Government have

declared their hand post-election, they have been consistent with that. They are going towards the

additional member system for the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly but are not

necessarily looking towards a change in respect of the national Parliament. Apparently Cabinet

members hold differing views on that. Tony Blair is a bit reluctant to steer towards any form of

proportional representation, but if he were to do so, it could be an additional-member system which

would keep that constituency link which is so ingrained in Britain nowadays that it would be very

hard to depart from. The principle which Plant was trying to establish was that, in a way, the form

of election to bodies which were less than legislating ones did not matter; there could be diversity

there. But he was quite clear about what he preferred for the national Parliament, and it was not

proportional representation nor plurality, the current system.

Rev William McCrea: I am saying this tongue in cheek. If you were to devise a system

which, in reality, was rigged, a system that would get you the result that you wanted — and this is

probably what the Government have in mind for any election here, if the past is anything to go by —

what would you come up with?

Mr Paisley: Lowest threshold.

Dr Elliott: No, it would probably not be the lowest threshold. It would depend on what

way you wanted to rig it. This is off the top of my head — I have not looked at this recently — but

it would be possible to do this by using a variety of St Lague. By having a differential interval in

your divisors, you could produce circumstances in which all the seats would go to four parties, or

whatever — I hesitate to say to three parties, given the way structures —

Rev William McCrea: That is not what the Government will be looking for.

Dr Elliott: I do not know what they might be looking for. What might have been a

preferred option in days gone by has never measured up to the threshold level required by the single

transferable vote in five-member districts at the minute. If they were thinking of lowering the

threshold in a single transferable vote system, the Government might have to think of, shall we say,

half the number of Westminster constituencies — in other words, nine — to be sure that most of the

parties that they might want in would get representation. In other words, if it was not a five-member

district, but a ten-member district you are talking about, say, 10% within that area and probably

close to 1% over all of Northern Ireland — I have no idea.

43

Rev William McCrea: Thank you for your submission, Dr Elliott. It was very helpful.

Mr Peter Robinson: Are there times when the number of seats is as much a factor as the

electoral system, in terms of bringing small parties in?

Dr Elliott: The boundaries are important. Let us say there is to be an Assembly with 90

members. If the whole of Northern Ireland is one constituency, and you are operating a list system,

just over 1% need to be elected, but if those 90 members are elected in 18 constituencies, at five

members per constituency and if you use, say, the Droop quota, then you are talking about 16·67%,

which is quite a high threshold for most people to attain. So the numbers are important as well. If

the Government decides on 33 members then —

Mr Peter Robinson: They will decide on a number of around 100.

Dr Elliott: That seems to be sensible. When Parliamentary redistributions were being

done in the past, the number of members was not usually reduced, and every member that currently

held a seat was given the chance of winning another one. That may or may not apply to an

Assembly, but that was what parliamentary boundary commissioners did in the past.

The Chairman: You have only to think back to the 1982 Assembly elections. South

Antrim was a 10-seat constituency, I think, and there was the longest electoral count in history.

Dr Elliott: I have enjoyed this exchange of views and will be happy to provide further

material or advice about what Committee members might consider. I will try to direct you in terms

of values and if you want to bounce things off me, you will find that what you say to me and vice

versa will be in the strictest confidence. That is the way I operate.

The Chairman: This has been very helpful. We would appreciate your letting us have a

paper on this.

It all comes back to your opening remarks on the whole question of values. The problem is

that the word “values” might mean different things to different people, but at least it is a

starting-point.

Once again, thank you very much for your help.

44

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE _____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 29 January 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Mr P Weir (Ulster Unionist Party))

on

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Chairman: Welcome to the Committee; we look forward to your submission. Do

you intend to make a written submission at a later stage?

Mr Weir: We want to keep open the option of making a written submission at a later

stage.

In considering electoral systems there are two things which strike one immediately. First, no

matter what system is advocated for a body, there can be no perfect electoral system. That has

been the experience of democracies throughout the world because they have come up with a wide

and wonderful range of options.

Secondly, there are a very wide range of options available. The Ulster Unionist Party has

looked at the principle ones which might be used both in Westminster elections and elections to a

future Northern Ireland Assembly — the first-past-the-past system of single transferable vote, the

additional member system, the alternative member system and the list system, which could be

applied either to constituencies or on a province-wide basis. Finally, there is the top-up system

which was used for the Forum.

When one considers an electoral system, one has to look at the purpose for which that

system is designed. And there are, broadly speaking, two different types of systems. The

traditional system which is used in Westminster elections is first-past-the-post. Its principle

advantage is that it is easy to use and tends to produce strong Governments. Generally it tends to

avoid coalition Governments. All the other systems represent some form of proportional

representation in which the aim is to try to produce a proportional Parliament or Assembly, but

often it does not lead to the same type of strong Government.

In judging what is best for both Westminster and a Northern Ireland Assembly there are

several criteria which need to be applied to any system which is selected. First, you have to look at

the nature of the Parliament or Assembly which you are electing. Secondly, any system selected has

45

to have broad, public acceptance. Thirdly, any system selected has to be broadly democratic and,

in our view, rely on the elected representation side of things. Some parties have suggested,

particularly with regard to Northern Ireland, some sort of upper chamber made up of people

nominated by interest groups or whatever. That is not something we favour. We want to

concentrate any system on the idea of elected representatives. Fourthly, there should be the widest

choice of representation for the voter, both in terms of parties and of individuals and independents

having the opportunity to put their names forward for election. Any system selected should have as

few anomalies and quirks as possible. Additionally, a key determinant should be a direct link

between those elected and the electorate. It should be a simple system which ensures that voters

are not confused.

We are committed to the unity of the United Kingdom, and we believe that the system

selected for the Westminster elections should be the same throughout the whole of the United

Kingdom. We do not favour there being some sort of unusual system for Northern Ireland which is

not applied throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. That is one criticism that we have of the

system for the European elections in which, up until now, there have been PR elections on the STV

model in Northern Ireland but individual constituency elections in the rest of the United Kingdom.

The Ulster Unionist Party is, broadly speaking, a party which supports the British

Constitution. The British Constitution has been an evolving process, particularly with regard to

elections. We support the status quo as regards Westminster elections. We favour a continuance

of the first-past-the-post system linked in with the current constituencies. We believe that this has

the broadest degree of public support throughout the United Kingdom. Members may argue about

that, but we feel that it is a simple system which people understand. While there may be agitation

and support for change among political parties, it is perhaps not reflected as widely among the

British public. The British Constitution, with the exception of terrorism in Northern Ireland, has

provided a stable framework for the United Kingdom. We have been able to avoid some of the

instability that has appeared in other parts of the world and other parts of Europe.

The first-past-the-post system has a number of advantages. It avoids some of the problems

of proportional representation. Principally, it ensures that there is a direct link between the

parliamentary representative and the constituency. Now one of the advantages that this has led to in

the British parliamentary system — and the parties here can testify to this — is that the Member of

Parliament for a particular constituency is the representative of all the people and is duty bound to

represent their interests whether or not they are supporters of that individual MP. I think that that is

a very healthy process. Additionally, there are several problems with PR when it comes to

Westminster elections. There is a wide range of schemes available for PR, so some of the criticisms

I have of PR from that point of view will be applicable to some systems and some to others.

First of all, proportional representation has a tendency — and I think we have seen this to

some extent, be it a good or bad thing — to lead to a certain fragmentation of politics. Rather than

giving the people of Britain a clear choice between a Conservative Government and a Labour

Government, it will, I think, tend to lead into smaller political parties, smaller blocks.

Secondly, in a number of instances, particularly before they reformed the system, it has led

to unstable government. One has only to look at the number of Governments that Italy has had

46

down the years and at the wide variety of parties and cobbled-together coalitions in somewhere like

Israel. Therefore there is a danger of unstable government with proportional representation.

Thirdly, there is a greater chance of extremist parties getting into Parliament and then into

power. We have occasionally suffered that in Northern Ireland. Under the current system, for

example, two Sinn Fein representatives got elected, but generally speaking, with the occasional

exception in Northern Ireland, it has meant that people supporting, say, a communist or fascist

platform have not been able to get into Parliament. If one looks at the experience of continental

Europe it is very different. One saw during the late 1980s and early 1990s a certain rise in support

for fascist groups, and there has also been a degree of support for communist groups. This

favouring that PR gives to extremist parties is not one that we find favour with.

Fourthly, it tends to mean that Governments are quite often dependent either on extremist

groups or on the whims of particular independents. This can happen in any system, but it is

probably particularly prevalent with PR. A Government will fall short of a majority and be

dependent upon the support either of a very extreme group to stay in power or, alternatively, will

have to pander to individual independents. At the moment in the Republic of Ireland the Taoiseach

is dependent upon three or four pro-Government independents. In an article in ‘The Irish Times’ a

couple of weeks ago those independents were listing the great concessions that they had got for

their constituencies. Any student of the political history of the Irish Republic over the last 20 years

will know about some of the deals that were done, particularly the deal between Charlie Haughey

and Tony Gregory in which, irrespective of the national interests, an agreement was made to pump

in large amounts of money into his constituency to gain the support of that particular independent.

That is not a particularly healthy situation and it is one of the dangers of PR.

Conversely, there is the danger of a situation developing like that in Germany in which the

Government is formed in smoke-filled rooms rather than by the will of the electorate. I think I am

right in saying that virtually every German Government over the last 30 years has been dependent in

terms of support on the small Free Democrat Party, which is, broadly speaking, a sort of Liberal

Party. They supported the Social Democrats throughout most of the 1970s. They switched in the

early 1980s to the Christian Democrats who have been in power since then with members of the

Free Democrats in their coalition. Therefore, a party which is maybe the third, fourth or fifth largest

party in a country can be the real power broker. With very little electoral support they are the

people who can determine the complexion of a Government.

There are problems with specific forms of proportional representation from a point of view

of a central Government. Many of the systems advocated tend to destroy or at least weaken the

link between the parliamentary representative and the constituency. If one moves, for example, to a

list system either on a regional basis or throughout the United Kingdom, there is no direct link

between an individual member and a particular constituency. Even with single transferable vote, in

which constituencies are grouped, the constituencies are very large, and it weakens the link with the

constituency.

Some forms of PR, particularly the list system, can actually leave the selection of Members

of Parliament very much in the hands of the parties rather than in the hands of the individual voters.

At the moment the voter can vote for a particular individual. The problem, particularly with a large

47

list system, is that people are voting purely for parties. Whoever is number one on that particular

list, depending on the situation, will have a very easy ride. The lists will inevitably be drawn up by

the parties and, to some extent, that takes the choice out of the hands of the electorate. There are

dangers with certain systems, particularly the system used for the Forum election. Some forms of

PR can deny individuals the right to stand. If they are members of a small party or independents it

makes it very difficult for them.

If there were to be some form of proportional representation for Westminster, the closest to

the first-past-the-post system would be the alternative-member system in which essentially we

would retain all the constituencies that we have at the moment with the top two, if you like, going

into a second ballot. That would be very much a second option, but at least it would maintain some

degree of link between the individual member and the constituency.

There is a different situation when one moves to a form of Northern Ireland Assembly, and

there are a number of reasons for that. There seems to be a much broader acceptance by the

public and the political parties that any future Assembly has to be based on some form of

proportional representation. That is largely accepted by most of the parties and would tend to rule

out the first-past-the-post and alternative-member systems.

In a regional Assembly, because of differences of scale, some of the problems that you

would encounter with PR in terms of central Government elections are overcome. Instead of 18

representatives from Northern Ireland you may well have somewhere in the region of 90. As such,

you could still retain 18 constituencies with five members each. Although you would have, at that

level, a PR system that maintains a strong connection between the individual and the constituency

and enables the individual to cope with the constituency work, our preference, if there is to be some

form of PR for a Northern Ireland Assembly, would be a single-transferable-vote model of

18 constituencies of five seats. We feel that that is broadly acceptable to most people.

Some people might argue that an Assembly with 90 members is too big when compared

with the proportionate size of Scotland and Wales. Scotland has 129 members and Wales 60 for

communities of 5 million and 3·5 million. We would be opposed to the scaling down of a Northern

Ireland Assembly from 90 members, but we would, I suppose, keep an open mind if there were an

argument for a slightly smaller body. If you were looking to retain proportional representation and if

it contained the constituency element, there might be consideration given to the grouping of

constituencies on a two-constituency basis. But, again, that would very much be a second option.

We favour retention of the current 18 constituencies with five members per constituency. In those

circumstances the advantages of single transferable vote are as follows: it retains that link between

the member and his or her constituency, which list systems do not; it gives the electorate the

opportunity to vote for independent candidates; it gives them the opportunity to vote for their

preferred candidates within parties; and it produces a broadly proportional result. That last point is

one of the key touchstones for any future Northern Ireland Assembly, and there is a great pressure

for that than perhaps there would be at central Government level. Finally, from a Northern Ireland

point of view, single transferable vote is a system that voters are used to. It has been used in the

European elections, the Assembly elections of 1973 and 1982, the Convention election of 1975 and

in local government elections. Having said that, it still leads to voter confusion, and so any move

towards a new system would only result in greater confusion.

48

If we look at alternative systems it can be seen that the advantages associated with single

transferable vote do not apply. For example, list systems or additional member systems destroy the

link between the constituency member and his electorate and weakens the opportunity for voters to

vote for a particular candidate within a party or an independent. Furthermore, a list system tends to

produce disproportionate results as was evident in the Forum election. In that election there was a

range of parties with broadly similar views, particularly on the Unionist side, which tended to

dissipate the Unionist vote. Under single transferable vote those parties would have won a greater

number of seats, but that did not happen because of quirks within the system.

We would be concerned if there were to be a move towards a list system in Northern

Ireland given the reasons I have already expressed. This is particularly true in Northern Ireland

where there has traditionally been a differential turnout particularly between the west of the province

and eastern parts of the province. Such a list system would tend to give a disproportionate say to

people in the west and south of the province, and would not reflect the electorate’s true wishes.

Finally, I would like to mention the top-up system as applied in the Forum election, a system

whereby the top ten parties gained an additional two seats. I appreciate that it could be argued that

it was done for a specific purpose but we remain opposed to its use, and it should certainly not

apply to any form of Assembly election. I believe its use to be both artificial and undemocratic, and

I am not aware of it being applied anywhere else in the world. It tends to increase the

disproportionality of results, so that in the Forum election the smallest party gained 5,500 votes, or

0·7% of the vote, and yet they gained two representatives. Candidates should be elected on merit,

and not rescued by use of an artificial system.

The Chairman: Dr Sidney Elliott has told the Committee that when trying to construct a

system it is important to introduce values around which the design can take place. What would

Ulster Unionists consider to be the important values?

Mr Weir: Any system must have broad public acceptance; it must be understood by the

electorate, and ideally it would be one with which they are familiar; it should retain a link between

the elected member and his constituency; and it should offer the widest possible choice of

representation, enabling the electorate to vote for the party of their choice, for individuals within that

party, and the opportunity to vote for independents.

The Chairman: I agree with your point that it is important to identify the individual with the

constituency, and that was obviously missing from the Forum elections. However, it is the case that

some people will incorrectly mark their ballot paper “1,2,3” et cetera in Westminster elections,

while others will mark their ballot paper with an “X” in local government elections. From the

electorate’s point of view, would it not be better to have the one system for all elections?

Mr Weir: First, we believe that any electoral system in Northern Ireland should reflect that

which operates in the rest of the United Kingdom, particularly for Westminster elections. There is

certainly a need for consistency, and that is one of the reasons why elections to a future Northern

Ireland Assembly should be based on the STV model that applies to local council elections. The

introduction of a third model would only lead to greater confusion.

49

In an ideal world the Ulster Unionists would be happy with a first-past-the-post system, as

it would bring individuals even closer to the community. However, we recognize that this would not

be the wish of the majority of parties in Northern Ireland nor may it be the wish of most of the

public. People will have different views on this, but with the exception of some political parties I do

not believe that there is a great demand in the United Kingdom for change to the way in which MPs

are elected to Westminster. However, at local level there is a broader public acceptance of the

system used in council elections.

Mr Paisley: We all realize that asking your party to present an argument against the

current system of election to Westminster is like asking turkeys to vote for Christmas. It has been

very, very good to your party in terms of electoral returns. You have said that you favour the

first-past-the-post system for Westminster elections specifically because it leads to strong

Government and it is simple. However, in a Northern Ireland context these are misnomers because

Northern Ireland parties are not going to be in Government in Northern Ireland. Also, the idea,

values and longevity of a hung Parliament are so transparent that there is no real lasting power there

anyway. Furthermore, the Northern Ireland electorate has proved itself to be rather sophisticated

and have shown themselves to be capable of embracing a more complicated system. Therefore, do

you not see that your arguments in favour of first past the post are quite weak in that sense?

Mr Weir: No, I do not agree with that. Also, it would be perverse for any party to argue

in favour of a system which is against party’s own interests.

Mr Paisley: The Alliance Party have just voluntarily given up 1% of their vote in their

presentation.

Mr Weir: Ulster Unionists are perhaps not noted for quite the same level of generosity.

We support the British Constitution and as such we believe that the same system of election

to Westminster should be applied throughout the United Kingdom.

You also indicated that there is relatively little that smaller parties can do when there are

hung Parliaments. While that is probably true under the current sytem, it has led to instability in

some European countries where coalitions have been formed. By contrast, the Ulster Unionist

Party believes that the first-past-the-post system has led to constitutional stability within the United

Kingdom. So we do have a certain amount of confidence in the current system. You can always

find fault with whatever system is chosen, as none is perfect; but the first-past-the-post system is the

most suitable one for the Westminster elections.

Mr Ford: You made the point that first past the post makes for strong Government. But it

is only since the 1950 General Election that the entire United Kingdom has voted by first past the

post in single member constituencies for Westminster; prior to that there were STV university

members and double-member constituencies. Since that time, eight General Elections have

produced a Government with a strong majority, and six have not. Therefore I do not buy your

argument that first past the post produces strong Governments when its success rate is only eight out

of 14.

50

Mr Weir: There has been a purely first-past-the-post system since 1950. The university

constituencies were an anomaly, which is one of the reasons why they were abolished in the 1950s.

Mr Ford: Or in 1969, in one case.

Mr Weir: But even before 1950, most elections were based on a first-past-the-post type

system. Therefore, to drag in the university constituencies is to slightly cloud the picture. If you

look at the history of parliaments in the Republic of Ireland it is clear that the PR system tends to

exacerbate the hung-parliament situation and reduces the likelihood of a single party holding power.

Broadly speaking, the first-past-the-post and proportional representation systems are, to some

extent, designed to produce different results. First past the post is largely designed to produce a

single central Government, relying on one particular party. Proportional representation, by its

definition, is designed to produce a proportionate Assembly or Parliament. It is therefore less likely

to produce a Government of a single party; most elections under PR tend to produce some form of

coalition Government. It is very rare for PR to produce Government by a single party.

Mr Ford: And yet the two most successful single political parties in Europe — the

Swedish Social Democrats and Fianna Fáil, at least until the last decade — have both been

consistently elected to majority Governments for most of the past 50 or 60 years. I accept there

may be a weight of evidence, but the suggestion that first past the post is the way to produce single

party stability wears a little bit thin.

Mr Weir: I think the weight of evidence though does tend to suggest that. If you look at

the Irish Republic, 1977, I think, was the last time that an election there produced a single-party

majority in the Dáil; they have had coalition Government ever since, relying particularly on a handful

of independents.

I do not know enough about the Swedish example to be able to comment, but one can

always quote exceptions to the rule. But in the vast bulk of cases, PR has produced coalition

Governments; the history of continental Europe over the last 50 years indicate that.

Mr Ford: But has coalition Government necessarily been unstable Government? We can

all poke fun at Israel and Italy, but you have cited the Scandinavian countries or Switzerland.

Mr Weir: Again, you can pick out individual exceptions, but the weight of evidence tends

to support my argument that PR can lead to a very unstable Government. In Germany, a very small

party has essentially control over the Government. Indeed, had the Free Democrats switched at

any stage over the last 15 years you would have had a Social Democrat Government. And so

Governments are not formed, broadly speaking, through the voter choice but through deals cut with

a small number of independents, which give them a disproportionate say in the make-up of the

Government.

Mr Ford: I don’t think we are going to resolve the national issue, but I would like to

record my welcome for the fact that the Ulster Unionists are now converted to STV at local level.

51

Mr Bolton: You referred to anomalies and quirks in the STV system. Mr Farry referred

to manipulation of the election process for any new Assembly in terms of the proposed number of

seats for each constituency. For example, if each constituency were to return six members instead

of five it would benefit the smaller parties. Who should be the arbiter in such a situation to ensure

fairness?

Mr Weir: There is clearly a problem there. Broadly speaking, most of the models that

have been considered for a Northern Ireland Assembly over the last 15 years have been based on

five seats per constituency, which would give a 90 member Assembly. That has got the broadest

degree of acceptance. I think that five members per constituency is probably about the right

number. But there will always be quirks with whatever system you operate. On a tangent, you

need also to tackle the problems of electoral fraud which has plagued the various electoral systems

here. I think most parties would tend to agree that 90 is probably about the right size for an

Assembly, with five members for each of the 18 constituencies.

Mr Bolton: The question really was who would be the arbiter if the parties did not agree?

Mr Weir: I will have to give that some further consideration.

Mr Paisley: We are fairly emphatically opposed to the top-up system. However, have

you considered the possibility of having a top-up system that could operate on the basis of a

threshold, which would make it a little bit fairer?

Mr Weir: Again, there is a complication. Any additional members who are elected by

way of a top-up system are not directly linked in with constituencies. That is one problem.

Secondly, if you have a top-up system, as was the case in the Forum election, where each party,

regardless of size, gets the same amount of extra seats, that works disproportionately to the

advantage of smaller parties over the larger ones.

Mr Paisley: You are really opposed to the top-up under all circumstances?

Mr Weir: It is not a system which we favour.

The Chairman: Thank you, very much. It has been very helpful. If you do decide to

make a written submission it would be appreciated, but everything will be on the record anyway.

Mr Weir: I think that the oral evidence will probably cover most things. But we may wish

to make a written submission at a later stage.

52

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE _____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 12 February 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Mr N Dodds (Democratic Unionist Party))

on

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Chairman: Good Morning.

Mr Dodds: Thank you very much for inviting me to give this submission. We were asked

primarily to address the issue of appropriate electoral system for elections to the Assembly in

Northern Ireland, as opposed to what we thought was the best system for Westminster. We are

happy to come back at a later stage and deal with that issue. But since the most pressing issue

relates to the system for the Assembly, I will concentrate on that aspect.

First there is a very broad consensus in relation to the overall numbers of members who

should be elected to a Northern Ireland Assembly. It is more or less agreed that that number

should be in the range of 90 to 100 members. I do not think it is feasible to suggest any reduction in

the number of members that should be elected from that which is currently envisaged in the

legislation. There would be consideration opposition if there were any such suggestion, even though

that would mean we had more members than, say, the Welsh Assembly, which will be actually

representing many more people.

So given that premise regarding the numerical strength of the Assembly, we then move on to

look at the type of electoral arrangement that should be used. We are all aware that there very very

many systems. I think Sydney Elliott talked about 1,000 different electoral systems that could be

employed by, and indeed within, different countries to elect legislative or executive bodies. But I

believe that the Government would be reasonably flexible, and if the parties here came up with an

original system which they believed to be in the best interests of the people, then they would be

willing to implement that system for elections to the new Assembly. So we should not necessarily

be constrained simply by what has been implemented here before. We should be looking

imaginatively at what best serves the interests of the people as we move into this new devolved

set-up.

We recognize that there are certain values that have to be taken into account when you are

devising a new electoral system, which Sydney Elliott, amongst others, outlined for us: first, there is

53

the relationship between seats held and votes cast; secondly, there is the issue of the link between

an elected member and their constituency; there is the issue of giving voters a real choice when it

comes to the ballot paper rather than placing restrictions; and, very importantly, there is the issue of

simplicity and voters being able to understand the electoral system. And I am not so much talking

here about the voters’ understanding of the counting of votes; I am talking more in terms of their

knowing what to do when casting their vote. And clearly if we can make the system as simple and

straightforward as possible for the electorate, then this will minimize the risk of people being

disenfranchised through not being able to exercise their vote validly.

Those are all issues that have to be thrown into the melting pot, and it is a question of finding

a balanced electoral system suitable for the particular body to be set up — for example, the system

may be different for parliament than for a local council election. We are looking at what is the best

balance for a Northern Ireland Assembly, and we believe that it should be possible to create a

system which ensures, as far as possible, that we get the best of all those worlds: one that ensures

the best in terms of proportionality, which retains a link between the member and their constituency,

and which is simple and understandable for the voter as well.

It would be easy to get into academic debate about the advantages and disadvantages of

proportional representation compared to first past the post. We could look at the experiences of

different countries, which I know some of the previous papers have referred to. But I want to come

down to some practicalities on how we see an electoral system working. We agree that there is a

need for some form of proportionality to ensure a fair correlation between the number of votes cast

for a party and the number of seats which it wins in a future Assembly. At the same time great

concern is being expressed in relation to balancing that requirement with the link between the

elected member in the constituency. For example, in the single transferable vote (STV) system of

election in multi-member constituencies, you could have the situation where the constituent has the

choice of five members to go to, each representing a different party. So the typical link that exists in

the Westminster model between the elected member and the constituents would be very much

diluted.

Another major drawback to the STV system is the whole issue of simplicity and choice.

One of the most striking pieces of evidence that has been given to this Committee was that of

Sidney Elliott in relation to the number of spoilt votes cast in the 1993 local government elections —

upwards of 17,000. In comparison, despite the amount of criticism levelled at the electoral system

for the Forum, that election resulted in only 4,000 votes being spoilt. Indeed 66% of the electorate

voted in the Forum election — much more than in the local government elections — which indicated

that their understanding of the system was a factor in their going out to vote. And the number of

invalid votes cast was much less than under the STU system. That is a very important matter to be

taken into account.

We should also bear in mind what is happening in Scotland and Wales, and, indeed, what is

happening as far as the 1999 European elections are concerned in the rest of United Kingdom. It

would obviously be helpful to have a tie-in to what is happening in the rest of the United Kingdom.

Scotland and Wales will have a system whereby you have a combination of members elected in

single member constituencies, and an additional top-up system from regional lists based on

54

European constituencies. It is a similar system both in Scotland and Wales, though Wales has just a

slightly different constituency basis.

It is clear therefore that the European constituency is coming more and more into play, and

of course for Northern Ireland the European constituency is the entire province. Therefore, when

you take all those factors into account, we are suggesting a model whereby you retain as strong as

possible a link between the elected member and the constituency, while at the same time having a

regional list on a province-wide basis. For example, you could have 50 new single member

constituencies with party lists, or you could elect three members from the current 18 constituencies,

with a top-up of 46 from party lists on a regional basis. We would suggest that following the

election in the constituencies, parties would be allocated seats from the regional list so ensuring that

there was a proportionate correlation between the overall percentage vote for that party and the

number of seats won. You would be retaining proportionality. There would be no wasted votes.

It would be also advisable when introducing such a regional list system to establish a

minimum percentage threshold of vote in order to qualify for representation from the regional list. It

ought to be low enough to ensure that people would be better off than they are under the present

STV system, but sufficiently high to ward off the possibility of hundreds of small groups forming in

the hope of getting 0.67% of the total vote and perhaps qualifying for one seat from the regional list.

You would have to introduce, as many European countries have done, some sort of minimal

threshold to discourage that, but at the same time set it low enough, say at 4% or 5%, to increase

the chances of smaller parties being elected compared to the present first-past-the-post system, or

the STV system where a smaller party has to obtain almost 17% of the vote in a constituency to

have any chance of getting elected. We would support a system that would provide for

representation for a party that was not particularly strong in one constituency but which had some

support right across the province.

So we see the advantages in such a system as follows: first, that retains the link between the

constituency and the member, which most people place great importance on; it ensures fairness and

proportionality by ensuring that no vote is wasted; it irons out the inequity of the present

first-past-the-post system by ensuring that the overall number of members is equal in percentage

terms to the number of votes cast for each party in the election; it means that parties, through the

regional list, can bring in people who they may not want to be necessarily burdened down with

constituency work, but who they deem to have specific qualities through which they could make a

useful contribution in the Assembly; it is a straightforward system which can be easily understood by

the electorate; it is in line with the systems being advocated for Scotland and Wales and is therefore

likely to be much sellable to the Government; it combines giving voters a good level of choice on the

one hand, with the ability of the parties on the other hand to bring forward people to play the role

that I have suggested, and not be burdened down with constituency responsibilities; finally, a

disadvantage under the STV system lies where there is a by-election for a seat previously held by

one of the small parties, because, invariably, since it then becomes a straight election, the biggest

party will win the seat. This of course does not accord with the wishes of the electorate when the

election was originally held, and you can have a situation where a party loses its representation

completely in a constituency, while the biggest party increases its representation. And that can be

particularly important if, say, the by-election occurs shortly after the main election. But you could

provide for such an event under a regional list system and, instead of having a by-election, you draw

55

the next person on that party list to fill the seat. This avoids the need for by-elections, and retains

the proportionality element. So for all those reasons, Mr Chairman, we believe that the sort of

system that we are putting forward is worth consideration. It takes account of all the important

elements and, it strikes the right balance.

The Chairman: Mr Dodds, thank you very much for a very clear presentation. Will you

be making a written submission?

Mr Dodds: Yes, we will make a written submission.

Mr Chairman: I think you would foresee problems in drawing up new boundaries for,

say, 50 single member constituencies and so your thrust would be towards the existing 18 member

constituencies. How do you envisage the three members for each of these constituencies being

elected? Will it be by STV or simply the first three highest votes?

Mr Dodds: Given the emphasis placed on an element of proportionality it is more likely to

be some form of proportional representation, and STV is the most likely one of those, although I

have drawn attention to the difficulties that presently exist with STV.

It may be possible to have a different form of proportional election in those three-seater

constituencies. You could, for instance, decide to have parties standing for election, as we did in

the Forum elections. But I am concerned that there should be a link between the member and the

constituency in any devolved Assembly which will have administrative and legislative powers. This

can be balanced with other members (from the regional list) who can also make a useful contribution

in the Assembly, but who we do not necessarily want to be burdened down with the same degree of

constituency work. That system works well in many many other countries, as indeed it does in the

Forum.

The Chairman: You say that one of your main aims is to simplify the voting system. But

would this proposal not complicate things by having two ballot papers, one based on proportionality

where votes would indicate their preference by marking one, two, three, and another ballot paper

where they would mark X against the party of their choice?

Mr Dodds: No. As far as the voter is concerned they would simply cast one vote, and

that would be a vote for the party of their choice in that constituency. You do not necessarily have

to have separate votes for the regional list and for the constituencies. You can simply add together

all the votes in the constituencies and this gives each party’s total number of votes. It is the simplest

of all choices for the electorate; they have one vote and they mark their ballot paper accordingly.

The Chairman: I have one other question which relates to the registration of parties. In

the Forum election many people believed that the DUP had a distinct advantage in the fact that the

inclusion of the party Leader’s name was on the ballot paper as well. What are your views on that?

Mr Dodds: I suppose we had a distinct advantage in that we studied the law in relation to

electoral arrangements, got the right advice and implemented it accordingly. What we did was not

different from what was open to any party and therefore there was no particular advantage to us; it

56

was quite open to every other party to take the same line. Perhaps some parties had very good

reasons for not wanting to put their Leader’s name on the ballot paper alongside their party name, I

do not know. I would not want to delve into that. We simply took advantage of the legal position,

and it was open to all parties to do likewise.

The Chairman: Your friend, Pat Bradley, facilitated you?

Mr Dodds: No, I do not think you could take Mr Bradley as our friend. The evidence of

the last few months in this Committee would certainly give the lie to that. But, Mr Chairman, as far

as the serious point is concerned, it would have been wrong had any one party been given a facility

that was not open to others. The important thing is that the facility was open to everybody, so it

could not be claimed by any stretch of the imagination that we had an unfair advantage, or, indeed,

that any party was getting a leg-up from the Chief Electoral Officer. It was a level playing-field.

Some parties chose to exercise the option, but most did not.

Mr Casey: The Forum election was, we all agree, a peculiar election. It did actually work

in favour of the smaller parties, but it did work against the independents. Where would the

independents come in under the system that you are advocating? Would they not be penalized

again? In Northern Ireland, especially in local government, there is a great tradition of electing

people who are independent of parties.

Mr Dodds: It would still be open for independents to stand in the constituencies and to

band together under whatever label they wished, as people did in the Forum election in order to get

their name onto the regional list. The reality at the moment is that in order to get elected under STV

an individual has to have a substantial amount of votes in one particular constituency. What I am

concerned about is the corollary of that. You could have a party that may not be particularly strong

in any particular constituency but may have a level of support — a bit like the Liberal Democrats

under the first-past-the-post system — right across the province. It could pick up a few hundred

votes in one constituency, a few hundred in another, but not be particularly strong in any one

particular constituency. How do those people ensure representation? I think that our system

ensures a better chance for people to be represented than, say, the old STV system, which certainly

made it difficult. The first-past-the-post system made it even more difficult for those people. The

system that we are proposing would give an opportunity for people and parties in that situation to

gain representation, whilst not excluding the possibility of independents getting in either.

Mr Ford: You talked about how easy it is for an individual to get in under certain systems.

You said that people need to get 17% to get one seat under STV. The practical reality is that a lot

of people can get elected on 10%, 11% or 12% with no difficulty. What you seem to be saying is

that parties that can achieve 5% province-wide — you talked about a 4% or 5% threshold — will

have difficulty achieving that 10% or 11% in any one constituency, and that does not seem to me to

be the case. There is no party in Northern Ireland at the moment which has its support so uniformly

spread that it can reach a 5% threshold province-wide but not reach the level which will result in its

winning some seats under STV.

Mr Dodds: Well, I think that is debatable. I can think of a couple of examples where that

might be the case. You can get 10 % or 11% of the first preference vote but you still need

57

substantial transfers to come your way. If you sit at 10% or 11% of the vote and do not get any

substantial, significant transfers from any other party, you will not get elected, so you do need quite

a number of second preference votes and quite a degree of electoral support in that constituency to

advance from that to get in. But I can well envisage a situation where you could get a party sitting at

around 3%, 3·5% or 4% of the vote who would not, at the same time, get in under the STV

multi-member constituency set-up. There are one or two examples even at the present time in

relation to that.

Mr Ford: But a party with 3·5% has a chance of winning something under STV. If you

are setting a 5% threshold it has no chance.

Mr Dodds: I suggested 5% as a possible threshold. That is open for discussion. You do

not want to end up in a situation where you have a ballot paper with hundreds of parties, most of

whom have absolutely no chance whatsoever of getting anywhere. If there is a chance of getting in

with 0·6% of the vote you cannot blame people for trying, but, at the same time, you want to set it

at a reasonable level so that you do not cut off people who have a reasonable amount of support.

It is a question of balance.

Mr Ford: I accept that if you are talking about a simple plurality AMS system you can

simply have one X vote. If you were to have STV — and it seems to me that you simply cannot

operate a list system with as few as three people being elected — you would not be able, on the

time-scale we are talking about, to draw the boundaries for 50 single-member constituencies. It

seems to me that the only way your system could operate would be on 18-times-three STV. You

would then presumably have to have a second vote for the regional list.

Mr Dodds: No. What I am saying is that the first preference vote is the indicator from the

voters as to who they wish to have elected first and that that is the vote that you take in terms of the

vote for the regional list. When people express a preference they are saying “This is my first choice.

This is the party that I want to get elected. This is the individual that I want to get elected.” I do not

think there is any particular difficulty whether it is X or whether you take the number one vote.

Mr Ford: So you are saying that the list will be a closed list.

Mr Dodds: Yes, it is in terms of the party lists on the regional basis. You would have the

choice in the constituency but when you are voting for an individual representing a particular party,

you are also casting a vote for that party’s regional list. The regional list would be published, as it

was for the Forum elections, and people would know who is on that list. It would be a closed list in

terms of people being drawn from it — the voter would not express a choice from that list. If you

were to get into that system it would be extremely complicated.

Coming back to the point about the 50 constituencies, I recognize that there is a difficulty

with boundaries and all the rest of it. All I am saying is that if we believe that that is the right system,

that the important thing is to keep a close link between the member and the constituency and at the

same time ensure proportionality, then it is important not to rule that out. It is possible to do these

things relatively quickly if we believe that that is the right system for Northern Ireland and its people.

We should not rule it out simply on the grounds of time.

58

The Chairman: I presume that anybody who stands for an individual constituency can

have his name on the regional list as well.

Mr Dodds: Yes. This is in line with what is being suggested for Scotland and Wales, so it

is something that the Government will be familiar with. People could be on a constituency ballot

paper and also on the regional list. If they were to get elected in any particular constituency they

would automatically come off the regional list so that their name would not come up twice for

election.

The Chairman: One of the values that you stated was the importance of the strong link

between the elected member and the constituency, and I agree entirely with you on that. Many

people in a constituency would not automatically recognize Forum Members as representing that

constituency, so to that extent by creating a regional list you are weakening the value of that link.

Mr Dodds: We knew when we stood for the Forum that it was purely to provide

delegates from which people for the talks could be drawn and that the Forum would have no

legislative, executive or administrative powers, or, it was made clear, no constituency representation

either. That is one of the reasons that the Forum has not impacted upon people at constituency level

in the way perhaps some of us would have preferred.

You are not going to get something that suits one particular value and suits everything else.

It is a question of balance, of getting the best of all the worlds. If you want proportionately, if you

want people to get in who you feel can make a contribution, you do not particularly want to have

them burdened with constituency work and so on. If you want to ensure proportionately, you are

going to have to balance that with trying to retain the link with the constituency. While still retaining

that constituency link it would be much less than under the present STV multi-member constituency

system. It would be better from that point of view, and the others members would be there on the

basis of the regional list. It is a balance. I think it could work reasonably well in practice, and since

it has been proposed for Scotland and Wales it is obvious that the parties across the water think

likewise. They are parties, remember, that have always operated totally on the basis of the

single-member constituency.

Mr Robinson: It was suggested by Mr Ford that there would be some time constraint.

Are you aware of any time constraint that would suggest that we could not have 50 seats drawn up?

I do not think it is a very difficult job to do so. Actually, if you move away from the exact number

of 50 you could probably divide the 18 seats into three, and although that would provide more than

50, it would be easier to do. Is not the easiest proposition for each party to provide two lists? If

Mr Ford is right and you do not have enough time to divide the boundary, you provide two lists,

one for your constituency and one for the region, and people vote for the party in each of the

constituencies. That overcomes the by-election problem — you just go to the next person on the

constituency list. That makes it easier for the voters. They would not have to look down all the

names, as each of the parties would be there.

Mr Dodds: It does not necessarily have to be STV for the constituencies; you could do it

on a list basis. It is a question of deciding what we want for the Northern Ireland Assembly, what is

59

the best system. As I said right at the start, if we believe that we can get a system that is easily

understood by the voters and provides flexibility for the parties and in which we can bring people in

who will make a positive contribution in terms of the workload and all the rest of it — and that is an

important aspect — and, at the same time, retain the constituency link, we should not hesitate to

push it. With regard to the numbers, you could have 54 elected and 46 on the regional list or

whatever. If you multiply 18 by three you get 54 directly elected and then 46 from the regional list.

That is very feasible and it would not take a lot of time to draw the boundaries on that basis.

Mr Robinson: If you go on with the single-member constituencies and the list do you not

end up exactly with the modified list system that was supported by the Ulster Unionist Party, the

DUP and Vanguard — the UUUC — in 1975?

Mr Dodds: Yes, that is absolutely correct. Maybe we should have a look at that while we

have those papers available. It might be useful.

Mr Coulter: On the matter of the value of the link between the elected person and the

constituency, have you done any comparative study with local government boundaries as opposed

to Westminster boundaries? If you have three people from 18 constituencies it is not very far

removed from two people from 26.

Mr Dodds: I was really dealing with it on the basis of the current Westminster

constituencies, but that might well be worth looking at.

Mr Robinson: The problem there would be that Belfast represents a massive number,

whereas Moyle represents a very small number.

Mr Dodds: The current electoral areas in Belfast each have about 25,000 people, so each

of those would be a constituency under the 50 single-member constituency idea. So the difficulty is

the difference in size between the different council areas and so on.

The Chairman: STV is used here for European elections and local government elections.

Why not have it for Assembly elections as well? From the Alliance Party’s point of view we believe

in the same sort of thing for Westminster.

Mr Dodds: In spite of the present system having been introduced into many of our

elections some 25 years ago, there is still a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding among

people. Indeed, I believe that a lot of people do not vote because they simply cannot get to grips

with the system. This means that people are disenfranchised. By contrast, the “X” vote is simply

understood, people are familiar with it and it is deeply ingrained. It is not necessarily a good

argument to say that because something has been around for so long that we should continue with it,

especially if we know it to be badly flawed. If we can come up with something better, we should go

for it.

Mr Ford: Just on the subject of spoilt votes. From my experience, every voter at the

Forum election, on being handed their ballot paper, was told to put an “X” opposite the name of

one party. That has not been my experience of STV elections where people are not given

60

instructions. I take your point that the cruder the system, the easier it is, but I think there are

arguments about the instructions that our friend Mr Bradley gave to his staff.

Mr Dodds: I would not use the word “cruder”; I would say the simpler the system, the

more easily it is understood, and the more likely it is that people will get it right. But obviously the

more instruction that polling officers and others can give electors on the day the better. I am not

convinced, however, that it is true to say that these polling officers and clerks were so assiduous

everywhere. They were certainly not telling everyone in my constituency how to vote. There may

well be a case for training staff in how they should explain the system of voting to the electorate, but

there would still be difficulties.

The Chairman: Mr Dodds, the clock has beaten us. Thank you very much for your

presentation.

61

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE _____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 29 January 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Mr S Farry (Alliance Party))

on

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Chairman: Members, may I welcome Mr Steven Farry, with whom some of you are

already familiar. Mr Farry’s presentation will be on behalf of the Alliance Party. Members will

have an opportunity then to ask questions.

Mr Farry: It is our intention today to argue for the use of the single transferable vote

system of proportional representation in all public elections in Northern Ireland; in fact we would

like to see it used in all elections in the United Kingdom, if not further afield.

In the multi-party talks, we have already tabled our proposals for an Assembly to be

elected by single transferable vote (STV). We propose that the 18 parliamentary constituencies

should each return either five or six representatives. Presuming that STV continues to be used for

both local government and European elections, the application of STV for parliamentary elections

would therefore provide a common electoral system for Northern Ireland. The case for

proportional representation (PR) is already, by itself, very strong. However, in divided societies

there are additional factors which make PR a necessity. In this paper we first make the case for

proportional representation in general, before reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of different

electoral systems. I will then set out our proposals for Northern Ireland, based on our conclusions

that STV is the only suitable electoral system.

First, I will set out the case for proportional representation. The main attraction of a system

of proportionality is its fairness. Such systems aim to accurately reflect the views of the electorate in

determining the make-up of an elected body. First past the post is only ever fair in a dominant

two-party system; even if a balanced result arises, this is more out of accident than by design. In

theory, a party with a lesser share of the popular vote could get more seats than its main rival. This

most notably occurred in South Africa in 1948 when the National Party formed the Government,

despite having a lesser share of the vote than their main opponent. And that Government formally

introduced apartheid, so we can see the danger sometimes inherent in such a system.

62

In divided societies, the requirement for proportionately is essential to ensure that no

significant group is neglected by the electoral system. Proportionality is an essential part of any

power-sharing approach to decision-making. Proportionality, in most European countries, arose in

line with the rise of consensual democracy. But even now that that requirement is superfluous, PR

continues to be used in those countries without much protest. However, PR can function just as

easily in a majoritarian system, and there are many examples of that as well. In most societies, the

argument for and against PR comes down to a trade-off between the presumed strength in

decision-making that comes from single-party Governments, and the weaknesses of multi-party

Governments or coalitions. Single-party Governments are allegedly best provided by the

first-past-the-post system, and coalitions are supposedly the inevitable consequence of PR. But this

is not necessarily the case, as I will illustrate later. Many coalitions have often been more stable,

and single-party Governments, with perilously small majorities, can often be very weak. Both types

of Government can be prone to corruption and inefficiency, where a political juggling is involved in

keeping competing factions together. It is more accurate to say that the nature of social and political

divisions within a society contributes to the stability of the political system rather than the electoral

system. The electoral system is no more than the means by which political divisions are translated

into the composition of the elected body.

I will just give a few practical examples to show how PR has worked in many societies,

and in slightly different ways. In Great Britain the first-past-the-post system has been the norm

since time immemorial. First past the post works accidentally well when just two factions oppose

each other — for example, the Conservatives and Liberals up until 1918, or after that Labour and

the Conservatives. But the system broke down from 1970s onwards, especially after the Liberals,

and later the Liberal Democrats, and also the Nationalist parties made major breakthroughs. First

past the post gave unnaturally large parliamentary majorities to the Conservatives under

Margaret Thatcher, and to Labour under Tony Blair, while their parties only polled in the mid to low

40s percentage wise of the popular vote. In the 1994 European election, Labour won 62 out of

87 seats, with less than 50% of the vote. In local elections in Great Britain first past the post turns

many local authorities into virtual one-party states; there are examples of councils in which the

Labour Party holds every seat. In the 1997 General Election, the Liberal Democrats only made

their breakthrough through having large concentrations of votes in the South West and a few other

parts of the country, whereas in Scotland and Wales the Tories polled relatively well, but were

wiped out getting no seats whatsoever.

First past the post has not always even produced stable Government in Great Britain.

During the 1930s there had to be a tri-partite national Government; in 1974 there was a hung

Parliament; and both the 1974 to 1979 Labour Government and the 1992 to 1997 Conservative

Government were both very weak due to small majorities.

The Republic of Ireland has had a stable political system since the 1920s. Fianna Fáil, until

the 1990s, had to be able to form a single-party Government for most of the 60 years; the

alternative was a stable Fine Gael/Labour coalition. But all this took place in the context of the use

of STV. The particular problems in the South of the proliferation of independence and the high

degree of clientism amongst TDs is as much a reflection of the country’s political culture and the

weakness of local Government as it is the electoral system.

63

Germany is another fascinating example: there was a stable Government both before the

Second World War under the Weimer republic and afterwards, with PR being used in both periods.

In the first period, there was a high proliferation of political parties, many of which were able to get

parliamentary representation. A lack of social cohesion in Germany at the time undermined the

ability to create stability; extremist parties grew in support, got representation at parliament, and

they helped to undermine democracy. In contrast post-War Germany has enjoyed relative stability

by continuing to use PR, but with the proviso that parties must reach a 5% threshold for election.

The CDU coalition and the SPD are the two main political parties, with the FDP in between them.

In recent years, the Greens have emerged as well.

Sweden is similar to Ireland in that under PR one party — the Social Democrats — has

been able to form a single-party Government for the majority of the country’s recent history.

Indeed the two most successful parties in Europe this century, the Swedish Social Democrats and

Fianna Fáil, judging by the average size of their share of vote, have both prospered under PR.

The final example is Italy, which has been known for weak Government for the past

50 years. This weakness has usually been explained away through the use of PR. However, in the

early 1990s Italy moved to a mixture of first-past-the-post and list systems, but nothing has

changed; there is still a very weak Government. The Italians were now talking about reforming their

constitution instead to try to solve that problem. Again, it will probably not be that successful.

There are some systems which are alternatives to first past the post which are not technically

PR. The alternative vote uses the same methodology as STV but is used in single-member

constituencies. It acts to ensure that successful candidates much attract over 50% of the vote; they

cannot get elected with just a plurality of votes. The use of second ballots, or run-offs, amounts to

the same thing. AV is used for elections to the Australian Lower House, with the exception of the

state of Tasmania which uses STV. The second-ballot system is used in France. AV tends to

exaggerate the results of the plurality system, and all it ensures is that no candidate can win a

constituency without securing at least half of the electorate’s support. Such a system would be

disastrous in Northern Ireland as it would further polarize election results. STV tends to become

AV when it is used in a by-election or in the election of a figure-head. The first cannot be helped in

Northern Ireland, but constitutional structures requiring the election of single executives — whether

it is a mayor or a Prime Minister — should be avoided in a divided society as the elections

essentially become sectarian head counts.

Alliance believes that there is widespread consensus for PR in Northern Ireland, and so we

should be focusing on its various systems. The most commonly-used is the list system, which can be

used either on a national or a regional basis. It can even be used on a constituency basis, as was the

case for election to this body. The list system is the most proportional of all PR systems, but this

advantage is more than outweighed by its numerous disadvantages. List systems are operated in

different ways. For example, they can be open or closed. In an open list voters still vote for a

party, but they can also indicate a preference for candidates on that list; in a closed list they must

accept their party’s order of candidates. This ordering of candidates causes major headaches for

the parties, and we experienced that ourselves in the Forum elections. The most open lists are to be

found in Luxembourg and Switzerland, while the purest form of closed list is to be found in Israel.

64

A number of European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark use

half-way house systems.

The list system virtually guarantees seats for smaller parties, especially when it is used on a

national scale, and means that parties with less than one per cent of the vote can often win seats.

For instances, this happens in Israel, which is not to their advantage. However, it must be noted

that when the list system is applied on a very small constituency basis, as it was in the Forum

election, then proportionality is lost. It was not fair that no non-Unionists were elected in Lagan

Valley and that no non-Nationalists were elected in Foyle. The Ulster Unionists and DUP only won

60 % of the Lagan Valley vote between them, yet they gained all five seats. Likewise, the SDLP

and Sinn Fein won 70% of the Foyle vote between them, yet again they took all five seats.

The list system gives political parties tight control over who gets elected to Parliament, and it

overly serves those who work in the party interest rather than in the constituency interest. It is

sometimes argued that list systems allow parties to balance their lists according to different sections

of the community. However, it is not guaranteed that this will happen, and anyway, why shouldn’t

the electorate be allowed to do it themselves?

Any conception of constituency representation is lost through having lists. This is because

voters select parties rather than individual candidates. An example of this can be seen with the

Forum, where the public are quite poor at identifying their Forum representative. I believe that to

be a detrimental situation.

I would now like to look briefly at the additional member system, which is a combination of

a list system and first past the post. The list system can either be used on a proportional basis, on a

stand alone basis, or it can be used to ensure complete proportionality by evening-out the overall

results. The latter is used in Germany with the only proviso being that parties must achieve a five %

threshold in the region in which it is applied before they can gain representation. In theory, AMS

preserves the constituency link as well as ensuring total or fractional proportionality. However,

some of the defects of first past the post and the list systems are still preserved in AMS. The

biggest problem, and the one that is uniquely introduced by AMS, is the creation of two different

classes of representatives; those with a constituency mandate and those without. In any body it is

important that all the people there have an equal vote and on equal status, and I think that AMS

would cause difficulties in that sense.

Finally, there is the single transferable vote. This system reliably produces a broadly

proportional result, although we acknowledge that it is not fully proportional as there is a slight bias

in favour of the larger parties. However, this is more than balanced by the strong advantages that

STV has over other systems of PR. STV gives the electorate greater choice, and takes power

away from the party machines, though they are still necessary to a certain extent. Voters can

choose between candidates from the same party or they can split their votes between candidates

from other parties, they can choose candidates of a particular political persuasion, they can choose

a geographical area or they can choose gender.

Sometimes political issues, such as Europe, transcend party differences, but again voters

can choose either pro- or anti-European candidates from all the parties. In first past the post, loyal

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party voters are sometimes forced to vote for candidates who are from a different wing of the party.

That would not happen to the same extent under STV — for example, in Great Britain a Tory voter

could have a choice between a pro- or anti-European Conservative candidate.

STV not only preserves, but actually enhances constituency representation. Since a range

of representatives are elected from the multi-member constituencies, voters have the choice of

approaching a member with whom they feel the most comfortable. I believe that consistency

representation is a treasured feature of the British electoral system; just as it is in America and in the

Republic of Ireland.

Finally, STV is useful in divided societies. Not only does it provide broad proportionality,

but it also tends to reinforce the political centre; the extremes tend to give their transfers inwards,

which is something that cannot be achieved with list systems.

Other systems that seek to give cross-community voting cannot work without the

registration of voters and/or candidates according to ethnic, national or religious labels. For

example, such systems have been proposed for places like Bosnia. The people there will be

required to vote for candidates of different political persuasions or different ethnic labels. But when

people are forced to vote for candidates whom they do not want, then that is a breach of

democracy and of human rights.

STV is used in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Tasmania. It has even

been introduced in American for certain local government elections — for example in Cambridge,

Massachusetts and in the Californian bay area. It is fair to say that STV has been the traditional

form of PR in those countries with an Anglo-Saxon tradition, whereas lists seem to be more of a

continental European phenomenon.

Finally, what is the way forward? We believe that STV should be used in all public

elections in Northern Ireland, where there are four types of election to consider. First, STV has

worked well in local government elections since 1973. There has been very little complaint; it has

been fair to all parties; and it has allowed popular local independents to be elected. There is no

case for change here. Secondly, STV has been used for elections to the European Parliament since

1979. While STV is not perfect when there are only three candidates to be elected, it does provide

a more proportional result than any other system operating under the same circumstances. During

the European elections STV was used in Northern Ireland, first past the post was used in the rest of

the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Parliament was chosen using various list systems.

So there is a precedent for using different systems for elections to the same body. However, this

cannot continue when Great Britain moves to a regional list system in 1999.

Thirdly, the main body which we will be focusing our attention on is a possible Northern

Ireland Assembly. We believe firmly that the system used in the Forum elections was a failure.

STV was used in the 1973, 1975 and 1982 Northern Ireland elections. Therefore, we argue that it

should be continued for any new Assembly. Each of the current 18 Parliamentary constituencies

can return either five or six people. The transferable vote system overcomes the quirks that

produced disproportionate results in the Forum elections, which used the constituency list system,

and removes the need for the registration of parties. It also lessens the complications and disputes

66

that can easily arise when that has to take place. STV will produce a broadly proportional result

across Northern Ireland as virtually every party has sufficient geographical strength to win seats.

The only exceptions to this may be the very small parties, but it is doubtful whether electoral systems

should be manipulated to such an extent that parties with around one per cent of the vote are

guaranteed representation.

However, if there is a fear that smaller parties may be excluded by the use of STV, then we are

prepared to accept the idea that each constituency should return six candidates rather than five.

STV has a good track record at regional level, and even should the Scottish and Welsh devolution

elections use a different system there is no reason why Northern Ireland should not be able to use

another system.

Fourthly, we believe that STV should also be used at Westminster elections. It is strange

that in the past 25 years PR has not been used for the most difficult Northern Ireland elections.

First past the post has traditionally resulted in an over-representation of Ulster Unionists at

Westminster. The use of STV in Westminster elections will bring Northern Ireland into line with the

three other systems used for public elections, and it can be very easily implemented. All that has to

be done is to convert the existing Parliamentary constituencies into multi-member ones. No

boundary commission would be necessary, one can obviously be introduced if a re-drawing of

boundaries is deemed necessary.

Some people may be uneasy about using a system for Westminster elections which differs

from that used in Great Britain. However, MPs would still have an equal standing were STV used

in Northern Ireland and a different system used in Great Britain. Instead, there are already

precedents for this. Until they were abolished, the university seats used STV while the rest of the

country used first past the post. The same thing happened in the Northern Ireland Parliament. We

also have the example of the state of Tasmania, which uses STV for elections to the Lower House

of the Australian Parliament while the rest of the country uses the alternative vote system. The

Electoral Reform Commission is currently reviewing the Parliamentary electoral system, and it will

suggest an alternative which will be tested in a referendum. If AV was advocated by that body it

would not be possible, as I explained explained earlier, to have it in Northern Ireland.

Finally, I would like to express my party’s very strong rejection of any electoral system that

requires voters to declare their party affiliation, ethnicity, or religious or political persuasion in

advance of voting. Such systems are used in countries like Croatia. We are also opposed to

systems that require fixed quotas of representatives of various religions otherwise they are not

elected, as is the case in Bosnia. Such measures contribute to the further polarization of already

divided societies and force people to adopt divisive labels, sometimes against their will.

In concluding, my party’s main proposal is that STV should be used in all Northern Ireland

elections, and we place particular importance on its use in any future elections to a Northern Ireland

Assembly.

The Chairman: When Dr Sydney Elliott gave evidence to the Committee he said that

when trying to construct a system, it is important to introduce values around which the design can

take place. What do you consider to be the most important values?

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Mr Farry: It is important that the final system strikes the right balance between values, and

because we live in a divided society the first value has to be that of proportionality. The second

value is having a constituency link — people treasure the fact that they can raise local problems with

their local MP or councillor. If we were not to have STV, that luxury would be lost.

Thirdly, the idea of voter choice is important. People should be able to vote for individuals

on the ballot and move their preferences between different individuals and between different parties.

Those three principles are probably the core issues that we have to address. And STV is the only

one that addresses those to any great extent.

Mr Paisley: I know you have not looked at this from a selfish, party perspective, but can

you tell us if you have done any calculations to show what the result would have been if your system

had been used in the Westminster or Forum elections?

Mr Farry: I have done no specific work on that, but I imagine that the Ulster Unionist

Party would not have 10 out of 18 seats on less than 50% of the vote — they got just over 30% in

Westminster. You would have a result that would be broadly proportional to your party’s share of

the votes. From our own perspective, our party would have been entitled to seats which we have

been denied for the past 25 years. Our vote is sufficient to win seats in an assembly election but not

in Westminster elections. Under a new system we might get one or two Westminster seats,

depending on how well we did.

Other parties would probably get two, three or perhaps four seats. And the SDLP and

Sinn Fein would also get their proportional share. Members of the Committee might not be aware

that under first past the post the Alliance Party always gained its highest share of the vote. Under

STV on a Northern Ireland-wide basis we go down about a percentage point on average, so it is

not necessarily completely in our own interest.

Mr Bolton: You suggested a choice between five or six members per constituency, and I

think you used the word manipulation. Such a choice could influence the result. It that a good thing

in terms of proportionality or democracy? Can this choice be tampered with?

Mr Farry: We have to acknowledge that every electoral system involves manipulation of

one sort or another. How you draw constituency boundaries will affect the result. And the electoral

system of counting votes will determine the result. You have to look at what extent you are

over-manipulating a result. The Forum election included 20 top-up seats to ensure that some

parties that would not ordinarily get seats under the normal system would get representation. As a

way of selecting parties for the talks that was fair enough. But it would be a different case if you

were talking about a permanent electoral system for future use in Northern Ireland.

However, we now have a changed situation. STV times 5 was the assumed rubric through

most of the 1980s when we had a dominant five-party system with the Ulster Unionists, DUP,

SDLP, Sinn Fein and Alliance being the five biggest parties. But in the early 1990s we saw the

emergence of a few other parties, especially on the Loyalist side. Perhaps it may be unfair to work

with a system that may not give them representation, so we may need to shift the goal-posts slightly.

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If we used an STV system and included an extra seat for every constituency, it would give

those smaller parties a better chance of being represented. However, there comes a point where

you have to say that they may not have enough votes to win a seat. Overall, we believe that

six-member constituencies may be slightly fairer to all the parties in Northern Ireland.

Mr Paisley: Are you opposed to a threshold?

Mr Farry: We have not really considered the introduction of a threshold. It is something

that is used in Germany, but their 5% is probably excessive. They introduced it to exclude the

extremist parties, especially successors to the National Socialists. If we use STV, there is no need

for a threshold. If we use a list system, there probably is.

In Israel there are a lot of micro parties that have 1% of the vote or less. They have got into

Parliament and have made the country very difficult to govern. They have had to introduce various

constitutional amendments to prevent the Prime Minister being turfed out of office at the whim of

some small party.

The argument against a threshold is that independents are excluded from the system and it

becomes a party system. There may well be a case for a 1% threshold or perhaps 1.5% or even

2% if people were going down that road. I would caution against having a list system, period. And

it would obviously remove the need for any threshold.

Mr Ford: Mr Farry was not involved when we were discussing the Forum election system

with the Northern Ireland Office. One of the points which I specifically remember making was what

the crudest possible form of list system could do in a small consistency — for example, to Unionists

in Foyle. We said that anything which did not have a transferable element or which did not have

something like a lower devisor system was going to be disastrous for that representation.

Unfortunately, the whizz kids in London took no notice of us, and we were subsequently proved

right when the Unionist parties took something like 27% of the vote but could not win a single seat.

With regard to the issue of seats per constituency, a sixth seat will not necessarily benefit the

very small parties, but the next three parties in line have a better chance on six-eaters.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. This presentation has been very helpful to us.

When can we have the written paper?

Mr Farry: I will leave a copy with Ms McKibbin later on today.

69

NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM

FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE ____________

COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORM

Thursday 12 February 1998

_____________

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

(Mr B Wilson (Labour Party))

on

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Chairman: Good Morning, Mr Wilson, you are very welcome to the Committee to

make the presentation on behalf of Labour. We appreciate also the written submission you have

provided.

Mr Wilson: Thank you very much, and to the Committee for inviting me. First of all,

Labour views the electoral system as being a very important factor in the success or failure of the

new Assembly. For the Assembly to be a success, it must be as widely representative of the public

as possible and therefore we have looked at the various options for the electoral systems. The three

main options are the simple majority systems, first past the post and the alternative vote, and the

various forms of proportional representation.

Both the simple majority and the alternative vote systems provide a strong Government, but

they do not fully reflect the wishes of the electorate. On the other hand, a proportional system will

more accurately reflect the views of the electorate, but may result in a unstable coalition, as some

would argue.

Labour rejects the option of the simple majority system because it greatly distorts the wishes

of the electorate and exaggerates the majority of the largest party — for example, in the 1983

Westminster election Mrs Thatcher had a majority of 140 seats in the House of Commons with

43% of the vote, and that is totally distorting the wishes of the electorate. Therefore we would be

against that system. It does not give fair representation to small parties. If people want to vote for

small parties they should be given that opportunity; it should not be considered a wasted vote to

vote for small parties.

It is also divisive. Normally, with the simple majority system, we end up with two large

blocks confronting each other, and that is the last thing we need in Northern Ireland. Therefore we

would prefer more opportunity for other parties. The result of the last general election totally

undermines the argument for a simple majority system when you consider that there is not a single

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Conservative MP left in either Scotland or Wales. Some people might think that is a good thing,

but, on the other hand, there are many people in Scotland and Wales who support the Conservative

party. It is totally wrong that their views should not be represented in Westminster. That is a total

distortion of the views of the people of Scotland. Because of these reasons we have rejected the

simple majority system.

The alternative vote system is not significantly different from the simple majority system.

Take Australia, for instance, where you have large majorities, distorting the real support for the

largest party. Again we would reject that model. The main objective of the electoral system must

be to reflect, as far as possible, the wide diversity of opinion in Northern Ireland.

We do not feel that a strong Government should be a priority, given the notion that

decisions made by the new Assembly will be based on a broad consensus. Strong Governments

tend to push legislation through against the wishes of the minorities, and on that basis we do not

want to get into a majority/ minority situation. We would like the decisions to be made on a

consensus basis. Having rejected both the alternative vote and the simple majority system, we

examined the various forms of proportional representation, and we have identified three main

models: a list system based on the 18 Westminster constituencies; a list system for the whole of

Northern Ireland; and STV based on the 18 Westminster constituencies.

I know that the Forum was elected on a list system based on the 18 Westminster

constituencies, but such a dog’s breakfast of an election I have never seen before; it was an

absolute farce. We reject this system because it exaggerates the support for the larger parties and

results in greater polarization, as a vote for a small party would be seen as a wasted vote. That was

a very polarized election. Small parties, such as the Workers’ Party, the Democratic Left, the

Green Party, who would have some support throughout Northern Ireland, were totally ignored by

the electorate who saw a vote for them as a wasted vote. The election only polarized the vote, to

the advantage of larger parties. As votes could not be transferred, the smaller parties lost out again.

If the 18 Westminster seats were used, plus top up as in the Forum election, this problem of

representing the smaller parties could be resolved. But this system was widely criticized. For

example, it effectively excluded independent candidates who may have had strong support within a

single constituency. It led to the elimination of large parties in particular constituencies — for

example, the Unionist minorities in Foyle and West Belfast received no representation, which is

absolutely ridiculous. We want to reflect the views of people throughout Northern Ireland, and to

exclude Unionist representation from, say, the Foyle is totally unacceptable. So the system

increased polarisation as the voters ignored the small parties and voted for larger parties to ensure

their side maximised its representation. This was very much polarization election.

It also greatly reduced the link between the local candidate and the constituency. Indeed,

most parties did not mention the names of their candidates on the election literature. In North

Down, where I was involved, only the Alliance and the Ulster Unionist parties actually mentioned

anything about candidates. Every other party as far as I am aware just said “Vote for John Hume”,

Vote for Ian Paisley” et cetera; it was not really voting for your local candidates.

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Finally, it gives the party machine too much power in drawing up the list; the independent

minded candidates will be placed at the bottom list to make sure they do not get elected. In

drawing up the lists for next year’s European elections, for example, the Conservatives have been

accused of omitting pro Europeans, and the Labour Party of weeding out the left wingers. This

gives the party hierarchy an opportunity to get rid of people they do not like or to put them at the

bottom of the list.

We also considered the option of a list system, which operates in several countries — for

example, Israel and the Netherlands. It could provide an accurate reflection of the voters

preferences, but it would depend on how the seats were allocated. If the D’Hondt system was

used, and the number of seats was sufficiently large, all the significant parties could be represented

— for example, if you get 1% of the vote, you get 1% of the seats.

However, we would reject this system because, first of all, it eliminates independence —

only parties can stand. A strong local personality would not be able to stand under the list system.

It breaks the link between the member and his consistency; again the list is centrally drawn up, you

do not have a constituency to work to. Thirdly, it again gives the party machine too much power in

compiling the list, as they are only likely to select those candidates who will rigidly adhere the party

line; the maverick candidate will not get selected.

We then move to our third option, the STV, based on 18 Westminster constituencies, and

this is the system we favour. We favour STV based on the 18 Westminster constituencies with five

members per constituency. It has been suggested that there should be six, and we would not object

to that. We would object to anything less than five, because the STV does not operate successfully

with less than five in a constituency. We support this because it ensures that all the significant parties

— for example, those with 15% or so of the vote — will get members elected. It also means that

the link between the member and the constituency is retained, that small parties — independents —

who are popular in a particular area will have a possibility of being elected and, finally, that all the

major parties will get members elected throughout Northern Ireland, unlike the situation in the

Forum election when no Unionists were elected in either Foyle or West Belfast. The transfers from

one Unionist party to another would ensure Unionist representation in any given constituency.

While we feel that the election should be based primarily on STV operating in the

18 Westminster constituencies, we also feel that the widest possible representation must be

achieved. On the basis of the above proposal, it is unlikely that four of the parties taking part in the

current talks would get any representation, even though they have support in the community.

Therefore, to maximize representation, we propose that in addition to the 18 five-member

constituencies, there should be top-up, so that all the parties will have members elected according to

their electoral support.

This top-up could take a number of forms. We could retain the practice, introduced in the

Forum election, of awarding two seats to the 10 largest parties in order to retain the widest possible

representation, but that would require there to be 110 seats which, we think, is about the limit that

we could have. However, this system is artificial. Why 10 parties? Why not five? Why not six?

Why not 12? If this system were to be adopted, we feel that it should not be retained beyond the

first election. Top-up should be retained in future elections, but the number of seats awarded should

72

be based on the number of seats already gained in a constituency and the percentage of the total

vote polled. So if we were to have a 100-member Assembly, and party A get 25% of the vote,

22% of the seats, on top-up, party A would be awarded three additional seats. Party B gt 2% of

the votes and no seats in the constituencies, so, as a result of top-up, it would be awarded two

additional seats. Party C got 2% of the votes and 22 seats in the constituencies, so it would not get

any additional seats. So any party which received 1% of the vote would be entitled to one seat.

To summarize, we support this type of system because it ensures representation for all

significant parties, it retains the link between the member and the constituencies, it allows

independents to be elected and major parties will get somebody elected in every constituency. In

addition, the better the proportional system, the closer it will be to the wishes of the voters, and all

the parties involved in the talks should have a share in its ownership. We think it is important that

the people who are involved in the setting up of the new Assembly should have a part to play in it.

It is also important that there is as wide a representation as possible to reflect all the different strands

of opinion in Northern Ireland. We do not like majority/minority politics. We feel that people

outside the basic majority and minority should have some form of representation in an Assembly,

and that is why we support the STV with top-up.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Wilson, you have put forward some very

interesting proposals.

Are you not being a little presumptuous in stating that four of the parties who are currently in

the process would not get elected under STV, regardless of whether the seats are

five-or-six-member?

Mr Wilson: That is my opinion as a sophologist. There is that possibility. I would

certainly say that at least three of the parties would not, under any circumstances, get anybody

elected.

The Chairman: You would not like to name them, would you?

Mr Wilson: No, I am not going to name them.

The Chairman: Since the Forum elections, things on the ground have changed. If we

were to have the top-up system that you are suggesting, is there not a danger — and I use that

word quite deliberately — that parties such as the IRSP or Republican Sein Fein might well succeed

in getting seats in the Assembly? Would that be helpful to a process?

Mr Wilson: I am not sure, but that is democracy. Look at the situation in Israel. I do not

know whether you feel that the situation there is acceptable, but some very extreme people there

wanted a very extreme candidate, and because they got 1% of the vote, that candidate was elected.

Do we exclude people who have only 1% of the votes? It depends how democracy works. You

have to have a limit somewhere or other.

For example, under the German system, every party that gets over 5%, gets members

elected. That is not a disproportionate system, but it is not a very effective proportional system, and

73

it excludes parties with 4%. Should those people with 4% have been excluded? I would suggest

not. As a democrat, I feel that we should have as wide a representation as possible to reflect the

views of all sections of the community.

The Chairman: You say that you do not believe in strong government — Governments

with huge majorities. If an Assembly were to be established in Northern Ireland, do you accept that

there would at least be a stable Government? With the system that you have proposed, is there not

a great danger of there being a very unstable Government?

Mr Wilson: If it is going to operate successfully at all, the Assembly has to be based on

the middle ground. The core of any Assembly should be made up of the SDLP, the Official

Unionists and the Alliance Party. If you do not get consensus between both sides, in particular the

SDLP and the Official Unionists, then the Assembly is not going to work. It is not going to work on

a basis of a majority/minority system. You have to have, say, 60% in the middle, and then what the

small, fringe parties do is largely irrelevant. I do not mean that they are irrelevant, they are there to

look after the interests of a particular group, to make sure that they are not forgotten about. They

are there to be awkward and raise questions about how effective policies are and it is important for

there to be these small groups who will buck against the trend, but there must be consensus among

the major parties if the Assembly is going to work.

Mr Ford: You will not be surprised by the fact that I agreed entirely with you for about the

first 85% of your presentation on the virtues of STV. When you were talking about the mechanics

of the top-up, you made the point that this would represent all significant parties. Can I take your

last response to mean that your definition of significant is 1%?

Mr Wilson: The main parties would be elected within the constituencies, but the top-up

would be for every party with 1%, yes.

Mr Ford: Regarding your final examples, what would happen to party D that got 14% of

the vote and won 17 constituency seats?

Mr Wilson: It gets its 17 seats. The actual number in the Assembly would be flexible.

For example, the Alliance party got about 7% of the vote and got 10 seats in the Assembly. You

would not take those off them.

Mr Ford: So you are applying the German Bundestag system that if a party is

over-represented in direct seats, it keeps them, and the same number of top-up seats is added, so

your 100-member Assembly could actually have 103 or 104 members?

Mr Wilson: Yes.

Mr Stoker: Is using the top-up system not a contradiction in itself? By doing away with

the list system, individuals have to stand in a constituency, and they may not be elected in the

constituency. Surely it is then a contradiction to take them from the constituency to use as a top-up.

If somebody has already been rejected as an individual in a constituency, is he going to be any more

acceptable in a top-up system?

74

Mr Wilson: The electoral system should reflect the views of the people throughout

Northern Ireland. So, therefore, if 2% of the people vote for a particular party, we would suggest

that that party should get 2% of the members. You could have the top-up system if you wanted to

operate on the basis that, for example, the people standing in the constituencies would not be on the

list. That is the situation in Germany. People stand in constituencies; if they lose, they can then get

in under the top-up system. But if you want to be pure about it, people could be excluded from the

constituencies and the top-up given to individuals who were not standing in constituencies. But I do

not see any need for that. People have every right to stand in a constituency, and if a party receives

a democratic mandate of 2%, they should be allowed to select two people to represent them in the

Assembly.

Mr Stoker: Is it not a contradiction to use the STV initially? Would it not be better to go

straight in there and say that the number of seats will be equated to whatever percentage of the vote

they get?

Mr Wilson: But that would break the link between the member and his constituency.

There would be a list of people selected by central party office and if you got the top 20%, you

would get the top 20 on the list. Those people would not represent any particular constituency.

Mr Stoker: So there is no link between the top-up people and the constituency?

Mr Wilson: No, but the top-up people would be a very small minority. Each constituency

would have five members elected on a constituency basis. The top-up people would be in addition

to that.

Mr Dodds: Is it not the case that you are rigging the system to ensure a particular result?

Why else would you refer to the fact that four of the parties taking part in the present talks would

not get representation?

Mr Wilson: The parties represented at this Forum got electoral support and whether or

not you think it was enough support, I, as a democrat I feel that that electorate is entitled to be

represented. You have mentioned an arbitrary limit of 5% or whatever — that is rigging the system

to keep out people who have not polled higher than that.

Mr Dodds: No. You mentioned that people did not vote for the Greens, Workers’ Party,

Democratic Left et cetera in the Forum election because the system encouraged them to vote for the

bigger parties. But it is interesting that in the local government elections, which took place three or

four weeks after that, that those parties got less votes under your system in some cases. How do

you explain that?

Mr Wilson: I would like to see your statistics because I am not aware of that.

Mr Dodds: The statistics are there. I do not know of any Green Party or any Workers’

Party candidate who got elected.

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Mr Wilson: Well, a candidate from the Women’s Coalition was elected in the local

government elections. There was nobody from the Women’s Coalition elected in the Forum

election.

Mr Dodds: But they did not get as many votes.

Mr Wilson: That is because they did not have as many candidates.

Mr Dodds: Well, what does that tell you about the system? You mentioned specifically

that it was unlikely that four of the parties taking part in the present talks would have had any

representation. Therefore, you suggested having a top-up system to ensure that those parties got

representation. You are very clearly stating that you have devised your electoral system to ensure

that certain parties get in.

Mr Wilson: No. This system is based on the idea that minority parties who obtain a

certain percentage of the votes do get representatives elected. Whether you draw it at 1% or 5% is

a matter of judgement, but my view is that parties with 1% should be entitled to representation.

That happens in quite a number of countries — for example, in Holland you would get two or three

people elected on 1% of the vote.

Mr Dodds: What would you do with somebody who got 0.7% of the vote?

Mr Wilson: Again, 0.7% of the vote is an arbitrary figure. It would depend on the

number of members in this Assembly. If you had 200 members then people with 0.5% of the vote

would be elected.

Mr Stoker: Why should this system, which you say is artificial, not be retained beyond the

first election? Why not just drop it right away?

Mr Wilson: There would have to be consensus among the parties involved about whether

that should be retained. It is artificial, but in the first election you want to ensure as many people as

possible have a say in the new Assembly, and to see themselves as representing the new Assembly.

When the proportional system would actually operate is a matter of detail, and I would not have

strong views on it.

Mr Paisley: You spent some time slagging-off the 1996 election process for the Forum,

which is quite interesting considering that that system has given your party a platform in the current

process. How would your system protect individuals and independents?

Mr Wilson: Well, you have a five-seat constituency. We do have independent standing in

five-seat constituencies where they have a prospect of winning.

Mr Paisley: That is it?

Mr Wilson: Yes. Bob McCartney stood as an independent before he formed his party

and Jim Kilfedder stood as an independent Unionist, and they were elected because of their

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popularity. Likewise, that could happen if Nelson McCausland, for example, was thrown out of the

Official Unionist Party. Why should he not stand as an independent Unionist? If he was popular

enough he could win a seat.

Mr Davis: Do you not think that tinkering with electoral systems is encouraging terrorism?

Mr Wilson: No. I do not see any connection at all between electoral systems and

terrorism. Perhaps you would clarify the point you are trying to make.

Mr Davis: The IRSP, for example, were mentioned earlier. Do you not think that the

publicity these people receive encourages people to take this kind of line?

Mr Wilson: Those groups get their publicity through their violence; they do not get any

publicity because of their political views.

Mr Davis: Are you saying that the UDP, for example, is not linked with —

Mr Wilson: No. I quite accept that a lot of the parties have paramilitary wings, but they

do have their support. For example, Sinn Fein have built up their support through the IRA. For

many years they did not contest elections, but if the violence had not taken place Sinn Fein would

not have as much support as they have now. It is the idea that these people are important players in

the political process that gives them their political support, and it is the violence which gives them the

publicity. We see Gerry Adams on television virtually every night, and he is important because he is

basically the leader of the IRA. His political views represent 12% or 13% of the population, but

they are not considered to be that relevant. It is his ability and willingness to use violence.

Mr Davis: I think you have answered my point — but they are one and the same.

Mr Wilson: Yes.

Mr Casey: We are talking about a democratic society, and irrespective of what political

parties stand, or how an election is rigged, it is up to the elector in the final analysis. The elector has

the right to vote for whomever he wants, just as everyone has the right to stand for election whether

as an individual or as a party’s candidate. You would be rigging elections by trying to keep

somebody out, whether it is the IRSP, LVF or whoever. It is probable that in the next council

election, or even at the Assembly election, there will be people standing for organizations who are

not in politics at the present time. It is all based on democracy and on the will of the people.

Mr Davis: Mr Wilson, do you disagree with Labour having a large majority at

Westminster at the present time?

Mr Wilson: Yes, I do. I have supported proportional representation for 30 years and

nothing will change my mind on that.

Mr Dodds: Most people will agree with the general point that is being made, but let us

always remember that even under the present system there are people who are not entitled to be

77

voted for. For instance, there are a whole range of people who are not entitled to stand for election

at this moment in time — bankrupts, convicts and even peers of the realm. There are party leaders,

of parties who are represented in here, who are not eligible, picked to stand for Parliament in the

House of Commons. I would tend to agree that, by and large, people should have the right in a

democracy to vote for whomsoever they please, provided they are not there to destroy democracy.

For instance, there are certain rules laid down in Germany about what people can say about

historical events, and about certain parties that try to ape the Nazi party and so on. I think that that

is right. Similarly, in Northern Ireland we have got to give attention to the point that some people

are so beyond the pale, in terms of their support for atrocious acts of violence or whatever, that

there may be a case for saying that they are not entitled to be part of the democratic process —

they want to destroy it and murder other members who are around the table.

The Chairman: Mr Wilson, have you any concluding comments to make?

Mr Wilson: We should have a system which represents as many different strands of

opinion in Northern Ireland as possible, and therefore we should not try to exclude parties with

support below certain levels. There are parties which could evolve quite significantly in the longer

term and they should not be denied the opportunity. We would like to see the divisions between the

majority and the minority being eroded so that a lot of other views are taken into consideration,

rather than just the sectarian or constitutional ones. For example, there are those who are

concerned with the environment and the working classes — basically the Labour group — who are

not really represented in the existing system. The system we have put forward would redress this,

and it would also be of the benefit to the Assembly itself.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Wilson.

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• The Electoral Committee's Report on an electoral system from a Northern Ireland Assembly (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - CREATE_FROM - e840501) [This document] [view current proposal at this moment]
  • Motion to adopt report on an electoral system for a Northern Ireland Assembly (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - PROCEDURE - e840502) [view current proposal at this moment]
    • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - ADOPT_PROPOSAL - e840508) [view current proposal at this moment]
  • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - DEBATE_PROPOSAL - e840503) [view current proposal at this moment]
  • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - DEBATE_PROPOSAL - e840504) [view current proposal at this moment]
  • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - DEBATE_PROPOSAL - e840505) [view current proposal at this moment]
  • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - DEBATE_PROPOSAL - e840506) [view current proposal at this moment]
  • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - DEBATE_PROPOSAL - e840507) [view current proposal at this moment]
  • None (introduced on 1998-03-13 10:04:00 - ADOPT_PROPOSAL - e840509) [view current proposal at this moment]